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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal

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BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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Figure 3-2
Alternative Ways of Looking at the Intelligence Community: A Functional Flow View
Source: U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,
104th Congress, 2d session. 1966.
Note
HUMINT = human intelligence; GEOINT = geospatial intelligence; MASINT = measurement and signatures intelligence; OSINT = open source intelligence; SIGINT = signals intelligence.
 
The flow suggested by Figure 3-2 is idealized, but it shows how the main managerial and execution concerns relate to one another. The flow is circular, going in endless loops. If one were to suggest starting at a particular point, it would be requirements. Without them, little that happens afterward makes sense. Given their proper role, requirements should drive everything else.
The various aspects of collection—systems development and collection itself—occupy much more of the figure than does analysis. This reflects the realities of the intelligence community, whether desirable or not.
THE MANY DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES
 
Within the broader U.S. intelligence community are many different intelligence communities.
(See
box,
“The Simplicity of Intelligence.
Figure 3-3 gives a better sense of what they are by showing what each agency or subagency component does, while preserving the sense of hierarchy. The vertical lines should be viewed as flowing from the topmost organizations through each of the agencies or components below, not subordinating each successive box to the one above it.
At the top of the hierarchy are the entities that are major intelligence managers, major clients, or both. The president is the major client but is not an intelligence manager. The secretaries of defense, state, commerce, and energy and the attorney general are clients, and three of them—the secretaries of defense and state and the attorney general—control significant intelligence assets. State has INR; DOD has numerous defense intelligence organizations, which respond to a broad range of needs. The attorney general oversees the FBI.
THE SIMPLICITY OF INTELLIGENCE
 
In the baseball movie
Bull Durham,
a manager tries to explain to his hapless players the simplicity of the game they are supposed to be playing: “You throw the ball; you hit the ball; you catch the ball.”
Intelligence has a similar deceptive simplicity: You ask a question; you collect information; you answer the question
In both cases, many devils are in the details.
 
 
Figure 3-3
Alternative Ways of Looking at the Intelligence Community: A Functional View
 
DOD organizations participate in national-level intelligence processes and products, providing indications and warning of impending attack (see chap. 6) and intelligence support for military operations at all levels—from theater (broad regional commands) down to tactical (small units engaged in operations or combat). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), created in 2002, has several components that are part of the intelligence community, such as the Coast Guard, which has its own intelligence unit, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. The attorney general has control over the FBI and now has an assistant attorney general for national security in the Justice Department who oversees intelligence policy, counterintelligence, and counterespionage. Some see this as a move that could lead to an entity like Britain’s MI5 (the British Security Service), which would constitute a major change for the United States, a country that has always kept domestic and foreign intelligence separate. The FBI now has a National Security Branch, under an executive assistant director. The new branch combines the intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism elements of the FBI and adds an office focusing on WMD. The Department of Energy has a small intelligence office devoted to its specific concerns and to coordinating the intelligence activities of the various national laboratories; and the Department of Commerce controls the commercial attaches, who are assigned to embassies and serve an overt intelligence function. The DCIA is manager of the CIA. The Department of Treasury has an Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, which is increasingly important in stopping illicit international financial transactions that support terrorism, crime, and narcotics.
The IRTPA also created a Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) to assist the DNI. Under DNI McConnell the JICC has been by-passed in favor of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) that he created. The EXCOM consists of the DNI and the heads of the intelligence components, plus senior policy makers, usually at the undersecretary level. McConnell’s stated goal is to bring together policy customers and senior intelligence officers at the highest level to ensure that the intelligence community is providing the support that is needed. Interestingly, a similar EXCOM existed during the tenure of DCI Robert Gates (1991- 1993); Gates became secretary of defense, replacing Donald Rumsfeld, in December 2006.
At the next level down are the builders of technical collection systems. The main one is the NRO, which is responsible for the design, building, and (via the Air Force or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) the launch of satellite collection systems. DOD also has an airborne reconnaissance responsibility for “air breathing” systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, which are of increasing importance on the battlefield for tactical collection and, in the Afghanistan campaign and the war on terrorism, for air attack as well. Finally, the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) has a role in some technical collection programs.
A variety of offices is responsible for the collection (including processing and exploitation) of intelligence. Within DOD are NSA, which collects signals intelligence (SIGINT), the interception of various types of communication; NGA, which processes and exploits what was known as imagery intelligence (IMINT)—that is, photos—and is now known as geospatial intelligence (GEOINT); DOD airborne systems; and the Defense HUMINT service (DH) of DIA, whose duties are reflected in its name. The CIA is responsible for espionage (HUMINT) collection via the National Clandestine Services (NCS), formerly known as the Directorate of Operations (DO). (Types of intelligence are discussed in detail in chap. 5.) The State Department collects for itself and for others via its array of embassies and Foreign Service officers, although its activities most often are not “tasked intelligence”—that is, they are not undertaken in response to a specific requirement, as are the others. The Commerce Department collects via the commercial attaches. The FBI collects counterintelligence information through its National Security Branch and has legal attaches posted in many U.S. embassies overseas. The DNI has authority to manage and task collection.
The most important of the producers of finished intelligence are the three agencies responsible for producing all-source intelligence: CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), DIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and State’s INR. Within DOD, the four service intelligence offices also produce finished intelligence. The FBI has a relatively new Intelligence Directorate, which is also codified in the 2004 legislation. DHS has the undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis; Energy has its intelligence office. The DNI controls the National Intelligence Council, which is made up of the national intelligence officers (NIOs) and is responsible for national intelligence estimates (NIEs) and some other analyses. He or she also has responsibility for the National Counterterrorism Center, which produces analysis on all terrorism and counterterrorism issues, except those that are purely domestic, and the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), which “coordinates strategic planning” for WMD proliferation intelligence, identifies gaps or shortfalls in this area, and comes up with solutions for these gaps. Thus, the NCPC does not produce intelligence per se. Again, the DNI has authority to manage and task analysis.
The new law focuses much more on the analytic process. The DNI has three specific charges. First, the DNI is to create a process to ensure the use of alternative analysis as appropriate. Second, the DNI is to assign an official or office to be responsible for analytic integrity, which includes timeliness, objectivity, and the use of all appropriate sources and proper analytic tradecraft. Third, the DNI is to appoint someone who will oversee and report on the objectivity of analysis and the quality of its associated tradecraft. These mandates reflect the unstated Iraq-related issues that shaped the legislation, not September 11, which was the ostensible basis for the new law. In 2007 the assistant deputy DNI for Analytic Integrity and Standards released a set of standards for evaluating the quality of analysis (see chap. 6 for details).
Figure 3-3 does not delineate counterintelligence or counterespionage functions. Each agency has certain internal security responsibilities beyond the NCIX under the DNI. The FBI’s National Security Branch coordinates foreign counterintelligence activities in the United States. CIA’s NCS has its own counterintelligence and counterespionage components. In addition, the director of NSA is also the director of the Central Security Service, with responsibility for safeguarding the communications of the United States from interception. The basic relationships, strengths, and weaknesses noted in Figure 3-1 are still evident, but discerning functions is easier in Figure 3-3.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS THAT MATTER
 
Bureaucracies love organizational charts, popularly called “wiring diagrams.” All wiring diagrams, no matter how sophisticated, are deceptive. They portray where agencies sit in relation to one another, but they cannot portray how they interact and which relationships matter and why. Moreover, personalities do matter. However much people like to think of government as one of laws and institutions, the personalities and relationships of those filling important positions affect agency working relations.
THE DNI’S RELATIONSHIPS. The relationship between the DNI and the president is crucial for the institutional well-being of the intelligence community. The DNI is the embodiment of the intelligence community, and the president is the ultimate policy consumer. DCI Richard Helms (1966-1973) put it succinctly when he observed that the DCI’s authority derived directly from the perception that he had access to the president. The same is now true for the DNI, although the DNI will have even more rivals than did the DCI. If the DNI does not have access and is not included in meetings where intelligence should be a contributor, there are several ramifications. For the DNI, the problem is personal and professional; for the intelligence community, the problem is being left out of the process. The role of the DNI thus would be diminished in the perception of others who become aware of the situation. The cases of some past DCIs are instructive. DCI John McCone (1961-1965) enjoyed good access to President John F. Kennedy and, initially, to Lyndon B. Johnson, but Johnson began to exclude McCone when the DCI disagreed with his incremental approach to the Vietnam War. After a short period of frustration, McCone resigned. Similarly, DCI R. James Woolsey (1993-1995), after his resignation, made no secret of the fact that he had little access to President Bill Clinton.
How close should the relationship between the DNI and the president be? Some observers worry that if it is too close, the DNI may lose some of the intelligence objectivity needed to support the policy process. Policy makers must be able to rely on the professionalism of the DNI. Still, if the intelligence community were forced to choose between the two extremes, an overly close relationship would probably be preferable to a very distant one. The relationship Tenet (1997-2004) had with George W. Bush was probably the closest of any DCI to a president, but it was also controversial. The intelligence provided on the eve of the war with Iraq in 2003 concerning the presence of WMDs is seen by some as an indicator of lost objectivity. However, a report issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee that was highly critical of intelligence analysis on Iraqi WMD also found that there was no evidence that intelligence had been politicized.
BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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