Listening In (28 page)

President Kennedy’s options, somewhat limited to begin with, were constrained further by the fact that his military advisors were urging him to invade Cuba, and were openly dismissive of diplomatic channels. Kennedy, in other words, had to negotiate around adversaries at home as well as abroad. The Air Force chief of staff, General Curtis LeMay, attempted to force the President’s hand when he complained that Kennedy’s delay in attack was similar to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich. In fact, since the opening of Russian archives, historians have learned that the Russians had far more missiles and troops in Cuba than were known at the time, and it would have been impossible to knock them all out with an air attack.

JFK:
Let me just say a little, first, about what the problem is, from my point of view. First, I think we ought to think of why the Russians did this. Well, actually, it was a rather dangerous but rather useful play of theirs. We do nothing, they have a missile base there with all the pressure that brings to bear on the United States and damage to our prestige. If we attack Cuban missiles, or Cuba, in any way, it gives them a clear line to take Berlin, as they were able to do in Hungary under the Anglo war in Egypt. We will have been regarded as—We would be regarded as the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin. We would have no support among our allies. We would affect the West Germans’ attitude toward us. And that we let Berlin go because we didn’t have the guts to endure a situation in Cuba. After all, Cuba is five or six thousand miles from them. They don’t give a damn about Cuba. But they do care about Berlin and about their own security. So they would say that we endangered their interests and security. And the implication [would be] that all the rest [happened] because of the end reaction that we took in Cuba. So I think they’ve got … I must say, I think it’s a very satisfactory position from their point of view. If you take the view that what really … And clearly, if we do nothing then they’ll have these missiles and they’ll be able to say anytime we ever try to do anything about Cuba, they’ll fire these missiles. So that I think it’s dangerous, but rather satisfactory, from their point of view.

If you take the view that what’s basic to them is Berlin and, there isn’t any doubt. In every conversation we’ve had with the Russians, that’s what … Even last night we [Gromyko and I] talked about Cuba for a while, but Berlin, that’s what Khrushchev is committed to personally. So actually, it’s quite a desirable position from their point of view.

(unclear)
McCone visit

military mission

over flights

military

PRESIDENTIAL DOODLES

Now that’s what makes our position so difficult. If we go in and take them out on a quick air strike, we neutralize the chance of danger to the United States of these missiles being used, and we prevent a situation from arising, at least within Cuba, where the Cubans themselves have the means of exercising some degree of authority in this hemisphere. On the other hand, we increase the chance greatly, as I think—there’s bound to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is—of their just going in and taking Berlin by force. Which leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons—which is a hell of an alternative—and begin a nuclear exchange, with all this happening.

On the other hand, if we begin the blockade that we’re talking about, the chances are they will begin a blockade and say that we started it. And there’ll be some question about the attitude of the Europeans. So that once again they will say that there will be this feeling in Europe that the Berlin blockade has been commenced by our blockade. So I don’t think we’ve got any satisfactory alternatives. Whether we balance off that, our problem is not merely Cuba, but it is also Berlin. And when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and recognize the importance of our allies to us, that’s what has made this thing to be a dilemma for three days. Otherwise, our answer would be quite easy.

quarantine

quarantine—how to describe

Letters to heads of state

What would have been the strategic effects

Announcement of test conclusion

Reexamination of our test agreement

Release of photographs

PRESIDENTIAL DOODLES

On the other hand, we’ve got to do something. Because if we do nothing, we’re going to have the problem of Berlin anyway. That was made clear last night. We’re going to have this knife stuck right in our guts, in about two months. And so we’ve got to do something. Now, the question really is what are we going to do?

It’s safe to say two of these missiles are operational now. They can be launched eighteen hours after the decision to fire has been reached. We’ve even seen—These missiles could be launched within eighteen hours after the decision to fire. [unclear]. They’d be ready in December of ’62. It depends on—intermediate range. Communication, targeting, and an integrated air-defense system are now gaining operational status.

MAXWELL TAYLOR:
That means that we’re hearing electronic emissions now, suggesting that they have sectors for the air defense of Cuba. I believe this is the latest intelligence file.

JFK:
I just wanted to say that these were some of the problems that we have been clearing up. Let’s hear from …

TAYLOR:
Well, I would just say one thing and then turn it over to General LeMay. We recognize these things, Mr. President. But I think we’d all be unanimous in saying that really our strength in Berlin, our strength anyplace in the world, is the credibility of our response under certain conditions. And if we don’t respond here in Cuba, we think the credibility is sacrificed.

JFK:
That’s right. That’s right. So that’s why we’ve got to respond. Now the question is, what is our response?

GENERAL CURTIS LEMAY:
Well, I certainly agree with everything General Taylor has said. I’d emphasize, a little strongly perhaps, that we don’t have any choice except direct military action. If we do this blockade that’s proposed, a political action, the first thing that’s going to happen is your missiles are going to disappear into the woods, particularly your mobile ones. Now we can’t find them, regardless of what we do, and then we’re going to take some damage if we try to do anything later on.

JFK:
Well, can’t they [put] some of these undercover new—now that they’ve been alerted?

LEMAY:
There is a possibility of that. But the way they line these others up, I’ll have to say it’s a small possibility. If they were going to hide any of them, I would think they would have hid them all. I don’t think there are any hid. So the only danger is that we haven’t picked up some position in plain sight. This is possible. If we do low-altitude photography over them, this is going to be a tip-off, too.

Now, as for the Berlin situation, I don’t share your view that if we knock off Cuba, they’re going to knock off Berlin. We’ve got the Berlin problem staring us in the face anyway. If we don’t do anything to Cuba, then they’re going to push on Berlin and push real hard because they’ve got us on the run. If we take military action against Cuba, then I think that the …

JFK:
What do you think their reply would be?

LEMAY:
I don’t think they’re going to make any reply if we tell them that the Berlin situation is just like it’s always been. If they make a move, we’re going to fight. I don’t think it changes the Berlin situation at all, except you’ve got to make one more statement on it. So I see no other solution. The blockade and political action, I see leading into war. I don’t see any other solution. It will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.

Because if this whole blockade comes along, MiGs are going to fly. The IL-28s are going to fly against them. And we’re just going to gradually slip into a war under conditions that are at great disadvantage to us, with missiles staring us in the face, that can knock out our airfields in the southeastern portions. And if they use nuclear weapons, it’s the population down there. We just drift into a war under conditions that we don’t like. I just don’t see any other solution, except direct military intervention right now.

GEORGE ANDERSON:
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Well, Mr. President, I feel that the course of action recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of view is the right one. I think it’s the best one from the political point of view. I’ll address myself to the alternative of the blockade. If we institute a blockade, from a military point of view, we can carry it out. It is easier for us and requires less force if we institute a complete blockade rather than a partial blockade, because instituting a partial blockade involves visit and search of all of these neutral ships, and taking them in, perhaps, to ports, which will certainly a great deal of [unclear], than if we go ahead and institute a complete blockade.

If we institute a complete blockade, we are immediately having a confrontation with the Soviet Union, because it’s the Soviet-bloc ships which are taking the materiel to Cuba. The blockade will not affect the equipment that is already in Cuba, and will provide the Russians in Cuba time to assemble all of these missiles, to assemble the IL-28s, to get the MiGs in a contract-manner control system ready to go. And I feel that, as this goes on, I agree with General LeMay that this will escalate and then we will be required to take other military action at greater disadvantage to the United States, to our military forces, and probably would suffer far greater casualties within the United States if these fanatics do indeed intend to fire any missiles.

We certainly cannot guarantee under those circumstances that we could prevent damage and loss of life in the United States itself. I think we have a good chance of greatly minimizing any loss of life within the United States under the present conditions, if we act fairly soon, although we do not recognize that will be very fast. I do not see that, as long as the Soviet Union is supporting Cuba, that there is any solution to the Cuban problem except a military solution.

On the other hand, we recognize fully the relationship to the Berlin situation. The Communists have got in this case a master situation, from their point of view, where every course of action posed to us is characterized by unpleasantries and disadvantages. It’s the same thing as Korea all over again, only on a grander scale.

We recognize the great difficulty of a military solution in Berlin. I think, on balance, the taking of positive, prompt, affirmative action in Berlin demonstrated the competence, the ability, the resolution of the United States. On balance, I would judge it, would be to deter the Russians from more aggressive acts in Berlin, and if we didn’t take any action, they’d feel that we were weak. So I subscribe fully to the concept that [unclear].

JFK:
It seems to me that we have to assume that just in order to, military … when we grabbed their two UN people and they threw two of ours out, we’ve got to assume that’s going to be an [unclear]. They may not do it, any more than we can let these go on without doing something. They can’t let us just take out, after all their statements, take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and not do anything. It’s quite obvious that what they think they can do is try to get Berlin. That may be a risk we have to take, but …

LEMAY:
Well, history has been, I think the other way, Mr. President. Where we have taken a strong stand, they have backed off. In Lebanon, for instance.
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