Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (45 page)

Table 2.3
summarizes the attempts to conquer the Mamluk fortresses on the Euphrates. The most striking point that emerges from this table is the decrease in the size of the army in comparison with the force under Hülegü before the establishment of the Īlkhānid state. At first it seems that the cause of these failures was the small size of the forces deployed, yet even when the numbers were considerably increased the Īlkhānid army could not subdue those fortresses. The claim that the lkhānid army was occupied with matters on the frontiers with Chaghatai and the Golden Horde does not fully explain the matter. The failure was clearly not only due to the size of the army. Although we do not have all the details, and historical accounts are lacking, it seems that part of the reason was the deterioration of the Īlkhānid siege units. None of the large-scale engineering works that were carried out during the campaigns of Chinggis Khan or on Hülegü’s journey to the Middle East were attempted by the Īlkhānid army. It is important to note that, although both fortresses were modest in size, their location made it impossible to flood or mine their walls and towers. Even if an original engineering idea had been implemented, such projects demanded a great deal of labor, hundreds if not thousands of workers (in addition to the fighting men), as well as advanced engineering knowledge and suitable teams of artisans. The number of men allocated to the campaigns was relatively small and hardly sufficient for carrying out large-scale projects that would have included shifting quantities of earth. Even when the army was bigger there is no sign of any new initiative in the conduct of siege, no new ideas or techniques.

The fact that the Mamluk relief force was able to arrive within two weeks prevented the Īlkhānids from carrying out large-scale engineering projects since they often required weeks and sometimes even months of preparation. Even the simplest method of siege warfare – surrounding the site and starving the garrison and the local population until they surrendered – was not possible due to the short time that passed until the arrival of the Mamluk reinforcement.

Table 2.3
The sieges of
and al-Bīra

This starvation method had been successful in the siege of
in 496/1103, when Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq, ruler of Damascus, and
al-Dīn Tughtigin Atabeg (who was married to Duqāq’s mother) prevented food supplies from entering the besieged city. The population surrendered after a long struggle that lasted six months until March of that year.
¹¹³
In 500/1107
was besieged by Jāwalī, a general of the Seljuk sultan
. The siege lasted eighty seen days. The city walls were breached and once the city had fallen the citadel was taken within five days.
¹¹⁴
Although these sieges took place at the beginning of the twelfth century they still give a clear idea of how long one would need in order to starve out a city. If the city was well stocked, supplies could last as long as six months.

The Īlkhānids’ ambition to conquer the Mamluk sultanate was genuine. It was driven by the Mongol imperial ideology: the belief that they were given the mandate by the heavens to conquer and rule the world. This ideology was maintained y the Īlkhānids.
¹¹⁵
The efforts invested in these military campaigns were by no means negligible. Nevertheless, as shown above, there were two main difficulties that prevented them from conquering Syria, shortage of time and their relatively small forces. It is important to note that the Mamluks were not conceived as a threat to Īlkhānid existence. Apart from a number of raids launched by the Mamluks beyond the Euphrates, in all the phases of the conflict they never sought to conquer Īlkhānid territory.
¹¹⁶
It thus seems the Īlkhānids did not fear the Mamluks; they never stationed troops along the Euphrates and there is no information of fortresses manned by their army. The shortage of time was a problem the Īlkhānid army could not overcome. The changes in strategy that occurred during the reign of Abagha in 680/1281 were the result of the decision to avoid siege warfare, which required both time and large forces. The new strategy emphasized the use of mounted archers, who had always been the core of Mongol military strength.