Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (14 page)

The submarine
I
54
was less fortunate. After her raid upon Oregon shipping she continued her voyage northward, and broke surface again in sight of several steamers off Cape Flattery on June 23, the day after the air raids upon San Francisco and Los Angeles — no doubt with the object of diverting attention from the retreating aircraft carrier. Unluckily for the submarine, the American destroyers
Rathburne
and
Shirk
, which with others had been undergoing an extensive refit at Bremerton Navy Yard, were proceeding down the Strait of Juan de Fuca to reinforce the coast patrols when they received intelligence by radio of the submarine’s latest appearance. The senior officer, Lieutenant-Commander Maynard, of the
Shirk
, calculating that only a very few miles separated him from the reported position of the enemy craft, ordered his consort to follow him at full speed to the spot, where he surprised
I
54
in the act of holding up a large Shipping Board steamer, the
West
Jappa
. The small airplane carried by the submarine was out of action; and the towering hull of the freighter, which was in ballast, appears to have hidden the approaching destroyers from the Japanese until they were quite near, but the submarine had time to discharge a couple of torpedoes into the
West
Jappa
before submerging. Numerous depth charges were dropped in the vicinity, and though no direct hit was claimed by the destroyers it is now practically certain that some fatal injury was thus inflicted upon
I
54
, for she was never seen again by friend or foe. At the time, however, there was no means of knowing this, and it was even doubtful whether only one submarine had been engaged in these repeated attacks upon American shipping. On the assumption that other boats were off the coast, the naval authorities continued to take every precaution, all merchantmen being held up in port for some days while aircraft and patrol vessels made an exhaustive search of the locality, until it became evident that the danger was past. There is no doubt that the diversion caused by
I
54
was of material assistance to the
Hakata
by enabling her to avoid observation, so much attention being concentrated on the area around Cape Flattery that more distant waters were neglected.

The whole enterprise had been well planned and skilfully conducted. It was acclaimed with tremendous enthusiasm in Japan, where highly coloured versions of what had been accomplished were served out to the newspapers. But measured by its military results, it was questionable if the expedition had been worth the effort it had cost. Doubtless its main purpose was so to terrorise the inhabitants of the Pacific Slope as to compel the naval authorities to modify their plans in deference to popular agitation. It certainly threw the whole coast into a ferment, and demands for local protection became so insistent that the Government could no longer afford to ignore them entirely. Twelve destroyers were recalled from Hawaii to reinforce the coastal patrol, and additional yachts and merchant steamers were taken over and hurriedly equipped for the same purpose. The War Department was induced to send two batteries of railroad artillery, operated by the Coast Artillery Corps, to the Los Angeles area, where the proximity of the railway to the sea would give these guns — 7-inch high-velocity pieces — a wide range of action. Two large naval dirigibles and two of the Army's smaller airships, together with twenty airplanes, were told off to maintain a night and day watch along the seaboard, while anti-aircraft batteries were mounted at San Francisco, Los Angeles, and other cities within reach of attack from the sea. By diverting so much of America’s man power and material to passive defence, which contributed nothing to the effective prosecution of the war, the Japanese could claim to have reaped a certain amount of indirect military advantage from their dramatic
coup
. But there was no possibility of repeating their exploits in the face of the improvements now made in the defence organisation, while the general effect in districts remote from the Pacific Coast was to stimulate the war spirit and harden the American nation’s resolve to see the thing through.

Thus again it was proved that a policy of intimidation can only be expected to succeed where it is backed by overwhelming force, which in this case was lacking. At the same time, the results of these daring coastal raids could not be surveyed with any feeling of satisfaction by the United States. The enemy had impudently invaded American territorial waters, holding up the traffic of the principal Pacific ports and heavily bombarding California’s biggest cities, and yet by adroit tactics had contrived to withdraw his forces almost intact. At the time the only loss that could be proved was that of the airplane whose wreck had been found near Santa Barbara; and it was not until many months afterwards that the failure of submarine
I
54
to return to a Japanese port became known.

Not since the Civil War had an American Government had to face such a storm of criticism and vituperation as now broke upon them. If they had not yielded to the tremendous pressure that was brought to bear from all quarters, but especially from districts immediately affected by the raids, the President and his Cabinet would have been superhuman. As it was, in addition to the local measures detailed above, they were forced to broadcast an undertaking that, in view of the delay in repairing the Panama Canal, all available forces should be concentrated around the stricken area without waiting until this means of communication was restored. The Japanese, who appear to have been informed of what was happening, could therefore congratulate themselves upon having to a large extent achieved their object in forcing their enemy into premature action. But, paradoxical as it may sound, there is little doubt that the ultimate effect of the raids by submarines and aircraft was more advantageous to the American cause than to the Japanese.

Immediately on the outbreak of war Congress had voted an emergency appropriation of $250,000,000 for increasing the Navy, and the nation assumed as a matter of course that numerous ships of every type had been laid down immediately. But, in fact, no such action had been taken. The voices of those who predicted a speedy ending to the war were still powerful in the councils of Washington. Even in the naval administration there were men of high position who disputed the need for an intensive programme of shipbuilding, believing as they did that the campaign would be over long before the new ships went afloat. It is now known that both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Operations were of this opinion, and it was due to their influence that the new construction ordered in the first two months of the war was limited to four cruisers, twenty destroyers, a few submarines, and two airplane carriers. But the raids on the West Coast showed the enemy to be bolder and more enterprising than had been suspected. Nor could they be reconciled with the theory that Japan desired and would soon make overtures for an early peace by negotiation. If such was her aim she would hardly have done the one thing calculated to excite belligerent sentiments in the United States. It looked, indeed, as if she were bent on exasperating American opinion by every means in her power, a policy that seemed to indicate a resolve on her part to press conclusions to the bitter end. Instead of proffering an olive branch, she had flung down a gauntlet of steel.

The reaction on American opinion, governmental as well as popular, was immediate and decisive. Since all the omens pointed to a prolonged struggle, the nation in grim earnest set about arming itself for the fray. Compulsory service had been introduced at the start, but since there appeared to be no prospect of large military operations developing, the number of men called to the colours had not as yet exceeded 150,000. Now, however, the whole scheme of Army expansion was recast on a far greater scale. In less than a week after the San Francisco raid the strength of the Army, already fixed provisionally at 1,000,000, was sensibly nearer that figure, and the industrial resources of the country were in process of mobilisation for the equipment of this vast force. At the same time a great programme of naval construction was framed, the principal items of which were four battle-cruisers, twenty-five cruisers, one hundred destroyers, fifty submarines, and six airplane carriers, besides numerous mine-sweepers and other auxiliary craft. Since this amount of tonnage was far beyond the capacity of existing shipyards in the Union, the Government financed extensions to the great shipbuilding yards on either coast and the laying-down of new plant for standardised production. To relieve the strain on home industry, large orders for ship material, heavy castings, guns, mounts, and munitions of every description were placed in Europe, the value of these foreign contracts alone amounting to $250,000,000. High prices had to be paid, because Japan was already in the market for similar supplies, and the European manufacturers were thus in a position to dictate their own terms.

This was the first time in thirty years that the United States had gone abroad for its naval supplies, but the circumstances were such as to leave no alternative. While we need not review the emergency building programme in detail, some brief explanatory remarks may be offered. In deciding to include four battle cruisers of the largest dimensions, the naval authorities were influenced by rumours of corresponding activity in Japan, where, it was said, three or four capital ships of unexampled power had been placed on the stocks during February. Their displacement was reported to be close upon 50,000 tons and their battery as consisting of 18-inch guns. To match these monster ships the American type was designed on a basis of 52,000 tons, with a speed of 35 knots, and an armament of eight 18-inch guns. The contract called for delivery in twenty months, though there was little chance of this schedule being observed. In size and battery the twenty-five cruisers were of uniform type — namely, 10,000 tons and nine 8-inch guns; but whereas fifteen were to have steam turbine machinery, the remaining ten were to be equipped with oil motors. This involved a reduction in speed, for despite the progress it had made in recent years, the internal-combustion engine had not yet succeeded in rivalling the steam turbine as a prime mover for large ships of the highest speed. Each of the ten motor cruisers was to be fitted with three engines developing together 60,000 brake horse-power, which would propel it at a maximum velocity of twenty-eight knots. This was seven knots less than the speed of the steam-driven ships, but, on the other hand, there would be a gain of thirty to forty per cent in cruising endurance, which was a point of prime importance in the case of ships destined to operate over the enormous expanse of the Pacific Ocean. Of the destroyers it need only be said that a certain number were fitted with oil motors for cruising, while relying on their turbines for great speed. The submarines were divided into several classes, but the majority averaged 1,700 tons and were designed for a wide radius of action. As many of the above vessels as possible were laid down as soon as the drawings could be prepared, but however strenuously the shipyards might labour, it would be a long while before the first vessels were ready to commission, and in the meantime the Navy had to do the best it could with the inadequate means at its disposal.

As a first step it had become necessary, in fulfillment of the President’s pledge, to dispatch nearly one-third of the United States Navy a distance of 14,000 miles round South America, practically a two months’ voyage. Transports and supply ships had to be found and assembled, repairs in hand at Atlantic Navy Yards accelerated, and a complete schedule for the voyage prepared by the Operations Bureau. This could not be done in a moment, and it was only by publishing far too many details of the preparations made and of ships’ movements that the popular clamour for energetic naval action could be allayed. It says much for the energy and resourcefulness of the Navy Department and Atlantic Navy Yard staffs that by July 10 the following fleet had been assembled in Hampton Roads, whence it was dispatched southward with orders to effect a junction with the Pacific Base Force at San Diego:

6 Battleships:
New
York
,
Texas
,
Arkansas
,
Wyoming
,
Utah
,
Florida
.

6 Cruisers:
Trenton
,
Pittsburgh
,
Pueblo
,
St
.
Louis
,
Birmingham
,
Chester
.

2 Aircraft Carriers:
Lexington
,
Wright
.

100 Destroyers, all of “flush deck” type.

2 Mine-layers:
Shawmut
,
San
Francisco
.

20 Mine-sweepers of “Bird” class.

3 Destroyer Tenders:
Dobbin
,
Whitney
,
Denebola
.

1 Repair Ship:
Vestal
.

40 Miscellaneous Auxiliaries, including Oilers, Colliers, Supply Ships, Hospital Ships, and Transports. 

No submarines accompanied the fleet, as practically all those available were of obsolescent types, which it was feared might occasion delay through mechanical breakdowns. It will be noted that there was a distinct shortage of long-range scouting vessels, the only fast modern cruiser being the
Trenton
, which served as flagship of the Destroyer flotilla. The whole force was under the command of Admiral E. C. Templeton, whose flag was flown in the
Texas
.