"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (216 page)

18.
Report by SS-
Sturmbannführer
Dr. Herbert Strickner, October 19, 1944, which refers to the statement on the Polish policy requested from the chief of the Security Police and the SD on October 16, 1944, IfZ, Ma 641–2094 ff.; a more recent account of Polish resistance is given in W. Jacobmeyer, “Polnischer Widerstand im deutschen Urteil,”
VjhZ
4 (1977): 658 ff., with numerous examples. See also report by F. Siebert (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I b/5); the chief blame lay with the Reich authorities who had seen the General Government as “a place of refuge for unwanted elements of society” (Siebert was the head of the Central Department of Internal Administration in the General Government).

19.
Cf. detailed report of the Security Police Command in Radom produced in spring 1943 (IfZ, Ma-641, Bl. 2271); unsigned report, February 1943, on the leadership of the administration in the General Government (BA Ostdok. 13 GG 19/10). Cf. also report by Dr. Siebert on November 11, 1959 (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I b/5), according to which complaints were rarely followed up with criminal proceedings but usually led to nothing more than transfer and withdrawal of their “reserved occupation” status [i.e., not liable for call-up—Trans.].

20.
For a personal portrait of Frank, see Fest,
Das Gesicht des Dritten Reiches
(1964), 286 ff.; cf. also a report by Max Frauendorfer, “Arbeitsverwaltung im GG,” July 20, 1961, BA Ostdok. 13 GG IV b/3, Bl. 9. On his leadership of the administration and friction with the SS and police, cf. Broszat,
Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik
(1961), 75 ff., 80 ff. Concerning his contradictory policy on the Jews, cf. Frank’s statements in a speech given on December 9, 1942 (ZS, Eichmann, no. 1383). Regarding his loss of power vis-à-vis the Berlin authorities, cf. events detailed in the telex sent by the RFSS to HSSPF Kraków on March 29, 1943, and to the governor general on October 21, 1943; telex from State Secretary Stuckart to Reich Ministry of the Interior (Himmler) on October 22, 1943 (IfZ, Bestand RFSS Persönl. Stab, GG, Ma-300, 58–3072). Regarding the “sensational” restoration of the governor general’s tarnished prestige through Hitler’s intervention, cf. summary of discussion between Hitler and Frank on February 6, 1944, in “Diensttagebuch,” February 6, 1944, Bl. 4) and Himmler’s meeting with Frank on February 12, 1944, recorded in “Diensttagebuch,” February 12, 1944, vol. 4. For more details, see “Diensttagebuch,” ed. Präg and Jacobmeyer, introduction, 14 f.

21.
For more details on Frank’s management style, see report by F. Siebert, “Verwaltungswirrwarr im Generalgouvernement” (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I a/1; ZS, Versch. 104, 695 ff.; copy). See also the interesting list made by Siebert of various personalities in the administration of the General Government, August 1958 (ZS, Versch. 47, 442 ff.; copy).

22.
More recently also “Diensttagebuch,” ed. Präg and Jacobmeyer, introduction, 29, in which it is said that Governor General Frank had no “real power of decision” and was a mere “executor.” But as head of the administration, Frank had
unlimited
powers (sec. 5 of the Führer decree of October 12, 1939,
RGBl
. I 2077) and also a certain scope for action with regard to the implementation of the Reich’s political demands. He exercised this discretion by trying to “overfulfill” the exigencies of the Reich.

23.
Report, F. Siebert, “Verwaltungswirrwarr im GG” (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I a/1; ZS, Versch. 104, 695 ff.; copy).

24.
A conflicting view is held by Präg and Jacobmeyer, “Diensttagebuch,” introduction, 11, who ascribe the failure of the administration primarily to external factors: interference by the Reich department and the fact that the SS and police were a law unto themselves; however, the authors overestimate the impact of these factors on the everyday operations of the administration.

25.
Cf. also “Diensttagebuch,” ed. Präg and Jacobmeyer, introduction, 23 (“Raubbau an Menschen und Wirtschaftskraft des GG”—plundering of human and economic resources in the General Government).

Part One. Section 3. A. Fundamentals

1.
According to the report on development in the General Government (GG) (July 1, 1940), at this time there were about 1.6 million Jews in the General Government; according to earlier official estimates, there were 200,000 Jews in the Kraków District (5.3% of the population), 310,000 Jews in the Radom District (10.4% of the population), 250,000 in the Lublin District (9.6% of the population) and 540,000 in the Warsaw District (17.4% of the population)—a total of 1.3 million (BA R 52 II/247). See also diary notes by Dr. Troschke (BA Ostdok. 13 GG no. 1a/10, Bl. 37), according to which the vast majority of business and trades were in Jewish hands; statistics in the report of July 1, 1940 (BA R 52 II/247); cf. also report “Das Judenproblem” issued in mid-1942 (no author) on the influence of the Jews on the Polish economy and their elimination (BA Ostdok. 13 GG IX a/5).

2.
Decree on the definition of the term
Jew
in the General Government, June 24, 1940,
VBl.GG
1 (1940) (ZS, Ordner 94, Bl. 314–16; copy).

3.
OLG-Rat Weh (head of the Legislative Office) in a discussion on June 6, 1942 (“Diensttagebuch,” 3:319).

4.
Decree on the identification of Jews in the General Government, November 23, 1939 (
VBl.GG
[1939]: 61); cf. also the decree circulated by the Central Department of Justice on July 21, 1941, to the district Departments of Justice, according to which, in the event of violations of the decree by Jewish subjects of allied or neutral states, the procedure set out in sec. 153, par. 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) was to be instituted (Main Commission Warsaw, Archive, government of the General Government, Central Department of Justice V/6). Cf. also circular decree of the government of the General Government (Central Department of Internal Administration), April 23, 1941: ban on carrying additional armbands, to “avoid disguise” (ZS, Polen 257, Bl. 64). Police order on the appearance of Jews in public in the Reich, September 1, 1941,
RGBl
. I 547.

5.
The government of the General Government notified the district chiefs on November 23, 1940, that the RSHA, in a decree of October 25, 1940, had described the emigration of Jews, also from the General Government, as “undesirable,” since it only strengthened “world Jewry”; at the same time they were empowered to reject requests for emigration by Jews without further examination. Only applications from foreign Jewish subjects should be processed; quoted from Berenstein, Eisenbach, and Rutkowski,
Eksterminacja
ydów
(1973), S. 55 f.

6.
Diary notes by Dr. Troschke (BA Ostdok. 13 GG no. 1a/10, Bl. 93).

7.
Decree of the Department of Internal Administration in the office of the governor general, December 11, 1939, ZS, Polen 257/5; according to this, Poles were to pay the German authorities onehalf złoty (0.25 RM) per application, and Jews were to pay twice as much.

8.
See, for example, Steiner, “Verändertes Tarnow,” Press Service of the General Government, June 9, 1942, ZS. Cf. pictures of the ghetto and Jewish markets in Warsaw and of the insurrection in the Warsaw ghetto in
Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung
, Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
. Cf. diary notes by Dr. Troschke (BA Ostdok. 13 GG no. 1a/10, Bl. 40).

9.
“Richtlinien für die Durchführung der antijüdischen Ausstellung ‘Jüdische Weltpest’ in den Gemeinden” (no date), Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
.

10.
Just how much anti-Jewish propaganda and how many anti-Jewish measures found favor with the Polish population is a matter of controversy. According to the reports of the German administrative authorities, the attitude of the population was predominantly positive; cf. diary notes, Dr. Troschke (BA Ostdok. 13 GG no. 1a/10), according to which the Poles hailed the “pushing back of Jewish influence”; cf. monthly report from the
Kreishauptmann
of Jasło on June 2, 1940 (ZS, Polen 347, Bl. 539): reprisals against work-shy Jews met with an “enthusiastic response”; monthly report by the
Kreishauptmann
of Ko
skie, August 1940 (Bl. 187, also IfZ, Ma-158/2, Bl. 15): “particular satisfaction” about the transportation of Jews to forced labor; previously the Jews had “triumphed,” since the Poles had been obliged to go to the Reich as seasonal workers; monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
of Jasło, Kraków District, August 1940 (ZS, Polen 347, Bl. 101 ff.): The Poles seem to be disturbed by the treatment of the Jews; the prospect of an “overall solution of the Jewish problem” was no compensation for the fact that the “population has to put up with the invasion of the Jews from Kraków.” The population did not understand why Kraków had to be completely “Jewfree” when it would be far simpler to carry out the necessary controls in Kraków itself. Monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
of Siedlce, February 1942 (ZS, Polen 348, 813 ff.): The anti-Jewish measures were—it was said—“supported and understood by the cities”; but the farmers were against the resettlement of the Jews because they were involved in smuggling operations with them and needed their craftsmen’s products. But see also Bartoszewski and Lewin,
Righteous among Nations
(1969), which gives numerous examples of Poles helping Jews.

11.
This included all Jewish questions, except matters of economic and industrial law, for which the various departments of the administration were responsible. Unlike the Reich, the General Government did not set up special Jewish bureaus. Jewish matters were dealt with in the Department of Population and Welfare or the Department of Health (from 1943 they were called Central Departments): administrative instruction no. 1 of April 7, 1941, and of March 16, 1941, on the organization of the government of the General Government (Weh,
Übersicht über das Recht des Generalgouvernements
[1943], A 122 a); and Decree on the Establishment of the Central Department of Health, January 20, 1943 (B 500). For more details, cf. part 1, section 3, C, VIII (“Freedom of Movement and Personal Liberty”), note 24.