Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (49 page)

The Mamluk defense system established by Baybars remained much the same even after the Īlkhānid army changed its strategy and avoided siege warfare whenever possible. The last Īlkhānid siege of
(1312) set off the same chain of reactions – a message was sent to the inner Syrian cities, which were quick to organize reinforcements together with the sultan’s army that arrived from Cairo under the command of
, just as had been done in earlier decades. The dependence of the Euphrates fortresses on reinforcements seems at times like a perilous gamble. Any delay would have ended with their fall, as neither fortress had a large garrison. The Mamluks, however, did not modify their concept of defense and the reinforcements seldom failed to arrive.

As far as siege technology is concerned, the knowledge possessed by Hülegü’s siege units was no greater than that generally found at the time in the Middle East. The siege machines used y both Franks and Mamluks were equal to those of the Mongols. The acquisition of Muslim siege machines by Qubilai via Abagha implies that the Īlkhānids were using counterweight siege machines by 1271. However, this did not give them any advantage and it seems that none of the siege methods and machines that the Īlkhānids used against the Mamluk fortresses could surprise Mamluk defenders or undermine the Mamluk defenses.

3
Laying the foundations

Fortification work conducted during the reign of Baybars (1260–77), Qalāwūn (1280–90) and Al-Ashraf Khalīl (1290–93)

The uniting of gypt and Syria under a centralized government in Cairo became an urgent issue under the Mongol threat of invasion and the remaining enclaves of the Crusader kingdom and principalities in the Levant. In addition, absorbing the Ayyubid entities and creating a geographical and political continuity from Cairo to Aleppo was necessary for the establishment of the new regime. Mamluk fortifications did not arise out of the desire to expand Mamluk rule. What led to this policy was the need to protect and guard the Sultanate’s territory. The decision was under taken in the face of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Mongols in the early 1260s,
¹
and the fact that the Mamluks were operating on three different fronts: Mongolian, Frankish and Armenian.

In light of the political and military situation, building and maintaining a defense line was by and large an easier and more practical procedure than defending the frontier by capturing territories east of the Euphrates. The Mamluk army did not have the means,
²
training or logistic framework that enabled the Mongols to hold vast territories, fight in distant lands far from the center of government and maintain themselves for long periods. Although permanent Mamluk armies existed in Syria, the core of the army was stationed in Cairo.

The Mongol invasion commanded by Hülegü began with the destruction of the
centers south of the Caspian Sea. It was followed by the sack of Baghdad (1258), the execution of the Caliph and the conquest of the Jazīra (1259). It concluded when the armies crossed the Euphrates into Syria (1260) and advanced into Trans-Jordan and Palestine. This long campaign left behind a trail of destruction, and destabilized the entire region. While the Ayyubids decided to play a passive role, the Armenian king was quick to turn his kingdom into a client state in the early 1240s. The Mamluks refused to bow their heads and surrender. The victory at the battle of
did not diminish the threat of Mongol power or strength in the eyes of the Mamluks; it probably gave them a better understanding of Mongol fighting abilities and the nature of the new enemy that was there to stay.

The political instability within the newly built Sultanate did not prevent Baybars from constructing a complex defense that continued to serve the Mamluk sultanate long after his death. As well as fortresses along the frontier a great deal of thought
and funds were invested in fortresses that protected the lines of the
barīd
,
³
trade and pilgrim routes. Mamluk attacks on Armenian territory, the remains of the Crusader kingdom and principalities during the second half of the thirteenth century were almost always concluded with the conquest of a number of strongholds. If it was decided to keep them, reconstruction work began almost immediately. In addition to the reconstruction of fortifications, the field army was strengthened and carefully administrated.
⁴

Flaws and weaknesses along the Sultanate’s borders and frontiers
⁵

The term “border” is somewhat problematic when used in surveying the geographical regions that the Sultanate ruled during the period under discussion. In comparison with modern Middle Eastern borders, carefully drawn, mapped, fenced, mined and marked with signs written clearly in three languages, the borders of the Mamluk sultanate in the second half of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth were vague. The location of fortresses only partly illustrates contemporary border lines, and one should be cautious in drawing conclusions since many fortresses acquired by the Mamluks, for example those in Cilicia, were in the heart of Armenian territory. Tall
, for instance, was for a long time a Mamluk enclave in a foreign and hostile territory (
Map 2.2
). This fortress was seldom directly involved in the defense of the Mamluk frontier and its main task was to keep a watchful eye on movements within the Armenian kingdom.

A large number of Mamluk fortresses are not located along a definite frontier. In fact, one can draw a clear border only along one section in the east, on the upper part of the Euphrates. The upper Euphrates marked a natural border and was treated as such by both the Īlkhānids and the Mamluks, each of whom saw it as the definite boundary of their territory. While the Mamluks seldom crossed the river and did not wish to collect taxes from the population east of it, the Īlkhānids clearly knew that any attempt to cross the river would be seen as an act of aggression and a declaration of war. Thus the Mamluk fortifications along the Euphrates enable us to draw the only linear border in the Sultanate. Al-Bīra,
and
are three out of five fortresses along the Euphrates that were rebuilt and garrisoned by the Mamluks before 1292.

The border between the Armenian kingdom and the Mamluk sultanate can not be seen as a line drawn between fortresses; though from Abū’l-Fidā’s account it appears that the
River was perceived by both sides (for lack of Armenian choice in the matter) as a border. During the first four decades of the fourteenth century the name of the
River comes up several times as a marker between Mamluk and Armenian territories. The agreement signed between the Armenian king Constantine and the Mamluk sultan Lachin in 697/1298 states: