Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (12 page)

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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal

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Much of the secretary of defense’s authority for intelligence usually devolves to the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, who becomes, in effect, the chief operating officer for defense intelligence. (The USDI is also the third ranking official in DOD, after the secretary and deputy.) DOD traditionally has tended to look at the intelligence community warily, worrying that the community managers might not be looking after DOD needs and that they might be assuming too much power over defense intelligence. The key to this relationship is the credibility of the DNI or his office with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); that is, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) should have a working knowledge of defense intelligence programs and needs and of the defense budget process. This helps explain why Gen. Mike Hayden was chosen to be the first principal deputy DNI, as he is both a career military officer and a career intelligence officer, most recently the director of NSA. McConnell had a similar background when he became DNI. The DNI and OSD have an unbalanced relationship, with OSD the stronger partner. If officials in OSD have the sense that the DNI is not paying adequate attention to DOD needs and privileges, they can stymie much that the DNI wants to do.
The relationship between DHS and the intelligence community continues to evolve. Critics of the imbalance between defense and intelligence sometimes refer to DOD as “the 800-pound gorilla.” Some observers now recognize that DHS has the potential to be the other 800-pound gorilla. In other words, the sheer size and complexity of DHS are likely to make it an increasingly important intelligence consumer. Therefore, the relationship of the DNI and the director of the NCTC with the secretary of DHS is important.
The relationship between the DNI and Congress has three key components. The first is the power of the purse. Congress not only funds the intelligence community (and the rest of the government) but also can, through its funding decisions, affect intelligence programs. Although it is generally believed that Congress reduces presidential budget requests, it has in many instances championed programs and funded them despite opposition from the executive branch.
The second is personal. Past DCIs have occasionally not gotten along with their overseers, to the ultimate detriment of the DCIs and the intelligence community. William J. Casey (1981-1987) was fairly contemptuous of the oversight process, which cost him support, even among his political allies. James Woolsey ended up in a constant public squabble with the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz. John M. Deutch (1995-1997) had a difficult relationship with the House Intelligence Committee. The question of the rights and wrongs in each of these cases is irrelevant. Simply put, the DNI can only lose in the end. Also, having created the DNI to solve a set of perceived problems, Congress will be watching closely to see if the DNI meets expectations.
The third is the public perception of intelligence and support for it. Because of the secrecy surrounding intelligence, citizens get a glimpse of it mainly through congressional activities. Even without knowing the details of hearings, the fact that a congressional committee is investigating an intelligence issue affects media and public perceptions. After all, if the intelligence community is doing its job, why have a hearing or investigation? And, as is usually the case, bad news tends to get reported more often than good news.
 
USDI AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. USDI was created by Congress in 2002 at the behest of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (2001-2006), who felt that he had too many people reporting to him on various aspects of defense intelligence and wanted the information funneled to one office. (This was similar to President Harry S. Truman’s desire for one official—the DCI—to be responsible to him for all national intelligence issues.) The USDI is limited by law to a small staff (ninety-nine positions). It is entirely a management oversight function as it has no direct control over any line intelligence assets—cottectors. operators, or analysts. Still, it is an extremely influential position in terms of defense intelligence policies, requirements, and budgets.
Tension had arisen between USDI and the heads of NSA and NGA, both of whom also had a responsibility to the DCI and now have one to the DNI. Although they head combat support agencies and although their budgets still come through DOD channels, the heads of these agencies struggle with their two masters within the executive branch—DOD and the DNI. During the congressional hearings about the 2004 intelligence legislation, the directors of NSA and NGA (Hayden and Clapper, respectively) testified that they believed they should come under the new DNI, a view that was not pleasing to DOD officials. However, neither the DNI nor USDI can issue orders or directives to NSA or NGA without taking into account the sensibilities of the other office.
The EXCOM established by DNI McConnell again raised the issue of the relationship between USDI and the defense intelligence agencies, all of whom are members of the EXCOM. To clarify the hierarchy, the USDI has been designated as the director of Defense Intelligence to make it clear that the USDI continues to have a position superior to the agencies even though they all sit on the same committee. Significantly, USDI Clapper has stated that he will carry out his director of Defense Intelligence function under the DNI, signaling a closer working relationship than had existed previously.
Another internal Defense set of relationships that matter are those between the Combatant Commands (CoComs) and the national intelligence agencies. Rivalry most often arises concerning control over collection assets between the regional CoComs (there are also functional CoComs) and national agencies. CoComs, of necessity, are more responsive to crises in their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs), although these may not loom as large when seen from Washington. Thus, CoComs are likely to demand intelligence collection that may not be supported by the national collection agencies or policy makers in Washington.
There has been a change in how DIA functions and in its relationship to the intelligence offices (formerly J-2s) at the CoComs. In April 2006, DIA was also designated as the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC, pronounced “dee-jai-ock.”) The JIOC concept derives from the recognition that operations and intelligence work much more closely now than they have in the past and that part of the United States’ military superiority in combat stems directly from superior intelligence support (or “battlefield awareness”). The so-called thunder run of U.S. forces into Baghdad in 2003 typifies this type of operation. To enhance this cooperation, DIA was designated as the DJIOC. with the ultimate goal of integrating intelligence, operations, and plans. In addition, the DJIOC is to coordinate and set priorities for all intelligence requirements across all commands, combat support agencies, reserve components, and service intelligence centers. The J-2s at each command are now also designated as JIOCs and they are supposed to refer back to the DJIOC for intelligence operational and planning support. The closer integration of planning, intelligence, and operations is undoubtedly a good idea; whether it will foster improved relations with the CoComs is less certain.
 
The USDI AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS. The USDI is one of two main conduits through which defense intelligence issues reach Congress, the other being DIA itself. But given the principle of civilian control of the military, USDI is more powerful and more important than DIA. The USDI has jurisdiction over defense intelligence requirements, the various defense intelligence agencies (among them, NSA, DIA, and NGA), and some defense collection programs—called the “air breathers.” The USDI deals with the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Furthermore, the USDI staff functions as a guardian of the authority of the secretary of defense over defense intelligence, watching warily for any possible encroachments, such as from the DNI.
 
INR AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE. State’s INR is the smallest of the three all-source analytical components (compared with CIA and DIA) and is often thought of as the weakest. A great deal of INR’s ability to get things done, both in its own department and as a player in the intelligence community, depends on the relationship between the INR assistant secretary and the secretary of state and one or two other senior State officials, who often are referred to collectively as “the seventh floor,” where they are situated at the Department of State. In some respects, the relationship among these State officials parallels that between the DNI and the president. If INR has access to the seventh floor, then it plays a greater role and has greater bureaucratic support when needed. But it is a highly variable relationship, depending on the preferences of the secretary and key subordinates. For example, Secretary of State George P. Shultz (1982-1989) met with all of his assistant secretaries regularly; Secretary of State James A. Baker III (1989-1992) did not, preferring to meet with a few senior subordinates, who then dealt with the rest of the department. Thus, under Shultz, INR had more opportunities to gain access; under Baker, most of INR’s clients were other bureaus, but less so the vaunted seventh floor.
In recent years INR has taken a number of steps to increase its visibility in the State Department and to involve other bureaus more actively in setting intelligence requirements. The goal has been to increase the bureaus’ appreciation of the role of intelligence and of INR, thus making them potential sources of support. The degree to which these steps have improved INR’s position in its department remains to be seen.
 
NEW AREAS OF RIVALRY. Increased rivalry has become evident among agencies both before and after the passage of the 2004 intelligence legislation. The war on terrorism has been a major impetus to this rivalry for at least two reasons. The first reason is that the war on terrorism has blurred distinctions between different types or fields of activity that were kept distinct, at least in U.S. practice. Most prominent are those between foreign and domestic intelligence issues and between intelligence and military operations. As became evident in 2001, terrorists could place themselves in the United States legally to plan and conduct attacks, creating what is both a foreign and domestic intelligence issue. The war against terrorism, particularly in places such as Afghanistan, called for greater intelligence-military cooperation but also blurred some of the distinctions between the areas in which both operated. For example, the initial liaison with and support of the Northern Alliance, which was fighting the Taliban, came via the CIA. The campaign against the Taliban had conventional and nonconventional (that is, special forces) aspects, as well as a large intelligence component. The second reason for increased rivalry has been the natural tendency of most organizations to increase activities, particularly during periods of crisis or war.
Rivalry has been an issue between the FBI and the CIA. The FBI, beginning before 2001, sought to increase its role both within the United States and overseas. In the mid-1990s, the FBI was aggressive about expanding the role of its legal attaches, who work out of U.S. embassies to foster greater cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies. Press stories have alleged that the FBI has, on occasion, conducted overseas activities without informing the CIA. Within the United States, increased rivalry has emerged over the recruitment of foreigners who are in the United States and are then sent overseas to collect intelligence. Although the CIA cannot conduct intelligence within the United States or on U.S. citizens, this type of activity has been allowed as the recruited individuals are foreigners and their collection takes place outside of the country. The FBI has reportedly sought to take over this activity, arguing that it is domestic intelligence (as recruitment takes place in the United States), and has sought to be responsible for disseminating intelligence produced by foreigners in the United States. The CIA has resisted the FBI efforts. Some observers note that the FBI has little experience in this type of intelligence recruitment and that its own intelligence analytic effort just began in 2003 and is not ready to take over reporting of this type. Concern also arose that both agencies could end up controlling some portion of overseas collection, resulting either in duplication or in the two working at cross-purposes if they are not aware of the other’s activities. The DNI has oversight over both sets of activities and may be asked to resolve the competing claims of the two agencies.
Rivalry also exists between DOD and the CIA. This relationship has always been difficult because of the imbalance between the DCI’s intelligence community responsibilities and the day-to-day control that the secretary of defense has exercised over some 75 to 80 percent of the intelligence community. Even though the new DCIA is responsible for only one agency, areas of rivalry remain. The blurring of intelligence and military roles in the war on terrorism has been one source. There are both overt and covert military aspects to this war. The CIA can claim to have a stake only in the covert aspect, as in its work with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. But the military can claim to have responsibilities in both spheres and appears to want to expand its activities in the covert sphere. (See the discussion of paramilitary operations in chap. 8.)
A second source of CIA-DOD competition was the apparent desire of DOD to gain greater control over any and all intelligence related to its missions. Several observers have noted that, once President George W. Bush decided to attack al Qaeda in its Afghan sanctuary, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was frustrated by the relative speed with which DCI Tenet was able to respond and begin inserting officers to link up with the Northern Alliance. DOD needed a much longer time span to plan and to deliver military combat units to Afghanistan. Rumsfeld was also reportedly displeased that the military had to depend largely on the CIA for human intelligence support.

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