Find, Fix, Finish (15 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Both supported the idea that the FBI and the military should work in concert.
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It made sense for the two organizations to cooperate in interrogations, not only because “some of the military guys at Bagram were reservists who had been cops or detectives in their former lives,” but also because “Mueller and others felt that al-Libi was for real, and that he wanted to cooperate. We wanted a prosecutable case on bin Laden and [Moussaoui and Reid].” The FBI, accordingly then, wanted to maintain custody of al-Libi and incarcerate him in a federal prison to serve time for aiding terrorist activities—while testifying against other terrorist suspects.
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It made sense for the two organizations to cooperate in interrogations, not only because “some of the military guys at Bagram were reservists who had been cops or detectives in their former lives,” but also because “Mueller and others felt that al-Libi was for real, and that he wanted to cooperate. We wanted a prosecutable case on bin Laden and [Moussaoui and Reid].” The FBI, accordingly then, wanted to maintain custody of al-Libi and incarcerate him in a federal prison to serve time for aiding terrorist activities—while testifying against other terrorist suspects.
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CIA officials disagreed, according to Cloonan. “Russell began explaining to me what was going on vis-à-vis the military and the CIA at Bagram.
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The Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division at Bagram was in favor of working with the FBI on interrogations. The CIA, however, didn’t want the FBI involved and didn’t want to get the lawyers involved. They didn’t want to go through the formal channels of investigation. To them, it was ‘gloves off’ and ‘do what it takes’ to get these people interviewed.”
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The Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division at Bagram was in favor of working with the FBI on interrogations. The CIA, however, didn’t want the FBI involved and didn’t want to get the lawyers involved. They didn’t want to go through the formal channels of investigation. To them, it was ‘gloves off’ and ‘do what it takes’ to get these people interviewed.”
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CIA felt strongly that al-Libi was withholding information about other key al-Qaeda leaders and potential attacks against the US. To further press al-Libi for this information, they wanted him transferred from FBI custody.
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The dispute quickly escalated, and the White House decided that the CIA should receive custody of al-Libi. Unlike FBI director Mueller, CIA director George Tenet had a seat at the decision-making table.
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The dispute quickly escalated, and the White House decided that the CIA should receive custody of al-Libi. Unlike FBI director Mueller, CIA director George Tenet had a seat at the decision-making table.
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“The bottom line is that we lost to the CIA,” said Cloonan.
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On the night al-Libi was transferred to CIA custody, Fincher and Mahon met with him one final time. According to Cloonan, “Al-Libi knew that he was about to be transferred.” A few days earlier, a CIA agent had visited al-Libi, intending to intimidate him by announcing that he was being sent to an Egyptian prison.
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On January 8, 2002,
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al-Libi was transferred from Bagram air base to the USS
Bataan,
where US authorities further interrogated him.
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This time, he provided information about an alleged al-Qaeda plot to blow up the American embassy in Yemen. In response, the US embassy in Yemen was shuttered for a week. Al-Libi also disclosed that al-Qaeda planned to bomb the US Navy base in Bahrain
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and provided specific information about the location of Abu Zubaydah,
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who was then believed to be the third- or fourth-highest ranking member of al-Qaeda. Abu Zubaydah had also been on the initial US list of twelve suspected terrorists whose assets were frozen following 9/11.
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US and Pakistani forces captured Abu Zubaydah a few months later.
45
al-Libi was transferred from Bagram air base to the USS
Bataan,
where US authorities further interrogated him.
46
This time, he provided information about an alleged al-Qaeda plot to blow up the American embassy in Yemen. In response, the US embassy in Yemen was shuttered for a week. Al-Libi also disclosed that al-Qaeda planned to bomb the US Navy base in Bahrain
47
and provided specific information about the location of Abu Zubaydah,
48
who was then believed to be the third- or fourth-highest ranking member of al-Qaeda. Abu Zubaydah had also been on the initial US list of twelve suspected terrorists whose assets were frozen following 9/11.
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US and Pakistani forces captured Abu Zubaydah a few months later.
In late January 2002, US officials rendered al-Libi to Egypt.
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Three years after his rendition, President Bush defended the practice: “In the post-9/11 world, the United States must make sure we protect our people and our friends from attack. That was the charge we have been given. And one way to do so is to arrest people and send them back to their country of origin with the promise that they won’t be tortured.”
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Three years after his rendition, President Bush defended the practice: “In the post-9/11 world, the United States must make sure we protect our people and our friends from attack. That was the charge we have been given. And one way to do so is to arrest people and send them back to their country of origin with the promise that they won’t be tortured.”
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But was al-Libi tortured?
In Egypt, al-Libi was held in the
maximum security compound known as al-Aqrab, or Scorpion.
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Although little was known about al-Libi’s detention there at the time, two other prisoners detained in this facility—Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed al-Zery—have recounted stories of horrific treatment, being incarcerated in freezing cold cells, receiving beatings routinely, and being electrocuted through electrodes clamped to their genitals.
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maximum security compound known as al-Aqrab, or Scorpion.52
Although little was known about al-Libi’s detention there at the time, two other prisoners detained in this facility—Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed al-Zery—have recounted stories of horrific treatment, being incarcerated in freezing cold cells, receiving beatings routinely, and being electrocuted through electrodes clamped to their genitals.
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Still, it would be another two years before al-Libi’s treatment in Egyptian custody would surface publicly.
American intelligence analysts who reviewed al-Libi’s interrogation transcripts from Egypt believed that the information he provided on potential terrorist attacks against the US was generally credible but lacked specificity. In April 2002, for example, al-Libi declared that al-Qaeda planned to attack financial institutions in the northeastern and mid-Atlantic US,
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a threat confirmed by Abu Zubaydah. US homeland security officials then raised threat-warning levels around the country.
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But American officials could not independently verify al-Libi’s claims, and were left wondering if al-Libi had made up his threats.
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a threat confirmed by Abu Zubaydah. US homeland security officials then raised threat-warning levels around the country.
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But American officials could not independently verify al-Libi’s claims, and were left wondering if al-Libi had made up his threats.
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While in Egyptian custody, al-Libi also began to claim that al-Qaeda had sent two operatives to Iraq for training in chemical and biological weapons (CBW)—despite the fact that he had initially denied any knowledge of a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq.
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This information, of course, piqued the interest of intelligence analysts for an obvious reason: the idea that if al-Qaeda had acquired training in weapons of mass destruction it would have posed a clear and immediate threat to US interests.
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This information, of course, piqued the interest of intelligence analysts for an obvious reason: the idea that if al-Qaeda had acquired training in weapons of mass destruction it would have posed a clear and immediate threat to US interests.
Both the CIA and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) noted these new declarations in their respective reports with varying degrees of uncertainty as to their accuracy.
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In the September 2002 and January 2003 versions of the
Iraqi Support for Terrorism
report, CIA analysts assessed al-Libi’s interrogation information as “credible,” but noted that he “did not know the results of the training” and that he “was not in a position to know if any training took place.”
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DIA analysts reviewing the same information doubted al-Libi’s statements on the Iraq/al-Qaeda WMD relationship. A DIA daily intelligence summary, or DITSUM, reported al-Libi lacked specific details about the relationship and stated that while the information from al-Libi’s interrogation was possibly true, it was “more likely that [he] was intentionally misleading debriefers.”
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In the September 2002 and January 2003 versions of the
Iraqi Support for Terrorism
report, CIA analysts assessed al-Libi’s interrogation information as “credible,” but noted that he “did not know the results of the training” and that he “was not in a position to know if any training took place.”
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DIA analysts reviewing the same information doubted al-Libi’s statements on the Iraq/al-Qaeda WMD relationship. A DIA daily intelligence summary, or DITSUM, reported al-Libi lacked specific details about the relationship and stated that while the information from al-Libi’s interrogation was possibly true, it was “more likely that [he] was intentionally misleading debriefers.”
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DIA analysts at the time further questioned the overall idea of a relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Saddam Hussein was a secular leader and wary of Islamic revolutionary movements; he was unlikely to assist a group such as al-Qaeda that he could not control.
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Later DIA reports, however, failed to question the veracity of al-Libi’s claims.
BUILDING THE CASE FOR WAR AGAINST IRAQ61
Later DIA reports, however, failed to question the veracity of al-Libi’s claims.
During the scorching summer of 2002, political momentum in Washington began to build for military action against Iraq. As Congress prepared for the upcoming November elections, they debated the necessity and justification of a military invasion. Several key Democratic leaders, including Senator Joe Biden—at that time chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—felt the US must ultimately eliminate an Iraqi nuclear threat. “The question is the means by which we eliminate the threat,” said Biden in early August, “and the means by which you build support to be able to do that.”
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Through the fall, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began building a public case justifying a preemptive invasion.
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On September 8, Cheney appeared on NBC’s
Meet the Press
, declaring Iraq a “mortal threat” and claiming that there was increasing intelligence that Saddam Hussein intended to acquire equipment for enriching uranium and, eventually, nuclear weapons.
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When asked if there was a direct link between al-Qaeda and Iraq, Cheney responded ambiguously. That same morning, the
New York Times
published an article about Iraq’s nuclear ambitions that pointed to the recent acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes as evidence that Hussein was seeking to rebuild Iraq’s nuclear program.
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Political commentators began discussing the possibility of an Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.
63
On September 8, Cheney appeared on NBC’s
Meet the Press
, declaring Iraq a “mortal threat” and claiming that there was increasing intelligence that Saddam Hussein intended to acquire equipment for enriching uranium and, eventually, nuclear weapons.
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When asked if there was a direct link between al-Qaeda and Iraq, Cheney responded ambiguously. That same morning, the
New York Times
published an article about Iraq’s nuclear ambitions that pointed to the recent acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes as evidence that Hussein was seeking to rebuild Iraq’s nuclear program.
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Political commentators began discussing the possibility of an Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.
As public information about Iraq’s alleged nuclear weapons program and a potential link between al-Qaeda and Iraq mounted, Democratic senators on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)—Dick Durbin, Carl Levin, Bob Graham, and Dianne Feinstein—each sent letters to CIA director Tenet and President Bush, requesting a national intelligence estimate (NIE) evaluating Iraq’s WMD capabilities and potential connections with terrorist organizations.
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“There has not been a formal rigorous IC assessment, such as a National Intelligence Estimate, addressing the issues relating to Iraq, and I deeply believe that such an estimate is vital to Congressional decision making,” wrote Senator Feinstein.
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The IC then rammed the Iraq NIE through the system in a record-breaking three weeks—a process that normally takes months—and delivered the document to Congress on October 1, 2002.
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“There has not been a formal rigorous IC assessment, such as a National Intelligence Estimate, addressing the issues relating to Iraq, and I deeply believe that such an estimate is vital to Congressional decision making,” wrote Senator Feinstein.
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The IC then rammed the Iraq NIE through the system in a record-breaking three weeks—a process that normally takes months—and delivered the document to Congress on October 1, 2002.
Throughout the autumn, several intelligence officials testifying before Congress used al-Libi’s statements as evidence—albeit imperfect—of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Tenet testified on September 17 before the SSCI that “Iraq provided training to al-Qaeda members in Iraq—of most concern, in the area of chemical and biological agents,” a statement directly stemming from al-Libi’s assertions.
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He continued:
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He continued:
There is evidence that Iraq provided al-Qaeda with various kinds of training—combat, bomb-making, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. Although Saddam did not endorse al-Qaeda’s overall agenda and was suspicious of Islamist movements in general, he was apparently not averse, under certain circumstances, to enhancing bin Laden’s capabilities. As with much of the information on the overall relationship, details on training are second-hand or from sources of varying reliability.
In another classified SSCI briefing on October 2, 2002, senators questioned deputy director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin about Iraq’s links to al-Qaeda. Using information gleaned from al-Libi’s Egyptian interrogation, McLaughlin said that “we have credible reporting that al-Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.”
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Al-Libi’s statements even surfaced in speeches and interviews with Bush administration officials. National security advisor Condoleezza Rice cited al-Libi’s statements when making the case for an al-Qaeda–Iraq link during a September 25 interview on PBS
NewsHour
:
NewsHour
:
We clearly know that there were in the past and have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of al-Qaida going back for actually quite a long time. We know too that several of the detainees, in particular some high-ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al-Qaeda in chemical weapons development. So, yes, there are contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda.
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Later, on October 7, 2002, just as Congress prepared to vote on a joint resolution authorizing war against Iraq, President Bush outlined his case for invasion in a key speech in Cincinnati. To support an al-Qaeda–Iraq connection, President Bush referenced al-Libi’s statements yet again,
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claiming “we’ve learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.”
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claiming “we’ve learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.”
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Three days later, the die was cast. The House of Representatives passed a joint resolution authorizing President Bush, acting alone if necessary, to use military force against Iraq. The Senate approved the resolution the following day.
Shortly thereafter, following the November midterm elections, the Republican Party maintained its majority in the House of Representatives and regained control of the Senate. The landslide Republican victory was viewed by many as an overwhelming vote of confidence in the Bush administration’s handling of the post-9/11 era and lead-up to the Iraq invasion. Likewise, the United Nations Security Council appeared supportive of the invasion, voting unanimously to adopt UNSC Resolution 1441, which declared Iraq in material breach of its cease-fire agreements and offered Saddam Hussein’s regime one last chance to disarm, as stipulated by previous UN resolutions.
Less than one week before he was to make the final US presentation arguing for the legitimacy of war against Iraq to the UNSC, US secretary of state Colin Powell seemed frustrated, according to Colonel Larry Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff.
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Poring through the reports that served as the basis for his speech, Powell thought the intelligence provided to him lacked substance.
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Poring through the reports that served as the basis for his speech, Powell thought the intelligence provided to him lacked substance.
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