Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (10 page)

Command of the air was absolutely essential to the execution of the Governor's scheme of defence, and how to obtain this was a problem which had been occupying his mind from the first appearance of the invading force. So far as he could see, there was but one airplane carrier with the Japanese fleet, which ship, the
Matsushima
, was in clear view as she cruised some twelve miles off Apra, with an escort of three destroyers. If she could be sunk, or even badly damaged, her planes would be rendered homeless and must soon withdraw from action, either to descend on the sea to be picked up by other ships, or, if their fuel lasted out, to fly to Saipan, the nearest friendly territory. It was therefore worth while taking a big risk to deal with the
Matsushima
, and having reached this conclusion Captain Harper ordered his eight planes to attack her. Four of these machines were scouts or fighters; the remaining four were medium bombers, each able to carry two 600-pounder bombs. Hitherto they had been held in reserve at Dededo, in the northern part of the island, an improvised aerodrome whose position was partly camouflaged by farm buildings.

On receiving the Governor’s orders all eight machines started on what the pilots and observers well knew to be a forlorn hope. Their instructions were to ignore everything but the
Matsushima
; the fighting planes were, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves in order to give the bombers a safe passage to the objective. Just before the engines started up, Lieutenant Jay, commanding the squadron, received a personal message from the Governor: “If you sink the airplane carrier we may save Guam. Everything depends on how your attack pans out. Go to it, and good luck!”

The eight machines had not climbed two thousand feet before they were observed by Japanese planes, which at once started in pursuit. But the Americans had a good start, and their pursuers, not knowing what the objective was, lost time in following directly after them, instead of heading out to sea to intercept them before they could reach the aircraft carrier. This ship was quickly identified by her curious build, with a single funnel placed over on the starboard side and her decks alive with planes. As the American machines hove in sight, two or three planes rose from the deck to engage them, thus masking the fire of the ship’s own guns, which did not come into action until it was too late. Flying well ahead of the bombers the first two American fighters poured a stream of machine-gun bullets into a Japanese machine that rose to meet them, and sent it down out of control. A second enemy was accounted for in the same way, and then the bombing planes were on the target.

The broad deck of the
Matsushima
offered a splendid mark, into which the opening salvo of bombs crashed with unerring aim, dropped as they were at the point-blank range of five hundred feet. So violent was the explosion that one of the American bombing machines, caught in the blast, was capsized, and before the pilot, could regain control, it fell headlong into the sea. The two remaining bombers were at this moment being fired on by Japanese pursuit planes, and their aim was therefore less accurate; but two more 600- pound bombs struck the deck, and a third, hitting the hull of the ship obliquely, detonated exactly on the water-line, where it blew an enormous hole in the side. To the anxious watchers on shore it soon became evident that the audacious attack had succeeded, for the
Matsushima
, vomiting fire and smoke, gradually assumed a heavy list, and as the heel increased more than one airplane was seen to slide from her deck into the water. She had stopped dead shortly after the first explosions. A large bomb had disabled her engines, and others, passing clean through the flying deck, had exploded with frightful effect in the lower compartments of the ship. It is probable that other severe leaks had been started, in addition to the great hole torn betwixt wind and water, since this alone would hardly have caused the vessel to founder, as she did, in ten minutes.

Owing to the confusion into which the enemy was thrown by this sudden blow, four of the American machines made good their escape and returned to the aerodrome at Dededo, practically undamaged; but the other four had paid the price of a great achievement, and they and their gallant occupants were now lying fathoms deep in the Pacific. The four survivors, three of which were fighting planes, remained on the ground only long enough to take in fresh ammunition, and were then up again with orders to drive off the Japanese spotting planes. At three o’clock the one surviving enemy machine was heading north, apparently for Saipan, pursued by bursting shell from the anti-aircraft guns at Agaña, while the wreckage of the last American plane lay smouldering on Mount Barrigada. The Guam air force had ceased to exist, but it had not sacrificed itself in vain.

That the Japanese failed to appreciate the significance of the desperate attack on their aircraft carrier was demonstrated by their subsequent procedure. Looking at the matter in the light of after knowledge, it may seem strange that they did not suspect that the defenders of the island had another card which could only be played when the factor of air observation had been eliminated. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that their knowledge of the defences was based on reports which had been compiled by spies shortly before the outbreak of war. They could not possibly have known of the subsequent arrival of the two transports and the landing of so many pieces of heavy mobile artillery.

At 3.15 p in., the warships off Apra having now ceased fire, several destroyers stood in towards the harbour, cutting a path through the mine-field with their paravane sweeps. They offered an excellent mark as they moved at low speed, threading their way through the reefs and shoals at the entrance, but not a shot was fired at them. The
Lamberton
and the
Rizal
were at this time lying near Santa Cruz Island; but both were on their beam ends, their decks were deserted, and to the enemy it must have seemed that these vessels had either been wrecked by the bombardment or scuttled by their crews. Encouraged by the absolute silence prevailing ashore, which was doubtless taken as proof that the last semblance of opposition had been crushed, nine transports now began to move in, their decks crowded with troops, their boats slung out-board, and destroyers going alongside to assist in the disembarkation. Eight miles out at sea lay the armoured cruiser
Kasuga
, while the
Tokiwa
and
Asama
were much closer inshore. The transports did not actually enter the harbour, but they approached to within a mile of the Catalan Bank before heaving-to. Then the first contingent of troops went over the side and entered the boats, which made for the harbour in tow of the motor pinnaces and destroyers.

The disembarkation was well under way and the first boatloads were within less than half a mile of the shore before Captain Harper played his trump card. Suddenly there came the dull boom of a great gun from among the hills behind Apra, followed an instant later by regular salvos from other guns, so well placed as to be invisible from the sea. The first shell pitched into the water just ahead of the leading transport, which lay broadside on to the shore, offering an easy target to skilled gunners at a range of barely four miles. Heavy explosions were now observed on board this ship and her consorts as the 7-inch projectiles got home. The field guns on the island had also come into action, spraying the crowded boats with shrapnel and blowing a good half of them to matchwood in the first few minutes.

Three of the transports were ablaze and others had suffered severely before the Japanese recovered from their surprise. Then their destroyers gallantly steamed in to shield the remaining boats, firing heavily but blindly at the hidden batteries ashore, and the large warships further out reopened with every gun that would bear. But not for a moment did the hail of projectiles cease to scourge the transports, which had now been transformed into slaughter pens. Three of them, all badly damaged, succeeded in withdrawing from effective range, but the remaining six were in a hopeless plight. One sank as a destroyer was towing her out, and shortly afterwards the destroyer herself lay helpless on the water with her engines wrecked by a shell. The armoured cruiser
Tokiwa
was so badly hit that she steamed out of action, the
Asama
had her forward funnel blown over the side, and a few hits were even made on the
Kasuga
.

By 4.30 p.m. the landing attempt at Apra had been utterly defeated. What remained of the enemy’s ships had hauled out of range, and boats from the
Lamberton
and
Rizal
were outside the harbour, picking up a few half-drowned Japanese soldiers. The carnage on board the transports and in the boats had been frightful Not less than five thousand men had perished, and each of the ships still afloat had the greater part of its contingent disabled by wounds

At Port Tarofofo, on the other side of the island, events had meanwhile been taking much the same course, though at this point the American artillery was less numerous and only three transports were actually sunk, the others making good their escape in a more or less damaged condition. But it was here that the Japanese Navy suffered its first serious loss. The armoured cruiser
Nisshin
, having incautiously approached to within three miles of the shore before the American guns were unmasked, came under so tremendous a fire that she was disabled in five minutes, and before the destroyers which came rushing to her assistance could pass a towing hawser, she blew up and sank.

At Tarofofo, as at Apra, the Japanese warships had reopened fire with all guns as soon as the cannonade from the island began. At both places clouds of brown smoke rising from the woods and hills seemed to denote the presence of American guns, and these positions were accordingly swept with projectiles of every calibre. And yet not a single gun was touched, nor were there more than a dozen casualties among the American gun crews. The smoke which had drawn the enemy’s fire came, not from the guns, but from small charges of a smoke-producing compound which were touched off periodically at various points well away from the batteries, each burst of smoke being timed to coincide with a discharge from the guns. By this means the Japanese observers were completely deceived, and their ships expended an enormous quantity of shell with practically no result.

Both sections of the invading fleet were well out to sea before darkness fell, and it looked as if the attack had been definitely abandoned; but the garrison stood to its guns throughout the night, for there was a bare possibility that the Japanese would try to land on some other part of the coast under cover of darkness. But when the sun rose on the 21st the sea was empty of ships; only a faint haze on the north-west horizon marked the whereabouts of the discomfited enemy, who was, in fact, returning to Formosa at the best speed of which his sorely damaged remaining transports were capable. Guam was safe — for the time being, but its elated defenders well knew that a fresh attack, this time in overpowering force, was merely a question of days. Nor was there any real foundation for the hope, which a few of them cherished, that the United States fleet would arrive from the east before the next Japanese assault took place. Since the island had no longer any means of communicating with the outer world, the American naval authorities necessarily remained ignorant of the situation at Guam, though they assumed it to be already in Japanese possession. In fact the Tokyo wireless bulletin of March 20 had announced — somewhat prematurely, as it turned out — that “the fortress of Guam has fallen to a combined attack by the Imperial military and naval forces.”

Captain Harper employed the respite which had been granted him by marking out new gun positions, building emplacements and trenches and improving the roads over which the tractor batteries were likely to pass. He knew, however, that there was not the least hope of repeating his former success. This time the enemy would come well provided with aircraft, and these would infallibly locate the position of the guns as soon as they opened fire.

On March 22, five American submarines reached Apra, three more coming in the next day. Unfortunately most of them had expended all their torpedoes, and there were none of these weapons in reserve at Guam. As submarines without torpedoes were useless for defence purposes, Captain Harper ordered six of the boats, after replenishing their oil tanks, to proceed to Honolulu, together with the destroyers
Lamberton
and
Rizal
and the transport
Newport
News
. Only two submarines,
S
23
and
S
50
, were retained at Guam. Damage to her machinery caused by a stray shell in the first attack prevented the
Beaufort
from sailing. It may be mentioned here that all the other vessels made the voyage to Honolulu without mishap.

Not until April 3 did the second Japanese attack develop. At an early hour that morning enemy aircraft appeared over the island in great strength, and soon afterwards a squadron of transports and naval vessels, including six battleships and cruisers, was seen approaching. Profiting by the severe lesson they had had on the previous occasion, the Japanese now adopted different tactics. No preparatory bombardment took place, but four of the transports headed towards the harbour with the apparent intention of coming right inside, to land their troops on the beach at Sumay. To counter this bold stroke it was absolutely necessary for the defenders to open fire, reluctant as they were to reveal the position of their guns while enemy airplanes were swarming overhead; but any further delay would enable the invaders to gain a foothold ashore, and that would be the beginning of the end. So Captain Harper passed word to the hidden guns, which at once came into action against the transports.