Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (23 page)

Following on this successful
coup
, the main body of insurgents took the road to Honolulu. They were organised on military lines, with Japanese Army reserve officers in charge of sections. On the way they were joined by contingents from other districts, and a series of positions in the central portion of the city, commanding the main approaches from the harbour, were occupied. Next morning the resident American population awoke to find their streets invaded by an enemy who seemed to have sprung out of the ground. The troops in the island, numbering over ten thousand, were not all assembled in a single place, but were scattered in various directions. The largest body was at Schofield Barracks, twenty miles away, in the centre of the island, and found themselves surrounded by insurgents who had torn up the railway line and cut all telegraph and telephone wires. Other detachments were at Forts Weaver and Kamehameha, at the entrance to Pearl Harbour; at Fort Shatter, to the north-west of Honolulu; at Forts Armstrong, De Russy and Ruger, to the south-east, between the city and Diamond Head; and at a new magazine on the slopes of Mount Konahuanui, about ten miles north of Honolulu. With the enemy holding the centre of communications, including the telephone exchange and railroad depot, the concentration of these troops was no easy task. Several of the camps which had been formed around the forts had been attacked, but their sentries seem to have been vigilant, as nowhere had the rebels gained a foothold, though they still surrounded the forts in unknown strength.

In Forts Armstrong and De Russy, which are practically in Honolulu, there were barely two thousand men, and not all of these were combatants. The guns were mostly disposed with a view to repelling an enemy attack from seaward, and in any case it did not seem advisable to shell the city except as a last resort. A fast launch was dispatched to Pearl Harbour to request assistance from the warships there. Pending the arrival of help, all available men were employed in driving off the detachments of Japanese in the vicinity of the two forts. This done, an advance was made along the streets leading towards the centre of the city. Firing was incessant until both rebels and defenders learned by experience the folly of wasting ammunition. As the day wore on, both sides were reinforced, the Japanese by further contingents from distant villages, the Americans by landing parties from the warships. But it was only in the late afternoon that General McVey, the officer commanding in Oahu, judged himself strong enough to make a general attack. Roofs were lined with riflemen and machine gunners, and the warships were ordered to throw shells into certain prominent buildings known to be occupied by the enemy. A large portion of the fleet had left on a cruise the day before, but about a dozen ships were brought round from Pearl Harbour. While their fire caused considerable structural damage, casualties among the Japanese were few, owing to the skill with which they took advantage of every bit of cover. An American bayonet charge was more successful, and after a short hand-to-hand fight the enemy positions were stormed. But on following the rebels across the open ground behind the buildings, the Americans found themselves enfiladed by a murderous fire from barricades and trenches at right angles to their line of advance, and were obliged to retreat. On regaining the shelter of the buildings they had just quitted the plan of attack was reorganised, and while some kept the rebels busy with a steady fire, other parties spread out on either flank to take them in the rear. These movements were not executed without heavy casualties, and at the close of the day it was felt that other methods must be devised if the enemy was to be turned out of his positions without long and arduous trench warfare.

The situation was saved by the arrival in port that night of a transport carrying a complete “tank” section. The tanks were of a light and handy type, eminently suitable for such an emergency. They were brought ashore without delay, gangs working all through the night to complete their discharge and assembly. Fortunately their crews had been embarked in the same ship, so the necessary trained personnel was not lacking. On the following day they led the advance with complete success, for the Japanese, taken altogether by surprise, were evidently disheartened by this unexpected diversion. Bursts of machine-gun fire from the tanks broke up every attempt to rally, and the victory was rendered complete by the arrival of strong reinforcements from Fort Shafter, whose garrison had been relieved by a body of troops and seamen marched overland from Pearl Harbour. These made a flank attack on the retreating Japanese, who now broke and fled in various directions. Their retirement was covered by a series of fires which broke out simultaneously, having evidently been kindled to delay pursuit. Several streets were involved in this conflagration, which added considerably to the heavy bill for damages caused by the revolt. Many of the Japanese wounded perished miserably in the burning houses. This marked the turning point of the insurrection, and though the last spark of rebellion was not quenched until some weeks later, it never again assumed dangerous proportions.

At the time this truth was not fully realised, and as soon as the fire had been mastered and order restored, strong detachments patrolled the city to guard against the possibility of renewed attack in the night. Next day steps were taken to reconquer the rest of the island, which appeared to be largely in the hands of the enemy. The garrison of Schofield Barracks, having driven off their assailants and repaired the railroad, were now in communication with Pearl Harbour, and with this aid systematic arrangements were made to round up the rebels. On the previous day a series of heavy explosions from the direction of Mount Konahuanui had caused grave misgivings as to the safety of the magazine there. It was now ascertained that Lieutenant Logan, the Coast Artillery officer in charge of this depot, had for many hours maintained a stubborn resistance to the assaults of a strong force of insurgents, who finally burst their way in by sheer weight of numbers. Although severely wounded, Lieutenant Logan contrived to ignite a train which had been laid in readiness, and blew up the whole magazine, killing some hundreds of Japanese and injuring many more. This desperate act completely wrecked the plans of the rebels, who had counted on seizing the large quantity of rifles and ammunition stored in the magazine. There is no doubt that by his heroic action Logan appreciably hastened the end of the revolt.

In the other islands, where fewer weapons were available, the outbreak was not so serious. At Hilo, the largest town in the group after Honolulu, the disturbances only amounted to rioting. In fact, the movement was manifestly aimed at the American naval and military establishments in Oahu. In the hills the Japanese insurgents contrived to maintain themselves for some two or three months by a form of guerrilla warfare scarcely distinguishable from brigandage; and the American War Department has placed it on record that the new military formations derived invaluable experience from the operations involved in the suppression of these dying embers of revolt.

All Japanese captured with arms in their hands were deported to Panama and employed as labourers in the Canal Zone. Those who surrendered voluntarily within a certain period were dealt with more leniently. The many thousands of Japanese still left in Hawaii were segregated as far as possible, and kept under surveillance by the military police.

A court of inquiry which sat at Pearl Harbour to probe into the origin of the revolt found no positive evidence of outside instigation, though many prisoners quoted the ringleaders as having declared that they were acting under the orders of the Japanese Government. A Japanese farmer named Morimoto, who had been captured while leading an attack upon Fort Ruger, assured the examining officers that the rising was planned to coincide with the arrival of a Japanese army of invasion, of whose coming the insurgents had been secretly apprised. This witness, it is true, bore a dubious character, and although he stuck to his evidence under severe cross-examination, the court appears to have remained sceptical. Another witness, named Sodo, who had also been captured with arms in his hands, flatly contradicted Morimoto, and insisted with considerable vehemence that the revolt had been planned from beginning to end by certain Japanese residents of Hawaii. In the opinion of several officers present in the court, Sodo’s vigorous denial of Japanese official complicity in the plot was overdone, though there was no means of testing his statements.

The only other fact bearing upon the question is a reference in a book published at Tokyo a few months after the war. Its author, Captain Amakasu, a former naval officer, speaks vaguely of a projected expedition against Hawaii, the date given coinciding with that of the actual revolt. This expedition, Captain Amakasu states, was not proceeded with, “as our scouts were unable to obtain the intelligence which was essential to the success of the undertaking; but,” he adds, “matters had already gone so far that warships and transports were assembling at Yokosuka for the voyage to Hawaii, and the plan was cancelled only ten days before the convoy was due to sail.”

In view of this testimony it is impossible to dismiss the suspicion that the Tokyo Government had some share in kindling the flames of rebellion. It would, in any case, have been a perfectly legitimate action from their point of view, for the creation of domestic embarrassments for an enemy State is one of the most time-honoured methods of waging war.

The rising might, of course, have proved a far graver affair than it actually turned out to be. Even as it was, many American lives and much valuable property had been sacrificed. Nor was the trouble without effect on the general military situation, for it delayed by at least three weeks the sailing of the expedition to Truk, and to that extent may be said to have prolonged the war.

The expedition, which finally sailed from Pago-Pago on June 18, consisted of 4,000 picked troops, with machine guns and field artillery. The troop transports, escorted by two divisions of destroyers and the aircraft-carrier
Wright
, pursued a route which as far as possible avoided all islands of importance, leaving the Ellice and Gilbert groups out of sight to the north, and Fiji and the Solomons to the south. Two strong squadrons of fast cruisers, each accompanied by an aircraft carrier, kept station some twenty miles ahead and to the northward of the transports, while forty miles astern came the main battle fleet with its attendant destroyers, submarines and auxiliaries. So large an assemblage of vessels could not be expected to cross even such a vast ocean as the Pacific without being sighted, but by the formation adopted the presence of the transports was effectually screened. Indeed, the only ships which caught a glimpse of the expedition were a British cruiser bound from the Solomon Islands to Fiji, and a merchant steamer carrying phosphates from Nauru. The former only reported what she had seen to the British Admiralty, while the merchant vessel, being without radio gear, had no opportunity of disclosing the news until she reached Sydney a fortnight later, by which time it was too late for any harm to be done.

The expedition covered the distance of three thousand miles from Tutuila to Truk in ten days, the average speed being rather below thirteen knots. A certain amount of bad weather was encountered, which lengthened the voyage by a day or two. Eventually, however, the islands were reached without misadventure, and the landing, which took place on June 28, was quite peaceful, no resistance being offered by the two or three Japanese officials who represented their Government. It is doubtful whether the native inhabitants of these remote islands appreciated that a war was in progress; nor would it have interested them if they had known. During the voyage radio signals were reduced to a minimum; but once the island was occupied full details were transmitted to Honolulu and thence to Washington in order that further preparations might proceed without delay. Since it was desirable that the enemy should be kept in the dark until the last possible moment, no intimation of the seizure of Truk was given out in the United States. So far as could be ascertained, Japanese cruisers were not in the habit of visiting Truk, but to guard against a surprise visit by enemy ships, the strictest possible watch was kept by airplanes, flights of which relieved each other in patrolling the group of islands. Four of the fastest cruisers were held ready with steam in their boilers, in case it should prove necessary to run down and destroy an intruder, and shortly after the landing had been effected all ships were refuelled from the attendant oilers and colliers. Long afterwards it was discovered that the expedition had narrowly missed running into the Japanese South Sea squadron, under Rear-Admiral Kokuyama, which had called at Ponapi on a cruise from the Philippines to Jaluit, in the Marshall Archipelago, the day before the descent on Truk, so that the bad weather which delayed the United States fleet was a blessing in disguise.

The Truk or Hogolu Islands, which had thus become an advanced war base of the United States Navy, constitute the largest group in the Carolines, and were among the ex-German insular territories which fell to Japan under the Versailles mandate. The dozen or more basaltic islands of the group form, as it were, the jagged rim of a great lagoon, some forty miles in length and about the same in breadth, studded with rocky islets. This lagoon is accessible by six or more navigable passages, each deep enough for the heaviest battleships, though patches of shoal water and the strong tide rip render it necessary to proceed with caution. Eten Harbour, the principal settlement and seat of the Japanese administration, is located between Eten and Dublon Islands. The passage into the harbour is clearly marked by pole beacons, which the Japanese had omitted to remove on the outbreak of war. The lagoon itself, as Rear-Admiral Harper had reported, was found to provide anchorage facilities for the entire fleet, and though there were not a few submerged rocks and areas of foul ground, the clear water enabled these dangers to be avoided by keeping a sharp look-out from each masthead when conning the ships to their berths. So far as natural advantages were concerned, it would have been difficult to find a place more admirably suited to the purposes of the expedition. Why the Japanese had neglected to take even the most elementary precautions against the seizure of Truk will always remain a mystery. True, there were so many islands in the South Seas which lay exposed to a sudden
coup
that the protection of all would have been physically impossible; but the geographical situation of Truk was such as to endow it with obvious strategic importance, and the failure to provide the simplest defences — there was not even a long-range radio station — was an error for which Japan was to pay dearly. The easy and bloodless seizure of this valuable position stood in marked contrast to the abortive expedition against the Bonins. But the whole history of successful warfare is largely a record of initial mistakes having been retrieved by the wisdom born of painful experience, and this war was to be no exception to the rule.