Find, Fix, Finish (19 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
CHAPTER 6
COUNTERTERRORISM IN A WAR ZONE
War is a series of catastrophes that results in a victory.
—GEORGES CLEMENCEAU
“O
h shit.” Those were the last words uttered by Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Brazilian United Nations secretary-general special representative to Iraq, before a massive truck bomb ignited in frightful luminescence underneath his personal office. The explosion caused the UN Baghdad compound at the Canal Hotel to pancake and crumble on the afternoon of August 19, 2003.
1
The envoy had just begun a meeting with colleagues and outside researchers when the force of the explosion caused the roof, walls, and floors in his wing of the building to buckle and disintegrate, leaving a large tan and gray concrete jumble where the UN’s mission—and its top man—had stood moments before.
h shit.” Those were the last words uttered by Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Brazilian United Nations secretary-general special representative to Iraq, before a massive truck bomb ignited in frightful luminescence underneath his personal office. The explosion caused the UN Baghdad compound at the Canal Hotel to pancake and crumble on the afternoon of August 19, 2003.
1
The envoy had just begun a meeting with colleagues and outside researchers when the force of the explosion caused the roof, walls, and floors in his wing of the building to buckle and disintegrate, leaving a large tan and gray concrete jumble where the UN’s mission—and its top man—had stood moments before.
The bombing would eventually claim some two dozen lives—UN officials, independent researchers, and local nationals dedicated to forging a better future for Iraq. After another suicide strike against the Canal Hotel a month later, the UN decided to pull out of Iraq. One organization single-handedly forced the humiliating withdrawal of the UN—an organization that had maintained a steadfast presence in Iraq throughout the punishing years of sanctions during the 1990s.
It was the handiwork of relatively little known terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his group Jama’at a-Tawhid wa Jihad (JTJ). He and his organization would eventually go by a number of names. In October 2004 it evolved into Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad Fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers, or QJBR), better known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi would prove to be a master of mayhem, battering away at the US mission in Iraq, and acting as the bogeyman most responsible for spurring the sectarian carnage that engulfed the country after 2003. After Saddam Hussein was captured, Zarqawi became high value target number 1 for the US. And despite intense efforts to track him down, Zarqawi remained beyond the reach of American and Iraqi forces for years while his group engaged in some of the most gruesome terror attacks against civilian targets in recent memory.
The hunt for Zarqawi was characterized by numerous near misses. Before the US invaded Iraq, the failure to neutralize Zarqawi was largely political. The Pentagon had actionable intelligence on Zarqawi’s whereabouts, but was held back by the White House out of a need to build support for the impending conflict. Following the invasion until mid-2005, most near misses stemmed from poor operational planning, thin intelligence, conflicting military objectives, and bad luck. During this time, Zarqawi demonstrated an evolving understanding of the US approach to capturing or killing him; over time, he and his henchmen learned to improve their personal operational security while exploiting weaknesses in the US approach. Zarqawi commanded support in key parts of the local Sunni populace and benefited from the foreign fighters flowing into Iraq, using them for protection and cover, as well as a force multiplier for his terrifying suicide operations.
Besides demonstrating the challenges faced by US forces, the story behind Iraqi, Jordanian, British, and US attempts to find, fix, and finish a terror leader like Zarqawi provides a compelling case study in the importance and the complexities of integrating human intelligence and military resources in conducting counterterrorism operations in a war zone. It also raises questions about the role of technology in intelligence gathering, as well as the possibilities for cooperation with foreign intelligence services. Finally, the hunt for Zarqawi shows that a small group of vicious, committed killers can destabilize a country.
ZARQAZarqa, Jordan, is a noisy, sprawling urban area of factories, low-slung buildings, and petty domestic intrigues—a developing city of dusty brick and concrete apartments and narrow, rutted streets. The local government functions poorly: “The smell of backed-up sewage clouds the city because the government will not improve the inadequate drainage system.”
2
Like many grim factory towns the world over, the young men of Zarqa have few job opportunities beyond working in the many sweatshops and workshops scattered throughout the city. It’s a Middle Eastern version of a Bruce Springsteen song—a land of deferred and broken dreams. This was the world Abu Musab al-Zarqawi entered on October 20, 1966.
2
Like many grim factory towns the world over, the young men of Zarqa have few job opportunities beyond working in the many sweatshops and workshops scattered throughout the city. It’s a Middle Eastern version of a Bruce Springsteen song—a land of deferred and broken dreams. This was the world Abu Musab al-Zarqawi entered on October 20, 1966.
Hailing from the Bedouin Bani Hassan tribal confederation, Zarqawi—born Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalayleh—grew up in the dilapidated but not destitute Masoum district of the city. Like many kids, Ahmad Fadil enjoyed kicking around a soccer ball and picking fights more than finishing his homework, and left school in the ninth grade. He found employment in a paper factory, then as a municipal functionary, but was fired from both jobs due to his chronic absenteeism and his knack for stirring up trouble.
After his two years of mandatory military service in the Jordanian army, the young Zarqawi returned to Zarqa and a life of drugs and petty crime. One report suggests he sexually assaulted a teenager, although that was never proven.
3
In 1987 he stabbed a man but escaped severe legal sanction with the payment of a stiff fine.
4
As one Western reporter noted years later, Ahmad Fadil was by all accounts “a bully and a thug, a bootlegger and a heavy drinker, and even, allegedly, a pimp in Zarqa’s underworld.”
5
This was a strange beginning for an international terrorist who would eventually terrify millions.
3
In 1987 he stabbed a man but escaped severe legal sanction with the payment of a stiff fine.
4
As one Western reporter noted years later, Ahmad Fadil was by all accounts “a bully and a thug, a bootlegger and a heavy drinker, and even, allegedly, a pimp in Zarqa’s underworld.”
5
This was a strange beginning for an international terrorist who would eventually terrify millions.
Ahmad Fadil’s mother, fearing that her son’s thuggish ways would mean disaster for his family, enrolled him in the late 1980s in the al-Hussein Ben Ali mosque in Amman.
6
There he would at least receive some sort of spiritual guidance. Sending the thug to a Salafist mosque was in hindsight a poor choice, as he fell in with a group of individuals who filled Ahmad Fadil with such religious zeal that he yearned to leave the humdrum confines of Jordan to pursue jihad abroad. Sometime in 1989, Zarqawi left Jordan for Afghanistan to battle the Soviet army.
6
There he would at least receive some sort of spiritual guidance. Sending the thug to a Salafist mosque was in hindsight a poor choice, as he fell in with a group of individuals who filled Ahmad Fadil with such religious zeal that he yearned to leave the humdrum confines of Jordan to pursue jihad abroad. Sometime in 1989, Zarqawi left Jordan for Afghanistan to battle the Soviet army.
Unfortunately for the Jordanian brawler, by the time he arrived in South Asia, the conflict between the mujahideen and the Soviets had more or less died down. Despite missing his first rendezvous with destiny, Zarqawi threw himself into the brutal internecine Afghan wars that erupted after the Soviet withdrawal.
Zarqawi also spent time in Pakistan, where he became fast friends with Palestinian jihadist thinker Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, whom the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point once called “the most influential living jihadi theorist.” He wrote the Salafist textbook
The Creed of Abraham.
Maqdisi was extremely doctrinaire and may have been the one who encouraged Zarqawi to refine his burning hatred of his Shia coreligionists—a hatred that would play out more than a decade later in postoccupation Iraq. From a more practical perspective, Maqdisi gave Zarqawi the religious guidance to pursue his dreams of bringing jihad back to Jordan.
7
After a while, Zarqawi and Maqdisi returned to Jordan to overthrow the king.
The Creed of Abraham.
Maqdisi was extremely doctrinaire and may have been the one who encouraged Zarqawi to refine his burning hatred of his Shia coreligionists—a hatred that would play out more than a decade later in postoccupation Iraq. From a more practical perspective, Maqdisi gave Zarqawi the religious guidance to pursue his dreams of bringing jihad back to Jordan.
7
After a while, Zarqawi and Maqdisi returned to Jordan to overthrow the king.
The Jordanian spy agency, the General Intelligence Department (GID), began tracking Zarqawi in the 1990s.
8
Unlike most government bureaucracies in Amman, the GID is an aggressive, highly professional service, and one of the most loyal organizations serving the Hashemite Kingdom. A former French defense official described the GID as “top-drawer, probably the best counterterrorism force in the world.... Any network they put their mind to destroying is gone.”
9
The GID was clearly not an organization that would suffer security threats to the country.
8
Unlike most government bureaucracies in Amman, the GID is an aggressive, highly professional service, and one of the most loyal organizations serving the Hashemite Kingdom. A former French defense official described the GID as “top-drawer, probably the best counterterrorism force in the world.... Any network they put their mind to destroying is gone.”
9
The GID was clearly not an organization that would suffer security threats to the country.
Zarqawi first encountered GID efficiency when he and Maqdisi formed Bayt al-Imam, a terrorist organization focused on attacking Israeli and Jordanian targets.
10
However, the GID broke up the cell in 1994 before it had conducted any major attacks. For their efforts, both Zarqawi and Maqdisi were imprisoned in 1996.
11
10
However, the GID broke up the cell in 1994 before it had conducted any major attacks. For their efforts, both Zarqawi and Maqdisi were imprisoned in 1996.
11
In a stroke of luck for Zarqawi, in 1999 Jordan’s King Hussein succumbed to cancer, and his son Abdullah II ascended the throne. In the tradition of extending royal amnesty for the forty days following a sovereign’s death, and under pressure from the politically active Muslim Brotherhood, King Abdullah freed several low-level radicals, including Zarqawi. He had achieved precious little as a militant and did not appear to be a serious security threat. Nonetheless, the GID continued to monitor Zarqawi after his release. His mother claimed that the surveillance drove him from the country within a few months, again to Pakistan.
12
12
Pakistan would prove to be almost as inhospitable as Jordan to the young militant. After a six-month stint in Peshawar, Zarqawi was thrown in prison for overstaying his visa. Faced with returning to Jordan and hostile GID surveillance, Zarqawi reluctantly crossed the border and connected with other Arab militants operating in the Taliban-controlled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
13
Unlike many of the other Arabs living there from the Gulf States and North Africa, the former convict had few financial resources—but made up for these deficiencies with street smarts and a forceful personality, which made him stand out as a possible leader amid the motley crew of international jihadists.
13
Unlike many of the other Arabs living there from the Gulf States and North Africa, the former convict had few financial resources—but made up for these deficiencies with street smarts and a forceful personality, which made him stand out as a possible leader amid the motley crew of international jihadists.
In 2000, Zarqawi met Osama bin Laden in Kandahar. Bin Laden asked the Jordanian to pledge allegiance to him and al-Qaeda.
14
Reputedly, and surprisingly for a man with weak jihadist credentials and no committed followers, Zarqawi rebuffed bin Laden’s advances over doctrinal issues. At the time, Zarqawi had no real interest in attacking the US in the so-called far jihad, preferring to wage the near jihad against the Hashemite Kingdom.
15
Bin Laden sent him packing. After a while, however, Zarqawi formed a small training camp near Herat in the western part of Afghanistan, for militants from the Levant, with $5,000 in seed money from Saif al-Adel, who sensed promise.
16
14
Reputedly, and surprisingly for a man with weak jihadist credentials and no committed followers, Zarqawi rebuffed bin Laden’s advances over doctrinal issues. At the time, Zarqawi had no real interest in attacking the US in the so-called far jihad, preferring to wage the near jihad against the Hashemite Kingdom.
15
Bin Laden sent him packing. After a while, however, Zarqawi formed a small training camp near Herat in the western part of Afghanistan, for militants from the Levant, with $5,000 in seed money from Saif al-Adel, who sensed promise.
16
The Herat camp was far away from other al-Qaeda camps, bin Laden, and the plotting that led to 9/11. Nonetheless, Zarqawi attracted a number of individuals to his spartan hideout, including many who would join him in the future fight in Iraq. After September 2001, however, he and his followers left the camp and disappeared—not with bin Laden’s entourage in the mountains of Pakistan, where all the major figures of jihad migrated after the furious attack by US and Northern Alliance forces, but rather west to Iran, Iraq, and beyond.
Before 2002, despite running a militant facility in Afghanistan, Zarqawi was not a high priority for the US—just another terror suspect who had fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. Some sources suggested he meandered around the Middle East with his hardcore followers, mostly Jordanians and others from the Levant whom he knew from his days in Afghanistan.
17
Others claimed that he eventually moved to Iraqi Kurdistan, a region beyond Baghdad’s grip, where he became involved with the al-Qaeda–associated Iraqi Kurdish terror group, Ansar al-Islam. The IC had lost sight of this Jordanian bit player, since he was not strongly associated with al-Qaeda’s core group of individuals, most of whom were still in the crease between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
17
Others claimed that he eventually moved to Iraqi Kurdistan, a region beyond Baghdad’s grip, where he became involved with the al-Qaeda–associated Iraqi Kurdish terror group, Ansar al-Islam. The IC had lost sight of this Jordanian bit player, since he was not strongly associated with al-Qaeda’s core group of individuals, most of whom were still in the crease between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, by 2002, Zarqawi was garnering significant attraction from Jordanian authorities. That summer, GID asked its Iraqi counterparts (the IIS) to hunt down Zarqawi, as he was suspected in the assassination attempt against GID counterterrorism chief Ali Burjak in February 2002, when unknown individuals placed a bomb underneath his wife’s car.
18
The bomb missed Burjak and his wife Yasmin but killed two unlucky bystanders. During this time, Zarqawi had also been sentenced in absentia for his part in the so-called Millennium Plot, which had targeted four sites in Jordan as well as the Los Angeles International Airport and the USS
The Sullivans
.
19
Jordanian officials wanted to rein-carcerate, convict, and execute him.
18
The bomb missed Burjak and his wife Yasmin but killed two unlucky bystanders. During this time, Zarqawi had also been sentenced in absentia for his part in the so-called Millennium Plot, which had targeted four sites in Jordan as well as the Los Angeles International Airport and the USS
The Sullivans
.
19
Jordanian officials wanted to rein-carcerate, convict, and execute him.
On October 28, 2002, members of Zarqawi’s group, looking for a target of opportunity, shadowed US Agency for International Development (USAID) official Laurence Foley, who was stationed in Amman. Ambushing Foley in his garage, Zarqawi’s henchmen blasted him several times at close range with a silenced 9-mm pistol. In this way they showed themselves capable of “coordinating an operation from abroad and profoundly destabilizing his country of origin.”
20
The GID quickly captured Foley’s assassins, most notably Libyan national Salim bin Suwaid and Jordanian national Yasir Furaihat, who claimed they had been “recruited, armed, and paid” by Zarqawi.
21
These men were tried and executed for their crime in 2006, a death sentence extended to Zarqawi, again in absentia. He remained at large.
20
The GID quickly captured Foley’s assassins, most notably Libyan national Salim bin Suwaid and Jordanian national Yasir Furaihat, who claimed they had been “recruited, armed, and paid” by Zarqawi.
21
These men were tried and executed for their crime in 2006, a death sentence extended to Zarqawi, again in absentia. He remained at large.
The American IC began to regard Zarqawi as an emerging threat. Still, American intelligence knew little, if anything, about Zarqawi and his activities. He might have been in Iraqi Kurdistan liaising with members of Ansar al-Islam, he might have been in Baghdad receiving unspecified surgery, or he might have been elsewhere. The US was guessing. However, everyone heard Zarqawi’s name a few months later when US secretary of state Colin Powell cited his presence in Iraq as the clearest evidence of a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda in his address to the United Nations Security Council on February 4, 2003.
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