Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews (126 page)

138. Himmler’s note about his visit to Mussolini on 11–14 Oct. 1942, published in Helmut

Krausnick, ‘Himmler über seinen Besuch bei Mussolini’, VfZ 4 (1956), 423–6.

139. The different attitudes towards the ‘Jewish question’ are examined in detail in Steinberg, All or Nothing.

140. Müller to Bergmann AA, 25 Feb. 1943 with a quotation from Himmler’s letter to

Ribbentrop, 29 Jan. 1943, published in Klarsfeld, Vichy, 495 ff.

141. ND NG 4956, Teleprinter message from the special train Westphalia to Wolf; Reply

from Abteilung Deutschland, 24 Feb. 1943.

142. Sztojay to Horthy, 28 Apr. 1943, published in Eichmann in Ungarn. Dokumente, ed.

Jenó Levai, (Budapest, 1961), 61 ff.

143. Message to Knochen, 24 May 1943 CDJC, XLVIIIa-24, Klarsfeld, Vichy, 528.

144. Best’s letters to AA, 13 Jan. 1943, PAA, Inland II g 184 (ADAP E V, 39). Shortly before, Best had discussed the situation with Luther and Rademacher in Berlin after Luther

had decided to postpone further measures for the time being. PAA, Inland II g 184,

note by Rademacher of 23 Dec. 1942. On these events see Herbert, Best, 361–2;

Browning, Final Solution, 160–1.

145. Report by Best of 24 Apr. 1942, ibid., ADAP E V, no. 344.

146. Luther to Ribbentrop, 28 Jan. 1943 and Ribbentrop’s marginal notes on this document

of 1 Feb. 1943 (PAA, Inland II g 184). Himmler decided in June that ‘provisional Jewish

566

Notes to pages 397–402

measures in Denmark should be suspended until he issues a new order on this

question’; ibid., Wagner to Kaltenbrunner, 30 June 1943.

147. Best to Himmler, 22 Aug. 1943, BAB, NS 19/3302; cf. Herbert, Best, 351; further

Telegram to AA, 30 Aug. 1943, ADAP E VI, 259.

148. Telegram from Ribbentrop (Führerhauptquartier) to Best, 31 Aug./1 Sept. 1943, PAA,

Inland II g 184, ADAP E VI, 268.

149. PAA, Inland II g 184, Telegram of 31 Aug. 1943, ADAP E VI, 259, note 4.

150. Report by Best, 6 September, PAA, Inland II g 184, ADAP E VI, 282; Herbert, Best, 358.

151. PAA, Inland II g 184 (ADAP E VI, 287). On the interpretation of the telegram see esp.

Herbert, Best, 362 ff. Best aimed for the right of command over all police troops in

Denmark, and wanted to set up a special court with himself at its head. See telegram to

AA, 1 Sept. 1943, ADAP E VI, 271.

152. Ribbentrop’s ‘note for the Führer’, 23 Sept. 1943, ADAP E VI, 344.

153. As Best put it in his telegram of v. 5 Oct. 1942.

154. Telegram to AA, 20 Sept. 1943, ADAP E VI, 332.

155. For greater details see Leni Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry (Philadelphia, 1983), 223 ff. Gunnar S. Paulsson, ‘ “The Bridge over Oeresund”. The Historiography on the

Expulsion of the Jews from Nazi-Occupied Denmark’ in Journal of Contemporary

History 30 (1995), 431–64, and (ibid., 465–79) the reply by Hans Kirchhoff, ‘Denmark:

A Light in the Darkness of the Holocaust? A Reply to Gunnars S. Paulsson’. See also

Hans Kirchhoff, ‘ The Rescue of the Danish Jews in October 1943’ in David Bankier

and Israel Gutman eds, Nazi Europe and the Final Solution (Jerusalem, 2003), 539–55.

156. PAA, Inland II g 184, telegram 5 Oct. 1942.

157. Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher, Teil II, Band 4, 4 June 1942, p. 444; ibid., Band 12, 11 May 1944, p. 270.

158. Ibid., Band 6, 13 Dec. 1942, p. 439; ibid., Band 9, 7 Aug. 1943, pp. 231–2; ibid., Band 11, 14

Jan. 1944, pp. 87–8.

159. Ibid., Band 8, 30 May 1943, p. 22; ibid., Band 13, 23 Aug. 1944, pp. 295–6.

160. Ibid., Band 8, 21 Mar. 1943.

161. Ibid., Band 7, 2 Mar. 1943, p. 454.

162. In the case of Bulgaria, the Western powers expressly made the signing of the ceasefire with Bulgaria in September 1944 dependent on the repeal of the Bulgarian anti-Semitic

laws. Baruch, Freikauf, 159 ff. See also pp. 148–9, according to which there were

indications that the American side, in their first probings concerning the withdrawal

of Bulgaria from the Axis, raised the issue of Bulgaria’s policy towards the Jews

163. On the persecution of the Jews in Italy after September 1943 see Lliana Picciotto

Fargion, ‘Italien’, in Benz, ed., Dimension, 199–227; Michaelis, Mussolini, 342 ff.; Lutz Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bündnis und Besetzung. Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Republik von Saló (Tübingen, 1993), 530 ff.

164. On Dannecker’s work in Italy see Steuer, Dannecker, 113 ff.

165. Presentation note by Wagner, 4 Dec. 1943, PAA, Inland II g 192, in ADAP E VII, 111.

166. Ibid.

167. Michaelis, Mussolini, 388–9.

168. Fargion, ‘Italien’, 206 and 222–3.

169. On this see Fleischer, ‘Griechenland’, 260 ff.

Notes to pages 402–407

567

170. See the memoirs of Errikos Sevillias, Athens-Auschwitz (Athens, 1983). In April there was also a corresponding ‘action’ in Albania, in which around 300 Jews were arrested

and deported via Belgrade to Bergen-Belsen. See Gerhard Grimm, ‘Albanien’, in Benz,

ed., Dimension 227.

171. Fleischer, ‘Griechenland’, 265 ff.

172. Sundhausen, ‘Jugoslawien’, 325.

173. On German Judenpolitik in France after the collapse of Italy see Klarsfeld, Vichy, 276 ff.; Steinberg, All or Nothing, 163; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 180 ff.; Poznanski, Jews, 390 ff.

174. Klarsfeld, Vichy, 278 ff.; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 181 ff.

175. See pp. 392 ff.

176. Klarsfeld, Vichy, 289.

177. Ibid. 298 ff.; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 190 ff.

178. On the government reshuffle see Eberhard Jäckel, Frankreich in Hitlers Europa. Die

deutsche Frankreichpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1966), 293–4.

179. CDJC, CXXXII-56, Klarsfeld, Vichy, 574 ff.; Zuccotti, Holocaust, 197 ff.

180. Klarsfeld, Vichy, 320. Slightly different figures quoted in the literature may be found in Juliane Wetzel, ‘Frankreich und Belgien’, in Benz, ed., Dimension, 132–3.

181. Hilberg, Destruction, 699 f.

182. Ladislav Lipscher, Die Juden im slowakischen Staat 1939–1945 (Munich, 1979), 114.

183. NG 4407, 29 June 1943.

184. Lipscher, Juden, 137 ff.; Gilda Fatran, ‘Die Deportation der Juden aus der Slowakei’, Bohemia 37 (1996), 98–119, 98–9; Tatjana Tönsmeyer, ‘Die Einsatzgruppe H in der

Slowakei in Finis Mundi—Endzeiten und Weltenden im östlichen Europa’, in Joachim

Hösler and Wolfgang Hösler, eds, Festschrift für Hans Lemberg zum 65. Geburtstag

(Stuttgart, 1998), 167–88.

185. 21 July 1943, ND NG 4749.

186. Report by Veesenmayer, 22 Dec. 1943, ND NG 4651; see also Statement by Wisliceny,

ND NG 1823.

187. Hilberg, Destruction, 789 f.

188. Lipscher, Juden, 144 ff.; Ivan Kamenec, ‘Die erfolglosen Versuche zur Wiederauf-

nahme der Deportationen der slowakischen Juden’, TSD (2002), 318–37.

189. Lipscher, Juden, 178–9; Fatran, ‘Deportation’, 116 ff.

190. PAA, Inland II g 208, Luther to Ribbentrop, 16 Jan. 1942; cf. Browning, Final Solution, 132.

191. PAA, Inland II g 208, Bergmann to Bormann. 9 Mar. 1943.

192. IMT xxxv. 428, D-736.

193. Sztojay to Horthy, 28 Apr. 1943, in Eichmann in Ungarn, ed. Lévai, 61 ff. On German activities with regard to Hungary in the spring and summer of 1943 see Braham, Politics, 250 ff.

194. Diary entry 8 May 1943, See Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher, Teil II, Band 8, p. 236 on

statements by Hitler the previous day.

195. ADAP E VI, no. 43.

196. Donauzeitung, 1 June 1943, cf. Hilberg, Destruction, 876.

197. Report of 10 Dec. 1943, NG 5560, in Randolph L. Braham, The Destruction of Hun-

garian Jewry: A Documentary Account (New York, 1968), no. 110.

198. Braham, Politics, 381 ff.; on the organization of the occupying administration, ibid. 406 ff.

199. Ibid. 396 ff.

568

Notes to pages 407–408

200. In Götz Aly and Christian Gerlach, Der letzte Kapitel Realpolitik, Ideologie und der Mord an den ungarischen Juden (Stuttgart, 2002) the authors argue in contrast that

four stages of escalation can be perceived within the decision-making process con-

cerning the deportation of the Hungarian Jews (Aly and Gerlach, Kapitel, 249 ff.).

Thus, according to them, there had been no ‘long planned preparation of the

deportations’, no deportation plan existing from the beginning; the decision for

ghettoization and deportation was to be seen not as a ‘unique act’ but as an ‘interactive process’ (ibid. 252, 266, 416). In their view many factors must be taken into account to

explain this process: the redistribution of resources (finance, labour, food supplies,

military and economic potential), the disposing of social burdens, internal political

mobilization in Hungary, relations with the German ally, etc. In their view, ‘Hungar-

ian pressure’ played a large part in the acceleration of the deportations (ibid.,

summary on p. 265). This interpretation is the result of an analysis of situational

factors and in my view takes too little account of the intention of the Germans,

demonstrable as early as the end of 1941, and pursued continuously from then

onwards, to set the deportations in motion with the help of the Hungarians. It was

the German occupation that created the crucial preconditions for radicalizing the

anti-Semitic policy of the Hungarian government to such an extent that the deport-

ations could begin. The events of 1944 must be seen in this perspective. Moreover, in

my view, Aly and Gerlach overstress rational m0tives (Zweck-rational) in their

analysis of the decision-making process. Thus, for example, the Germans plainly

had no genuine interest in an effective exploitation of the workforce of the Jewish

prisoners, as Aly and Gerlach themselves show in their account of the treatment of the

deported workers: only a very few of the 200,000 Jewish forced labourers were in fact

deployed in the context of the Fighter Programme for which they had originally been

requested. Instead, they worked mostly in functions that had little to do with the war

and with no regard for their qualifications. Because of their bad treatment, the

productivity of the forced labourers, who had been robbed of all material and

emotional support by separation from their families, was poor and mortality rates

were extremely high so that a third of the forced labourers had died by the end of the

war (ibid. 409).

201. Ibid. 259.

202. Veesenmayer to the AA, 22 Apr. 1944, BD no. 144.

203. Braham, Politics, 510 ff. and 446 ff.

204. Diary entry 27 Apr. 1944 in Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher, Teil II, Band 12, p. 199.

205. Braham, Politics, 573 ff.

206. Ibid. 674 ff.

207. Ibid. 662 ff.

208. Veesenmayer was already working on the basis of four transports each carrying 3,000

Jews on 4 May 1944: telegram to the AA (BD, No. 153).

209. BD, no. 157, Thadden to German Mission in Bratislava, 6 May 1944.

210. See Braham, Politics, 733 ff.

211. The figure of 433,000 also contains several thousand Jews who were deported to

Auschwitz after the official halt to deportations.

212. Braham, Politics, 780 ff.

Notes to pages 408–412

569

213. Ibid. 850 ff.

214. Ibid. 1205 ff.

215. Telegram from Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 6 July 1944, ADAP E VIII, 101.

216. PAA, Inland II g 210; Braham, Destruction, 700–1. Ribbentrop to Veesenmayer, 10 July 1944. Veesenmayer to the AA, 24 Aug. 1944. On this complex, Braham, Politics, 884–5.

217. PAA, Inland II g 209; Braham, Politics, 887–8.

218. Braham, Politics, 890 ff.

219. PAA, Inland II g 210, Gesandtschaft Budapest to the AA, 19 Aug. 1944, in ADAP E VIII, 167. On the events in August see Braham, Politics, 911 ff.

220. PAA, Inland II g 210, Veesenmayer to AA, 24 Aug. 1944.

221. PAA, Inland IIg 209, Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop in Braham, Destruction, no. 214.

222. Braham, Politics, 916.

223. Bauer’s view, (Jews for Sale? Nazi Jewish Negotiations, 1933–1945 (New Haven and

London, 1994), 221), that Himmler’s order to halt the deportations of 24 August has to

do with the beginning of negotiations between Kurt Becher and Saly Mayer in Switz-

erland, concerning the possible release of Jews for foreign currency or the delivery of

goods, cannot be verified. In order to influence these negotiations effectively, it would have made more sense, as had already happened in Strasshof in June, to keep certain

contingents of deportees within the territory of the German Reich in camps as hostages.

224. Braham, Politics, 947 ff.

225. At this point the the decision to dismantle the extermination facilities in Auschwitz had either already been taken or was about to happen. See Czech, Kalendarium, 31

Dec. 1944 (last murder with gas) and 25 Nov. 1944 (start of the destruction of the

crematoria).

226. Veesenmayer’s report to the AA, 18 Oct. 1944, ADAP E VIII, 275. Eichmann kept to

this intention until at least mid-November (Veesenmayer, report 13 Nov. 1944, PAA,

Inland II g 209).

227. Braham, Politics, 957 ff.

228. PAA, Inland IIg 209.

229. Braham, Politics, 976 ff.

230. Shmuel Spector, ‘ “Action 1005”: Effacing the Murder of Millions’, HGS 1 (1990),

157–73.

231. Ibid. 159 ff.

232. Ibid. 161 ff.

233. Adalbert Rückerl, NS Vernichtungslager in Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse. Belzec,

Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmno (Munich, 1977), 280–1.

234. Arad, Belzec, 165 ff., 370 ff.

235. Sybille Steinbacher, Auschwitz: A History (London, 2005), 123 ff.

236. On this see Bauer, Sale; Richard Breitman and Shlomo Aronson, ‘The End of the

“Final Solution”?: Nazi Plans to Ransom Jews in 1944’, Central European History