Making War to Keep Peace (45 page)

It is not surprising that the will of the nations providing such peacekeepers has sometimes wavered, and that these nations or their military leaders have sometimes proved unwilling to risk lives in such circumstances. In the 1990s, by a twist of policy nuance, we began to deploy peacekeepers into these challenging new circumstances, assigning them to build nations as a way of ensuring lasting peace. Because the ideal of human rights is at the core of our view of law and culture, we took upon ourselves the task of building democratic nations where there were no institutions to bolster the societies against the chaos inherent in democratic rule—or, more so, in the march toward democracy. Nation building became a military activity rather than one reserved for more gradual influences from market and cultural forces, and so the arrival of democracy in some nations came at the end of a sword, not the end of a cultural and political evolution instigated by the governed themselves.

In the process, our own military has too often been turned away from its main purpose—to wage war to keep peace, a peace in which
more transformational forces would be freed to resurrect societies from the ruins of decay and war. In practice, the practice of nation building further distracted the UN from its own mission and opened the door for an expansionist UN and Secretariat. Our future foreign policy need not tempt the UN to challenge our sovereign rights to self-defense or to seek legitimacy in anything other than the will of its collective of nations. Neither our foreign policy nor our international role requires the use of our remarkable military simply because they are capable of enduring a crucible without an objective. Our military needs and deserves to remain dedicated to its true and singular role: to preserve peace and security by waging and winning war.

Our Declaration of Independence expresses a dream and a doctrine of government by consent. An important part of our history has been devoted to making a reality of this dream for all Americans. As the world has shrunk, we have, rightly or wrongly, sought to share the dream beyond our borders. We need to take stock and revisit this impulse, however well intentioned it may be.

For the United States, the enjoyment and protection of the rights stipulated in our Declaration of Independence and institutionalized in our Constitution lie at the heart of our identity as a nation. The struggle to ensure that those rights are enjoyed by each and every one of our citizens—a struggle that is still in progress—has been the engine of our history and our development as a nation. Of course, it is reasonable that those of us who enjoy the benefits of freedom are motivated to remember the millions who do not, the millions who are vulnerable to coercive forces of domination and injustice.

Yet it is a different matter entirely to commit military resources to keep peace in such areas, where often no peace can be kept, or to build nations in our own image before they are ready for our freedoms—or even want them. The military need not do the work of sanctions and diplomacy. As we carry on in this new century, we would do well to remember the importance of balancing the twin goals of our foreign policy: preserving national security and promoting democratic principles. And we must remember that historic conflicts between enemies can be won on moral force, without firing a single bullet or missile; that cultural,
market, political, and perhaps religious forces can be far more transformative in areas of the world where chaos and violence reign; and that America can contribute to the building of nations by any and all of these means—while preserving our military and reserving our sovereign right to wage war to maintain true peace.

Allan Gerson

Reflecting on her work at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations from 1981 to 1985, Jeane Kirkpatrick later published the most definitive articulation of her views in an anthology of essays published by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1989:
Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force
. I was her counsel at the UN post during these years, and I served as her coauthor on the essay entitled, “The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law.”

That article demonstrated her innate affinity to the ideas of John Stuart Mill, whom she quoted liberally to the effect that the first principle of law is necessarily the equal application of the law, or reciprocity, and that unilateral compliance was unacceptable. Secondly, she drew her cue from Mill in distinguishing intervention that is rightful from that which is not, while recognizing that what is right may not always be prudent.

The Reagan Doctrine, she wrote, “is, as we understand it, above all concerned with the moral legitimacy of U.S. support—including military support—for insurgencies under certain circumstances.” She never saw a legitimate basis for the direct use of U.S. force in support of democracy. Rather, the use of force was legitimate when it was wielded to support indigenous insurgents in opposition to a government maintained by force and not democratic consent. As she put it, “The Reagan Administration did not create these resistance movements”; nor did it initiate the policy of providing support. This was in contrast to what the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter administrations had done, respectively, in
Vietnam and Cambodia; Southeast Asia and Angola; and Afghanistan. In short, the Reagan Doctrine permitted assistance in self-defense, and as a means of counterintervention where an enemy like the Soviet Union was using military support to keep in power governments that had no popular consent. As such, the Reagan Doctrine was one that expressed solidarity with democracy, but was prudent and conservative in the use of military force to support democracy. It was a doctrine of counterintervention. As she put it, “In Kant's view, intervention to bring down despotic governments was to be encouraged. The Reagan Doctrine does not go this far, but it has the same philosophical underpinnings.”

Today, the future of U.S. foreign policy is essentially a debate between when and in what sequence security and promotion of democracy can occur. For Jeane Kirkpatrick, the choice was always clear. The sequence, if force was to be used at all, was first to gain security, and only then to encourage freedom. If there could be no security, there could be no freedom. By that token, if Iraq could not be secure, there could be no thought of promotion of democracy. And Iraq could only be made secure if U.S. force was established on the basis of legitimacy.

It is sad that the Bush administration, in its conduct of the Iraq war, did little to pursue the same standards of informed analysis that Jeane Kirkpatrick had tried to foster. The failure to do so has made matters worse, not better. Kirkpatrick understood the limitations of humanitarianism. She believed deeply in what she had learned as a student at Columbia in the 1950s, where she was deeply affected by the disclosures of the horrors of the Holocaust. She saw in what had occurred vindication of Sigmund Freud's thesis in
Civilization and its Discontents
, that we are born not as angels, but more like animals, and that the task of civilization is to civilize and to defend against barbarism. She applauded Ronald Reagan for declaring to the world that the American people had the necessary energy and conviction to defend itself, as well as a deep commitment to peace and democracy. But she believed most of all in being careful, very careful, before ever descending down the path of direct use of military might. As a nation, and as individuals, we have, she believed, a civic duty to articulate that direct resort to force should always be undertaken as a last resort, in a manner compatible with our nation's ideals and our understanding of international law.

The Dayton talks culminated in the initialing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties were the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Contact Group of Nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Germany) and the European Union special negotiator witnessed the agreement.

GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

• Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Croatia agree to respect the sovereignty of one another and settle future disputes by peaceful means.
  
• The parties agree to fully respect the commitments made in the four annexes of the agreement and to respect the human rights of the habitants in the region and the rights of refugees and displaced persons.
  
• The parties agree to implement the peace settlement and cooperate with the entities authorized by the United Nations to carry out this task. They also agree to collaborate in the prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.
  

ANNEX 1-A: MILITARY ASPECTS

• The parties commit themselves to re-create as quickly as possible normal conditions of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to respect the cease-fire that began on October 5, 1995.
  
• Foreign forces that are present in Bosnia will leave its territory within thirty days.
  
• The parties invite into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military implementation force (IFOR) that will be under the authority of the United Nations (UN) and under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The tasks of this force will include monitoring and helping ensure compliance with the military aspects of this agreement. To achieve this, IFOR will have unimpeded freedom of movement by land and control over airspace; if necessary, it will have the right to use violence.
  

ANNEX 1-B: REGIONAL STABILIZATION

• The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation, and the Bosnian Serb Republic will begin negotiation within the next seven days with the objective of agreeing on measures that will build confidence within forty-five days. These may include the exchange of information between the parties and the implementation of restrictions for carrying out military exercises. These conversations will take place under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
  
• The parties, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, must begin negotiations within thirty days to agree on limits on the holding of military armament, including combat vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and tanks.
  
• If the parties do not establish limits in these categories within the next thirty days, the agreement provides numerical limits with which all parties will comply.
  
• The OSCE will conduct negotiations with the parties to establish a regional balance in the former Yugoslavia.
  

ANNEX 2: INTER-ENTITY BOUNDARY

• An inter-entity boundary line between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic will be established.
  
• Sarajevo will be reunified within the Federation and will be open to all people of the country.
  
• Gorazde will be linked to the Federation by a land corridor composed of two roads.
  

ANNEX 3: ELECTIONS

• The parties agree to create the conditions necessary for organizing free and fair elections; these include ensuring the right of citizens to vote in secret without being intimidated, freedom of expression in the press, and freedom of association.
  
• Elections will be conducted within six to nine months for the presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the House of Representatives of the Federation, the National Assembly and presidency of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and, where possible, for local offices. International organizations will supervise the electoral process.
  
• Refugees and all those who were displaced by the conflict will have the right to vote in their original place of residence.
  

ANNEX 4: CONSTITUTION

• Bosnia and Herzegovina will adopt a new constitution that protects the human rights and freedom of movement of its citizens throughout the territory. The country will consist in two entities: the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.
  
• The central government will include a president, two legislative chambers, and a constitutional court. Direct elections should be conducted to elect the president and one of the legislative chambers. The central government will be responsible for monetary policy, law enforcement, and foreign policy.
  

ANNEX 5: ARBITRATION

• The Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to resolve disputes between them through a system of arbitration and to establish the necessary mechanisms for arbitration to take place.
  

ANNEX 6: HUMAN RIGHTS

• A commission on human rights will be established with the objective of protecting the fundamental freedoms of all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The commission will be composed of a human rights ombudsman who will be in charge of investigating human rights violations and a human rights chamber that will issue decisions.
  
• UN human rights agencies, the OSCE, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia will monitor the situation regarding human rights violations.
  

ANNEX 7: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

• The parties agree to allow refugees and displaced persons to return safely to their homes and to permit the free movement of persons throughout the country.
  
• A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will be created with the objective of returning property or giving just compensation for its loss.
  

ANNEX 11: INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE

• The parties request the establishment by the UN of an international police task force (IPTF) with the objective of providing advice and training to the members of local law enforcement organizations. A commissioner appointed by the UN will be in charge of the IPTF.
  

INTRODUCTION

1. Mikhail Gorbachev, National Museum of American History Archives, January 1992, http:/www.americanhistory.si.edu/subs/history/timeline/end@2000, The National Museum of American History.

2. President Ronald Reagan, Address to members of the British Parliament, June 8, 1982.

3. President George W. Bush, President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005.

1. IRAQ INVADES KUWAIT

1. David McCullough,
Truman
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 776–7.

2. In Secretary of State James Baker's words, “It took some arm-twisting to convince the Latins to denounce Noriega by name for stealing the election. The old doctrine of non-interventionism and fear of U.S. power still paralyzed the organization.” James A. Baker III,
The Politics of Diplomacy Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992
, with Thomas M. DeFrank (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 183.

3. National Security Directive 26, “U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” October 2, 1989, http://www.bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2026.0001.pdf.

4. Ibid. NSD-26 reaffirmed our strategic interests in the region and, with caveats conveying our concerns, generally confirmed the previous policy of engaging Iraq: “Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.”

5. Don Oberdorfer, “Missed Signals in the Middle East,”
Washington Post Magazine
, March 17, 1991, W19.

6. The transcript of the July 25, 1990 meeting between April Glaspie originally appeared in an Arabic-language version leaked from Iraqi sources to ABC News, who translated it and then passed it on to the
New York Times.
The translated version appeared as “Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy,”
New York Times,
September 23, 1990, page 19. In 1998 the U.S. government declassifed the document, which appears on the Margaret Thatcher Foundation website, as “Gulf War: US Embassy Baghdad to Washington, 25 July 1990,” margaretthatcher.org.

7. Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.

8. George Bush, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
26, August 5, 1990, 1207.

9. Entire text of UN Security Council Resolution 661:

1. Determines
   that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
   
2. Decides
   , as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
   
3. Decides
   that all States shall prevent:
   
   • (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported there from after the date of the present resolution;
     
   • (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported there from after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
     
   • (c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;
     
4. Decides
   that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial, or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, food stuffs;
   
5. Calls upon
   all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution;
   
6. Decides
   to establish, in accordance with Rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:
   
   • (a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;
     
   • (b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action
     taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;
     
7. Calls upon
   all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;
   
8. Requests
   the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose;
   
9. Decides
   that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and
   calls upon
   all States;
   
   • (a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;
     
   • (b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;
     
10. Requests
    the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;
    
11. Decides
    to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.
    

10. Baker,
The Politics of Diplomacy
, 277. Baker's interpretation is curious, as the last five presidents were Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Only Carter's presidency really fits Baker's description.

11. Ibid., 277.

12. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor,
The General's War
(Boston: Little Brown, 1995), 49.

13. George Bush, “Annual State of the Union Address,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
27, January 29, 1991, 90. In his State of the Union Address in 1991, President Bush said,

14. William Schneider, “Consensus Holds, But for How Long?”
National Journal
22, no. 35 (September 1, 1990): 2102. Schneider points out that the American public generally believed that protecting our oil supply was the most important reason for our actions in the Gulf. He writes:

15. Robert Thompson, “Japanese Companies in Saudi Oil Link Study,”
Financial Times
, May 29, 1991; Steven Weisman, “Japan, Courting Israel, Joins Move to Scrap UN's Stand on Zionism,”
New York Times
, December 13, 1991.

16. George Bush, “On Deployment of U.S. Troops to Persian Gulf,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
26, August 8, 1990, 1216. See also William Schneider, “Consensus Holds, But for How Long?” 2101. In an address to the nation concerning the Gulf crisis, President Bush stated,

17. These six points are paraphrased from remarks by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club. See Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” Speech before the National Press Club, November 28, 1984. See John T. Correll, “The Use of Force,”
Air Force Magazine
, December 1999, Vol. 82, No. 12. http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec1999/1299force.asp.

18. Edward Lucas, “Storm Clouds Gather Over White House,”
Independent
, May 3, 1991, 10.

19. Robert M. Kimmitt, undersecretary of state for political affairs, citing President Bush in “Economic and National Security,”
U.S. Department of State Dispatch
, June 3, 1991.

20. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 304.

21. Ibid., 278.

22. Ibid., 279.

23. Ibid., 307.

24. Ibid., 304.

25. See Steven Hurst, “The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration,” in Search of a New World Order (New York: Cassell, 1999), 4.

26. George Bush, “Remarks of President George Bush upon Presenting the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Margaret Thatcher,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
27, March 7, 1991, 264.

27. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 279.

28. Margaret Thatcher,
The Downing Street Years
(New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 1993), 821.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 167.

32. Other policymakers also speculated openly about the price of the coalition. For example, during a November 28, 1990, hearing of the Armed Services Committee, Senator William Cohen (R-ME) noted: “According to this morning's news, China apparently is using the threat of a veto or an abstention from voting to purchase goodwill, mainly an adjustment of their trade status. This is extortion by another name, in my opinion.” Senator William Cohen, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Persian Gulf Crisis,” November 28, 1990.

33. See Weinberger Doctrine, principles 2 and 5.

34. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Though Our Allies May Waiver…,”
Washington Post
, January 7, 1991.

35. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 314.

36. Note: There are no democratic governments in the Gulf; but there is a great deal of oil.

37. Dan Goodgame and Michael Duffy, “Read My Hips,”
Time
, October 22, 1990, 26–27.