Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (74 page)

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The fortresses in the Crusader kingdom and principalities were built by a similar array of rulers. Some of the independent political entities were often stronger and wealthier than the king, the count or the prince. Most of the large impressive fortresses that date to the first half of the thirteenth century (Chastel Pelerin, Crac des Chevaliers, Safad, Marqab and others) were built under the auspices of the Military Orders. The latter ere the only bodies that could afford to build, garrison and maintain fortresses on such a scale.
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The Armenian fortresses are the only example we have that resembles the system of the Mamluk sultanate. The building of fortresses was initiated and supervised by the king and probably funded by the crown. Since a high percentage of the kingdom’s revenues came from providing services to merchants and collecting taxes on imported and exported goods, most Armenian fortresses were built in order to safeguard the merchant caravans traveling along the main routes.
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The fortresses rebuilt by Baybars, Qalāwūn and al-Ashraf Khalīl best reflect the differences between Mamluk governance and that of the Ayyubids and the Franks. Whether conquered, rebuilt or even destroyed, most of the strongholds served the political, economic and military interests of the Mamluk sultanate itself, and not those of the aristocracy, religious institution, high-ranking amirs or wealthy and influential traders.

The decision as to which fortresses should be maintained was made solely by the sultan, who occasionally consulted his most prominent amirs. When amirs doubted or disagreed with the sultan’s final decision, his response was fierce and uncompromising as was the case when al-Ashraf Khalīl ordered the destruction of Shawbak. Fortress governors were chosen only from the sultan’s amirs and were appointed directly by him. When a governor died or was moved to a different post the sultan himself appointed a new one in his place. Once Qalāwūn had established himself in power he replaced all the fortress governors in Syria who had been chosen by Baybars, appointing governors from among his own amirs in their stead.
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All construction work concerning restoration and strengthening of fortifications, whether in urban or rural areas, required the sultan’s approval. High-ranking governors such as Shams al-Dīn Qarā Sunqur al-Jukandār
, the
nā’ib
of Aleppo, had to receive Qalāwūn’s permission before building the mosque and the citadel.
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Due to this highly centralized rule, the total number of fortresses was less in comparison to the number of fortresses held by the Ayyubids,
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and the Franks.
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Ibn Shaddad gives a list of 22 fortresses in the vicinity of Aleppo that were taken but never rebuilt. As noted above, the reasons for the drop in the number of fortresses were linked directly to the size of the Mamluk army, its preference to be stationed in urban centers and possibly the financial constraints of the Sultanate’s treasury. However, the main reason appears to have been the geopolitical changes and the unification of Ayyubid and Crusader territories under one political entity. This reduced conflicts and hostilities throughout Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and the number of fortresses needed for defense purposes was accordingly smaller.

It is almost impossible to propose a theory or a historical framework that would offer a comprehensive explanation for the spatial distribution of the Mamluk fortresses. There will always be a number of sites that do not fit the assumed framework, and any attempt to bind all the fortresses together and impose one over-riding idea on them, will never fully or accurately represent the historical scene. The fortresses along the Euphrates, bordering the Īlkhānid state, were restored by the Mamluks in order to defend the fords and raise the alarm against Mongol invasions. Even after this stretch of the river was fortified and two additional large strongholds were taken and restored (
and
al Rūm) the effectiveness of the fortifications and safety of the Syrian population largely depended on the ability of the Euphrates fortresses to alert the Mamluk contingents in Syria and Egypt and to confine the fighting to the area east of the river.

The Mamluk priorities were fairly clear. The Armenian frontier did not enjoy the same status as the Īlkhānid. The Sultanate’s limited ability to provide relief forces restricted the number of strongholds and garrisons it could maintain in Cilicia.

The region of Trans-Jordan cannot be defined as a military front and it rarely demanded the Mamluk army’s attention. The main eason for Baybars’ restoration of the Trans-Jordan fortresses was the considerable interest they attracted during the first Mongol invasion. Though very few were severely damaged, the key fortresses were besieged and taken by the Mongols, who maintained the Ayyubid governors providing they were loyal to the new regime. Thus it became essential to beak up the Ayyubid principalities and bring their territories under the authority of the Mamluk sultan in Cairo. The appointment of new fortress governors certainly guaranteed the establishment of the Mamluks in the region. It is most important to remember that the main transport and communication routes between the two Mamluk capitals, serving the sultan’s couriers, pilgrims on Hajj and merchants, ran through the entire length of Trans-Jordan, thus adding to the importance of the Trans-Jordan strongholds. Other than Shawbak, which was destroyed during al-Ashraf Khalīl’s reign, all the main fortresses were restored; each played a different role and there was a definite hierarchy within this group. Karak topped the list it became an administrative center and a place of refuge for the sultan and his family during stormy political periods in Cairo.

Mamluk policy towards the Franks remained essentially the same throughout the reign of the three sultans. Qalāwūn for a short time appears to have followed a moderate policy.

As important as the military aspects may be, they were not always the main consideration that led to the final decisions concerning the fortresses that should be maintained. Economic and social aspects and permutations within those two fields require careful consideration. Those aspects should be examined both on regional and more local levels. Although Qalāwūn had taken Marqab and destroyed Maraqiyya, his approach in northern Syria was restrained. Some ports and a number of fortresses were rebuilt and garrisoned. Their defensive properties were of relatively little importance and it seems commercial activity and the profits that were to be made were the main reasons for Qalāwūn’s policy.

The fortune of most of the fortresses was decided by the end of Baybars’ reign. Qalāwūn and al-Ashraf Khalīl did not significantly change the map of Mamluk fortifications. A few fortresses were added and construction work continued on sites that Baybars had not had time to complete. The status and importance of certain strongholds changed as the Frankish states were gradually reduced in size. This tend became more apparent once the Crusader kingdom fell and a peace treaty was signed with the Īlkhānid state (1323).

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Mamluk power on display

Fortresses in the second half of the thirteenth century

By the end of Baybars’ reign fortresses were well integrated in the Mamluk military array. If there was ever a short period of trial and error it left little trace in early Mamluk fortifications.

While the Mamluks evidently followed some existing patterns and models that had long been used and improved by the Franks and Ayyubids, it is yet to be considered whether they brought new ideas into the field of fortifications, which had by then almost reached the peak of its development.
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As with the Ayyubid period, the few works dedicated to the subject of Mamluk military architecture are mainly monographs giving a detailed description and analysis of a specific site. The Mamluk fortifications of Cairo and the central Syrian cities such as Damascus and Aleppo have been explored and studied in greater detail. Deschamps carried out an extensive survey of Karak,
and Crac des Chevaliers (
al-Akrād), but his emphasis was on the Crusader architecture of each site.
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Pringle surveyed and excavated towers on the Sharon plain that have a Mamluk building phase, but his research centered on the Crusader period. Hartal’s excavations at
concentrate on Bīlīk’s tower; where Mamluk construction methods are extensively described. Some new information has emerged in the past decade concerning the Mamluk architecture at the site of
in Jordan.
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During the late 1980s small excavations were conducted at Karak and at Shawbak, giving precise dating to some of the construction work carried out during the fourteenth century.
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Edwards has composed a short description of Mamluk construction work in Cilicia; his research, however, is dedicated to Armenian fortresses.
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