Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome (45 page)

mention in the narrative of the
Commentaries
. Caesar and other sources

claim repeatedly that Roman soldiers fought better when they were

being watched by their commander, who had the power to reward or

punish them.17

Many of Caesar’s senior officers became extremely wealthy during

these campaigns, something lampooned by the poet Catullus. Com-

mand of an army gave a Roman governor considerable patronage,

allowing him to make appointments as legates and tribunes and to a

218 Goldsworthy

whole range of other posts. He could also award contracts to business-

men. The profits of war were also of great value in winning friends at

Rome. Caesar gave a loan to Cicero and a legate’s commission to his

brother Quintus, who is portrayed in a very favorable light in the
Com-

mentaries
. Vast sums were rumored to have been spent to purchase the

support of Aemilius Paullus and Curio, respectively consul and tribune

of the plebs, in 50 BC.18

Caesar’s massive expansion of his army was not officially sanctioned

at first. He carried this out on his own initiative and authority, funding

it through the revenue from his province. He treated the people of Cis-

alpine Gaul as if they were citizens and enrolled them in the legions.

Later he would do the same in the Transalpine province, eventually

forming an entire legion,
Legio V Alaudae
, from this source.19 In 55 BC,

Pompey and Crassus arranged not only the extension of Caesar’s com-

mand but the retrospective approval and funding from the Senate for

the enlargement of the army. It was probably not until the dictatorship

that Caesar himself was able to confirm the grant of Roman citizen-

ship to the Gauls recruited into his army.

Expanding the army gave Caesar not only greater forces but also

much greater patronage. Each new legion raised created sixty com-

missions for centurions, as well as half a dozen or so tribune posts. In

the
Commentaries
, Caesar notes that he promoted centurions to higher

grades for conspicuous service, often transferring men from a veteran

legion into a new formation. By the end of the campaigns in Gaul, it

is likely that every centurion in the army owed his original commis-

sion or one or more steps in promotion to Caesar. By 48 BC, Caesar’s

legions were on average below half strength, and by the time it reached

Alexandria, the veteran Legio VI numbered fewer than 1,000 men, just

20 percent of its full complement. We do not know how often fresh

recruits were drafted into existing legions, but it is possible that the

preference was always to raise new formations, creating more commis-

sions with which to reward loyal followers.20

Ordinary soldiers—
nostril
,
“
our men”—are praised for their cour-

age and prowess in the
Commentaries
but are almost never named. Even

the eagle bearer of the Tenth Legion who famously jumped over the

side of a ship and led the charge up the beach during the landing in

The General as State 219

Britain in 55 BC is anonymous. Centurions are singled out and identified

far more often. When Caesar was rallying the line at the Sambre, he

encouraged the men as groups, but called to the centurions by name.

(There were 480 centurions in the army at that time, a number it is not

impossible for one man to know. Today, battalion commanders could

be expected to recognize each of the soldiers under their command,

in a way that would not be possible for leaders of brigades or larger

formations.)21

Although there is a persistent myth that centurions were promoted

from the ranks, Caesar never once mentions doing this. Many, if not

all, seem to have been directly commissioned, and probably came from

the moderately well-off classes and local aristocracies of Italy. Substan-

tial numbers of centurions were given leave by Caesar to assist in vital

elections at Rome. In part this was through intimidation, but given that

the Roman voting system gave more weight to the better-off, this also

suggests that many centurions were men of consequence. Some were

rewarded by Caesar with enough wealth to become equestrians, such

as Scaeva, who held an outpost at Dyrrachium against massive odds

in 48 BC. The prominence of centurions in the
Commentaries
adds to

the impression that they came from a politically significant class that

Caesar wished to cultivate.22

The Rubicon and Beyond

Crossing the Rubicon was a sign of Caesar’s political failure. It was a

gamble; hence his famous comment, “the die is cast.” It would have

been far better to return peacefully, moving smoothly into a second

consulship and then a new provincial command, both of which would

have secured him against prosecution. Such a victory would also have

been far more satisfying, forcing his rivals to acknowledge his deserved

preeminence. Caesar’s eventual victory should not blind us to the fact

that in most respects, the odds were against him. Pompey and his allies

were not ready to defend Italy. This was in part because no one would

expect a war to begin in January, long before the normal campaigning

season, but also because they always expected Caesar to back down. Yet

they managed to withdraw with considerable troops to Greece. Once

220 Goldsworthy

there, Pompey was able to call on the resources of the eastern prov-

inces to mass and train a great army.

Caesar overran Italy quickly but did not have the ships to pursue

Pompey. Inactivity would only allow his enemies to grow stronger,

and so he led his army to Spain. Pompey had controlled the Spanish

provinces since his second consulship in 55 BC, governing them through

deputies and remaining near Rome himself. Caesar won another quick

victory, outmaneuvering Pompey’s generals. He could not afford to suf-

fer a serious defeat. Since the war was fought to protect his career and

position, a serious reverse would have utterly discredited him. His op-

ponents were far more able to absorb such losses and blows to prestige.

Caesar had to keep attacking and had to keep winning, and even after

these early successes his enemies possessed much greater resources.

Pompey waited for Caesar to attack him in Greece. The same strat-

egy was employed by Brutus and Cassius in 42 BC, and by Mark Antony

in 31 BC. There was much to recommend it, as each of these possessed a

stronger fleet than their opponents. Yet in every case they were beaten

and the risk-taking attacker prevailed. Keeping the initiative was clearly

a major asset in civil as well as foreign wars. The 48 BC campaign was

close and could easily have ended in disaster for Caesar. Despite his

soldiers’ formidable powers of endurance, Caesar failed at Dyrrachium

and was forced to retreat. Pompey then decided that the Caesarean

army was sufficiently weakened to be defeated, and so risked battle at

Pharsalus. This was not unreasonable, since he was under considerable

pressure from the distinguished senators with his army, who accused

him of prolonging the war needlessly. Caesar’s failure to attract promi-

nent supporters ensured that his leadership was never challenged by

subordinates. Waiting to starve the enemy into submission, however,

was a difficult strategy to maintain in a civil war. Caesar accepted the

offer of battle and proved himself the better tactician, winning an over-

whelming victory.

The civil war did not end. Pompey fled to Egypt and was killed.

Caesar pursued him and became embroiled in that kingdom’s own civil

war. He placed Cleopatra on the throne and then stayed for some time,

personal reasons mingling with political ones. The time permitted sur-

viving Pompeians to muster again in North Africa. They were defeated

The General as State 221

in 46 BC. Another force, led by Pompey’s son, had to be confronted

and beaten in Spain in 45 BC. Caesar had not intended to seize supreme

power by force. Once he had done so he had to fight to keep power, and

also had to decide how to use it. It is important to remember just how

short a time Caesar spent in Rome as dictator. After his murder another

spate of civil wars erupted, fought first between his defenders and his

assassins. Both sides produced floods of propaganda concerning what

Caesar was planning to do. The truth is now impossible to recover with

any certainty.

Caesar’s immediate plans involved fighting major wars against the

Dacians and then the Parthians. These offered the “clean” glory of

defeating foreign enemies of the republic rather than fellow Romans.

Caesar nominated magistrates for the next three years, which suggests

that he planned to be away for at least this time. The Parthians were

formidable opponents who had defeated and killed Crassus in 53 BC

and would later severely maul Antony’s invasion force. Whether or not

Caesar would have fared better is hard to say. It is uncertain whether he

planned conquest and occupation or simply a grand punitive expedi-

tion to gain public vengeance for Crassus.

As dictator, Caesar was head of the republic. Since he had come to

power by force, it was important to maintain control of the army. At

some point, probably just before or during the civil war, Caesar had

doubled the basic rate of pay for a legionary soldier. No doubt higher

ranks received proportional increases. Veterans were discharged and

given farms. As far as possible this was done without inflicting serious

hardship on existing communities. Around the time he celebrated his

triumphs, there was a protest by disgruntled soldiers. This was dealt

with extremely severely, and several men were executed. As dictator,

Caesar continued to be generous but firm with his soldiers. Officers of

all ranks received lavish rewards. Caesar enrolled large numbers of new

senators, including equestrian officers, some Gauls, and a few former

centurions.23

Many individuals from the army benefited from Caesar’s dictator-

ship. The army itself was not granted particular privileges, nor was it

placed in direct control of any new aspects of life. Caesar had come

to power through civil war but, as in Gaul, hoped to create a regime

222 Goldsworthy

that survived by consent as much as by force. In the last months of

his life he dismissed his Spanish bodyguard. Presumably he felt that

if his regime was to survive three years of his absence on campaign,

then he needed to show confidence while he was in Rome. Sulla had

resigned the dictatorship he had taken by force, but Caesar described

this as the act of a “political illiterate.”24 Caesar believed he should hold

on to power. He misunderstood the attachment of others to tradition,

and was murdered.

Limits of Force

Caesar was a commander of genius. Like Alexander or Napoleon, he

was not a great military reformer and took over a fighting force already

improved by others. All of these men honed their armies to a fine edge,

inspired them, and led them with a flair and imagination that produced

spectacular success. Also like Napoleon, Caesar exploited his military

success to seize supreme power within the state. Unlike the French em-

peror he did not so profoundly shape the entire state around himself.

Caesar effectively controlled elections and was himself a higher author-

ity above the magistrates chosen. Yet these still served, the Senate and

Popular Assemblies continued to meet and vote, and the courts func-

tioned much as they had before the dictatorship. The conspirators felt

that almost the sole thing needed for the republic to function as normal

was the removal of Caesar himself.

The dictator fel to internal rather than foreign enemies, unlike Na-

poleon. Military success was not enough to al ow Caesar to create a

stable regime; that task would be left to Augustus. He too would seize

supreme power through military force. It took decades to create his new

regime and to turn the brutal triumvir who had clawed his way to the

top so violently into the beloved “father of his country.” Augustus took

care to keep the army loyal to himself alone. For over two centuries,

the republican tradition of the senatorial class holding military and civil

power continued. At any time, only a handful of senators were capable

of supplanting the emperor. There were civil wars in AD 68–69 and 193–

97, but otherwise there was far greater stability than in the last decades

of the republic. Augustus and his successors were military dictators, but

The General as State 223

at the cost of political independence they gave the Roman world in-

ternal stability. Senators enjoyed prestigious careers and could stil win

glory, but simply did so as representatives of the emperor. This and so

much more would change in the third century.