Making War to Keep Peace (47 page)

3. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,”
Foreign Policy
, no. 89 (Winter 1992): 3–20.

4. Defining an internal breakdown as a “threat to international peace and security” is how the Security Council claims jurisdiction over a situation such as that in Somalia. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39.

5. “Interim Leader OK's Caretaker Cabinet,”
Los Angeles Times
, February 3, 1991.

6. That Egypt had a long-standing close relationship with Said's government made Boutros-Ghali suspect in the eyes of Said's enemies, especially Farah Aideed.

7. Anton Ferreira, “More Than 1000 Somalis Die Every Day—Red Cross,”
Reuters Library Report
, October 5, 1992. Also, William Claiborne and Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. Envoy Arranges Talks Between Top Somali Warlords,”
Washington Post
, December 11, 1992. The United Nations estimated that “out of a total population of 8 million, approximately 4.5 million Somalis required urgent external assistance. Of those some 1.5 million people were at immediate risk of starvation, including 1 million children.” Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
The United Nations and Somalia
, 1992–1996 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 5.

8. Mohamed Sahnoun,
Somalia: The Missed Opportunities
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 18.

9. Ibid., 28–29.

10. UN Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), April 24, 1992.

11. The violence in Mogadishu in July 1992 was judged too great to permit Senator Nancy Kassebaum from visiting the city. Jane Perlez, “UN Observer Unit to Go to Somalia,”
New York Times
, July 20, 1992.

12. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Report of the secretary-general on the situation in Somalia, proposing the deployment of four additional security units, each with 750 troops, in Bossacco, Berbera, Kismayo, and the Southwest,” S/24480, August 24, 1992, and addendum, S/24480/Add.1, August 28, 1992, in Boutros-Ghali,
The United Nations and Somalia
, 187.

13. Sahnoun,
Somalia
, 27.

14. Robert Kaplan, “Continental Drift,”
The New Republic,
December 28, 1992(v. 207, n. 27), p. 28.15. Sahnoun,
Somalia
, 37–40.

16. Ibid., 28.

17.
Ibid
., and Thomas W. Lippman, “UN Chief Faulted in Somalia Mess,”
Washington Post
, August 29, 1994.

18. Mohamed Sahnoun, “This Way Out (of Somalia),”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
, November 7, 1993.

19. Michael Maren,
The Road to Hell
(New York: The Free Press, 1997), 214–15.

20. “The Somalia intervention was a unique geopolitical event…In sum, Bush's intervention in Somalia contained the seeds of a new doctrine: that Americans would fight for human and moral values, in contrast to the cold war, when it was willing to fight only for its strategic interests.” In William G. Hyland,
Clinton's World
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 54.

21. UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), November 29, 1990.

22. Somalia was not the first instance of the deliberate use of hunger and famine as a weapon of war in Africa. Mengistui Haile Mariam had produced mass famine in Ethiopia in the decade before famine developed in Somalia, and many thousands of Ethiopians died. One important difference was the absence of foreign troops in Ethiopia. Another difference was in the lesser control exercised by any one faction leader in Somalia.

23. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had created an international problem, not an internal problem. Both Iraq and Kuwait were recognized as wholly independent members of the United Nations.

24. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 39, et seq.

25. UN Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), April 5, 1991, on Repression of Iraqi Civilians, “The Security Council…Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees toward and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region.”

26. Not only was there a humanitarian catastrophe, but the Bush administration believed that Somalia “was a problem it was able to solve, indeed one that only the U.S. was capable of solving, and at relatively little cost…. The differences between Bosnia and Somalia were thus quite clear and rest fundamentally in the perception of the Bush administration, and particularly of the Pentagon, that the mission in Somalia was achievable.” In Steven Hurst,
The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order
(New York: Cassell, 1999), 220.

27. John M. Goshko, “UN Orders U.S.-Led Force Into Somalia,”
Washington Post
, December 4, 1992.

28. Eagleburger quoted: “This is a tragedy of massive proportions…and, underline this, one that we could do something about.” In Patrick Glynn, “The ‘Doable' War: Somalia v. Bosnia. Now,”
New Republic
, August 16, 1993, 15.

29. George Bush, “Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
27, September 23, 1991, 1324.

30. Alan Elsner, “Baker Attacked in Congress for UN Peacekeeping Expenditures,” Reuters Library Report, March 3, 1992.

31. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, “Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, State Department Fiscal Year 1993 Funding Proposal,” March 3, 1992.

32. Ibid.

33. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
(New York: United Nations, 1992).

34. The reasoning resembled that in the somewhat similar decision that was made concerning Iraq's repression of Kurds and Shiites after the Gulf War (Res.688), where massive human rights violations by the government of Iraq were said to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security.

35. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations,”
Foreign Affairs
71, no. 5 (December 1992): 89.

36. Ibid., 91. He commented, “It is difficult to avoid wondering whether the conditions exist for successful peacekeeping in what was Yugoslavia.” In fact, the necessary conditions did not exist in either the former Yugoslavia or Somalia.

37. Boutros-Ghali,
An Agenda for Peace
, 13–38, 41–45.

38. Letter dated November 29, 1992, from the secretary-general to the president of the Security Council presenting five options for the Security Council's consideration, S/24868, November 30, 1992, in Boutros-Ghali,
The United Nations and Somalia
, 209–212.

39. Ibid., 212. In explaining his idea of how the fifth option would operate and his clear preference for that course of action, Boutros-Ghali writes, “The focus of the Council's immediate action should be to create conditions in which relief supplies can be delivered to those in need. Experience has shown that this cannot be achieved by a United Nations operation based on the accepted principles of peacekeeping. There is now no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the Charter…If forceful action is taken, it should preferably be under United Nations Command and Control. If this is not feasible, an alternative would be an operation undertaken by Member States acting with the authorization of the Security Council.” In Boutros-Ghali's mind, U.S. troops undertaking the Somali operation under the command and control of a competent U.S. military and its democratically elected leaders was less “preferable” than the submission of U.S. troops to the personal command and control of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.

40. The commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command (also the commander of Operation Restore Hope) argued in an article published the following year that “disarmament was…neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for
the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations.” See Joseph P. Hoar, “A CINC's Perspective,”
Joint Force Quarterly
, no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 58.

41. John Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,”
Foreign Affairs
73, no. 1 (January/February 1994) (New York: Council on Foreign Relations): 61.

42. On these early understandings and misunderstandings, see especially Robert Oakley, “An Envoy's Perspective,”
Joint Force Quarterly
, no.2 (Autumn 1993): 46. Also John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley,
Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995). They stated that “the top UN officials rejected the idea that the U.S. initiative should eventually become a UN peacekeeping operation” (13), but George Bush had said, “once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force”(14).

43. Rowan Scarborough, “Somalia Dangers Weighed,”
Washington Times
, December 2, 1992.

44. “Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council presenting five options for the Security Council's consideration,” S/24868, November 30, 1992, in Boutros-Ghali,
The United Nations and Somalia
, 209.

45. UN Security Council Resolution 794, S/Res/794 (1992), December 3, 1992, paragraph 10.

46. Written statement of President-elect Bill Clinton, issued December 3, 1992.

47. George Bush, “The People of Somalia…the Children…Need Our Help,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
28, December 4, 1992, 2329.

48. George Bush, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in Somalia,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
28, December 10, 1992, 2338.

49. “Congressional Leaders Offer Comments on Somalia Plan,” CNN News, Live Report, Transcript #175-3, December 4, 1992.

50. Peter Applebome, “Mission to Somalia,”
New York Times
, December 13, 1992.

51. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Statement made by the Secretary-General to the people of Somalia on United Nations action on security, humanitarian relief, and political reconciliation in Somalia,” UN Press Release SG/SM4874, December 8, 1992, in Boutros-Ghali,
The United Nations and Somalia
, 218.

52. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Letter dated 8 December 1992 from the Secretary-General to President Bush of the United States discussing the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia and the need for continuous consultations,” in Boutros-Ghali,
The United Nations and Somalia
, 216.

53. Paul Lewis, “Mission to Somalia,”
New York Times
, December 13, 1992.

54. George Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
28, December 4, 1992, 2329.

55. Barton Gellman, “United States and United Nations Differ over Best Way to Silence Somalia's Many Guns,”
Washington Post
, December 23, 1992.

56. Eagleburger quoted: “This is a tragedy of massive proportions…and one that we could do something about,” in Glynn, “The ‘Doable' War,” 15.

57. In his address to the nation as the operation in Somalia was beginning, President Bush said, “To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence. Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence: We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed.” In Michael MacKinnon,
The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 17. Also, an account of the limits the Bush administration placed on American involvement in Somalia, including a treatment of its haggling with the secretary-general over those limits, is found in Bolton, “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” 56–66.

58. On American public opinion regarding intervention in Somalia, see Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, “U.S. Public Attitudes on Involvement in Somalia” (College Park, MD: University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes, October 26, 1993).

59. Alison Mitchell, “Legislator Faults UN Over Somalia,”
New York Times
, January 11, 1993.

60. Jennifer Parmelee, “UN Hosts Meeting of Somalia Factions,”
Washington Post
, January 5, 1993.

61. Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. Envoy in Somalia Viewed As Linchpin of Reconciliation; In Absence of Leaders, Many Groups Seek Oakley's Counsel,”
Washington Post
, February 2, 1993.

62. Jonathan T. Howe, “The United States and United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement,”
Washington Quarterly
18, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 47–62, 53.

63. Stuart Auerbach, “It Just Seems Our Job Is Done: Tired Marines, Eager to Return Home, Await UN Takeover in Somalia,”
Washington Post
, March 1, 1993.

64. Stuart Auerbach, “Oakley Calls Mission in Somalia a Success; U.S. Envoy Laments Leaving Before Marines,”
Washington Post
, March 2, 1993.

65. Ibid.

66. Stuart Auerbach, “UN Assailed for Delay in Takeover in Somalia; Envoy Seeks to Clear Way to Pare U.S. Role,”
Washington Post
, February 21, 1993.

67. Julia Preston, “Shift to UN Targeted for May 1,”
Washington Post
, March 4, 1993.

68. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Further Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992),” in Boutros-Ghali,
The United Nations and Somalia
, 251.