"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (212 page)

8.
Stuckart, “Die Neuordnung der Kontinente” (1941), 5, 7.

9.
Maunz, “Verfassung und Organisation im Großraum”; the emphasis is on the
völkisch
core and goals of the German Großraum theory. Maunz says that his emphasis has helped the foreign states to understand the Großraum theory, because they misunderstood(!) it as a means of mere conquest.

10.
Höhn, “Großraumordnung und völkisches Rechtsdenken” (1941), 276.

11.
Maunz, “Verfassung und Organisation im Großraum,” 459.

12.
Report by Dr. F. Annexed Eastern Territories (then head of the Central Department of Internal Administration in the General Government) “Zur Polenpolitik im GG,” May 4, 1959, 15 (BA Ostdok 13 GG I b/3). Cf. discussion between Governor General H. Frank and State Secretary J. Bühler, head of the Central Departments, and the higher SS and police leader (HSSPF), Krüger, March 25, 1941, in Kraków: in this discussion, Frank said that it would be necessary to keep some of the General Government civil servants in readiness to “bring order to other areas,” should this be necessary. He and Keitel agreed on 500 officials (“Diensttagebuch 1941,” vol. 2).

13.
Cf. discussion in Lemberg (L’viv) on July 31, 1942, in which the serving district governor, Ludwig Losacker, explained the principles of the German administration in Galicia. Among other things, the Soviets had achieved “results in the administrative sphere … albeit in the name of an objective that is a mockery of German concepts of legality … which on face value had to be seen as extraordinary.” For the German administration, “the conclusion to be drawn was that, when implementing its own administrative goals in the Galicia District, it should apply a degree of harshness that did not fall short of that applied by the Soviets…. Otherwise, the population would be inclined to doubt the earnestness of the instructions emanating from the district administration” (“Diensttagebuch 1942,” 717).

14.
Cf. minutes of a discussion between Hitler, Frank, and von Schirach on October 2, 1940 (ZS, Ordner 325, G.J. no. 83; copy).

15.
F. Siebert, “Zur Polenpolitik im Generalgouvernement” (BA Ostdok 13 GG I b/3, 17).

16.
Hitler, Frank, and von Schirach discussion, October 2, 1940 (ZS, Ordner 325, G.J. no. 83; copy), in which Hitler declared that the Germans were the masters, the Poles the slaves. The Polish ruling classes should be killed. “AB Operation” was the codename for the Extraordinary Pacification Operation.

17.
Hitler, Frank, and von Schirach discussion (ibid.): Living standards should, in Hitler’s view, be kept as low as possible; the Poles should be kept as ignorant as possible. For more details, see “Bericht über den Aufbau im GG bis zum 1 July 1940,” vol. 1 (BA R 52 II/247), which among other things says: the planned further development of the General Government was not “misconstrued humanitarianism” toward the Polish people but rather was informed by “pragmatic considerations”; the task of planning was not to “introduce the principles of settlement policy appertaining in the German Reich” but to guarantee “harmony and security,” as well as to “relieve the economic and ethnic burden” (on the Reich). In this sense see also Kundt, “Entstehung, Probleme, Grundsätze und Formen der Verwaltung des Generalgouvernements” (1944),
Die Burg
, 51, 53 (University Library, Warsaw, Sign. 011249). A different view is given by Siebert, “Zur Polenpolitik im Generalgouvernement” (BA Ostdok 13 GG I b/3, 19), who maintains that the treatment of the Poles reflected the presence of “feelings of regret, as well as political intentions” [though in the kindest of interpretations it can only have been the reverse: political considerations first and regret, in the best of cases, second—Author].

18.
Siebert, “Zur Polenpolitik im Generalgouvernement” (BA Ostdok 13 GG I b/3, 19); concerning the activity of the Central Polish Aid Committee, cf. the report of H. Heinrich, former adviser on “free welfare for non-Germans” in the Department of Population and Welfare in the Central Department of Internal Administration, August 27, 1958; memo of the Department of Population and Welfare, September 15, 1943 (BA Ostdok 13 GG I k 1). See also the order on the Provisional Regulation of Benefit Payments to pensioners of the former Polish states and the Polish self-management associations, December 9, 1939 (
VBl.GG
[1939]: 206 ff.), and the so-called War Victims Decree of December 20, 1939 (
VBl.GG
1 [1940]: 1 ff.).

19.
See, for example, the letter from Supreme Command East to OKW, March 8, 1940, reporting a meeting of the Reich Defense Council held on March 2, 1940, in Warsaw; at the meeting it was agreed to adopt the general line that the Polish people had to be maintained at the bare subsistence level (Nuremberg doc., NO-EC-300; English summary). Also see Frank’s statement at a meeting held on December 14, 1942 in Warsaw: “The situation here is one of absolute starvation” (“Diensttagebuch 1942,” 3:482 f., 487). Kundt, “Entstehung, Probleme, Grundsätze und Formen der Verwaltung des Generalgouvernements,”
Die Burg
, 51, 53 (University Library, Warsaw, Sign. 011249).

20.
Although the fundamental direction of the policy—like that toward the Jews and the exploitation of the General Government for the benefit of the Reich—was established in Berlin, one cannot go along with Siebert’s view (“Zur Polenpolitik im Generalgouvernement” [BA Ostdok 13 GG I b/3, 27]) that the administration had acted under pressure from on high (the basics of the policy on Poland had been accepted virtually without debate. “That which had been commanded could not be changed. Attempts at resistance met with no success!”) In fact, because the basic policies were so general, the administration had plenty of flexibility in their implementation and in all matters not determined by Berlin. An energetic exercise of official powers (bureaucratic sabotage) could have prevented much harm or alleviated some of the suffering, all the more so as it was very difficult for Reich officials to gain an insight into the almost autonomous General Government. In Siebert’s opinion, the central administration of the General Government “did everything in its power” to make use of their scope of action (27).

21.
For more details see Broszat,
Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik
(1961), 168 ff.; G. Eisenblätter, “Grundlinien der Politik des Reiches gegenüber dem Generalgouvernement” (1969), 361 ff.

22.
For further details, see Frank’s memos dated June 19, 1943 (BA R 52 II/12 a), and May 25, 1943 (ZS, Ordner 439, 419 ff., copy). Corresponding proposals were put forward by Frank in a letter to the chief of the Security Police and the SD, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, July 5, 1944 (BA R 52 II/12 a). See also the speech by Frank on December 9, 1942, in which he complained about the mistreatment of Polish workers in the Reich (“If you want to milk a cow, you don’t slaughter it”); details of Frank’s proposals are given in Eisenblätter, “Grundlinien der Politik des Reiches gegenüber dem Generalgouvernement.” Cf. Siebert, “Zur Polenpolitik im GG,” BA Ostdok. 13 GG I b/3, Bl. 12/13.

23.
Cf. letter from Reich Ministry of the Interior to State Secretary Bühler of the government of the General Government, October 19, 1944, in which a secret agreement with the Poles, based on the principle of
legal
cooperation, was considered (BA R 58/1002). Three further options for a change in the Polish policy were weighed: reassertion of “German authority with sweeping powers”; no mention of the “long-term goal” of German settlement of the General Government, but only “short-term policies”; and acceptance of the Poles as partners in the “struggle against Bolshevism.” For further details, see an internal memo from the Reich Ministry of the Interior to Ref. III A 6, October 17, 1944 (BA R 58/1002).

24.
In a meeting on February 12, 1944, Frank asked Himmler to back his new line. Himmler agreed (“Diensttagebuch,” February 12, 1944). In a letter from the chief of the SIPO and the SD to the RFSS of October 1944 (BA R 52 II/12 a), Kaltenbrunner explained that two things were important for the realignment of the policy toward the Poles: first, the decision whether or not to designate the General Government an area for future German settlement; second, a change of direction on three fronts: an end to all statements discriminating against Poles (including propaganda material); the abolition of harassment measures; and cooperation with the Polish
Heimatarmee
(through the commander of the Security Police and SD, BdS Kraków—without legalization).

25.
Reich Ministry of the Interior to State Secretary Bühler, government of the General Government (BA R 58/1002).

26.
Ibid.

27.
Broszat,
Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik
, 81.

28.
Ibid., 171 f.

Part One. Section 3. Introduction. V. Principles of Administrative Organization

1.
Best, “Die deutsche Militärverwaltung in Frankreich” (1941), 29; Schröder, “Die Heeresverwaltung” (1943), with a detailed overview of the historical development of the administration in areas defined as occupied under international law; Maunz, “Verfassung und Organisation im Großraum” (1941), 457 f.; Spanner, “Fragen der Verwaltung besetzter Gebiete” (1944).

2.
Krüger, “Der Raum als Aufgabe der inneren Verwaltung” (1941); Stuckart, “Die europäische Neuordnung” (1942); Stuckart, “Die Neuordnung der Kontinente” (1941); Ernst, “Erlebnis und Gestaltung deutscher Großraumverwaltung” (1943) (with a useful overview of the administration—mostly military administration—of all occupied territories in Europe); Best, “Grundfragen einer deutschen Großraumverwaltung” (1941); Maunz, “Verfassung und Organisation im Großraum,” 456 ff.

3.
Spanner, “Fragen der Verwaltung besetzter Gebiete.”

4.
Labs, “Die Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete” (1943); Runte, “Die Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete” (1942).

5.
Best, “Grundfragen einer deutschen Großraumverwaltung.”

6.
Maunz, “Verfassung und Organisation im Großraum,” 456.

7.
Best, “Grundfragen einer deutschen Großraumverwaltung”: German rule is included here only in the form of “wishes” (54 f.); German rule is to be implemented through instructions (56 f.); implementation of German rule is to be by directives (57).

8.
Ibid., 57 f.

9.
Although Polish local government, which was de facto subject to loose German control, remained largely autonomous, in the Occupied Eastern Territories local self-government remained intact though under strict German supervision only in the
Rayons
(districts in the Ukraine) and in the districts of the former Baltic states (for further details, see Runte, “Die Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete,” 227).

10.
Letter from the chief administrator of the Military District of Kraków to the head of the civil administration (CdZ) of the commander-in-chief East, October 1939 (IfZ, Bestand MiG, MA-682, Bl. 0226 ff.).

11.
Dr. F. Siebert, president of the Central Department of Internal Administration, at a meeting in Lemberg (L’viv) on July 31, 1942 (“Diensttagebuch 1942,” July 31, 1942). Report by Siebert, May 4, 1959, on the Polish policy in the General Government (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I b/3), 21; Lasch, “Die deutsche Aufgabe im Osten” (1940), with detailed descriptions of the “neglect” in Poland, the “political incompetence” of the Poles, and the German “work of construction.”

12.
Report by Siebert, “Die Hauptabteilung Innere Verwaltung im Generalgouvernement,” November 11, 1959 (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I b/5).

13.
Report by Siebert, November 11, 1959, on the development and position of the General Government (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I a/9), in which he puts forward the view that cooperation with the Polish intelligentsia was out of the question anyway.

14.
Report by Siebert, ibid.; Broszat,
Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik
(1961), 159 f.

15.
“Report on the Development of the General Government,” July 1, 1940 (BA R 52 II/247). Hitler in a discussion with the cief of the Armed Forces High Command on the future shape of Polish affairs, October 17, 1939 (quoted from
Doc. Occ
. 6:27 f.). Frank, “Der Aufbau der Verwaltung im Generalgouvernement” (1940), 98.

16.
Every aspect of the system of administration was regulated down to the last detail in accordance with the criteria of the Reich administration; the ponderous legislative machinery remained intact—untouched by the events—almost until the end of the German administration. The last decrees issued in the General Government were the Decree on Supplements to the Law of Civil Status, November 25, 1944, and the Decree on the Increase of Telephone Charges, December 4, 1944.

17.
This is underestimated by Präg and Jacobmeyer in their introduction to “Diensttagebuch,” 23: they explain that “the beginnings of a model administration” were nipped in the bud by the designation of the General Government as an object for exploitation.

18.
For more details, see Broszat,
Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik
, 75 ff., 80 ff.; Eisenblätter, “Grundlinien der Politik des Reiches gegenüber dem Generalgouvernement” (1969), 235 ff.; report by Siebert, May 4, 1959 (Ostdok. 13 GG I b/3).

19.
The secretary of state of the General Government, Joseph Bühler, had been a public prosecutor (Frank,
Nationalsozialistisches Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung
[1934], xxix–xxxii). The head of the Department of Legislation in the office of the governor general, Albert Weh—a “straight A” law graduate—came originally from the Austrain administration; the head of the Department of Education and Science, Watzke, had a similar background. The head of the Central Department of Justice, Wille, originally worked in the Reich Judicial Administration of the Weimar period and was responsible for political crimes (“Personalliste des RMJ,” BA R 22/4378; and “Geschäftsverteilungsplan des RMJ” [Organizational Plan of the RMJ (Reich Ministry of Justice)], April 1938, BA R 22/4223). The governor of the Warsaw District, Fischer, was
Regierungsrat
. The heads of the offices of the district governor were also specialists from the Interior Administration of the Reich or the Austrian administration.