Find, Fix, Finish (14 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
KSM was not forsaken by his comrades-in-arms—bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri mentioned him throughout the years in their various media submissions, underscoring his continuing propaganda value for al-Qaeda. Since his capture, KSM has grown a long beard and has chosen Middle Eastern clothing over Western attire. Gone is the man who made the headlines in 2003 and in his place is a man who, consciously or unconsciously, has modeled himself after his chief financier, bin Laden. What differentiates KSM from al-Qaeda’s former leader, however, is that KSM does not seem interested in the fantastical reestablishment of the caliphate but is motivated by anti-American sentiments and a desire to strike the US, whatever the consequences.
He is single-minded, and that makes him dangerous. If released, he will likely continue to pursue violent anti-American activities; if imprisoned without trial, he will become the preeminent symbol of an American legal system gone badly awry. The status quo, then, may be the “least worst” option for the US government. This most indefensible of defendants will most likely remain incarcerated without trial for the rest of his natural life, a thorn in the side of the White House and a stain on America’s honor.
CHAPTER 5
INTERROGATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND WAR
A
little more than a month after the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom and invaded Afghanistan, Pakistani security forces patrolling the rugged terrain of western Pakistan’s Kurram valley apprehended a senior al-Qaeda operative. Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi—not to be confused with Abu Faraj al-Libi or any of the other Libyans in al-Qaeda—whose given name was Ali Abdul-Hamid al-Fakhiri, was detained as he attempted to cross over the border into Pakistan to escape American military operations targeting Osama bin Laden in Tora Bora.
1
little more than a month after the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom and invaded Afghanistan, Pakistani security forces patrolling the rugged terrain of western Pakistan’s Kurram valley apprehended a senior al-Qaeda operative. Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi—not to be confused with Abu Faraj al-Libi or any of the other Libyans in al-Qaeda—whose given name was Ali Abdul-Hamid al-Fakhiri, was detained as he attempted to cross over the border into Pakistan to escape American military operations targeting Osama bin Laden in Tora Bora.
1
Over the next eight years, officials would transfer custody of al-Libi at least three times, though the US government has never confirmed the exact destinations.
2
First detained and interrogated by the military, FBI, and CIA in Afghanistan, al-Libi was subsequently imprisoned in Egypt,
3
again in Afghanistan, and eventually in the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
4
In 2006, US officials transferred al-Libi from Guantanamo Bay to Libya, his country of birth, where he remained imprisoned until his death—allegedly a suicide—in May 2009.
5
2
First detained and interrogated by the military, FBI, and CIA in Afghanistan, al-Libi was subsequently imprisoned in Egypt,
3
again in Afghanistan, and eventually in the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
4
In 2006, US officials transferred al-Libi from Guantanamo Bay to Libya, his country of birth, where he remained imprisoned until his death—allegedly a suicide—in May 2009.
5
Al-Libi, who had been the emir of the Khalden military training camp in Afghanistan, initially tricked his Pakistani captors into thinking he was a mere refugee fleeing the conflict in Afghanistan. After approximately two weeks of interrogation, however, Pakistani forces determined that he held a senior position in al-Qaeda and turned al-Libi over to the US military. American intelligence officials in Kandahar air base in Afghanistan soon determined al-Libi’s true identity and value as a source of detailed intelligence information about al-Qaeda operations.
6
He certainly was a catch: Al-Libi was one of the top twelve al-Qaeda terrorists initially targeted by President Bush after 9/11.
7
At the time, few would have guessed that the subsequent transfer and interrogation of the first official high-value detainee would eventually result in one of the most controversial episodes in the global war against al-Qaeda.
8
6
He certainly was a catch: Al-Libi was one of the top twelve al-Qaeda terrorists initially targeted by President Bush after 9/11.
7
At the time, few would have guessed that the subsequent transfer and interrogation of the first official high-value detainee would eventually result in one of the most controversial episodes in the global war against al-Qaeda.
8
Al-Libi’s case raises key questions concerning the analysis and use of intelligence in policymaking. Despite some intelligence officials’ initial doubts about the accuracy of the intelligence produced by interrogations of al-Libi,
9
several senior political leaders, including President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, exploited the information he provided to construct the case for the 2003 Iraq invasion.
10
The intelligence later came under scrutiny after the links between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi WMD program asserted by the Bush administration proved overstated and incorrect. Such an outcome raises questions: How should intelligence agencies ensure that only the most reliable intelligence goes to senior policymakers? And to what degree was the al-Libi case politicized to achieve purely partisan objectives?
9
several senior political leaders, including President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, exploited the information he provided to construct the case for the 2003 Iraq invasion.
10
The intelligence later came under scrutiny after the links between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi WMD program asserted by the Bush administration proved overstated and incorrect. Such an outcome raises questions: How should intelligence agencies ensure that only the most reliable intelligence goes to senior policymakers? And to what degree was the al-Libi case politicized to achieve purely partisan objectives?
Even before he began working with al-Qaeda, al-Libi had been long involved with radical Islam. Born in 1963 in Ajdabiya, Libya, al-Libi (“the Libyan”) left his homeland in the mid-1980s for Syria, where he studied engineering.
11
Al-Libi then moved to Afghanistan, where he became a bombmaker
12
and then a commander in the twilight struggle against the Soviet army.
13
Later, al-Libi joined the radical Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
14
before training hundreds of mujahideen as the emir of the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan.
15
11
Al-Libi then moved to Afghanistan, where he became a bombmaker
12
and then a commander in the twilight struggle against the Soviet army.
13
Later, al-Libi joined the radical Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
14
before training hundreds of mujahideen as the emir of the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan.
15
According to his associates, al-Libi’s subordinates respected his leadership and intellectual abilities. In his book detailing his experiences training with al-Qaeda at the Khalden camp, Omar Nasiri called al-Libi an “intellectual” who obviously “read and thought very deeply.” Citing his “extraordinary charisma,” Nasiri wrote that al-Libi “spoke more intelligently and eloquently than anyone else at the camp” and that “all the brothers listened to him with rapt attention.”
Soon after the Pakistanis turned him over to US authorities, al-Libi was transferred from Kandahar to Bagram air base, where CIA, FBI, and military officials interrogated him.
16
From the start, the FBI and the CIA had different perspectives on the most appropriate and effective method of interrogating al-Libi. No agency, it seemed, was without its problems.
16
From the start, the FBI and the CIA had different perspectives on the most appropriate and effective method of interrogating al-Libi. No agency, it seemed, was without its problems.
The military’s interrogation (or “strategic debriefing”) capabilities focused on providing tactical commanders on the ground the intelligence necessary to successfully accomplish their mission on the battlefield. As one interrogator described it, military officials typically look for tactical information such as “the location of the next IED, the next arms cache”—that is, “immediately actionable information”—and not larger objectives like the structure of a terrorist organization.
17
17
FBI special agent Russell Fincher and New York Police Department detective Marty Mahon were among the first sent to Bagram to interrogate al-Libi. “What I was hearing from Russell [Fincher] about al-Libi’s vetting in Bagram, during his initial intake session, highlighted the many inefficiencies of this whole process,” said Jack Cloonan, a senior FBI counterterrorism agent who was supporting Fincher and Mahon from New York City. “It was clear that the military investigators vetting al-Libi didn’t have a clue what they were doing.”
18
18
The interrogation of terrorist suspects and al-Qaeda members was not traditionally the CIA’s responsibility. As Kenneth J. Levit, former special counsel to the CIA director argued, the organization’s future “lead responsibility for al-Qaeda interrogation” represented “a departure from the Agency’s previous counterterrorism role.” Because the “job of interrogating terrorist operatives is distinct from the typical elicitation and information gathering traditionally associated with intelligence service responsibilities,” Levit viewed “significant changes in training and mind-set” as a necessity.
19
19
On the other hand, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division began interrogating members of al-Qaeda as far back as 1996, when President Clinton took the first steps to identify and target bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the rest of al-Qaeda network. After identifying hundreds of key al-Qaeda operatives, the FBI succeeded in capturing and interrogating a few lower-level individuals. To build rapport, the FBI utilized the traditional law enforcement framework of carrots and sticks: suspects who cooperated were rewarded with favors. According to Cloonan, these methods were successful, enabling the FBI to find both al-Qaeda’s weapons suppliers and supporters.
20
20
But interrogation in Afghanistan post-9/11 was very different. Cloonan later said, “We had to work within the military chain of command, and no one really knew what was going on or how the detainees were being picked up. Many of the detainees the military zeroed in on were strap hangers—these [detainees] clearly didn’t know much if anything. The military guys didn’t really understand how the training camps worked.”
21
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In 2001, there were over 120 such military training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
22
Though many had been established in the 1980s during the Soviet occupation to train troops, bin Laden directed some of these camps to exclusively train al-Qaeda operatives. In his testimony on March 27, 2007, Abu Zubaydah provided the following history of the Khalden camp—of which al-Libi was emir:
22
Though many had been established in the 1980s during the Soviet occupation to train troops, bin Laden directed some of these camps to exclusively train al-Qaeda operatives. In his testimony on March 27, 2007, Abu Zubaydah provided the following history of the Khalden camp—of which al-Libi was emir:
The Khalden camp has been around since back when Russia was considered our enemy due to their invasion of Afghanistan. The mission of this training camp was for the purpose of training Muslim brothers for defensive jihad. Defensive jihad means that if an aggressor or invader invades Muslim lands, no matter where, then it is every Muslim’s duty to defend the land against the invader.
23
According to Omar Nasiri, al-Libi agreed with the camp’s purpose as described by Abu Zubaydah and “spoke mostly of jihad, and the duty of Muslims all over the world.” He explained to the men “the difference between the
faridat al-jihad
and the
kifayat al-jihad
—the obligatory or defensive jihad and the offensive or preemptive jihad, respectively. All of us, he explained, were fighting the
faridat al-jihad
, the battle to reclaim the lands of the caliphate from the infidels.”
24
faridat al-jihad
and the
kifayat al-jihad
—the obligatory or defensive jihad and the offensive or preemptive jihad, respectively. All of us, he explained, were fighting the
faridat al-jihad
, the battle to reclaim the lands of the caliphate from the infidels.”
24
Still, Cloonan argued, the Khalden camp was of “low importance,” since it was “well-infiltrated by Saudi, British, and some US agents, and the terrorists knew this.” At such an inconsequential camp, the only person of significance would have been the emir, who was responsible for identifying talented trainees, testing their commitment to the cause, and then sending them to specialized training camps. This, according to Cloonan, was al-Libi’s primary role.
25
INITIAL INTERROGATIONS25
After vetting al-Libi, CIA agents concluded that he had important information but was hiding it.
26
On the FBI’s behalf, Fincher and Mahon took charge of the investigation. Fincher began his interrogation by offering al-Libi coffee and attempting to build up his ego as a jihadist commander.
27
Knowing that al-Libi was a religious man, Fincher asked him whether he prayed, to which al-Libi replied, “of course.”
28
Fincher then explained that he, too, was a man of faith, though a Christian. The two men prayed together and discussed religion over numerous cups of coffee. Soon al-Libi began to open up about his history and his contacts, at which point Fincher showed him photos, and al-Libi identified US terrorist suspects who had been at the Khalden camp.
29
“Russell [Fincher] went through a basic interview, and before they finished, al-Libi says two important things: he knew Zacarias Moussaoui and he knows Richard Reid,” recalled Cloonan.
26
On the FBI’s behalf, Fincher and Mahon took charge of the investigation. Fincher began his interrogation by offering al-Libi coffee and attempting to build up his ego as a jihadist commander.
27
Knowing that al-Libi was a religious man, Fincher asked him whether he prayed, to which al-Libi replied, “of course.”
28
Fincher then explained that he, too, was a man of faith, though a Christian. The two men prayed together and discussed religion over numerous cups of coffee. Soon al-Libi began to open up about his history and his contacts, at which point Fincher showed him photos, and al-Libi identified US terrorist suspects who had been at the Khalden camp.
29
“Russell [Fincher] went through a basic interview, and before they finished, al-Libi says two important things: he knew Zacarias Moussaoui and he knows Richard Reid,” recalled Cloonan.
Both Reid and Moussaoui were significant terrorist suspects in US custody at the time. Reid, widely known as the shoe bomber, was later convicted of attempting to destroy American Airlines Flight 63 en route to Miami from Paris in December 2001 by igniting explosives embedded in his footwear. His al-Qaeda colleague Zacarias Moussaoui had trained to be a pilot and was thought at the time to have been the 9/11 attacks’ intended twentieth hijacker. Though authorities had already arrested him in Minneapolis in August 2001, the FBI had little evidence directly connecting Moussaoui to al-Qaeda—until al-Libi provided it.
“Neither the Moussaoui or Reid cases were a slam dunk for the FBI,” said Cloonan. “I told Russell he needed to preserve this guy and his info, and treat him accordingly. I told him to read him his Miranda rights in Arabic and English so the whole thing was preserved if he goes before the court.”
Fincher continued to interrogate al-Libi for the next few days, playing on al-Libi’s religious motivation to build rapport.
30
In return, al-Libi continued to provide valuable, actionable intelligence, including details about al-Qaeda training camps and recruits.
31
But when pressed for insight into a connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq, al-Libi said he had no information.
32
30
In return, al-Libi continued to provide valuable, actionable intelligence, including details about al-Qaeda training camps and recruits.
31
But when pressed for insight into a connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq, al-Libi said he had no information.
32
Al-Libi also said that he had never really liked bin Laden. Although bin Laden wanted al-Qaeda fighters to be trained for the offensive
kifayat al-jihad
, and insisted that the Khalden camp be used to train only al-Qaeda fighters,
33
al-Libi preferred to train those underneath him in the defensive
faridat al-jihad
. Both he and Abu Zubaydah disagreed with bin Laden on these doctrinal points.
34
kifayat al-jihad
, and insisted that the Khalden camp be used to train only al-Qaeda fighters,
33
al-Libi preferred to train those underneath him in the defensive
faridat al-jihad
. Both he and Abu Zubaydah disagreed with bin Laden on these doctrinal points.
34
But as the FBI proceeded to extract information from al-Libi, tension rose among the FBI, CIA, and military officials.
35
Continuing fear of another terrorist attack inside the US put pressure on the entire IC to generate results—though they disagreed as to the best method to do so. As one of the first high-value detainees to be interrogated after the 9/11 attacks, al-Libi became a focal point of the tensions, and FBI director Robert Mueller and the Bagram military commander were among the first to intervene.
36
35
Continuing fear of another terrorist attack inside the US put pressure on the entire IC to generate results—though they disagreed as to the best method to do so. As one of the first high-value detainees to be interrogated after the 9/11 attacks, al-Libi became a focal point of the tensions, and FBI director Robert Mueller and the Bagram military commander were among the first to intervene.
36
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