Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (19 page)

To the south, the German summer offensive of 1942, the Soviet counterattack that autumn and the German reaction in the winter of 1943 dominated fighting between the two titans. By early February 1943, the far right wing of Red Army forces punching west after their victories at Stalingrad hit the Second Army and levered it out of Kursk. This made the Orel bulge occupied by Second Panzer even more dangerous. At this time, Schmidt’s command consisted of XXXV, LIII Infantry and XLVII Panzer Corps and the army reserve (442nd and 707th Infantry Divisions).
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On 22 February, the 13th and 48th Armies of the Bryansk Front hit Second Panzers’ north flank along the oft-contested Zhizdra sector. Von Kluge dispatched reinforcements from the Rzehv and Viazma sectors. By the end of the month the Soviets had gained only about 20km and called off the attack. Accordingly, Rokossovsky moved his efforts south to the boundary between the Second and Second Panzer Armies. His men gained a little ground until OKH ordered Schmidt to counterattack toward the south and regain contact with his neighbor. The 4th Panzer led the way over the exact same Novgorod-Seversky battlefield it fought over during the opening phases of the Kiev pocket maneuver a year and half earlier. On 12 March, the Soviets tried to reorganize but the endeavor came too late. By the 21st, Red Army forces went over to the defensive, thus creating what would be the north face of the Kursk bulge in the next great campaign in the Nazi-Soviet War, Operation Citadel. Until then, that spring Second Panzer Army had to defend its 250km front with its 160,000 men in 14 weak divisions.
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As the original choice to lead the northern pincer in Citadel, Second Panzer Army had an opportunity to regain some lost glory and again become an operational force to be dealt with. Instead, that honor went to the Ninth Army, and Second Panzer remained the whipping boy of the Soviet Bryansk and Western Fronts along with partisans intent on making the occupiers regret their invasion. Stavka had been planning Operation Kutuzov against the Orel bulge since April. When it became clear in its early stages that Citadel was going nowhere, especially its northern attack, the Soviets pounced. The Western Front (211,000 men, 745 tanks and self-propelled guns, 4,285 tubes of indirect-fire weapons) and Bryansk Front (170,000 men, 350 AFVs) attacked at 0300 hours on 12 July. The Western Front’s move split the 56th from the 262nd Infantry Division northeast of Bolkhov. It achieved success unexpected by the high command, which did not have reserves nearby with which to exploit
the good fortune. Schmidt immediately rushed the relatively fresh 5th Panzer Division to the main point of rupture near Kroma. By noon on that first day, von Kluge first sent two divisions from Ninth Army, then later in the day dispatched a further two panzer divisions. If there had been any doubt before, with the loss of these assets, Citadel’s northern attack was over for certain. Hitler now put Model in temporary command of the combined Second Panzer and Ninth Armies with orders to restore the earlier lines.
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However, Second Panzer’s front in turn suffered three penetrations: two east of Orel and another up near Sukhinichi. The XXXV Corps (left to right: 34th, 56th, 262nd and 299th Infantry Divisions) took the brunt of the punishment between Mstensk and Orel. The Germans brought up reinforcements, the arrival of which, fortunately for the defenders, the Red Army Air Force could not halt. The Soviets set about enlarging the cracks they had created in the Second Panzer lines and expanded their attacks into the Ninth Army Sector; Model could foresee more trouble ahead. The 8th Panzer Division and other units came forward and halted the 1st Guards Tank Corps. German success was short–lived, because on the 20th, Stavka committed the 698 tanks of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. Even General PS Rybalko’s massive force stalled before the two panzer divisions. Two days later Stalin personally telephoned 3rd Guards Tank headquarters and asked the chief of staff, ‘Why has Rybalko not yet taken Stanovoi-Kolodez? Tell the commander that I am not pleased with the handling of the tank army.’
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While Stalin cajoled his commanders forward in order to freeze Second Panzer units as far east as possible, the Germans were considering the unthinkable: a phased withdrawal. On 16 July, Model had ordered increased exertion on the Hagen Line, a set of field works at the base of the Orel salient, just east of Bryansk. On the 20th, Hitler ordered Ninth and Second Panzer Armies not to retreat, but two days later gave Model approval to form an ‘elastic defense’. Hitler giving such latitude to a commander had become very rare during the eighteen months following the Moscow counteroffensive, and it is certain few generals besides Model would have received this permission. On 28 July, OKH ordered Operation Herbstreise, the withdrawal from Orel to the Hagen Line. On the last day of July, Second Panzer units began to move west. Soviet units arrived in Orel on 5 August, just as XXXV Corps units left. By the 6th, both German armies were on the run, closely pursued by many units of the Red Army. Partisans mercilessly hounded their every step. Its first units arrived at the Hagen positions on 14 August, and the last closed in three days later. The Second Panzer Army executed a skillful withdrawal, complete with scorched earth tactics. The 129th Infantry Division received the unenviable mission to serve as the rear guard, ably assisted by 8th Panzer Division.
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Upon
reaching its new lines, the army’s units were distributed to other formations, while its headquarters moved to a new theater of war, complete with a new mission and a new commander. After having the eyes of the world fixed on its operational maneuvers during Barbarossa, Second Panzer slipped into the background for the next two and a half years. When it was not involved in static warfare or retreating, the most it could accomplish was a counterattack by four divisions.

As the Red Army finished its first great lunge westward following Citadel, Headquarters Second Panzer Army traveled by rail to occupied Yugoslavia. It redeployed, far from the main front, to combat partisans, disarm – and often fight – Germany’s erstwhile Italian, Bulgarian and Rumanian allies and guard the Adriatic coast from expected Allied landings. An Austrian, General of Infantry Lothar Rendulic, whose XXXV Corps had defended unexpectedly so well against Operation Kutuzov, ascended to command the panzer army. In late August and early September, the Second Panzer’s headquarters arrived in the Balkans to lead the main striking force of Army Group F there. With its command post at Kragujevac, Yugoslavia, it commanded fourteen divisions but had only two battalions of tanks. For much of the next few months, most of its ‘panzers’ were captured Italian models. The Germans estimated that at the beginning of 1943, Tito’s partisans numbered 150,000 men organized into 9 divisions and 36 brigades. The Yugoslav partisans were better led, armed and motivated than their Greek comrades, so Second Panzer spent much of the campaign on the defensive.
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Rendulic commanded many fine organizations, such as the fabled 1st Mountain Division. But he also had the 297th Infantry, rebuilt after destruction at Stalingrad with a base of 1,000 men returning from leave and collected from various hospitals. One of the Second Panzer’s first missions was to disarm Italians in the Balkans. A month before Rendulic took over the theater, on 25 July, General Vittorio Ambrosio overthrew Mussolini. On 9 September, Hitler launched Operation Achse to disarm the Italian military, including a quarter of a million occupation troops in the Balkans. Most Italians gave up without a fight, but many resisted according to Marshal Pietro Badaglio’s orders, resulting in casualties on both sides. Still others remained with the Germans, figuring that was a better alternative than returning to their own country. Rendulic’s men had alternately to protect their Italian charges from communists and partisans, take the surrender of Italian divisions and corps or fight large groups loyal either to the Italian king or the partisans. One major operation against ‘Badaglio’ Italians took place in the second half of September, between the 7th SS Mountain Division, Prinz Eugen and the garrison of the
old fortress at Split. Stukas pounded the fort, while Allied warships in the harbor countered with fire in support of the Italians. The Wehrmacht reported Split captured on the 27th. Likewise, the 1st Mountain conducted Operation Spaghetti to disarm Italians on the island of Korfu and the 100th Jager and 297th Infantry Divisions did the same in Albania.
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Infantry

By far the bulk combat power of all Second World War armies (even the American) was marching infantry. The blitzkrieg and Panzerwaffe would have failed without infantry, mounted or dismounted. Fighting as a combined arms team of infantry, cavalry, artillery and other branches was a hallmark of successful combat since before Frederick the Great. Although often forced to make do with the bottom of the manpower pool, the infantry nevertheless carried the heaviest load of all armies during the war. Despite this, the number of infantry officers who became successful practitioners of the blitzkrieg or who commanded panzer armies is impressive. German armaments engineers and manufacturers gave the infantry a wide variety of excellent weapons and equipment.

Even the mass of panzer and panzergrenadier units fighting in the USSR were made up of infantry. The Germans had a number of vehicles to get the Landsers into combat, but once engaged, they fought dismounted. Often the infantry rode to battle on trucks, artillery prime movers, panzers or whatever vehicles were available. Best known of the purpose-built armored personnel carriers were the half-tracks. The medium model (SdKfz 251 family, of which over 15,000 were produced) was developed in the mid-1930s as the concept of the panzer division was being explored. In addition to its main function, throughout the war the army created many variants: command, mortar, ammunition resupply, ambulance, rocket launcher, anti-tank, pioneer, signal, anti-aircraft and even infrared searchlight models. Later, the Wehrmacht ordered a light version (SdKfz 250), and over 7,200 of these rolled off German production lines.

For individual weapons, the German soldier in 1939–45 used many of the same armaments as his father, including the Model 98 rifle (Gewehr 98) and carbine (Karabiner 98k) firing a 7.92mm shell and the Luger P08, plus the newer Walther P38 9mm pistols. These could not produce the amount of firepower required against the Red Army, and so machine pistols (automatic weapons firing pistol ammunition) became popular with soldiers (and postwar movie makers). The MP38 and MP40 were originally intended for small unit leaders, but later could be found in regular rifle sections. Their short range prompted the development of the MP43 and MP44 Sturmgewehr, an adaptation of Soviet assault rifles, firing ‘short’ rifle ammunition. Hand grenades were a staple for close combat. The German ‘stick grenade’ is one of the most recognizable weapons of the period, although they also had an egg–shaped version.

The Germans excelled in the design of machine-guns, the best known being the MG34 and MG42. Both fired 7.92mm rifle ammunition and were reliable, easy to maintain and had high cyclic rates of fire. Either could be employed in light (bipod) or heavy (tripod) mode and in anti-aircraft defense. These weapons were superior to contemporary Allied weapons in rate and weight of fire.

The infantry had two main indirect fire weapons for use at the regimental level and below: infantry guns and mortars. The lightweight (but still horse drawn) short–barreled 75mm Infantriegeschutz was common early in the Nazi-Soviet War but later weapons superseded it. On the other hand, the Germans employed mortars throughout the war. A 50mm model proved to be ineffective and was phased out. The 81mm type was constantly improved over time. The Germans copied the heavy 120mm Soviet mortar, and mounted it on two-wheeled trolleys or on the back end of trucks and half-tracks. These proved to be excellent close-support weapons and could be found in large numbers in both line and motorized (later panzergrenadier) regiments.

Anti-tank weapons were another critical piece of military hardware near and dear to the heart of the infantry. With the introduction and improvement of shaped–charge explosives, individual anti-tank weapons became very common, especially late in the war. The best known are the Panzerfaust and Faustpatrone series grenade launchers, effective to a range of 150m. A true bazooka-type weapon, commonly known as the Ofenrohr or Panzerschrek, fired rocket-propelled projectiles, accurate to 120m.

Rendulic, who once said, ‘When things look blackest and you don’t know what to do, beat your chest and say, “I’m a National Socialist!’’ that moves mountains!’
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would lead Second Panzer in a losing effort in the Balkans. For the most part, the Germans owned the villages and some roads, but the partisans owned the countryside. The numerous anti-partisan operations it conducted give this period of the army’s history a useful framework. A constant fear for Army Group F was the threat of Allied landings along the Adriatic coast; to paraphrase Mussolini, the Adriatic Sea could now be called ‘an Allied lake’. The Second Panzer discovered this unhappy fact when they launched Operation Herbstgewitter, intended to clear the coast line. In late October, partisans, reinforced by Italians and supported by Allied naval gunfire and CAS, put up a tenacious defense. On 8 November, the Volksdeutsche of Prinz Eugen tried to assault the Italian fort at Jasen, but lacked the requisite training and pioneer support or equipment. The entire operation yielded little. Next came Operation Kugelblitz, conducted by V SS Mountain Corps under Lieutenant General of Police and SS Gruppenführer Hermann Behrens. The corps consisted of Prinz Eugen, 1st Mountain, 369th and 187th Infantry
Divisions, the 24th Bulgarian Division and the 1st Croatian Mountain Division. Against partisans plus over 2,000 Italians, the operation in central Bosnia lasted from 2 to 17 December. At the end of Kugelblitz, one SS man said, ‘We had great respect for Tito.’
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