"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (46 page)

This policy of exploitation was primarily practiced in Poland’s occupied western territories. By a decree of the Führer dated October 8, 1939,
⁸³
these were incorporated into the German Reich as the Annexed Eastern Territories, in complete disregard of the principles of international law. As will be thoroughly demonstrated later on, it was the dominant opinion, both in theory and in practice, that the Polish state had been finished,
extinguished
, ever since September 1, 1939, or at the very latest upon Poland’s capitulation, so that the Civil Service established in the Eastern Territories could not proceed on the basis of the “preservation of the previously existing state structure.”
⁸⁴
In consequence, the validity of any norms or standards of international law (as established at the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention) within the Eastern Territories was denied and their inclusion in Germany’s interior sphere of influence declared permissible
⁸⁵
—all this in contravention of international law, which in cases in which a state was occupied initially presumed the continued existence of the occupied state, more especially when the occupation was brought about by aggression.
⁸⁶
With the annexation the entire administrative policy became fixated on “Germanization,” with a view toward making room for German settlement. The Warthegau district (or Wartheland) in particular, in the minds of the National Socialist leadership (who found their most zealous champion in the Gauleiter and Reich governor [
Reichsstatthalter
] of Posen [Pozna
], Arthur Karl Greiser),
⁸⁷
was to become a “living Eastern bulwark,”
⁸⁸
a German “model district” (
Mustergau
), from which the greatest possible number of undesirable Poles were to be expelled and whose administration was meant to become the model for the later organization of the
Reichsgaue
within the Altreich itself.
⁸⁹
The essential principles of this (Germanization) policy, which, however, depending on the audience, was paraphrased as a policy of “containing” the Poles (
Volkstumskampf
) or as a policy of building up “Germanness,” consisted, first, in the liquidation of the property-owning and politically dominant classes or their expulsion (“resettlement”) and replacement with German settlers,
⁹⁰
while the remaining population was for the time being to be kept on as a source of cheap labor. The ultimate objective was the “utter removal of everything Polish,” that is, in the long term, the deportation of all Poles and the final incorporation of these territories into the German state.
⁹¹
The second component or stage of the Polish policy consisted in the strictest possible separation between Germans and the resident population, while subjecting the latter to discriminatory measures with the aim of dramatizing German authority and obtaining the greatest possible work efforts (with the Poles as “more or less slave laborers”) for the purposes of the Reich.
⁹²

The fulfillment of the objectives delineated here was approached exclusively from a standpoint of draconian severity.
⁹³
Not surprisingly, the favorite slogan of this policy was the motto “harsh, but fair,” which in reality meant harshness alone, and no fairness. For, as with “non-Germans” in general, what was expected from Poles and Jews in particular was nothing but obedience and labor; they were to be “honest and diligent” and submit in all things to German orders and directives. As in all authoritarian administrations, here, too, oppression was justified by assertions that it was also in the interests of the oppressed: “The broad mass of Poles feel,” as
Reichsstatthalter
Greiser declared during a lecture in Kiel, “absolutely fine.”
⁹⁴

One of the first measures taken was the registration of all those fit to work, enforced if necessary under compulsion (roundups);
⁹⁵
the labor of the Jews, in particular, was exploited to the point of total exhaustion (as was noted with pride), because the procedure was “unbureaucratic,” that is, SS and police units were used instead of administrative officials.
⁹⁶
Further legal measures to enforce separation included raising the minimum age required for marriage among Poles; the maintenance of the existing poor living conditions through cuts in wages and salaries; and deliberate complications in the purchase or cuts in the distribution of foodstuffs and consumer goods,
⁹⁷
leading to hoarding,
⁹⁸
sinking labor productivity, and general dissatisfaction. Actual legal discrimination consisted, as is documented in detail below, in prohibitions on the use of the means of transportation and communication, choking off sources of information (newspaper, radio), introduction of special laws in the areas of criminal law, civil administration, and some parts of the labor laws—all exhibiting clear parallels to the legislation affecting Jews in the Reich itself. The final goal of the administrative “special treatment” of the Poles, as differentiated as it may have been in various areas, consisted in codifying the general principles for treatment of the “non-German” population in a system sui generis, in a special “Polish Codex” or set of legal statutes,
⁹⁹
thus finalizing their removal from the German community of law by enshrining it in a special legislative act.

In addition, the “special treatment” of the Poles was perfected via numerous measures of psychological warfare, which are dealt with in detail later. Aside from measures exquisitely calculated to humiliate (such as mandatory salutation of Germans),
¹⁰⁰
no propagandistic measure was spared to convince the Poles of the finality of their state’s destruction, the victories of German arms, and the perpetual duration of German rule,
¹⁰¹
as well as to suppress with rigorous severity all signs of Polish resistance,
¹⁰²
although these were, compared with those experienced in the General Government, relatively inconsequential. In order to secure the agreement of the German population, elements of which perceived the measures of persecution, in particular the resettlements, to be cruel and unjust, no kind of propaganda went untried that might provoke aversion and hate. Polish excesses committed against Germans in the first days of the war (the so-called September Murders) served as political justification, being laid at the door of the Poles as a collective guilt. Therefore, went the argument, Germany was free from any legal or political considerations.
¹⁰³
Within the populace, these actions apparently met with only partial success, as demonstrated by the numerous complaints of friendly contacts between Germans and Poles and of “Polonophile behavior” among indigenous ethnic Germans.
¹⁰⁴
Later on, the murder of thousands of Polish officers by Soviet troops at Katyn (the Katyn Murders) provided the Nazis with welcome grounds for excoriating the outrages of the Communists while distracting from their own plans for suppressing “non-Germans.”

Thanks to regular reports on the mood of the populace, the living conditions, and the political situation received by the administrative authorities from subordinate departments and the Security Service,
¹⁰⁵
there were numerous opportunities for adapting the administrative policy, turning the screw now looser, now tighter. Basically, however, a tough and inflexible course was pursued from the very beginning, not only in the speeches of the National Socialist leadership but also in practice—in reckless disregard of actual conditions. Since the official version held that Poles were fundamentally “cunning,” “cheeky,” and “underhanded,” that is, born servants with whom anything but strong remedies were misplaced,
¹⁰⁶
senseless measures were taken—such as, for instance, the public thrashing of Poles (“vigorous castigation”)—which derived from colonial thinking
¹⁰⁷
and whose justification was traced to a firmly established “unwritten principle of law.” This latter (then) experienced a corresponding revival in the Eastern Territories.
¹⁰⁸
A further principle was never to allow Poles to take executive appointments or positions of trust.
¹⁰⁹
The only things expected and demanded of them were underpaid work in subordinate positions and strict obedience. Trivialities were viewed as sabotage against German directives.
¹¹⁰
Because the mood and morale in the population were necessarily bad on account of the rigorous anti-Polish measures,
¹¹¹
this in turn was made to serve as the alibi for even sterner measures, so that both the mood of the “non-German” population and the measures directed against it mutually escalated; to this extent—and especially in the Warthegau—one may speak of a “closed system” of anti-Polish measures, resolutely imposed.
¹¹²
Even when, toward the end of the war at the latest, a milder course would have been in their own best interests, the police leadership and the radical wing of the Party and the Civil Service stubbornly adhered to the previously determined path; they viewed the Annexed Eastern Territories as “German settlement land” for all time,
¹¹³
where a tough position was to be enforced under all circumstances. Leniency was taken for weakness, flexibility for indulgence. The only means of rule and the only language understood and practiced by these officials was that of violence and suppression.

The special-law policy directed against Poles and Jews (
Volkstumskampf
) was accompanied by substantial efforts at Germanization (the “German Restructuring Effort”), the outlines of which can only be hinted at here. First and foremost in this category was the Germanization of place names and streets, the removal of Polish signs, and the Germanization (
Eindeutschung
) of the population
¹¹⁴
by resettling ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and the Baltic states, who took possession of the property of the expelled Poles but whose identity as distinct ethnic groups was shattered and whose cultural individuality was stolen in order to breed the standardized “greater German man.” In all this, the most important principle of the settlement policy was the partition of Polish-settled areas with German-settled strips that were to
smother
or prevent the spread of the Polish-settled areas.
¹¹⁵
In legal terms Germanization was reflected in the introduction of regulations adopted from the Reich,
¹¹⁶
particularly pertaining to economics, that favored the German population; in the creation of considerable tax advantages for the indigenous and incoming Germans; and in making the latter visually distinguishable from the Poles.
¹¹⁷
On the basis of such notions of settlement policy, the Annexed Eastern Territories were to develop into the model for future Eastern settlements, which in turn were to represent the agricultural reservoir (“breadbasket” of the Reich)
¹¹⁸
in addition to taking in soldiers and disabled veterans from the region of the Altreich. Germans reveled in historical reminiscences and intoxicated themselves with the “German Restructuring Effort,” with their “admirable resettlement work,” and with the riches that flowed into public coffers thanks to the expropriation of Polish possessions.
¹¹⁹
They invoked the new type of men, those destined “to be leaders of men,” who were primarily to come from the ranks of former soldiers. The East required not only “professionally educated” personnel. If a man’s “heart was in the right place” and his attitude correct, then he too could climb the career ladder in the East.
¹²⁰

II. The New Type of Administration in the Annexed Eastern Territories: The Primacy of the Party and the Separation of the Regional Administration from the Reich Administration

This radical administrative policy was decided on by the new revolutionary powers, the Party and the police, as both “racial struggle” and Germanization had been removed from the preserve of the administration, being declared instead issues “involving the leadership and guidance of people,” that is, a matter for the Party (and the police).
¹
The
Reichsstatthalter
(regional governors) of the new Eastern Territories, who also functioned as Gauleiter of their respective regions, certainly enjoyed excellent relations with the Party leadership and shared its taste for violent measures and the suppression of the Poles at all costs, its aversion to the stipulation of any legal status for “non-Germans,” in fact its general dislike of bureaucratic methods and procedures. This developed into a “natural” opposition to the Reich administration, which although approving a tough anti-Polish line was still in favor of continuity and a degree of legal security for “non-Germans,” albeit in its own interests. However, the policy of the Party, its obstinacy and arrogance, prevailed in the new Eastern districts (
Ostgaue
), whose administrative structure was much closer to the National Socialist ideal than the rigid system of the Altreich because it enjoyed the backing of the Gauleiter, Party Headquarters in the Reich, and ultimately Hitler himself,
²
whereas the administrative authorities could rely only on the weak Reich Ministry of the Interior, which was suffering from repeated attempts by the Party and the police to bring about its elimination and indeed whose continuous compromises made a not insubstantial contribution to the process of neutralization.