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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal
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Information is needed about these actors, their likely actions, and their capabilities in a variety of areas, including economic, military, and societal. The United States built its intelligence organizations in recognition of the fact that some of the information it would like to have is either inaccessible or being actively denied. In other words, the information is secret as far as the United States is concerned, and those who have the information would like to keep it that way.
The pursuit of secret information is the mainstay of intelligence activity. At the same time, reflecting the political transformation brought about by the end of the cold war, increasing amounts of once secret information are now accessible, especially in states that were satellites of or allied with the Soviet Union. The ratio of open to secret information has shifted dramatically. Still, foreign states and actors harbor secrets that the United States must pursue. And not all of this intelligence is in states that are hostile to the United States in the sense that they are enemies.
Most people tend to think of intelligence in terms of military information—troop movements, weapons capabilities, and plans for surprise attack. This is an important component of intelligence (in line with avoiding surprise attack, the first reason for having intelligence agencies), but it is not the only one. Many different kinds of intelligence (political, economic, social, environmental, health, and cultural) provide important inputs to analysts. Policy makers and intelligence officials must think beyond foreign intelligence. They must consider intelligence activities focused on threats to internal security, such as subversion, espionage, and terrorism.
Other than the internal security threats, domestic intelligence, at least in the United States and kindred democracies, is a law enforcement issue. This fact differentiates the practice of intelligence in Western democracies from that in totalitarian states. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ State Security Committee (
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosli,
or KGB), for example, served a crucial internal secret police function that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) does not. Thus, in many respects, the two agencies were not comparable.
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosli,
or KGB), for example, served a crucial internal secret police function that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) does not. Thus, in many respects, the two agencies were not comparable.
What is intelligence
not
about? Intelligence is not about truth. If something were known to be true, states would not need intelligence agencies to collect the information or analyze it. Truth is such an absolute term that it sets a standard that intelligence rarely would be able to achieve. It is better—and more accurate—to think of intelligence as proximate reality. Intelligence agencies face issues or questions and do their best to arrive at a firm understanding of what is going on. They can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is true. Their goals are intelligence products that are reliable, unbiased, and honest (that is, free from politicization). These are all laudable goals, yet they are still different from truth.
(See box, “And ye shall know the truth ”)
not
about? Intelligence is not about truth. If something were known to be true, states would not need intelligence agencies to collect the information or analyze it. Truth is such an absolute term that it sets a standard that intelligence rarely would be able to achieve. It is better—and more accurate—to think of intelligence as proximate reality. Intelligence agencies face issues or questions and do their best to arrive at a firm understanding of what is going on. They can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is true. Their goals are intelligence products that are reliable, unbiased, and honest (that is, free from politicization). These are all laudable goals, yet they are still different from truth.
(See box, “And ye shall know the truth ”)
Is intelligence integral to the policy process? The question may seem rhetorical in a book about intelligence, but it is important to consider. At one level, the answer is yes. Intelligence should and can provide warning about imminent strategic threats, although several nations have been subjected to strategic surprise. Intelligence officials can also play a useful role as seasoned and experienced advisers. The information their agencies gather is also of value given that it might not be available if agencies did not undertake secret collection. Therein lies an irony: Intelligence agencies strive to be more than just collectors of information. They emphasize the value that their analysis adds to the secret information, although equally competent analysts can be found in policy agencies. The difference is in the nature of the work and the outcomes for which the two types of analysts are responsible—intelligence versus policy decisions.
“AND YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH....”Upon entering the old entrance of the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, one will find the following inscription on the left-hand marble wall“And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.”John VIII-XXXIIIt is a nice sentiment, but it overstates and misrepresents what is going on in that building or any other intelligence agency
At the same time, intelligence suffers from a number of potential weaknesses that tend to undercut its function in the eyes of policy makers. Not all of these weaknesses are present at all times, and sometimes none is present. They still represent potential pitfalls.
First, a certain amount of intelligence analysis may be no more sophisticated than current conventional wisdom on a given issue. Conventional wisdom is usually—and sometimes mistakenly—dismissed out of hand. But policy makers expect more than that, in part justifiably.
Second, analysis can become so dependent on data that it misses important intangibles. For example, a competent analysis of the likelihood that thirteen small and somewhat disunited colonies would be able to break away from British rule in the 1770s would have concluded that defeat was inevitable. After all, Britain was the largest industrial power; it already had trained troops stationed in the colonies; colonial opinion was not united (nor was Britain’s); and Britain could use the Native Americans as an added force, among other reasons. A straightforward political-military analysis would have missed several factors—the strength of British divisiveness, the possibility of help from royalist France—that turned out to be of tremendous importance.
Third,
mirror imaging,
or assuming that other states or individuals will act just the way a particular country or person does, can undermine analysis. The basis of this problem is fairly understandable. Every day people make innumerable judgments—when driving, walking on a crowded street, or interacting with others at home and at the office—about how other people will react and behave. They assume that their behavior and reactions are based on the golden rule. These judgments stem from societal norms and rules, etiquette, and experience. Analysts too easily extend this commonplace thinking to intelligence issues. However, in intelligence it becomes a trap. For example, no U.S. policy maker in 1991 could conceive of Japan’s starting a war with the United States overtly (instead of continuing its advance while bypassing U.S. territories), given the great disparity in the strength of the two nations. In Tokyo. however, those same factors argued compellingly for the necessity of starting war sooner rather than later. The other problem with mirror imaging is that it assumes a certain level of shared rationality. It leaves no room for the irrational actor, an individual or nation whose rationality is based on something different or unfamiliar—for example, suicidal terrorists viewed through the eyes of western culture.
mirror imaging,
or assuming that other states or individuals will act just the way a particular country or person does, can undermine analysis. The basis of this problem is fairly understandable. Every day people make innumerable judgments—when driving, walking on a crowded street, or interacting with others at home and at the office—about how other people will react and behave. They assume that their behavior and reactions are based on the golden rule. These judgments stem from societal norms and rules, etiquette, and experience. Analysts too easily extend this commonplace thinking to intelligence issues. However, in intelligence it becomes a trap. For example, no U.S. policy maker in 1991 could conceive of Japan’s starting a war with the United States overtly (instead of continuing its advance while bypassing U.S. territories), given the great disparity in the strength of the two nations. In Tokyo. however, those same factors argued compellingly for the necessity of starting war sooner rather than later. The other problem with mirror imaging is that it assumes a certain level of shared rationality. It leaves no room for the irrational actor, an individual or nation whose rationality is based on something different or unfamiliar—for example, suicidal terrorists viewed through the eyes of western culture.
INTELLIGENCE: A WORKING CONCEPTIntelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, policy makers are free to reject or to ignore the intelligence they are offered. They may suffer penalties down the road if their policy has bad outcomes, but policy makers cannot be forced to take heed of intelligence. Thus, they can dispense with intelligence at will, and intelligence officers cannot press their way (or their products) back into the process in such cases.
This host of weaknesses seems to overpower the positive aspects of intelligence. It certainly suggests and underscores the fragility of intelligence within the policy process. How, then, can it be determined whether intelligence matters? The best way, at least retrospectively, is to ask: Would policy makers have made different choices with or without a given piece of intelligence? If the answer is yes, or even maybe, then the intelligence mattered.
(See boix, “Intelligence: A Working Concept. ”)
(See boix, “Intelligence: A Working Concept. ”)
What is intelligence? There are several ways to think about intelligence, all of which will be used throughout this book, sometimes simultaneously.
• Intelligence as process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted.
• Intelligence as product: Intelligence can be thought of as the product of these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves.
• Intelligence as organization: Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various functions.
intelligence
mirror imaging
politicized intelligence
FURTHER READINGSEach of these readings grapples with the definition of intelligence, either by function or by role, in a different way. Some deal with intelligence on its own terms; others attempt to relate it to the larger policy process.
Betts. Richard. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable.”
World Politics
31 (October 1978). Reprinted in
Power, Strategy, and Security.
Ed. Klaus Knorr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
World Politics
31 (October 1978). Reprinted in
Power, Strategy, and Security.
Ed. Klaus Knorr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Hamilton, Lee. “The Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process.”
Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy.
Claremont, CA: Claremont College, Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, 1987.
Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy.
Claremont, CA: Claremont College, Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, 1987.
Herman, Michael.
Intelligence Power in Peare and
War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Intelligence Power in Peare and
War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Heymann, Hans. “Intelligence/Policy Relationships.” In
Intelligonce: Policy and Process.
Ed. Alfred C. Maurer and others. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985.
Intelligonce: Policy and Process.
Ed. Alfred C. Maurer and others. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985.
Hilsman, Roger.
Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions.
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958.
Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions.
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958.
Kent, Sherman.
Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.
Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.
Laqueur,
Walter.
A
World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence.
New York: Basic Books, 1985.
Walter.
A
World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence.
New York: Basic Books, 1985.
Scott, Len, and Peter Jackson. “The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice.”
Intelligenre and National Security
19 (summer 2004): 139-169.
Intelligenre and National Security
19 (summer 2004): 139-169.
Shulsky. Abram N., and Gary J. Schmitt.
Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of intelligence.
2d rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993.
Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of intelligence.
2d rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993.
Shulsky, Abram N., and Jennifer Sims.
What Is Intelligenre?
Washington, D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.
What Is Intelligenre?
Washington, D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.
Troy, Thomas F. “The ‘Correct’ Definition of Intelligence.”
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
5 (winter 1991-1992): 433-454.
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
5 (winter 1991-1992): 433-454.
Warner, Michael. “Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence.”
Studies in Intelligence
46 (2002): 15-23.
Studies in Intelligence
46 (2002): 15-23.
CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
E
ACH NATION practices intelligence in ways that are specific—if not peculiar—to that nation alone. This is true even among countries that share a great deal of their intelligence, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. A better understanding of how and why the United States practices intelligence is important because the U.S. intelligence system remains the largest and most influential in the world—as model, rival, or target. (The practices of several foreign intelligence services are discussed in chap. 15.) Such an understanding comes with knowledge of the major themes and historical events that shaped the development of U.S. intelligence and helped determine how it continues to function.
ACH NATION practices intelligence in ways that are specific—if not peculiar—to that nation alone. This is true even among countries that share a great deal of their intelligence, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. A better understanding of how and why the United States practices intelligence is important because the U.S. intelligence system remains the largest and most influential in the world—as model, rival, or target. (The practices of several foreign intelligence services are discussed in chap. 15.) Such an understanding comes with knowledge of the major themes and historical events that shaped the development of U.S. intelligence and helped determine how it continues to function.
The phrase “intelligence community” is used throughout the book as well as in most other discussions of U.S. intelligence. The word “community” is particularly apt in describing U.S. intelligence. The community is made up of agencies and offices whose work is often related and sometimes combined, but they serve different clients and work under various lines of authority and control. The intelligence community grew out of a set of evolving demands and without a master plan. It is highly functional and yet sometimes dysfunctional. One director of central intelligence (DCI), Richard Helms (1966-1973), testified before Congress that, despite all of the criticisms of the structure and functioning of the intelligence community, if one were to create it from scratch, much the same community would likely emerge. Helms’s focus was not on the structure of the community but on the services it provides, which are multiple, varied, and supervised by a number of individuals. This approach to intelligence is unique to the United States, although others have copied facets of it. The 2004 legislation that created a director of national intelligence (DNI; see chap. 3) made changes in the superstructure of the intelligence community but not to the functions of the various agencies.
BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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