Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (15 page)

The larger ships were ordered to conform to a programme which involved their calling at the following ports:

San Juan (Porto Rico), distant from Hampton Roads 1280 miles.

Pernambuco (Brazil), a further distance of 2500 miles.

Montevideo (Uruguay), a further distance of 2100 miles.

Punta Arenas (Chile), a further distance of 1410 miles.

Valparaiso (Chile), a further distance of 1274 miles.

Panama, a further distance of 2800 miles.

The total distance, including the run to San Diego, was practically 14,000 miles. Some of the smaller vessels, with lower fuel capacity, called also at other ports, such as Port of Spain (Trinidad), Para and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, and Callao (Peru). On the whole the progress of the fleet down the East coast of South America was uneventful, though, owing to so many of the ships having been hastily commissioned after long periods of lying-up, various machinery and other defects were encountered, which in some cases involved putting into the nearest port and following the fleet independently after the necessary repairs had been effected. Advantage was taken during the voyage to exercise the fleet in tactical evolutions, while continuous training of the crews, who included an unusually large proportion of “green” recruits, was carried on. 

CHAPTER X

Two Japanese submarines await United States Scouting fleet in Magellan Straits — Attack partially frustrated — American vessels sunk and damaged — Fate of Japanese submarines — Scouting fleet arrives at its destination — Tactical observations

WITH their usual enterprise the Japanese, in the expectation that American warships would use the Cape Horn route, had prepared an ambush there. Two submarines had been lying in concealment for an uncertain period in the Beagle Channel, a remote Strait separating Tierra del Fuego from Navarin and Hoste Islands. Some 120 miles in length, with an average breadth of about two miles, this channel is almost perfectly straight for the greater part of its course, which runs nearly due east and west. Bounded on either shore by mountains and cliffs, it is one of the most remarkable features of this wild region. Here was an ideal hiding place for submarines, for the Strait is seldom visited by ships, and has near its middle an independent exit, known as Ponsonby Sound, leading southward to the open sea near Cape Horn. The exact spot in which the submarines (
I
58
and
I
53
) established their temporary base is uncertain, as there are many small coves on both sides of the Beagle Channel. It is known, however, that they occasionally shifted from Chilean to Argentine waters and back again, with the object of confusing the issue should awkward questions arise in connection with their infringement of neutrality. It should be noted that the boundary between Chile and Argentina, after cutting across Tierra del Fuego from north to south, turns somewhat abruptly to the eastward on reaching the Beagle Channel, and thence runs in a line with its course, so that all the islands to the south of Tierra del Fuego are Chilean territory.

On August 7 the American fleet passed Cape Virgins and entered the Straits of Magellan. Reference to the accompanying sketch map will elucidate the events that followed. For about the first hundred miles of their course from the Atlantic the shores of the Straits are comparatively level, but from a point a little beyond the second “Narrows” they become rugged and hilly, until both sides are hedged with mountains, densely wooded, and often snow-capped. Here and there the landscape is diversified by the appearance of a glacier, though at certain seasons mist and rain render it difficult to pick out anything distinctly. The scenery when visible is magnificent, and the shore can be approached closely in most parts, the water, though remarkably clear, being very deep right up to the base of the cliffs. A conspicuous feature of the heights when closely approached is the gigantic tree fuchsia, which flourishes everywhere.

Just within the second “Narrows,” on the northern shore, is situated the southernmost town of the Republic of Chile — Punta Arenas (Sandy Point). This isolated port is well furnished with piers, quays, cranes, and all the normal accessories of a coaling station, but there are no docks. It is practically the only settlement of any size on the Straits, which elsewhere are but very sparsely populated, the climate being damp in summer and severe in winter.

It will be noticed from the map that innumerable channels, bays, and inlets open off the Straits between Punta Arenas and the Pacific, offering a fine choice of routes, but also providing many opportunities for an ambush. Of the several alternative courses which can be followed to reach the Pacific from Punta Arenas, the three principal ones are:

(
a
) Straight out into the Pacific through Cockburn Channel.

(
b
) To the termination of the Magellan Straits proper, passing into the Pacific by the channel leading between Queen Charlotte Island to the north and Desolation Island to the south.

(c) Right through the continuation of the Straits known as Smyth Channel, this being the route followed by the majority of merchant steamers.

In its passage through the Straits the fleet preserved the same general formation as throughout its voyage. Under this arrangement destroyers and mine-sweepers took the lead, followed by the heavy ships, each division of which was accompanied by more light craft. The aircraft carriers
Wright
and
Lexington
were stationed in the van and rear respectively, and the various auxiliaries distributed between the several divisions of the fleet. Owing to the slowness of certain auxiliary craft, the necessity for economising fuel, and the mistiness of the weather at this time of year — which in these southern latitudes is winter — the speed of the fleet was never more than ten knots, and at times fell below that figure. The target offered by such a long procession of ships (numbering at this stage 170 units) was therefore a tempting one, but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that low visibility has its disadvantages for an attacking submarine.

Two days earlier the Japanese boats,
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58
and
I
53
, had taken their station at a point of vantage near Sholl Bay, where the Cockburn Channel leads out from the Magellan Straits into the Pacific. Here they were in a position to deliver an attack upon the American fleet irrespective of the route it might elect to follow. They had been kept closely advised of the fleet’s movements by the Japanese Vice-Consul at Punta Arenas, whose fast motor launch was busily engaged in maintaining communication with the submarines during their vigil. Apparently it was considered too dangerous to employ radio signals for this purpose, lest the suspicions of the Chilean authorities should be aroused.

At Punta Arenas the fleet made a stay of twenty-four hours, in order to refill bunkers from the accompanying colliers and oilers, as well as from ships which had been specially chartered to deliver fuel at this stage of the voyage. Provisional arrangements were also entered into for the engagement of local pilots in case it should be decided to follow the route through Smyth Channel.

Reference must now be made to a factor which was to prove of considerable importance. The cruiser
Trenton
, a vessel of 7,500 tons displacement and over 33 knots speed, had been temporarily detached from the fleet on reaching the entrance to the Straits. She had proceeded southward through the Strait of Le Maire and round Cape Horn, where she encountered heavy weather which was scarcely felt by the fleet in the shelter of the Straits. Her orders were to rejoin the flag by way of Cockburn Channel, the Admiral proposing to decide, according to the nature of her report on weather conditions in the Pacific, whether or not to take the somewhat longer and more exposed route
via
Cockburn Channel and the open sea. In pursuance of these instructions the
Trenton
passed eastward through Cockburn Channel and in due course reached Sholl Bay, where she awaited the arrival of the fleet from Punta Arenas.

In this spot the mist, which had been drifting across the Straits in scattered patches, seems to have perceptibly thickened on the morning of August 9. After a couple of hours, as it showed no signs of clearing, Captain Soames of the
Trenton
ordered one of his two airplanes to go aloft and report whether the fleet was in sight. Owing to damage to aerials sustained in the heavy weather of the preceding day, the
Trenton’s
radio apparatus does not appear to have been in a condition to despatch messages at this juncture.

In the meantime, the sudden appearance of the cruiser from an unexpected direction had seriously perturbed the commanders of the two lurking submarines. They could not understand what object the
Trenton
could have in remaining at this spot in particular, and began to suspect that their existence might somehow have become known to the American Admiral. If this were so, he might not intend to take his fleet further until he was satisfied that the route was clear.

In such a contingency as this they found it difficult to decide on the right course to pursue, since it does not appear to have been covered by their instructions. Like other men of action under similar circumstances, they could not reconcile it with their sense of duty to remain inactive, but they hesitated to forsake the carefully chosen point of vantage which they occupied at the mouth of Sholl Bay. As a compromise, they divided forces,
I
53
remaining to watch the
Trenton
at Sholl Bay, while
I
58
proceeded up the Straits towards Punt a Arenas to ascertain the whereabouts of the United States Fleet.

Shortly afterwards a seaplane ascended from the deck of the
Trenton
, and rising to a height sufficient to keep above the low-lying mist banks, flew away to the northward. Close to Cape Froward she came over a comparatively clear patch of water, where her observer, Lieutenant Murton, who had undergone a special course of instruction in anti-submarine operations, discerned the track of
I
58
proceeding in the same direction as the airplane. After directing the pilot’s attention to the phenomenon, and confirming its existence by circling over the spot once or twice, speed was increased to over 150 miles an hour, and contact with the approaching fleet was quickly obtained. The alarming intelligence of the hostile submarine’s presence was at once communicated to Admiral Templeton, by whose direction the entire fleet, with the exception of the destroyers and the light cruisers
Birmingham
and
Chester
, turned sixteen points and retraced their course in the direction of Punta Arenas, which they had left an hour earlier. Unfortunately, in the course of this evolution the collier
Ajax
, whose steering gear had been giving trouble for some days previously, failed to answer her helm, and fell aboard the battleship
Utah
in the parallel column. In a vain attempt to avoid ramming the
Ajax
, the
Utah
reversed her engines with such suddenness that her next astern, the battleship
Florida
— which failed to perceive what had happened owing to the poor visibility — did not stop her engines in time, and struck the
Utah’s
starboard quarter with great violence, opening a large rent on the water-line. For a couple of minutes the three ships remained locked together, much damage being done to upperworks before they drew clear; and it was only by skilful manœuvering on the part of the other ships in the Third Squadron that further collisions were avoided.

Of the three vessels involved, the unlucky
Ajax
was in the worst case. She had been badly holed in the engine-room, and it soon became apparent that it would be impossible to save her, as her list became more and more pronounced. All hands were taken off, and she sank inside half an hour, the steep cliffs with deep water alongside rendering it impossible to beach her.

The damage to the
Utah
, though less severe, might also have proved fatal had it occurred in bad weather or far from port; as it was, her powerful pumping installation was fully taxed to control the inrush of water from the flooded compartments, the shock of the collision, in spite of her stout construction, having started the bulkheads in the vicinity of the leak. She was able to reach Punta Arenas under her own steam, and with the assistance of harbour tugs was berthed alongside the quay at a spot where the water was sufficiently shallow to prevent her becoming completely submerged. Here it may be remarked that the skilled
personnel
of the repair ship
Vestal
, with the aid of local contractors and salvage plant, were able to prepare and fit a temporary patch which enabled the battleship eventually to complete her voyage.

The
Florida
, though leaking slightly forward, had not damaged her bows to an extent affecting her seaworthiness, and she was able to remain with the fleet.

Had the Japanese submarine been at hand when the collision occurred she could scarcely have hoped for a more favourable opportunity of delivering an attack; but she was too far distant, and indeed was soon sufficiently occupied with the problem of her own safety. The destroyer flotillas, numbering ninety boats (six having remained with the
Utah
), and led by the
Birmingham
and
Chester
, were not long in locating
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58
, to whose lair they were guided by the
Trenton’s
plane and other aircraft sent up by the fleet. Numerous depth charges were dropped without immediate effect, but in a hunt by such a swarm of swift vessels the odds were heavily against the submarine, which sealed her doom by steering an underwater course which took her into Useless Bay. Here she was sighted by seaplanes, and her retreat being cut off by the pursuing destroyers, she was forced to the surface in a crippled condition, after depth charges had been dropped all around her. The concentrated gunfire of the destroyers quickly completed her destruction, and her shattered hull sank without having exhibited any sign of surrender. So far as could be ascertained, she discharged two torpedoes in the course of the hunt, neither of which took effect. When the report of her destruction reached Tokyo it was embodied in a much magnified account of her exploits by the vernacular Press, which credited the sinking of the
Ajax
and damaging of the
Utah
and
Florida
to her torpedoes. Doubtless Japanese official circles were better informed, but colour was given to these and other exaggerated reports by the posthumous promotion and decoration of the officers and men who were lost in the submarine.