Listening In (29 page)

TAYLOR:
I would agree, Mr. President. I think from the point of view of face that they’ll do something. But I think it will be considerably less, depending on the posture we show here. I can’t really see them putting the screws in. The dangers of hitting Berlin are just as great or greater after our action down here, because we have our [unclear].

JFK:
They’ve got to wait for three months until they get these things all ready, and then squeeze us in Berlin. But I think at that point, for what it’s worth, it may not be worth much, but at least we’ll have the support of Europe.

TAYLOR:
That is true.

JFK:
This way we have to figure this [unclear] in Europe will regard this action, no matter what pictures we show afterwards of [missiles] having been …

EARLE WHEELER:
Mr. President, in my judgment, from a military point of view, the lowest-risk course of action if you’re thinking of protecting the people of the United States against a possible strike is to go ahead with a surprise air strike, the blockade, and an invasion, because these series of actions progressively will give us increasing assurance that we really have gone after the offensive capability of the Cuban-Soviet corner. Now, admittedly, we can never be absolutely sure until and unless we actually occupy the island.

Now, I’ve also taken into consideration a couple of other things at the present time. To date, Khrushchev has not really confronted us with Soviet power. In other words, he has not declared Cuba a part of the Warsaw Pact. Nor has he made an announcement that this is a Soviet base, although I think that there is a chance that he may do that at any time, particularly later in November, when he comes to the United States. And this course of action would then immediately have us confronting the Soviets and not Cubans. And at that time Soviet prestige, world prestige, would be at stake, which it is not at the present time.

The effect of this base in Cuba, it seems to me, has at least two sizeable advantages from his point of view, and two sizeable disadvantages from our point of view. First, the announcement of a Soviet base in Cuba would immediately have a profound effect in all of Latin America at least, and probably worldwide, because the question would arise, is the United States incapable of doing something about it, or unwilling to do something about it? In other words, it would attack our prestige. Not only that, increasingly, they can achieve a sizeable increase in offensive Soviet strike capabilities against the United States, which they do not now have. They do have ICBMs that are targeted at us, but they are in limited numbers. Their air force is not by any manner of means of the magnitude and capability that they probably would desire. And this short-range missile course gives them a sort of quantum jump in their capability to inflict damage on the United States. And so as I say, from a military point of view, I feel that the lowest risk course of action is the full gamut of military action by us. That’s it.

JFK:
Thank you, General.

DAVID SHOUP:
¹¹
Mr. President, there’s a question in my mind. Under what circumstances would Cuba want to inflict damage on the United States? The placing of the kind of weapons and the bombers that can do that certainly demand a hell of a lot of attention. There’s one feature of this that I’ve been unable to reconcile. And I wonder whether the American people and the other nations of the world can reconcile it, and that is that we are now so anxious or we’re discussing the anxiety of eliminating the possibility of damage to America from the Cuban air raid, whereas for a good many months the world has known, and we’ve known, that we have tremendously greater potential already aimed in on us from Russia, and it has been many months. We didn’t attack Russia. I think that’s a hard thing to reconcile, at least it is in my mind, and I would think it would be in the American public and other nations of the world. If it’s only a matter of distance, that it’s closer now, we know they have them in Russia. So if they want to inflict damage, it’s a question of whether Khrushchev wants to have them do it, and him keep out of it.

So if there’s a requirement to eliminate this threat of damage, then it’s going to take some forces, sizeable forces, to do it. And as we wait and wait and wait, then it will take greater forces to do it. And as long as it isn’t done, then those forces will increasingly require a greater force. We’ll be absolutely tied to that function. That means that they’re going to have to stand by and take care of that function. And you will then have a considerable force of troops, ships, aircraft tied to this requirement that someday may happen. I can’t conceive that they would attack us just for the fun of it. They might do it at the direction of Khrushchev. But I cannot see why they would attack us, because they couldn’t invade to take us. So there’s a question in my mind, in the political area, and as I say, the public and the people, what does this mean? Does it mean they’re getting ready to attack us, that little pipsqueak of a place? If so, Russia has a hell of a lot better way to attack us than to attack us from Cuba.

Then, in my mind, it all devolves upon the fact that they do matter. They can damage us increasingly every day. And each day that they increase, we have to have a more sizeable force tied to this problem, and then they’re not available in case something happens someplace else. And these guys either then have to take some new action in Berlin, South Vietnam, Korea. You would be degrading. You’d have to degrade your capability against this ever-increasing force in Cuba.

So, in my opinion, if we want to eliminate this threat that is now closer, but it’s not clearly the threat we’ve experienced all these months and months, if we want to eliminate it, then we’re going to have to go in there and do it as a fulltime job to eliminate the threat against us. Then if you want to take over the place and really put in a new government that is non-Communist, then you’ll have to invade the place. And if that decision is made, we must go in with plenty of insurance of a decisive success in as quick [?] as possible.

JFK:
Well, it is a fact that the number of missiles there, I would say that no matter what they put in there, we could live today under. If they don’t have enough ICBMs today, they’re going to have them in a year. They obviously are putting in [unclear] missiles.

LEMAY:
Plus increase their accuracy against the fifty targets that we know they could hit now. But the big thing is, if we leave them there, it’s a blackmail threat against not only us, but the other South American countries that they may decide to operate against.

There’s one other factor that I didn’t mention that’s not quite our field, [which] is the political factor. But you invited us to comment on this at one time. And that is, if we should talk about Cuba and the SAM sites down there. And we made pretty strong statements about the [unclear] Cuba, that we would take action against offensive weapons. I think that a blockade, and political talk, would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. And I’m sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too. In other words, you’re in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President.

JFK:
What did you say?

LEMAY:
You’re in a pretty bad fix.

JFK:
You’re in there with me. [laughter]

EAVESDROPPING ON THE JOINT CHIEFS, OCTOBER 19, 1962

As the tape kept rolling, JFK left the room, and then his closest military advisors, General Maxwell Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, also left. That left several of the Joint Chiefs, unaware that the tape was rolling and recording their conversation. There is no indication that JFK ever listened, but nevertheless, the very fact that their disrespectful conversation was captured constituted a chit for the President, well aware that the military had advised him disastrously during the Bay of Pigs.

DAVID SHOUP:
You pulled the rug right out from under him.

CURTIS LEMAY:
Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?

SHOUP:
I agree with that answer, General, I just agree with you, I just agree with you a hundred percent. Just agree with you a hundred percent. That’s the only goddamn … He finally got around to the word “escalation.” I just about [unclear]. That’s the only goddamn thing that’s in the whole trick. It’s been there in Laos, it’s been in every goddamn one. When he says escalation, that’s it. Somebody’s got to keep him from doing the goddamn thing piecemeal. That’s our problem. Go in there and frig around with the missiles. You’re screwed. You go in there and frig around with anything else, you’re screwed.

LEMAY:
That’s right.

SHOUP:
You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing, some way, he could say, that they either do the son of a bitch and do it right, and quit frigging around. That was my conclusion. Don’t frig around and go take a missile out. [unclear] Goddamn, if he wants to do it, you can’t fiddle around with taking out missiles. You can’t fiddle around with hitting the missile site and then hitting the SAM sites. You got to go in and take out the goddamn thing that’s going to stop you from doing your job.

EARLE WHEELER:
It was very apparent to me, though, from his earlier remarks, that the political action of a blind strike is really what he’s …

SHOUP:
His speech about Berlin was the real …

WHEELER:
He gave his speech about Berlin.

LEMAY:
He equates the two.

WHEELER:
If we smear Castro, Khrushchev smears Willy Brandt.
¹²

CALL TO PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, OCTOBER 22, 1962