Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome (44 page)

faithfulness (
fides
). Even in the build-up to the civil war, Caesar’s oppo-

nents attacked him for his behavior during his consulship in 59 BC and

for what they claimed were his ambitions for the future. They do not

seem to have wanted to hold him to account for his activities in Gaul.10

Different Politics

Caesar won almost every battle he fought and never lost a campaign.

Yet from the beginning of his time in Gaul, he realized that battlefield

success alone was not enough. Rome had existing alliances with many

tribes, especially those bordering Transalpine Gaul. Defending these al-

lies provided the main pretext for Caesar’s initial intervention and most

of the subsequent campaigns. As he advanced farther into Gaul, new

allies were acquired. Caesar was always considerably more brutal in

dealing with enemies from outside Gaul than with the tribes already

established there. Ariovistus, the Helvetii, and the migrating German

tribes were treated with extreme savagery and ejected. On the whole,

The General as State 213

Gallic tribes that fought against him were treated more generously.

Allied tribes provided him with troops and shared in the benefits of

victory. The Aedui, a well-established Roman ally, were granted many

favors, and expanded their own influence as it became clear that their

subordinate allies would also enjoy Roman protection.

Individual chieftains and leaders benefited even more from Caesar’s

friendship. Every year he summoned the tribal leaders to a council

at least once, and frequently more often. He also met and consulted

with them individually. Some served with his army for long periods.

Commius of the Atrebates played an especially prominent role in the

expeditions to Britain, and was rewarded for this and other services,

becoming king of his own people and being given overlordship of the

Menapii. Diviciacus of the Aedui proved a staunch ally and gained

many adherents from other tribes because it was known that Caesar

often granted him favors.

Caesar kept a close eye on politics within the tribes and supported

the leaders who seemed most likely to be loyal to him. For such men,

the arrival of the Roman army was an opportunity to strengthen their

own position. It was also a reality they could not afford to ignore. The

same had been true of Ariovistus, who had been invited in by the Se-

quani, but who had then used his army to dominate them as well as

their neighbors. Caesar drove out any rival power so that his would be

the only outside influence on the politics of the tribes.

Caesar’s conquest of Gaul did not introduce large numbers of Ro-

man colonists to the region. The province he created—as indeed was

the case with virtually every other Roman province—would be pop-

ulated by the people already living there. For this to be successful,

enough of the inhabitants needed to be persuaded that it was in their

best interests to accept Roman rule. The power of the Roman army

acted as a deterrent to resistance, but on its own was not enough.

Caesar increased his forces from four legions to more than a dozen

during the course of the Gallic campaigns, but even after this increase

these troops could not be everywhere simultaneously. It was not prac-

tical to hold down a province by force alone, nor was it desirable. A

large army could easily cost as much as or more than the revenue from

the province. The need for such a garrison would also make clear that

214 Goldsworthy

the war was not really won and would greatly reduce the glory of any

victory.

Therefore, from 58 BC on, Caesar devoted considerable time and ef-

fort to diplomacy, hoping to win over the tribal leaders. Old al ies were

strengthened and defeated enemies were shown leniency in order to

turn them into new al ies. This was the normal Roman method, and in-

deed it has been that of most successful imperial powers. He was helped

by the fact that he possessed both civil and military authority, which

meant that in each campaign, his strategy was molded to fit a political

objective. This is perhaps harder in the modern world, where things are

likely to be less neat and more than one authority is frequently involved.

At the time of writing, the United States and its al ies are involved in

conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where military force in itself cannot

achieve victory without the creation of a stable political settlement.

However, it is worth remembering that Caesar was not attempting to

create a viable democracy and then withdraw. He was engaged in per-

manent conquest and could be considerably more ruthless in his behav-

ior. The Romans did not have to worry about world opinion.11

Yet some factors do remain in common. For every tribal leader who

gained from Caesar’s arrival, there were others who did not. Politics

were as fiercely competitive within and between the tribes as they were

in the Roman republic. If a chieftain saw his rivals preferred over him,

he had little personal incentive to support Rome. One alternative was to

seek aid from another outside source, such as one of the German tribes,

accepting their dominance as the price. Alternatively, the chieftain could

directly attack and defeat his rival. Ideal y this could be done swiftly and

so completely that Caesar might be wil ing to accept the change, al-

though in general, he took care to resist and punish anything of this

sort.12 If not, then the Romans would need to be driven out as wel . It is

too simplistic to think of purely pro- or anti-Roman factions or leaders

within each tribe, in the same way that it is mistaken to speak of a sim-

ple divide between pro- and anti-Western groups in modern conflicts.

Men like Commius and Diviciacus had agendas and ambitions of

their own. Such leaders felt that they were using Caesar as much as he

was using them, adding to their own power through Roman support.

Diviciacus’s brother Dumnorix looked elsewhere for the support needed

The General as State 215

to dominate the Aedui. As his sibling became more and more powerful,

Dumnorix began covertly to resist Roman rule. Later, probably after Di-

viciacus’s death, Dumnorix encouraged a rumor that Caesar planned to

make him king of the tribe. He was eventual y kil ed on Caesar’s orders,

having tried to avoid being taken on the first British expedition.

Allegiances could change. Personal interest more than anything else

dictated whether leaders supported Rome or resisted Caesar. This in-

terest could change. In the winter of 53–52, many Gaulist leaders de-

cided that the Roman presence was hindering their own freedom of

action. In the great rebellion that followed, chieftains who had ben-

efited from Caesar’s favor joined with those who had consistently re-

sisted to expel the Romans. Vercingetorix, the man who became the

main leader of the rebellion, had been a favorite of Caesar, although

this is not mentioned in the
Commentaries
.13 A more conspicuous defec-

tion was Commius’s.

Caesar came close to defeat in 52 BC, and suffered a serious reverse in

his attack on Gergovia. He did not give up, and, after winning a small-

scale action, seized back the initiative and cornered Vercingetorix at

Alesia. After an especially brutal siege, Vercingetorix was forced to sur-

render. The war was not quite over. For more than a year, Caesar and

his legates launched a succession of punitive expeditions against any

tribe that still showed resistance. Leaders like Commius were hunted

down, although in his case he managed to escape to Britain. When the

walled town of Uxellodunum was captured, Caesar ordered that the

captured warriors have their hands cut off as a dreadful warning.

Yet as always, along with reprisals and the use and threat of force

came concerted diplomacy. As one of his officers put it, “Caesar had

one main aim, keeping the tribes friendly, and giving them neither the

opportunity nor cause for war. . . . And so, by dealing with the tribes

honourably, by granting rich bounties to the chieftains, and by not im-

posing burdens, he made their state of subjection tolerable, and easily

kept the peace in a Gaul weary after so many military defeats.”14 This

task took more than two years. As always, much of the diplomacy was

personal. It worked. In 49 BC, Caesar led away almost his entire army to

fight in the civil war. Gaul did not erupt into rebellion when the Roman

troops left and Caesar was kept busy elsewhere.

216 Goldsworthy

Yet this success came at a price. Caesar had misread the situation in

the winter of 53–52 BC and had been surprised by the rebel ion. Although

he recovered and won, it took much time and effort to rebuild the peace.

Rumors spread in Rome of serious defeats in Gaul, encouraging his op-

ponents in the belief that he was vulnerable. Caesar had less time to pre-

pare for his return to Rome. Had he been able to spend a year or more

in Cisalpine Gaul, closer to Italy, had he been more accessible to mes-

sages and visits from influential men, then it is possible that the civil war

could have been avoided—possible, but not certain. In the end, much

depended on the attitude of Pompey. It was his shift toward Caesar’s

enemies that gave them the military capacity to wage a civil war.
15

Private Armies

None of the civil wars could have been fought without the willingness

of Roman soldiers to kill each other. By the first century BC the army

was effectively a professional force, its ranks filled mainly from the

poorest sections of society. For such recruits the army offered a steady,

if not especially generous, wage, and fed and clothed them. Unlike the

old conscript army recruited from property owners, such men had no

source of livelihood once they were discharged from the army. The

Senate generally proved reluctant to deal with this problem, and it was

usually only with considerable effort that a commander was able to

secure grants of farmland for his discharged veterans. This encouraged

a bond between general and soldiers that often proved stronger than

that between the legions and the state itself. Securing land for his vet-

erans was one of Pompey’s chief motives for allying with Crassus and

Caesar. The latter brought forward the necessary legislation in 59 BC.16

There was more to the bond between general and soldier than sim-

ple economic dependency. Shared victories helped create mutual trust

but in themselves were not enough. Lucullus was one of the ablest

tactical commanders of this period, but nevertheless he was not liked

by his men, being seen as mean when it came to rewarding them. Men

like Pompey were far more generous in sharing the spoils of victory.

Caesar had immense charisma, and the loyalty of his soldiers dur-

ing the civil war was almost fanatical in its intensity, in a way matched

The General as State 217

throughout history by only a few individuals, such as Napoleon. The

bond was not instant, nor did it spring out of nothing. In 58 BC, Caesar

took charge of four legions raised by someone else. He immediately re-

cruited two new legions, and the following winter he added two more.

In twelve months the size of his army doubled. It would soon triple.

At first the soldiers did not know Caesar and did not especially trust

him. In the campaign against the Helvetii he made mistakes, notably a

botched night attack on their camp that left a force stranded out on a

limb while Caesar and the main body sat and did nothing. In the event,

the Helvetii were either oblivious to the opportunity or not inclined

to take advantage. Later in the summer came the mutiny at Vesontio,

where for a while his army refused to march against Ariovistus. Caesar

flattered and cajoled them into moving, and then rapidly defeated the

enemy. The victories in 58 BC were followed by the hard-won success at

the Sambre in 57 BC. During that battle Caesar went personally to rally

the most hard-pressed section of the line, demonstrating that he would

not abandon his men. Over time, the legionaries came to feel that they

could rely on their commander to support them and to win. The fixed

belief that they would prevail in the end made Caesar’s soldiers ex-

tremely difficult to beat.

Confident of victory, Caesar’s soldiers were equally confident of

sharing in its rewards. These were considerable. One source claims that

a million people were sold into slavery during the course of the Gal-

lic campaigns. Another mentions the looting of local shrines and their

hoarded treasure. Caesar expected tight discipline on campaign and im-

posed a rigorous training regimen, but mitigated this by granting the

soldiers considerable freedom at other times. Conspicuous gallantry

was rewarded with money and perhaps promotion—and also with a