Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (116 page)

In quite a few cases funds for the reconstruction of fortresses came from the sultan’s treasury. A unique appointment is created during the reign of the sultan Lachin (r.
696/1296–698/1298); the amir Sayf al-Dīn
was sent by the sultan to oversee the finances of all the fortresses in the region of Aleppo.
⁷

According to Keegan, wherever there is a strong central government one almost invariably finds the construction of strategic defenses at the periphery. Keegan cites a number of examples: the Roman
Limes
, the Egyptian fortresses on the Nubian border built in the second millennium BC, and the fortifications of the Persian Empire in the fourth century BC that stood against the armies of Alexander the Great.
⁸
The idea is supported by Tracy, though his study deals explicitly with urban fortifications.
⁹
The concept that a strong central government builds fortifications along the periphery of its state fits the general pattern of Mamluk defenses. When Baybars began to rebuild strongholds he worked from the periphery to the center. The first fortresses rebuilt and garrisoned were those along the Euphrates. The main defensive idea behind rebuilding existing inland fortresses was to help secure the new Mamluk authority.
¹⁰
The Mamluks had hardly been in power in Egypt for a decade before Hülegü’s invasion, and Mamluk rule in Syria only began in 1260 after the Mongols were defeated at the battle of
. Thus they were still trying to establish their own regime. This was partly achieved by the presence of Mamluk governors and garrisons in strongholds such as Safad and Karak that were officially turned into provincial administrative centers soon after they had been taken.

Mamluk military architecture was directly influenced by the structure of the Mamluk army. Well-constituted professional armies existed in the region prior to the Mamluk period. The two best examples are the military orders,
¹¹
and the mamluk forces that served in the Ayyubid army as early as
al-Dīn’s reign.

The military orders were well trained, disciplined and fairly mobile. They ere, however, settled in their own fortresses and urban quarters and were not mobile in the sense that they could be sent to central or remote parts of the kingdom at the king’s command: “The military orders were not fully subject to any Latin magnate, either secular or ecclesiastical, and they dearly prized their independence.”
¹²
Their interests often clashed with those of the king and his barons and they could not be summoned or employed in the same manner as the Mamluk army under Baybars or any of his immediate successors.
¹³
According to Smail, “No Christian ruler of the twelfth century had an army at his disposal which met his needs in full … Frankish rulers and in particular the Kings of Jerusalem, did not enjoy full authority as commanders of their military forces.”
¹⁴

The main flaw of the Frankish military system, Smail thinks, was the inability to maintain both a strong field army and adequate garrisons.
¹⁵
This is where the Mamluks’ system differed greatly from that of the Franks. It was not the military architecture but rather the organization and fine balance between the field armies and the garrisons that enabled them to defend their Sultanate successfully.

Although the Ayyubid armies had a core of mamluks, their number and standards of military training can not be compared to those of the Mamluk armies in the second half of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.
¹⁶
al-Dīn had full control over his armies, but winter campaigns were difficult to organize, for most of his amirs demanded leave at the beginning of winter.
¹⁷

Since the entire army was under the Mamluk sultan’s command the organization of relief forces for strongholds could be implemented throughout the Sultanate.
¹⁸
The ranks were well aware that fortresses largely depended on reinforcements. When the fortress of Vadum Iacob was besieged by
al-Dīn in 1179, the king managed to recruit a large Frankish army. The fortress fell because the Muslim besieging force was quick, and organizing the relief force was in this case a slow procedure.
¹⁹
The kin’s army left Tiberias for Vadum Iacob (approximately 40km), but the fortress fell before they had covered half the distance. By the mid thirteenth century the king’s weak position and the quarrels among the various factions in the Crusader kingdom made it increasingly difficult to organize a large relief force for besieged strongholds. When Baybars besieged Caesarea, Arsūf, Haifa and Safad no Frankish force in the kingdom could afford to offer help.
²⁰

The Ayyubids suffered from similar problems although it seems that their failure to organize reinforcement stemmed from disunity and lack of a central authority rather than shortage of manpower. There were several cases where strongholds were dismantled because there was no possibility of ensuring the support of a field army in times of siege. After he took Baghrās (1188)
al-Dīn ordered its demolition, realizing that the Crusader army would pass through the region. Mount Tabor was built and then destroyed (1219) after learning that the Crusader armies had reached the Nile. In the same year
ordered the destruction of Safad, the curtain walls of Jerusalem, and Tibnīn because he feared they would all be retaken by the Franks.
²¹
Rather than refortify and reinforce the garrisons, these fortresses were abandoned and left in ruins.

If the key to a fortress’s existence indeed lay in the ability of the ruler to provide a relief force, this was best understood and implemented by the Mamluks.
²²
Though by no means an innovative strategy, it could not be fully exploited by the Ayyubids or the Franks, for neither regime possessed a sufficiently tight control over its army.

The structure of the Mamluk regime and army enabled it to guarantee reinforcement to almost all its strongholds, although, as has been shown, certain regions were given preference over others. The frontier with the Armenians came second to the frontier with the Īlkhānids. During Baybars’ reign the Mamluk army probably numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 horsemen. The sultan’s force of Royal Mamluks numbered 4,000 men, who were chosen, bought, trained, armed and paid by him and could be called upon at his will. During the
period their number never exceeded 10,000. High-ranking amirs bought and trained their own mamluks and the rulers of the Syrian cities, who had fully submitted to Baybars, maintained their own forces. Nomadic tribes such as the Bedouin (
) and the Türkmen were often recruited, as well as refugees from the Īlkhānid state (
wāfidiyy
).
²³
During the first three decades, the several components of the Mamluk army were subject only to the sultan’s command.