Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (23 page)
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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal
BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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A controversy involving U.S. and British SIGINT operations arose in 2004. A Government Communications Headquarters employee alleged that NSA had conducted SIGINT at the UN, against Security Council members, during the debates prior to the war against Iraq. Both governments refused to confirm the allegations. The UN, by treaty, is deemed to be inviolate from such activity. At the same time, all nations know that the UN is an excellent intelligence collection target as virtually all nations of the world have missions and representatives there. (See chap. 13 for a fuller discussion.)
MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE. FISINT and ELINT are both major contributors to a little-understood branch of collection known as MASINT. MASINT refers to weapons capabilities and industrial activities. MSI and HSI also contribute to MASINT.
An arcane debate rages between those who see MASINT as a separate collection discipline and those who see it as simply a product, or even a by-product, of SIGINT and other collection capabilities. For our purposes, it is sufficient to understand that MASINT exists and that, in a world increasingly concerned about such issues as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it is of growing importance. For example, MASINT can help identify the types of gases or waste leaving a factory, which can be important in chemical weapons identification. It can also help identify other specific characteristics (composition, material content) of weapons systems.
MASINT practitioners think of their INT as having six disciplines.
1. Electro-optical: the properties of emitted or reflected energy in the infrared to ultraviolet part of the spectrum, including lasers and various types of light—infrared, polarized, spectral, ultraviolet, and visible
2. Geophysical: the disturbance and anomalies of various physical fields at, or near, the surface of Earth, such as acoustic, gravity, magnetic, and seismic
3. Materials: the composition and identification of gases, liquids, or solids, including chemical-, biological-, and nuclear-related material samples
4. Nuclear radiation: the qualities of gamma rays, neutrons, and x-rays
5. Radar: the properties of radio waves reflected from a target or objects, including various types of radars such as line-of-sight and over-the-horizon and synthetic apertures
6. Radio frequency: the electromagnetic signals generated by an object, either narrow-or wide-band
MASINT can be used against a wide array of intelligence issues, including WMD development and proliferation, arms control, environmental issues, narcotics, weapons developments, space activities, and denial and deception practices.
MASINT has suffered as a collection discipline because of its relative novelty and its dependence on the other technical INTs for its products. Often analysts or policy makers look at a MASINT product without knowing it. MASINT is a potentially important INT still struggling for recognition. It is also more arcane and requires analysts with more technical training to be able to use it fully. At present, policy makers are less familiar—and probably less comfortable—with it than they are with GEOINT or SIGINT. Responsibility for MASINT is shared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and NGA: it is not a separate agency. Some of its advocates believe that MASINT will never make a full contribution until it has more bureaucratic clout. Others, even some sympathetic to MASINT, do not believe this INT needs the panoply of a full agency.
HUMAN INTELLEGENCE. HUMINT is espionage—spying—and is sometimes referred to as the world’s second-oldest profession. Indeed, it is as old as the Bible. First Moses and then Joshua sent spies into Canaan before leading the Jewish people across the Jordan River. Spying is what most people think about when they hear the word “intelligence.” whether they conjure up famous spies from history such as Nathan Hale or Mata Hari (both failures) or fictional spies such as James Bond. In the United States, HUMINT is largely the responsibility of the CIA, through the National Clandestine Service (NCS), formerly known as the Directorate of Operations (DO). The DIA also has a HUMINT capability with the Defense Humint Service, which it has sought to expand since the war in Afghanistan. The FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also have officers who operate overseas. This multitude of collectors was what led DCI Porter Goss to create the NCS. The NCS has three branches: CIA HUMINT; Community HUMINT; and Technology. The Community HUMINT office serves to coordinate among the various agencies conducting HUMINT, a necessary task to avoid duplication of effort or operations that run at cross purposes. The director of the CIA (DCIA) is the HUMINT program manager.
HUMINT largely involves sending clandestine service officers to foreign countries, where they attempt to recruit foreign nationals to spy. The process of recruiting spies has several steps and a unique vocabulary. The process of managing spies is sometimes referred to as the
agent acquisition cycle.
The cycle has five steps.
agent acquisition cycle.
The cycle has five steps.
1. Targeting or spotting: identifying individuals who have access to the information that the United States may desire.
2. Assessing: gaining their confidence and assessing their weaknesses and susceptibility to be recruited: done via the
asset validation system.
3. Recruiting: making a
pitch
to them, suggesting a relationship; a
source
may accept a pitch for a variety of reasons: money, disaffection with their own government or thrills. U.S. clandestine service officers state very firmly that blackmail is not used, at least by them, to recruit spies.
4. Handling: managing of the asset.
5. Termination: ending the relationship for any of several reasons—unreliability, a loss of access to needed intelligence, a change in intelligence requirements, and so on.
Another HUMINT term of art is the
developmental,
a potential source who is being brought along—Largely through repeated contacts and conversations to assess his or her value (validation) and susceptibilities—to the point where the developmental can be pitched. If and when the pitch has been accepted, the officer must meet with this new source regularly to receive information, holding meetings in a manner and in places that reduce the risk of being caught and then transmitting the information back home. The source may rely on sources of his or her own, known as
sub-sources,
to provide intelligence that the original source then conveys to the agent.
developmental,
a potential source who is being brought along—Largely through repeated contacts and conversations to assess his or her value (validation) and susceptibilities—to the point where the developmental can be pitched. If and when the pitch has been accepted, the officer must meet with this new source regularly to receive information, holding meetings in a manner and in places that reduce the risk of being caught and then transmitting the information back home. The source may rely on sources of his or her own, known as
sub-sources,
to provide intelligence that the original source then conveys to the agent.
Diplomatic reporting is a type of HUMINT, although it tends to receive less credibility in some circles because of its overt nature. After all, the foreign government official knows, when speaking to a diplomat, that his or her remarks are going to be cabled to that diplomat’s capital. An espionage source is likely to be thinking the same thing. Nonetheless, some people prefer more traditional HUMINT, even if the source’s reliability remains uncertain, rather than diplomatic reporting.
HUMINT requires time to be developed. Clandestine service officers need to learn a variety of skills (foreign languages; conducting, detecting, or evading surveillance; recruiting skills and other aspects of HUMINT tradecraft; the ability to handle various types of communications equipment; weapons training; and so on). Like all other professions, it takes time to become adept. In the case of HUMINT officers, it takes up to seven years, according to some accounts.
In addition to gaining the skills required for this activity, officers have to maintain their cover stories—the overt lives that give them a plausible reason for being in that foreign nation. There are two types of cover: official and nonofficial. Officers with
official cover
hold another government job, usually posted at the embassy. Official cover makes it easier for the agent to maintain contact with his or her superiors but raises the risk of being suspected as an agent.
Nonofficial cover
(NOC, pronounced “knock”) avoids any overt connection between the officer and his or her government but can make it more difficult to keep in contact. NOCs need a full-time job that explains their presence; they cannot make contact with superiors or colleagues overtly. (This led to a bureaucratic problem for the CIA in that NOCs had to at least appear to be paid at a level commensurate with their cover job, which was sometimes higher than their government salary. This then raised the issue of being liable for taxes higher than their actual salary. Congress authorized the CIA to pay NOCs “in a manner consistent with their cover.”)
official cover
hold another government job, usually posted at the embassy. Official cover makes it easier for the agent to maintain contact with his or her superiors but raises the risk of being suspected as an agent.
Nonofficial cover
(NOC, pronounced “knock”) avoids any overt connection between the officer and his or her government but can make it more difficult to keep in contact. NOCs need a full-time job that explains their presence; they cannot make contact with superiors or colleagues overtly. (This led to a bureaucratic problem for the CIA in that NOCs had to at least appear to be paid at a level commensurate with their cover job, which was sometimes higher than their government salary. This then raised the issue of being liable for taxes higher than their actual salary. Congress authorized the CIA to pay NOCs “in a manner consistent with their cover.”)
For the CIA, at least, some limits exist on the jobs that NOCs can hold. Clergy and Peace Corps volunteers are off-limits. Journalism is an ideal cover for a NOC, as journalists have a plausible reason for being in a foreign country, for seeking out officials, and for asking questions. However, professional journalists have long protested any such use of cover, arguing that if one spy posing as a journalist were to be unmasked, then all journalists would be suspect and perhaps in danger. Proponents counter that journalism is a profession like any other and should be available for use. All told, the use of NOCs is more complex than is official cover for spies.
Some HUMINT sources volunteer. They are called
walk-ins.
Spies Oleg Penkovsky of the Soviet Union, Aldrich Ames of the CIA, and Robert Hanssen of the FBI were all walk-ins. Walk-ins raise a host of other issues: Why have they volunteered? Do they really have access to valuable intelligence? Are they real volunteers or a means of entrapment—called
dangles
? Dangles can be used for a number of purposes, including identifying hostile intelligence personnel or gaining insights into the intelligence requirements or methods of a hostile service. According to press accounts reporting on the investigation led by former FBI director and DCI (1987-1991) William H. Webster, the Soviet Union suspected that Hanssen was a dangle and protested to the United States. The United States denied the charge but did not follow up.
walk-ins.
Spies Oleg Penkovsky of the Soviet Union, Aldrich Ames of the CIA, and Robert Hanssen of the FBI were all walk-ins. Walk-ins raise a host of other issues: Why have they volunteered? Do they really have access to valuable intelligence? Are they real volunteers or a means of entrapment—called
dangles
? Dangles can be used for a number of purposes, including identifying hostile intelligence personnel or gaining insights into the intelligence requirements or methods of a hostile service. According to press accounts reporting on the investigation led by former FBI director and DCI (1987-1991) William H. Webster, the Soviet Union suspected that Hanssen was a dangle and protested to the United States. The United States denied the charge but did not follow up.
In addition to recruiting foreign nationals, HUMINT officers may undertake more direct spying, such as stealing documents or planting sensors. Some of their information may come through direct observation of activity. Thus, HUMINT can involve more INTs than just espionage.
An important adjunct to one’s own country’s HUMINT capabilities are those of allied or friendly services. Known as
foreign liaison
relationships, these offer several important advantages. First, the friendly service has greater familiarity with its own region. Second, its government may maintain a different pattern of relations with other states, more friendly in some cases or even having diplomatic relations where one’s own government does not. These HUMINT-to-HUMINT relationships are somewhat formal in nature and tend to be symbiotic. They also entail risks, as one can never be entirely sure of the liaison partner’s security procedures. Thus, there are different degrees of liaison, depending on past experience, shared needs, the sense of security engendered, the depth and value of the intelligence being shared, and so forth. Furthermore, some liaison relationships may be with intelligence services that do not have the same standards in terms of operational limits, acceptable activities, and other criteria. A choice therefore has to be made between the value of the information being sought or exchanged and the larger question of the propriety of a relationship with this service. Nevertheless, liaison is an important means of increasing the breadth and depth of available HUMINT.
foreign liaison
relationships, these offer several important advantages. First, the friendly service has greater familiarity with its own region. Second, its government may maintain a different pattern of relations with other states, more friendly in some cases or even having diplomatic relations where one’s own government does not. These HUMINT-to-HUMINT relationships are somewhat formal in nature and tend to be symbiotic. They also entail risks, as one can never be entirely sure of the liaison partner’s security procedures. Thus, there are different degrees of liaison, depending on past experience, shared needs, the sense of security engendered, the depth and value of the intelligence being shared, and so forth. Furthermore, some liaison relationships may be with intelligence services that do not have the same standards in terms of operational limits, acceptable activities, and other criteria. A choice therefore has to be made between the value of the information being sought or exchanged and the larger question of the propriety of a relationship with this service. Nevertheless, liaison is an important means of increasing the breadth and depth of available HUMINT.
Foreign intelligence liaison is carried out on an agency-by-agency basis instead of by the intelligence community as a whole. The CIA, DIA, NGA, and NSA, for example, create and conduct their own liaison relationships, which does raise questions about the possible need for better coordination to avoid duplication. Thus, the stovepipes problem carries over into foreign liaison. This may prove to be a problem for the DNI who is charged with overseeing the coordination of these relationships.
In the war against terrorism, several nations have apparently offered intelligence support to the United States, including some whose services may be considered occasionally hostile. These types of liaison relationships call for extra caution regarding intelligence sharing, and questions may arise about the depth and detail of the intelligence received. However, exchanging useful intelligence is a good way for nations to build confidence in one another. For example, according to press accounts, Russian officers placed nuclear detection equipment in North Korea at the request of the United States to help track possible nuclear developments.
Espionage provides a small part of the intelligence that is collected. GEOINT and SIGINT produce a greater volume of intelligence. But HUMINT, like SIGINT, has the major advantage of affording access to what is being said, planned, and thought. Moreover, clandestine human access to another government may offer opportunities to influence that government by feeding it false or deceptive information. For intelligence targets in which the technical infrastructure may be irrelevant as a fruitful target—such as terrorism, narcotics, or international crime, where the signature of activities is small—HUMINT may be the only available source.
HUMINT also has disadvantages. First, it cannot be done remotely, as is the case with various types of technical collection. It requires proximity and access and therefore must contend with the counterintelligence capabilities of the other side. It is also far riskier, as it jeopardizes individuals and, if they are caught, could have political ramifications that are less likely to occur with technical collectors.
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