Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (13 page)

Comparatively few vessels of the Japanese mercantile marine fell into American hands at the outbreak of war, and even these were unimportant in size and value. There is no doubt that early warning must have been given of the imminence of hostilities, a fact of which the blocking of the Panama Canal by the
Akashi
Maru
affords further proof.

At the same time, however, a few people in Washington did evince a clearer perception of the difficulties confronting Japan. More than one member of the War Cabinet, it has since been affirmed, foresaw that Japan would eventually find herself assailed either by Russia or China, perhaps by both, and would then be compelled to make peace and restitution to the United States in order to free her hands for defence against these new enemies. This view no doubt appealed to some minds because, if it were sound, it did away with the uncomfortable necessity for a more vigorous prosecution of the war. According to their arguments, it would suffice for America to stand on the defensive, taking only such measures as were necessary to protect her coastline and her floating trade, but without incurring the costs and hazards of operations in the war zone overseas. In other words, she should restrict her combatant energies to the minimum consistent with defence in the narrowest sense of the term, and, for the rest, wait upon the march of events in the Far East, which would, they suggested, soon compel Japan to put forward peace proposals. This specious reasoning, however, failed to impress the majority of American strategists, nor did it escape criticism in the Press, a section of which emphasised the folly of gambling on optimistic expectations which might at any moment be falsified. That Japan should have gone to war without first insuring herself against an attack in flank seemed quite incredible to thoughtful Americans, who remembered with what careful judgment she had selected the right moment for breaking off relations with Russia in 1904.

At this time, be it remembered, the world was in ignorance of the domestic motives which had impelled Prince Kawamura and his colleagues to precipitate the war. Whether they had foreseen or fully estimated the dangers of complications with Russia and China must always remain in doubt; but it is clear from reports of the conference at Tokyo on the fateful 5th of January that they were prepared if necessary to take immense risks rather than allow their country to drift into revolution.

While these discussions were going on at Washington, alarming news came from the Pacific. In pursuance of their policy of taking the initiative, and with the object of maintaining the morale of the populace, the Japanese had determined that the war must be carried to the enemy’s coasts. Their first move in this direction was the laying of a series of mine-fields, the earliest of which were planted off the Hawaiian capital, Honolulu, in the island of Oahu, and Pearl Harbour, the naval station some few' miles from it. This work appears to have been carried out by a 7,000-ton Japanese submarine, of the type described in a previous chapter, and its first effect was to sink the United States Shipping Board steamer,
Dewey
, of 5,630 tons gross, immediately after she had sailed from Honolulu on May 20. The local naval authorities acted promptly, suspending all departures and warning expected arrivals by radio, pending an investigation of the mine-field’s extent. Thanks to good organisation and favourable weather, both groups of mines were located and swept up within a week, without further loss than the sinking of one auxiliary mine-sweeper. The United States Navy was favoured by fortune on this occasion, since a considerable concentration of force had now been effected at Pearl Harbour, and the enemy’s mine-field might easily have revealed its existence by the sinking of some important warship.

The next spot where mines were discovered was to the southward of Gammon Shoal, just outside the entrance to San Diego Bay. Here again matters might well have been more serious. A flotilla of destroyers ran into this mine-field on leaving port for exercises on the morning of May 25, the consequent casualties involving the loss of the
Yarborough
and
Thompson
, and the temporary disablement of the
Ballard
,
Laub
and
Aaron
Ward
. Energetic measures resulted in the removal of the remaining mines without further loss. There is still considerable doubt as to the agency employed in this instance. Since no actual proof can be found of Japanese mine-laying submarines operating so far afield, the most probable explanation is that the mines had been laid by Japanese fishing craft, many of which before the war had followed their avocation off the Mexican coast of Lower California. This view was held by the naval authorities at San Diego, who thereupon established a patrol in Lower Californian waters to guard against a repetition of the incident. These measures threw a severe strain on American resources in the way of patrol vessels, in spite of the fact that a large number of auxiliary craft had been taken up for the purpose.

Before closing this chapter it is as well to set out the distribution of the United States Fleet as it was left after the closing of the Panama Canal. There is no question but that the Japanese were kept well informed of such matters at this early period, as an effective censorship did not yet exist, and there was consequently a serious leakage of news through the American Press.

Excluding the Asiatic squadron, which, with the exception of two destroyers, seven submarines, and some unimportant units in Chinese rivers, had been practically wiped out when the Japanese descended on the Philippines, the following ships were in the Pacific:

12 Battleships:
West
Virginia
,
Maryland
,
Colorado
,
California
,
Tennessee
,
New
Mexico
,
Idaho
,
Mississippi
,
Pennsylvania
,
Arizona
,
Oklahoma
,
Nevada
.

13 Modern Cruisers:
Minneapolis
,
Portland
,
Kansas
City
,
Indianapolis
,
Omaha
,
Milwaukee
,
Cincinnati
,
Raleigh
,
Detroit
,
Richmond
,
Concord
,
Marblehead
,
Memphis
. (Three more cruisers of the new 10,000 ton type were completing, but not ready for sea.)

7 Older Cruisers:
Charlotte
,
Huntington
,
Huron
,
Seattle
,
Charleston
,
Salem
,
New
Orleans
.

2 Aircraft Carriers:
Saratoga
,
Langley
.

113 Destroyers (First Line), all of “flush deck” type.

41 Submarines, including 6 of “V” type, 16 of “S’’ type, and 19 of “R” type.

15 Patrol Vessels of “Eagle” type.

2 Mine-layers:
Aroostook
,
Baltimore
.

12 Mine-sweepers of “Bird” class.

4 Destroyer Tenders:
Altair
,
Rigel
,
Melville
,
Buffalo
.

2 Submarine Tenders:
Holland
,
Canopus
.

2 Repair Ships:
Medusa
,
Prometheus
.

14 Miscellaneous Auxiliaries, including Oilers, Colliers, Supply Ships, Hospital Ships, etc.

Very soon after the blocking of the Panama Canal there had been concentrated at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, the whole of the twelve battleships, organised in three divisions of four ships each; eight of the modern cruisers, in two divisions of four; the old cruiser
Seattle
, as Administrative flagship for the fleet; thirty-six destroyers in six divisions of six boats each, with the modern cruiser
Concord
as flagship and the tenders
Altair
,
Rigel
and
Melville
attached; six submarines of “V” type and twelve of “S” type, with the tender
Holland
; six of the minesweepers, and about a dozen auxiliaries. The remaining strength of the United States Navy in the Pacific was distributed between San Diego, Mare Island, and Bremerton, the largest number being at the first-named base, where the auxiliary
Procyon
served as flagship.

In the Atlantic were the following ships, mostly of older types:

6 Battleships:
New
York
,
Texas
,
Arkansas
,
Wyoming
,
Utah
,
Florida
.

1 Modern Cruiser:
Trenton
.

(Several cruisers of the new 10,000 type were completing, but were not immediately ready for sea.)

9 Older Cruisers:
Pittsburgh
,
Pueblo
,
St
.
Louis
,
Rochester
,
Birmingham
,
Chester
,
Olympia
,
Chattanooga
,
Des
Moines
.

2 Aircraft Carriers:
Lexington
,
Wright
.

160 Destroyers, all of First Line (a few Second Line Destroyers still existed, but were pronounced unfit for active service).

70 Submarines of various types, none being fit for long distance cruising with the Battle Fleet.

6 Patrol Vessels, mostly armed yachts, several more of which were acquired later.

4 Destroyer Tenders:
Dobbin
,
Whitney
,
Denebola
,
Bridgeport
.

5 Submarine Tenders:
Bushnell
,
Fulton
,
Beaver
,
Camden
,
Savannah
.

2 Mine-layers:
Shawmut
,
San
Francisco
.

30 Mine-sweepers of “Bird” class.

1 Repair Ship:
Vestal
.

32 Miscellaneous Auxiliaries, including Oilers, Colliers, Supply Ships, Hospital Ships, etc.

Great difficulty was found in manning destroyers and other vessels brought forward from reserve at the outbreak of war, and in view of the situation created by the closing of the Panama Canal, 50 per cent of the complements of the Scouting Fleet in the Atlantic were transported overland to complete the crews of the undermanned Pacific fleet. The strength of the Scouting fleet was made up with new recruits, of which large numbers were being drafted to sea by the Navy Recruiting Bureau. A fair number of these had served before, but the majority were new to naval life, and even those with previous experience were necessarily ignorant of the latest improvements in gunnery and other branches.

Without exaggeration it may safely be said that in the earlier stages of the war the shortage of trained
personnel
gave American admirals more cause for anxiety than the manoeuvres of the enemy.

CHAPTER IX

Japanese submarine attacks on United States Pacific coast — Air raids in California — Japanese aircraft-carrier makes good her retreat — United States Government finds popular demand for energetic measures too strong to resist — New ships ordered — The Scouting fleet to proceed to Pacific via Cape Horn

THE next Japanese move was decidedly sensational. On June 17, or approximately three weeks after the discovery of the mine-field referred to in the preceding chapter, a freight train heavily laden with stores for the fleet at San Diego was derailed forty-five miles south of Santa Ana. While the ensuing confusion was at its height, shells began to explode amid the wreckage. These came from a Japanese ocean-going submarine,
I
54
, lying a mile off shore. After setting some of the cars on fire and causing numerous casualties, the vessel dived and was not seen again. It was then discovered that a considerable section of the line had been torn up. This outrage was at first attributed to enemy agents on shore, but it was later suggested, with a greater element of probability, that the submarine may have landed a party at night to damage the line, which at this point runs very near and in full view of the sea. Certainly the submarine must have been in communication with the land, since she was evidently waiting in a half-submerged condition for the train to pass. Destroyers sent to hunt for her could find no traces of her presence in the vicinity. As a matter of fact, she had proceeded further north, to reappear that same evening off the coast near Los Angeles. A large Standard Oil tanker, the
J
.
A
.
Moffett
Junior
, was torpedoed in Santa Monica Bay, and had to be beached in a sinking condition, eventually becoming a total loss.

Before the facts could be fully ascertained, the submarine had made a third raid, this time off the Golden Gate, where she succeeded in sinking four ships without interference. Exasperated by this further exhibition of audacity on the part of the enemy, the naval authorities ordered all available patrol vessels and aircraft to the scene of the latest attacks; but the Japanese commander had evidently calculated with accuracy the length of time in which he would be able to operate undisturbed, for the patrols found only the floating wreckage of his victims. No lives were lost, the crews of all ships intercepted being allowed time to take to their boats.

It is now known that submarine
I
54
did not operate alone; she had been accompanied most of the way to the Pacific Coast by the auxiliary aircraft carrier
Hakata
and the oiler
Tsurugizaki
. But at the time no suspicion of this fact appears to have been entertained, and the only quarry sought was the submarine, which was a vessel of close on 2,000 tons, mounting a pair of 5.5-inch guns. She also carried a seaplane of small size and special design.

After lying in concealment for two days to allow the hunt to die down a little,
I
54
continued her northerly course as far as the mouth of the Columbia River. Here a similar programme was enacted, two ships being sunk, while Aberdeen, South Bend, and other coastal towns in Washington found themselves under fire from the sea. Although the damage caused was insignificant, these daring attacks set the whole Pacific slope in an uproar. The wildest rumours found ready credence. An immense flotilla of gigantic submarines had crossed the Pacific with orders to lay waste the entire coastline, declared one Los Angeles journal. No place could be considered safe, for a city lying beyond the range of gunfire might be attacked by aircraft, with which the submarines were well provided (here the newspaper was nearer to the truth than was at the time realised). Several of the coast town authorities telegraphed to Washington, demanding that warships be permanently stationed at their ports. One enterprising mayor would not be content with less than a squadron of battleships! There were, of course, no ships available for such duty, and even if there had been, the Navy Department could not have so allocated them without deranging all its war plans.

A similar agitation had arisen in 1898, when the supposed approach of the Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera so alarmed certain cities of the Atlantic seaboard that some ancient monitors, of no value for war, were assigned to various harbours for guard duty. But in view of the pressing demands now made upon them, the authorities can hardly be blamed for having ordered every spare airplane to the Oregon coast, leaving California denuded of aircraft. Nothing could have suited the Japanese better, for their main line of attack was now unmasked by the almost simultaneous bombing on June 22 of San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles by squadrons of airplanes, flying so high as to be almost invisible to the naked eye when first perceived. At San Francisco the citizens, hearing gunfire from the few anti-aircraft guns in position (which, it may be mentioned, were all outranged), flocked into the streets in their thousands to learn what was passing, nor could all the efforts of the police prevent dense crowds from gathering in the main thoroughfares. Hardly had it dawned upon them that an air attack was impending when several loud detonations were heard close at hand, and a terrible stampede for shelter at once ensued, many unfortunate people being trampled to death. As bombs continued to fall and explode with devastating violence, it became painfully apparent that a serious attack was in progress, not merely a lone-hand raid by a small machine flown off from a submarine. In the absence of all local airplanes in Oregon and Washington, the enemy had everything in his favour, and utilised the opportunity to distribute his entire load of bombs upon the unfortunate inhabitants of San Francisco and Oakland. The greater number of these missiles appear to have been filled with high explosive, and their effects upon life and property were most disastrous, hospitals being filled to overflowing with victims who had been struck down by bomb fragments or falling masonry, or crushed beneath the feet of panic-stricken fugitives. Some of the bombs were undoubtedly incendiary, but at San Francisco, thanks to an efficient fire-fighting service, these proved comparatively ineffective, only one serious conflagration being caused. This was confined to the shipping quarter facing Goat Island, and was responsible for a vast amount of damage to warehouses and wharves. Altogether, the loss of life and property caused by this lightning raid on the San Francisco district was very severe.

At Los Angeles, though only nine airplanes were engaged as compared with eleven at San Francisco and Oakland, the damage was, if anything, more extensive, as many fires were started. These took long to subdue, several oil reservoirs being involved. The motion picture industry was seriously affected by the destruction of several important studios. Exaggerated estimates of the number of attacking aircraft were prevalent locally at the time, but it is now known that only twenty were engaged. The American planes which had been sent north in search of submarines were hastily recalled to California, only to find that no certain indication existed as to the quarter in which the raiding machines were to be sought, these having flown straight in from the sea and departed in the same direction. The fact that the submarine
I
54
had retreated northward after her first appearance on the Californian coast caused many to urge that attention be concentrated in that area, on the theory that the attacking force might have been launched from some secret base in one of the numerous islands fringing the coast of British Columbia.

Some time elapsed before the riddle was partially solved, and even then there were few facts to go upon. Not until the end of the war was the whole truth revealed. It appears that the
Hakata
, originally a large fast passenger steamer, had been hastily fitted out at Yokosuka as an auxiliary aircraft carrier, with stowage capacity for twenty large seaplanes, each able to carry half a ton of bombs. These machines were stowed in the holds with their wings folded. The ship herself, elaborately disguised as a British freighter of the Blue Funnel Line, mounted an armament of four 6-inch guns concealed behind dummy deck houses. She sailed from Jaluit on May 31, in company with the oil tanker
Tsurugizaki
, and for the greater part of their voyage across the Pacific the vessels had the ocean to themselves. Not until they had reached a point four hundred miles north-east of Hawaii, to which the two steamers had given a wide berth, was another ship sighted. This was a British merchantman bound from Vancouver to Australia, whose radio operator was puzzled to know why his greetings to the passing vessels met with no intelligible response, but he thought little of the matter at the time.

At dusk on June 16 the two Japanese ships had crept to within two hundred miles of the American coast without being challenged or even sighted by a patrol. Here they separated, the
Hakata
steering a southerly course parallel with the coast, while her smaller consort (which was also disguised as a British ship) proceeded at low speed toward the north, as if making for a Canadian port, but actually heading for a rendezvous which had been arranged beforehand. At midday on the 22d the
Hakata
was twenty miles to the south-east of Point Reyes, and therefore about seventy miles west of the Golden Gate. Here she was sighted by an American armed yacht on patrol duty, manned by naval reservists, but on hoisting the number of the British ship she was impersonating and giving her destination as Valparaiso, she was allowed to proceed. Had the yacht approached near enough for verbal conversation the ruse might have been detected, in spite of the fact that the officers of the
Hakata
are said to have been selected for their knowledge of the English language; but in that case the yacht herself would no doubt have been blown out of the water by the heavier armament of the disguised ship. As it was, the
Hakata
was able to pass on without arousing suspicion. An hour later, no sail being then in sight, she was hove-to, while the airplanes were brought up from the holds, their wings assembled, and a supply of bombs placed in the traps. They were then lowered to the water, and, with engines started up, flew off to carry death and destruction to the Californian cities.

While they were away, the
Hakata
had to cruise in the vicinity with steam enough for full speed, awaiting the return of her flock. This was the most perilous phase of the whole adventure, for the alarm might be given at any moment, and all patrol craft within call would then be on the alert. However, nothing occurred until a call was received by radio-phone from one of the returning airplanes, asking for the position of the ship. Just after this, four other machines were sighted, and twenty minutes later all but one of the planes had been accounted for. Eventually eighteen were picked up and hoisted inboard. Of the remaining two, one was wrecked by a faulty landing on the water and the other failed to return, though the ship remained in the neighbourhood for another hour at imminent peril to herself. Owing probably to engine trouble, this machine must have come down in the sea, as its wreck was driven ashore near Santa Barbara some days later. Hope of its return having been abandoned, the
Hakata
set off at high speed for the rendezvous with her consort.

Some time after darkness had set in the beam of a searchlight was concentrated on her from a ship about a mile distant, and several shots were fired. She held on her course without attempting to return the fire, the target being practically invisible. Her opponent was the United States Coast Guard cruising cutter
Haida
, a vessel of 1,780 tons displacement and sixteen knots maximum speed, armed with two 5-inch guns. She was normally stationed at Port Townsend, Washington, but had been attached to the Naval Service in view of the urgent demand for patrol craft of every description. Contact with the
Hakata
was soon lost, and it remained doubtful whether her refusal to stop when fired on was any positive proof of her being an enemy — until a Japanese official announcement revealed the facts. All that the naval authorities could do was to broadcast a general warning for a sharp look-out to be kept for a suspicious vessel, of which only a very general description could be furnished by the
Haida’s
people.

The obsolete cruiser
Charlotte
, which, as already mentioned, was employed on escort work between San Francisco and Honolulu, and was then within five hundred miles of Hawaii, was the only ship in a position to take advantage of the news. Having obtained permission by radio to allow her convoy to proceed on its voyage without her, she stood off to the north-west at her best speed. Originally twenty-two knots, this had decreased, owing to the age of her boilers and long disuse, to a doubtful nineteen knots, which she maintained with difficulty for nearly twelve hours, when speed had to be reduced. The cruiser kept on for a further twelve hours at a reduced speed averaging under seventeen knots, but there was still no sign of the quarry. It seemed useless to continue the hunt, so a course was set for Honolulu. The
Charlotte
had, in fact, never been within 250 miles of the
Hakata
, which on leaving the Californian coast had steered almost due north for some time, this being judged to be the direction in which American warships were least likely to be encountered. Contact with the
Tsurugizaki
was made on the 24th, and on the following day, the weather being propitious, the
Hakata’s
bunkers were replenished with oil from the tanker. Thereafter the two vessels proceeded on their homeward voyage, still keeping well to the northward, and finally reached Yokosuka without misadventure.