Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Find, Fix, Finish (20 page)
POWELL’S UN SPEECH
By early 2003, the US was banging the war drum to invade Iraq and overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. While the Bush administration focused on Baghdad’s supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal as the primary justification for invasion, Saddam’s ties to terrorist groups were an integral part of the argument. While Baghdad had decades-long public ties to various Palestinian terror groups, the evidence tying Saddam’s regime to al-Qaeda was thin. Without Zarqawi, Powell’s slim presentation on Iraq’s support for international terrorism could be whittled down to almost nothing.
Using linguistic sleight of hand, Powell only referenced Zarqawi’s
associates
as closely allied with bin Laden. Powell outlined Zarqawi’s associates’ intentions and capabilities, most notably his relationship to WMD production at the Khurmal camp in Iraqi Kurdistan.
associates
as closely allied with bin Laden. Powell outlined Zarqawi’s associates’ intentions and capabilities, most notably his relationship to WMD production at the Khurmal camp in Iraqi Kurdistan.
When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this camp is located in northeastern Iraq.... The network is teaching its operatives how to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less than a pinch—imagine a pinch of salt—less than a pinch of ricin, eating just this amount in your food, would cause shock followed by circulatory failure. Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote, there is no cure. It is fatal. Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq.
22
Of course, Zarqawi was famously
not
part of al-Qaeda, but Powell nevertheless painted a terrifying picture of a terror network spanning the globe and orchestrated by Zarqawi. Besides linking him to the Foley assassination, Powell said he had directed his associates to conduct terrorist acts throughout Europe and elsewhere:
not
part of al-Qaeda, but Powell nevertheless painted a terrifying picture of a terror network spanning the globe and orchestrated by Zarqawi. Besides linking him to the Foley assassination, Powell said he had directed his associates to conduct terrorist acts throughout Europe and elsewhere:
Zarqawi’s terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Zarqawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries, including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia.... Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web have been arrested.
To connect the Saddam regime to al-Qaeda, Powell pointed to the presence of two dozen al-Qaeda members in Baghdad, members he claimed first arrived during Zarqawi’s two-month stay in that city in 2002 and with whom Zarqawi’s “direct subordinates” maintained “regular contact.” Suggesting that Baghdad must have known the terrorist’s whereabouts during his time in the capital and in northern Iraq, Powell suggested that Saddam Hussein knowingly declined to capture Zarqawi or his associates:
We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large to come and go.
Powell’s speech was an exercise in guilt by association, as he presented mostly circumstantial links between Zarqawi and Saddam’s intelligence services. The US had thus far presented no hard evidence of an actual link between the two. Some questioned the administration’s shaky analysis, noting that Zarqawi had few links to al-Qaeda and had not actually pledged himself to bin Laden through the Islamic custom of
bayat
. Finally, there was contention among analysts as to whether Zarqawi’s camp even had any direct ties to Baghdad or al-Qaeda at all.
23
bayat
. Finally, there was contention among analysts as to whether Zarqawi’s camp even had any direct ties to Baghdad or al-Qaeda at all.
23
Postwar findings—in particular the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) review,
Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments
— eventually revealed many errors in the intelligence on which Powell’s conclusions were based. Although Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysis prior to hostilities indicated that Saddam’s regime was aware of Ansar al-Islam’s presence in Kurdistan,
24
Saddam’s secular government, which was “firmly rooted in the separation between religion and state,” had entirely different goals than Zarqawi’s group of Islamic extremists.
25
As a result, some analysts concluded before the war that neither had an interest in working with the other; Zarqawi’s cell considered Saddam’s government apostate, while Saddam considered Zarqawi a “threat.”
26
Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments
— eventually revealed many errors in the intelligence on which Powell’s conclusions were based. Although Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysis prior to hostilities indicated that Saddam’s regime was aware of Ansar al-Islam’s presence in Kurdistan,
24
Saddam’s secular government, which was “firmly rooted in the separation between religion and state,” had entirely different goals than Zarqawi’s group of Islamic extremists.
25
As a result, some analysts concluded before the war that neither had an interest in working with the other; Zarqawi’s cell considered Saddam’s government apostate, while Saddam considered Zarqawi a “threat.”
26
Prior to the war, intelligence showed that Saddam appeared to have made a genuine effort to locate Zarqawi. These efforts by Saddam, for one reason or another, were unsuccessful in finding the Jordanian militant. In any case, the US, however, “overestimated” Iraqi intelligence capabilities.
27
While Zarqawi was probably somewhere in Iraq during the run-up to the invasion, now termed Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Baghdad regime was probably more preoccupied with preparing for war with the US and a countrywide occupation than with locating a middling terrorist who might or might not be in its territory.
27
While Zarqawi was probably somewhere in Iraq during the run-up to the invasion, now termed Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Baghdad regime was probably more preoccupied with preparing for war with the US and a countrywide occupation than with locating a middling terrorist who might or might not be in its territory.
Records seized after OIF revealed that Saddam took measures to catch Zarqawi. According to the SSCI review, Saddam’s intelligence service, the Iraq Intelligence Service (IIS) “formed a special committee” to track down Zarqawi, but for one reason or another they could not locate him.
28
Even after Zarqawi was thought to have transited out of Iraq, the report concluded, Saddam continued to search, and in early 2003, the IIS managed to arrest one of the other individuals associated in the Foley murder, though Zarqawi remained at large.
29
28
Even after Zarqawi was thought to have transited out of Iraq, the report concluded, Saddam continued to search, and in early 2003, the IIS managed to arrest one of the other individuals associated in the Foley murder, though Zarqawi remained at large.
29
But these findings were developed three years after the invasion, written with the benefits of the full intelligence record and hindsight. In 2002–2003, the CIA Directorate of Intelligence had struggled to make sense of the scraps of information that argued for or against Saddam’s supposed relationship with Zarqawi and al-Qaeda. The analysis by compromise would later emerge as CIA’s
Iraqi Support for Terrorism
and
Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,
among others.
30
Essentially, CIA analysts believed that “Iraq has had sporadic, wary contracts” with al-Qaeda, “[but] mistrust and conflicting ideologies and goals probably tempered these contacts and severely limited the opportunities for cooperation.”
31
Furthermore, there may have been “limited offers of cooperation, training, or safe haven (ultimately uncorroborated or withdrawn)” between Saddam and al-Qaeda, but even this line of reasoning was tenuous at best.
32
As investigative journalist Michael Gordon later noted, this limp analysis was nevertheless “controversial within the agency” and that “the CIA ombudsman for politicization received a confidential complaint that the conclusion went too far.”
33
Based on the heavily redacted version of the murky intelligence assessment released in 2005,
34
Zarqawi did not figure as a terribly prominent analytical data point in the case against Iraq.
Iraqi Support for Terrorism
and
Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,
among others.
30
Essentially, CIA analysts believed that “Iraq has had sporadic, wary contracts” with al-Qaeda, “[but] mistrust and conflicting ideologies and goals probably tempered these contacts and severely limited the opportunities for cooperation.”
31
Furthermore, there may have been “limited offers of cooperation, training, or safe haven (ultimately uncorroborated or withdrawn)” between Saddam and al-Qaeda, but even this line of reasoning was tenuous at best.
32
As investigative journalist Michael Gordon later noted, this limp analysis was nevertheless “controversial within the agency” and that “the CIA ombudsman for politicization received a confidential complaint that the conclusion went too far.”
33
Based on the heavily redacted version of the murky intelligence assessment released in 2005,
34
Zarqawi did not figure as a terribly prominent analytical data point in the case against Iraq.
While the US intelligence bureaucracy tied itself into knots creating pieces of paper, the action arms of the US government probably had several opportunities to finish Zarqawi prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq. These included a June 2002 Pentagon-drafted plan to strike Zarqawi after intelligence revealed he had set up a bioweapons lab in Khurmal in northern Iraq to manufacture ricin and anthrax—the same camp Powell would refer to in his UN speech some eight months later.
35
The plan to attack the camp with cruise missiles and air strikes was debated to a standstill by the National Security Council (NSC) and ultimately shelved.
35
The plan to attack the camp with cruise missiles and air strikes was debated to a standstill by the National Security Council (NSC) and ultimately shelved.
In October 2002, the Pentagon again advanced a plan after intelligence indicated that Zarqawi was planning to use manufactured ricin in terrorist attacks in Europe. According to former NSC member Roger Cressey, the NSC killed the plan because the administration was “more obsessed with developing the coalition to overthrow Saddam than to execute the president’s policy of preemption against terrorists.”
36
Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer corroborated this account in a May 2006 interview, stating that the Bush administration was provided solid intelligence on Zarqawi’s location in the year before the invasion but believed any unilateral military action would undermine support from key European allies, who might view the US as “gunslingers.”
37
Nearing the eve of war, the NSC in January 2003 again nixed a Pentagon attack plan even after London police arrested six terror suspects and discovered a ricin lab connected to the Khurmal camp––apparently again fearing that destroying the terrorist camp would undercut the case for war against Saddam Hussein.
38
36
Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer corroborated this account in a May 2006 interview, stating that the Bush administration was provided solid intelligence on Zarqawi’s location in the year before the invasion but believed any unilateral military action would undermine support from key European allies, who might view the US as “gunslingers.”
37
Nearing the eve of war, the NSC in January 2003 again nixed a Pentagon attack plan even after London police arrested six terror suspects and discovered a ricin lab connected to the Khurmal camp––apparently again fearing that destroying the terrorist camp would undercut the case for war against Saddam Hussein.
38
So, prior to the outbreak of hostilities in March 2003, the Bush administration was able but unwilling to finish Zarqawi despite fixing him at various times in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Baghdad. Still, one of the first actions the US military took in Operation Iraqi Freedom was to obliterate Khurmal with a punishing weeklong aerial bombardment and a ground assault against the fanatical Islamists willing to fight to the death.
39
After the smoke cleared, the subsequent investigation indicated Zarqawi had long since left. American man-hunting forces shifted from finding this terrorist to targeting Baathists and Saddam supporters, allowing Zarqawi to take advantage of a distracted US overwhelmed by the task of occupying a country of 26 million people to develop his networks and lay the operational groundwork needed to unleash waves of punishing attacks against American forces and Shia groups.
39
After the smoke cleared, the subsequent investigation indicated Zarqawi had long since left. American man-hunting forces shifted from finding this terrorist to targeting Baathists and Saddam supporters, allowing Zarqawi to take advantage of a distracted US overwhelmed by the task of occupying a country of 26 million people to develop his networks and lay the operational groundwork needed to unleash waves of punishing attacks against American forces and Shia groups.
Zarqawi’s overall strategy was straightforward—ceaselessly attack US and Iraqi forces while murdering large numbers of Shia, causing them to react violently against their Sunni countrymen. The subsequent communal violence would then oblige the Sunni population—knowing that the Shia-dominated Iraqi government could not or would not protect them—to seek refuge with the only organization capable of protecting them: Zarqawi’s group. US forces would get caught in a communal civil war, lose heart, and retreat, ceding the field to the jihadists. Zarqawi would then take advantage of the chaos to carve out an Islamic rump state while developing the capabilities to launch terrorist attacks outside the country. The crude, bloodthirsty strategy almost succeeded.
The US may have tracked Zarqawi periodically through early to mid-2003, but could not fix his location with any precision as he moved across borders to gather support and money for the insurgency in Iraq. The US believed that Zarqawi was one of many al-Qaeda leaders who crossed over to Iran as the Iraq ground war started, and was either in custody or considered a guest during major hostilities.
40
Sometime after the fall of Baghdad, Zarqawi began moving between Iraq and neighboring countries to gather men and materiel for the upcoming postconflict conflict, according to US officials.
41
As money, foreign fighters, and arms flowed into Iraq, Zarqawi probably set up a base of operations in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province where he could find protection.
40
Sometime after the fall of Baghdad, Zarqawi began moving between Iraq and neighboring countries to gather men and materiel for the upcoming postconflict conflict, according to US officials.
41
As money, foreign fighters, and arms flowed into Iraq, Zarqawi probably set up a base of operations in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province where he could find protection.
Zarqawi likely enjoyed free range of movement following the invasion because American forces were preoccupied with the hunt for WMD and for Saddam. US military forces during this time were likewise focused on maintaining security, restoring basic services such as water and electricity, and pursuing the fifty-five members of “Iraq’s most wanted” from the former regime. Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld blithely dismissed concerns about the increasing anarchy in an unsecured Baghdad: “free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things . . . stuff happens.”
42
Zarqawi was not unaware that US forces were overstretched; one of his top lieutenants—and key planner for the UN attack—Awwaz Abd al-Aziz Mahmood Sa’id (a.k.a. al-Kurdi) would later claim that, in the early days of the occupation, Zarqawi and he had no trouble meeting daily in Ramadi.
43
42
Zarqawi was not unaware that US forces were overstretched; one of his top lieutenants—and key planner for the UN attack—Awwaz Abd al-Aziz Mahmood Sa’id (a.k.a. al-Kurdi) would later claim that, in the early days of the occupation, Zarqawi and he had no trouble meeting daily in Ramadi.
43
Elite military units remained focused on capturing Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay, not controlling the increasingly unstable political environment. Saddam’s sons were killed in a firefight with US troops on July 22, and Saddam himself was captured in the famous “spider hole” on December 13. It is likely that US military planners refocused their efforts on the growing insurgency, spurred by the purging of Baath Party members from positions of power, as well as the disbanding of the Iraqi army, toward the beginning of 2004. The warning signs of a broader Sunni backlash went unheeded by most policymakers at the time.
In late summer 2003, Zarqawi struck. After a number of small-time attacks against Iraqi police stations, Zarqawi was responsible for a string of brutal bombings throughout August, including a car bomb outside the Jordanian embassy that killed seventeen; the aforementioned suicide bombing of the UN compound;
44
and an especially bloody suicide attack aimed at the revered Shiite clergyman and Supreme Council of the Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) political leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in Najaf. Zarqawi’s father-in-law Yasin Jarad carried out the strike, killing Hakim and up to seventy-five bystanders.
44
and an especially bloody suicide attack aimed at the revered Shiite clergyman and Supreme Council of the Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) political leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in Najaf. Zarqawi’s father-in-law Yasin Jarad carried out the strike, killing Hakim and up to seventy-five bystanders.
Zarqawi’s attacks directed attention at the insurgent leader, although Saddam remained the priority. Still, the US made some effort to quash Zarqawi’s organization. Two wild firefights on September 16, 2003, in the towns of Ramadi and Khaldiyah between US forces and Zarqawi’s men killed numerous terrorists—Iraqis and foreigners—and put a large dent in his plans. But Zarqawi escaped unscathed.
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