I Signed My Death Warrant (17 page)

On the Ulster question the draft treaty gave a fleeting re­cognition to Irish unity in that it applied to the whole island even though the representatives of Northern Ireland were not even consulted, but the proposals protected their interests by stipulating that the area could opt out of the Irish Free State and retain its existing status. In that event, however, a Boundary Commission would be established to adjust the boundary of Northern Ireland ‘in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions.'

The previous day Lloyd George and Churchill met T. M. Healy. Churchill told him the British government would ap­point a Boundary Commission that would ‘ensure the transfer to the Free State of the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, South Armagh, and (if I remember rightly) South Down.' Churchill continued that ‘the inevitable result' would be that Craig would have to accept Irish unity.

‘That,' said Healy, ‘is a statement of supreme importance. Do you mind repeating it, so as to enable me to transmit it to those men. I cannot imagine anything better calculated to silence their objections.'

Healy took down Churchill's words in shorthand. ‘Am I to understand,' he asked, ‘that that assurance is endorsed by the Prime Minister?'

‘It certainly is,' Lloyd George's replied.

Collins and Griffith were already convinced the Boundary Commission would transfer extensive territory, but the main issues facing them at the time were the crown and empire. Many believed Childers was the real author of External Association and he seemed to be holding on to this with a kind of blind tenacity. He understood better than any of them the real status of Canada, but even though the British were offering Ireland that status with the specified exceptions of some defence and trade concessions, he argued those concessions essentially undermined that status. Even if the British dropped all the demanded concessions, he would still argue that Ireland would not have the same status as Canada because the Canadians essentially enjoyed their freedom as a result of their distance from Britain. The British were simply too far away to enforce their legal edicts. Ireland, on the other hand, was close enough that British laws ‘could be enforced against Ireland so as to over-ride the fullest constitutional freedom nominally conferred.' But this would be a violation of the agreement, and if the British were going to violate it, they could just as easily violate External Association as Ireland was still going to be as close to Britain.

Childers worked that day on a second part to his document contrasting the legal and constitutional status of Canada. But Collins no longer had any confidence in his judgment. ‘Integrity of purpose is defeated at all times by those whose start rests elsewhere,' Collins wrote on 30 November. ‘The advice and inspiration of C [Childers] is like farmland under water – dead. With a purpose, I think – with a definite purpose. Soon he will howl his triumph – for what it is worth.'

‘I think also that Birkenhead's integrity of purpose is foiled in other quarters,' Collins continued. ‘I can almost see the gloating that is so obvious among some of our opposites – whichever way it means trouble at home, an enjoyable spec­tacle for more people than one imagines.'

Chartres and Childers had come up with the phrase ‘con­stitutional usage' to cover the
de facto
status of Canada. This was communicated to the British, and the term was included in the British draft treaty, which guaranteed that the Irish Free State the same status as Canada in ‘law, practice and constitutional usage'. Collins objected to the oath being prescribed for Irish members parliament. He suggested an alternative. There is no indication of who suggested it to Collins. Did he come up with it himself, or was it the result of Griffith's request that Childers and the others suggest an oath? The oath that Collins proposed on 30 November was:

I ... do solemnly swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to His Majesty King George in acknowledgment of the Association of Ireland in a common citizenship with Great Britain and the group of nations known as the British commonwealth.

Such an oath would be explicitly in line with Childers' assess­ment of the
de facto
situation in Canada, where he contended that each ‘Canadian owes obedience to his own constitution only'. The word ‘faithful' was specifically included to denote equality be­tween the monarch and those taking the oath, as opposed to allegiance normally owed to one's sovereign. Although the oath involved common citizenship, which was tantamount to acceptance of indirect allegiance and also membership of the Bri­tish commonwealth, the British rejected the proposal at this stage.

‘Got my political life at stake,' Lloyd George said to Collins that night. Collins did not reply, but the following day he wrote to a friend, ‘My life – not only political – is at stake.'

Griffith called a full meeting of the Irish delegation for 1 December. ‘I want to hear all points of objections,' he said, ‘so that nobody can say afterwards that all arguments were not fully heard.'

Childers noted that did not want to create a scene at the meeting of the delegation by repeating some of his old argu­ments, so he confined himself to the defence terms, but got in a hassle with Griffith anyway. ‘He flared at me with some vague charge of often be­fore having said the delegation was going back on July 20th. I said on this occasion I had criticised on defence only. M.C. instead of backing me up, said he thought I implied a wider criticism and refused to withdraw when I asked him.' After the meeting Collins made what Childers considered ‘a ghost of an apology'. Of course, there is no way of determining what Childers actually said, but it was significant that in referring to the draft treaty in his diary the previous night, he wrote, ‘It is July 20th', with the addition of the
de facto
stipulation, the boundary commission scheme, and safeguards for Ulster, but without the right for the British to recruit in Ireland.

Before accepting the British terms the Irish representatives were obliged to consult the cabinet in Dublin in line with their instructions. Barton and Duffy, who were so opposed to the British terms, did not want the bother of returning to Dublin for consultations. But Griffith insisted that the whole delegation return for a meeting with the cabinet in line with their instructions. The negotiations had reached a critical stage and everyone knew that the conference was supposed to be concluded by the following Tuesday.

Arrangements were made for a cabinet meeting at the Mansion House on Saturday morning, 3 December 1921. Griffith returned to meet de Valera on Friday night, while Collins stayed on with Childers for some talks with the British on financial matters. De Valera broke off his tour of IRA units to return to Dublin on Friday. He insisted on driving all the way himself and was very tired when he reached Dublin at 10.30 that night. Griffith arrived about thirty minutes later and their meeting lasted for two hours.

‘First of all I got a document from Mr Griffith which I said I will never sign,' de Valera recalled later. ‘I will not sign it.' It was a strange thing for him to say, unless he was expecting to take over the leadership of the delegation at the last moment.

Griffith again emphasised that he was not going to break over the crown, but de Valera later told his authorised biographers that he was too tired at the time to argue the matter. So further discussion was postponed until the cabinet meeting next morning.

Meanwhile Collins was doing such an effective job of hiding his own attitude that Childers could not determine where the Big Fellow stood on the proposals. He and Childers set out for Dublin that evening and crossed from Holyhead on the mail boat, but it was delayed on route by an accident and had to return to port. As a result the mail boat it did not eventually dock until shortly before the cabinet was due to convene. A sleepless night was certainly not the best preparation for the arduous meetings that were to follow.

Before setting out Collins had requested a meeting with the available members of the supreme council of the IRB while he was in Dublin but, because of the delay, he was unable to meet them as planned. Instead, he telephoned Seán Ó Muirthile from the Mansion House to pick up a copy of the draft treaty while the cabinet was meeting.

In addition to the cabinet members, Gavan Duffy and Duggan were invited to sit in on the meeting, as were Kevin O'Higgins and Childers, while Colm Ó Murchada attended as acting-secretary to the cabinet,

At the outset each member of the delegation gave his views on the draft terms. Griffith explained he was in favour of acc­epting them, and he emphasised that he would not break on the question of the crown. Barton, on the other hand, argued against acceptance on the grounds that the proposals were not Britain's last word, that they did not really give full Dominion Status, and that there was no guarantee of unity. Gavan Duffy agreed with him, but Duggan concurred with Griffith.

There was come confusion about the attitude of Collins, who was obviously still trying to keep his views to himself, especially in the presence of Brugha and Stack. Childers noted in his diary that ‘Collins was difficult to understand - repeatedly pressed by Dev but I really don't know what his answer amounted to.' Stack later recalled that ‘Collins did not speak strongly in favour of the document at all.' But Ó Murchada described him as being ‘in substantial agreement' with Griffith and Duggan in arguing that rejecting the ‘Treaty would be a gamble as England could arrange a war in Ireland within a week'. Collins did say, however, that further concessions could be won on trade and defence, and he suggested the oath should be rejected.

At the president's invitation, Childers criticised the pro­­­posals. Confining himself to the defence clauses, he denounced them saying that they meant the Free State's status would be less than that of a dominion.

Barton asked him if the dominions would support the Free State in any question involving status, seeing that any British infringement in Irish affairs might be seen as setting a precedent affording Britain the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the other dominions.

‘No,' replied Childers. So long as those defence clauses re­mained, he felt the Free State would not really be a Dominion at all. ‘I said,' he recalled, ‘we must make it clear that we had a right to defend ourselves.'

Griffith suggested consulting a constitutional lawyer to interpret the significance of the stipulation that the defence of Irish coastal waters would be undertaken ‘exclusively' by the British. At this point Childers adopted a distinctly censorial tone.

‘I said,' he wrote in his diary, ‘two such lawyers had been brought by him to London and had been there for some time and could have been consulted.'

De Valera contended that the word ‘exclusively' in the pro­vision stipulating that ‘the defence of the sea of the British Is­­lands, including Ireland shall be undertaken exclusively' by British forces ‘clearly meant a prohibition on us which could not be admitted,' according to Childers. ‘He said he differed from me in that he thought it natural for them to demand facilities on our coast as being necessary. I said I didn't disagree in this but we had to keep up our principles.'

‘There was a very free expression of disagreement at the cabinet meeting,' according to Barton. But Childers noted that Brugha went over the top and created ‘an unpleasant scene'.

Observing that Griffith and Collins had been doing most of the negotiating, Brugha asked who was responsible for the sub-conference set up in which some of the delegation were not in complete touch with what was happening. Someone replied that the British had invited Griffith and Collins to meet them, and Brugha remarked that the British had selected ‘their men'.

Griffith was furious. He stood up and went to where Brugha was sitting and demanded that the remark be withdrawn, but Brugha refused at first. Collins, too, was angry, but he contained himself. ‘If you are not satisfied with us,' he said to Brugha, ‘get another five to go over.'

‘Brugha had at last realised the situation but he took no steps to strengthen our hands or to join the delegation himself or to induce the President to do so,' according to Barton. ‘He was serious, glowered and took no action.' But that was largely Barton's own fault, because he came to the defence of his colleagues. Not withstanding his own dislike of the sub-conference set up, he said that Griffith and Collins had been negotiating with the ‘knowledge and consent' of the full delegation.

Brugha therefore withdrew his remark, but Griffith insisted it be entered in the minutes. The damaged had been done and an air of tension prevailed throughout the rest of the day's dis­cussions.

De Valera avoided personalities in criticising the draft treaty. He rejected it mainly on the grounds that the oath was un­­­acceptable. ‘The oath,' he later wrote, ‘crystallised in itself the main things we objected to – inclusion in the empire, the British King as King of Ireland, Chief Executive of the Irish State, and the source from which all authority in Ireland was to be derived.' He also criticised the fact that Northern Ireland would be allowed to vote itself out of the Irish state. While he could have understood accepting Dominion Status in return for an end to partition, he complained that the proposals afforded neither one nor the other. He therefore suggested the delegation should return to London, try to have the draft treaty amended and, if necessary, face the consequences of war.

At 1.30 the cabinet broke for lunch. During the recess Collins had a hurried meeting with Ó Muirthile, who explained that their IRB colleagues had reservations about the oath, together with the defence and partition provisions of the British terms. He gave Collins an alternative oath acceptable to his IRB colleagues. As it was comparatively similar to the one al­­ready suggested by Collins to the British, it was likely the wording was actually suggested by somebody who was aware of the lines on which Collins was thinking.

The cabinet reconvened at three o'clock and Barton appealed to de Valera to join the delegation on the grounds that it was unfair to ask Griffith to break on the crown when he was un­­­willing to fight on the issue. The president later said that he was seriously considering the suggestion but was reluctant to go because, as he later explained, ‘my going over would be in­terpreted as anxiety on our part and likely to give in. I did not want this interpretation to be placed on my action, and that extra little bit I wanted to pull them and hoped they could be pulled could not be done if I went and therefore I was balancing these.'

Griffith – who never lost an opportunity of declaring that he would not break on the issue of the crown - emphasised his own attitude. When as many concessions as possible had been gained, he said that he would sign the agreement and go before the Dáil, which was the body to decide whether it should be war or not.

‘Don't you realise that, if you sign this thing, you will split Ireland from top to bottom?' Brugha interjected.

‘I suppose that's so,' replied Griffith, obviously struck by the implication of the Brugha's words. ‘I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll go back to London. I'll not sign the document, but I'll bring it back and submit it to the Dáil and, if necessary to the public.'

De Valera was satisfied with this. He later said that he would ‘probably' have gone to London but for Griffith's undertaking not to sign the draft treaty. It never seemed to have occurred to him that he did not have the authority to join the delegation, seeing that he had not been selected as a plenipotentiary by the Dáil, as had the other members of the delegation.

Although various defects were pointed out in the draft treaty during the seven hours of discussion, the oath was the single item that evoked most criticism. In fact, with the exception of Griffith, every member of the cabinet advocated rejecting the oath.

Unfortunately, Ó Murchada's brief notes did not reflect much of the criticism. For example, he never even mentioned any contributions by W. T. Cosgrave. But about thirty minutes before the meeting broke up, Cosgrave actually declared that he would not ‘take that oath'. There followed a discussion in which the cabinet was asked to suggest an alternative.

Brugha objected to any oath unless the British were, in turn, willing to swear to uphold the Treaty. De Valera also questioned whether an oath was necessary but, on being told that the British were insisting on one, he sought an acceptable formula to replace the oath in the draft treaty.

‘It is obvious that you cannot have that or any like “and the King as head of the State and the Empire”,' he said. ‘You could take an oath of true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of Ireland.'

‘I started trying to get some sort of oath,' de Valera explained afterwards. ‘Here is the oath I refer to, “I, so and so, swear to obey the Constitution of Ireland and to keep faith with His Britannic Majesty, so and so, in respect of the Treaty associating Ireland with the states of the British commonwealth”.'

‘Nothing doing,' Brugha snapped, ‘there is going to be no unanimity on such an oath as that.'

‘Surely Cathal, you can't object to taking an oath if you agree to association,' de Valera said.

Stack agreed with the president, so he, too, tried to persuade Brugha that such an oath would be acceptable.

‘Well,' Brugha sighed in resignation, ‘you may as well swear.'

‘At the end of the discussion on the oath,' Childers recalled, ‘I expressly raised the point myself as to whether scrapping the oath in the draft mean scrapping of the first four clauses of the British draft, that is to say the clauses setting out Dominion Status.'

‘Yes,' the president replied. Childers was therefore satisfied, but Collins never heard this exchange.

Before the meeting concluded some decisions were taken hurriedly. It was decided that the delegation should return to London with the same powers and instructions. If the oath were not amended, the draft treaty would be rejected regardless of the consequences. If this led to the collapse of the conference, Griffith was advised to say that the matter should be referred to the Dáil, and he was to try to blame the northern unionists for the impasse, if possible.

It was also decided that the trade and defence clauses should be amended, according to Childers, who noted that no specific suggestion was made about how to change the trade provisions. But the president did advocate that the British should be given ‘two ports only' instead of the four they were demanding.

‘All this amendment business was too hurried,' Childers noted in his diary, ‘but it was understood by Barton, Duffy, and me that amendments were not mandatory.' They were ‘only suggestions.' Later, de Valera emphasised this point himself in the Dáil.

‘I did not give, nor did the cabinet give, any instructions to the delegation as to any final document which they were to put in,' he said.

Some writers have suggested that the fact the two elements of the delegation returned to London separately was evidence that the division between them was deeper than ever, but it seems the real reason was purely personal. After the meeting Childers returned to his home with Barton, and they had dinner there, and Childers saw his son Bobby to bed before heading back to London. Barton, Duffy and Childers took a boat from the North Wall, while Griffith, Collins and Duggan went on the mail boat from Dun Laoghaire.

Childers, Duffy and Barton talked together in a cabin until Cope arrived. ‘He was all agog for information,' Barton recalled. ‘We were in a similar state but we gave none and got none. On the train to London, Diarmuid O'Hegarty arrived at Barton's sleeper to invite him to go for a chat with Tim Healy who was un­­able to walk along the train. Barton and Hegarty then talked with Healy for a couple of hours. ‘Healy expatiated on the dreadfulness of the crisis, the imminent risk of a renewal of war, and the generosity of the settlement the English were prepared to offer us,' Barton noted. ‘I told him quite frankly and Hegarty supported me that he was on the wrong line and going full speed astern. He was furious at first but grew maudlin later and I left him and Hegarty to finish their bottle.

‘Next day Healy saw Lloyd George and afterwards came across to us where we had a long interview,' Barton continued. ‘Later I met him in the hall and he told me that Collins was the only sensible man amongst us, possibly he told Lloyd George so too.'

‘There's a job to be done and for the moment here's the place,' Collins wrote to Kitty upon his return to London. ‘That's that.'

Childers began drafting an alternative to the British draft treaty, with help from Barton and later Gavan Duffy. ‘The Cabinet gave us no written direction, no draft agreement, nothing but the hazy verbal headlines,' according to Barton. ‘Griffith Collins and Duggan made no attempt to write any­thing or if they did, they did not show us the result of their deliberations which took place as was usual in some other room. When we were finished we requested them to come for a conference and presented them with copies of the proposals we suggested should now be sent to the British.

‘On reading the document to our colleagues an extraordinary scene ensued,' Barton wrote. ‘Griffith was very angry. He declared that the cabinet had been prepared to go much further towards agreement than we had indicated. That the terms we were proposing were stiffer than these already declared by the English to be impossible and that he was not going to stand for any such silly tactics.'

Collins objected to the inclusion of External Association. He thought the British guarantee about according the
de facto
status of Canada had been acceptable to the cabinet. He noted that nobody had talked about pressing for External Association at the cabinet meeting. He was right. There had been no such discussion, but the president had responded affirmatively when Childers asked if the suggested alterations to the oath also applied to the first three clauses of the British proposals. When Childers mention this exchange, Collins could not remember it, but Griffith confirmed that it had taken place.