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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal

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BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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CHAPTER 1
 
WHAT IS “INTELLIGENCE”?
 
W
HAT IS
intelligence?
Why is its definition an issue? Virtually every book written on the subject of intelligence begins with a discussion of what “intelligence” means, or at least how the author intends to use the term. This editorial fact reveals much about the field of intelligence. If this were a text on any other government function—defense, housing, transportation, diplomacy, agriculture—there would be little or no confusion about, or need to explain, what was being discussed.
Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First, much of what goes on is secret. Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some information from other governments, which, in turn, seek to discover hidden information by means that they wish to keep secret. All of this secrecy leads some authors to believe that issues exist about which they cannot write or may not have sufficient knowledge. Thus, they feel the need to describe the limits of their work. Although numerous aspects of intelligence are—and deserve to be—kept secret, this is not an impediment to describing basic roles, processes, functions, and issues.
Second, this same secrecy can be a source of consternation to citizens, especially in a democratic country such as the United States. The U.S. intelligence community is a relatively recent government phenomenon. Since its creation in 1947, the intelligence community has been the subject of much ambivalence. Some Americans are uncomfortable with the concept that intelligence is a secret entity within an ostensibly open government based on checks and balances. Moreover, the intelligence community engages in activities—spying, eavesdropping, covert action—that some people regard as antithetical to what they believe the United States should be as a nation and as a model for other nations. Some citizens have difficulty reconciling American ideals and goals with the realities of intelligence.
To many people, intelligence seems little different from information, except that it is probably secret. However, distinguishing between the two is important. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information. Intelligence and the entire process by which it is identified, obtained, and analyzed respond to the needs of policy makers. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.
WHY HAVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES?
 
The major theme of this book is that intelligence exists solely to support policy makers in myriad ways. Any other activity is either wasteful or illegal. The book’s focus is firmly on the relationship between intelligence, in all of its aspects, and policy making. The policy maker is not a passive recipient of intelligence, but actively influences all aspects of intelligence.
Intelligence agencies exist for at least four major reasons: to avoid strategic surprise; to provide long-term expertise; to support the policy process; and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods.
 
TO AVOID STRATEGIC SURPRISE. The foremost goal of any intelligence community must be to keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that are capable of endangering the nation’s existence. This goal may sound grandiose and far-fetched, but several times over the past one hundred years nations have been subjected to direct military attacks for which they were, at best, inadequately prepared—Russia was surprised by Japan in 1904, both the Soviet Union (by Germany) and the United States (by Japan) in 1941, and Israel (by Egypt and Syria) in 1973. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States are another example of this pattern, albeit carried out on a much more limited scale.
(See box, “The Terrorist Attacks on September I1, 2001: Another Pearl Harbor?”)
Strategic surprise should not be confused with tactical surprise, which is of a different magnitude and, as Professor Richard Betts of Columbia University pointed out in his article, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” cannot be wholly avoided. Putting the difference between the two types of surprise in perspective, suppose, for example, that Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones are business partners. Every Friday, while Mr. Smith is lunching with a client, Mr. Jones helps himself to money from the petty cash. One afternoon Mr. Smith comes back from lunch earlier than expected, catching Mr. Jones red-handed. “I’m surprised!” they exclaim simultaneously. Mr. Jones’s surprise is tactical: He knew what he was doing but did not expect to get caught. Mr. Smith’s surprise is strategic: He had no idea the embezzlement was happening.
THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: ANOTHER PEARL HARBOR?
 
Many people immediately described the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon as a “new Pearl Harbor.” This is understandable on an emotional level, as both were surprise attacks. However, important differences exist.
First, Pearl Harbor was a strategic surprise. U.S policy makers expected a move by Japan but not against the United States. The Soviet Union was seen as a possible target, but the greatest expectation and fear was a Japanese attack on European colonies in Southeast Asia that by-passed U.S. possessions, thus allowing Japan to continue to expand its empire without bringing the United States into the war.
The terrorist attacks were more of a tactical surprise. The enmity of Osama bin Laden and his willingness to attack U.S. targets had been amply demonstrated in earlier attacks on the East African embassies and on the USS
Cole
Throughout the summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence officials had warned of the likelihood of another bin Laden attack. What was not known-or guessed—was the target and the means of attack.
Second, Japan and the Axis powers had the capability to defeat and destroy U.S. power and the U.S. way of life. The terrorists do not pose a threat on the same level.
 
Tactical surprise, when it happens, is not of sufficient magnitude and importance to threaten national existence, although it can be psychologically devastating. To some extent, the 9/11 attacks were tactical surprise. Repetitive tactical surprise, however, suggests some significant intelligence problems.
 
TO PROVIDE LONG-TERM EXPERTISE. Compared with the permanent bureaucracy, all senior policy makers are transients. The average time in office for a president of the United States is five years. Secretaries of state and defense serve for less time than that, and their senior subordinates—deputy, under, and assistant secretaries—often hold their positions for even shorter periods. Although these individuals usually enter their respective offices with an extensive background in their fields, it is virtually impossible for them to be well versed in all of the matters with which they will be dealing. Inevitably, they will have to call upon others whose knowledge and expertise on certain issues are greater. Much knowledge and expertise on national security issues resides in the intelligence community, where the analytical cadre has been relatively stable. (This has changed in the United States since 2001. See chap. 6.) Stability tends to be greater in intelligence agencies, particularly in higher-level positions, than in foreign affairs and defense agencies. Also, intelligence agencies tend to have far fewer political appointees than do the State and Defense Departments. However, these two personnel differences (stability and nonpolitical) have diminished somewhat over the past decade.
 
TO SUPPORT THE POLICY PROCESS. Policy makers have a constant need for tailored (meaning written for their specific needs), timely intelligence that will provide background, context, information, warning, and an assessment of risks, benefits, and likely outcomes. Their needs are met by the intelligence community.
In the ethos of U.S. intelligence, a strict dividing line exists between intelligence and policy. The two are seen as separate functions. The government is run by the policy makers. Intelligence has a support role and may not cross over into the advocacy of policy choices. Intelligence officers who are dealing with policy makers are expected to maintain professional objectivity and not push specific policies, choices, or outcomes. To do so is seen as threatening the objectivity of the analyses they present. If intelligence officers have a strong preference for a specific policy outcome, their intelligence analysis may display a similar bias. This is what is meant by
politicized intelligence,
one of the strongest expressions of opprobrium that can be leveled in the U.S. intelligence community. If intelligence officers were allowed to make policy recommendations they would then have a strong urge to present intelligence that supported the policy they had first recommended. At that point, all objectivity would be lost.
Three important caveats should be added to the distinction between policy and intelligence. First, the idea that intelligence is distinct from policy does not mean that intelligence officers do not care about the outcome and do not influence it. One must differentiate between attempting to influence (that is, inform) the process by providing intelligence, which is acceptable, and trying to manipulate intelligence so that policy makers make a certain choice, which is not acceptable. Second, senior policy makers can and do ask senior intelligence officials for their opinions, which are given. Third, this separation works in only one direction, that of intelligence advice to policy. Nothing prevents policy makers from rejecting intelligence out of hand or offering their own analytic inputs. When doing so, however, policy makers cannot present their alternative views as intelligence per se, in part because they lack the necessary objectivity. There are no hard and fast rules here but there is an unwritten and generally agreed standard. This became an issue in 2002, when Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith created an office that, to many observers, appeared to offer alternative intelligence analyses even though it was in a policy branch. Assuming that policy makers stay within their bounds, they will likely see their offering alternative views as being different from imposing their views on the intelligence product per se. This would also politicize intelligence, which is an accusation policy makers as well as intelligence officials hope to avoid, because it calls into question the soundness of their policy and the basis on which they have made decisions. The propriety of a policymaker rejecting intelligence was central to the 2005 debate over the nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Critics charged that Bolton, as undersecretary of state, had engaged in this type of action when intelligence did not provide the answers he preferred.
(See box, “Policy Versus Intelligence: The Great Divide. ”)
 
TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF INFORMATION, NEEDS, AND METHODS. Secrecy does make intelligence unique. That others would keep important information from you, that you need certain types of information and wish to keep your needs secret, and that you have the means to obtain information that you also wish to keep secret are major reasons for having intelligence agencies.
WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE ABOUT?
 
The word
intelligence
largely refers to issues related to national security—that is, defense and foreign policy and certain aspects of homeland and internal security, which has been increasingly important since the terrorist attacks of 2001. In U.S. law (the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, 2004) all intelligence is now defined as
national
intelligence, which has three subsets, foreign, domestic, and homeland security. It is important to note that practitioners are experiencing some difficulty distinguishing among homeland, internal, and domestic security.
POLICY VERSUS INTELLIGENCE: THE GREAT DIVIDE
 
One way to envision the distinction between policy and intelligence is to see them as two spheres of government activity that are separated by a semipermeable membrane. The membrane is semipermeable because policy makers can and do cross over into the intelligence sphere, but intelligence offcials cannot cross over into the policy sphere.
 
 
The actions, policies, and capabilities of other nations and of important non-state groups (international organizations, terrorist organizations, and so on) are primary areas of concern. But policy makers and intelligence officers cannot restrict themselves to thinking only about enemies—those powers that are known to be hostile or whose policy goals are in some way inimical. They must also keep track of powers that are neutrals, friends, or even allies but are rivals in certain contexts. For example, the European Union is made up largely of nations that are U.S. allies. However, the United States competes with many of them for global resources and markets, so in that sense they are rivals. This type of relationship with the United States is also true of Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, circumstances may arise in which a country would need to keep track of the actions and intentions of friends. For example, an ally might be pursuing a course that could involve it in conflict with a third party. Should this not be to a country’s liking—or should it threaten to involve that country as well—it would be better to know early on what this ally was doing. Adolf Hitler, for example, might have been better served had he known in advance of Japan’s plans to attack the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941. He had no interest in seeing the United States become an active combatant and might have argued against a direct attack by Japan (as opposed to a Japanese attack to the south against European colonies but avoiding U.S. territories). In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries it has become increasingly important for the United States to keep track of non-state actors—terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and others.
BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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