"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (49 page)

The mandatory Hitler-
Gruss
and the humiliating prohibitions ordered as “disciplinary” measures by local head administrators in the first weeks of occupation proved more severe than these measures.
¹²
Although such regulations were not deemed necessary in Danzig–West Prussia and the administrative district of Kattowitz (Katowice) in the Eastern Territories (although the Party leadership in Upper Silesia was convinced that the compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
had been introduced for Poles),
¹³
the measures implemented at the local level in the “model district” of the Wartheland were centralized and extended. As early as November 1939, the HSSPF (higher SS and police leader) in Posen (Pozna
) issued a directive that all male Poles should greet all German officials with the Hitler-
Gruss
and that they must step aside if the sidewalks were “congested,”
¹⁴
a directive that was to be enforced by all available means, including the imposition of forced labor on “recalcitrant” Poles.
¹⁵
Of course the local population did not obey such an absurd directive, or at least not to the extent desired by its author.
¹⁶
Thus, despite the numerous exhortations from above to take a hard line, the compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
was not administered very consistently in the Wartheland
Gau.
In some instances it was imposed by force, and in others it was not practiced at all, because the Germans did not identify themselves by badges.
¹⁷
There were also rural
Kreis
authorities who attached no importance to the compulsory Hitler-
Gruss;
they dispensed with it or simply did not introduce it in the first place.
¹⁸
In contrast, there were authorities (in the railways and streetcars) who actually demanded that Poles use military salutes. Ultimately, even the German security authorities in the Warthegau realized that although dispensing with the compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
would be “further evidence of German weakness,” the impossibility of enforcing the Hitler-
Gruss
consistently was damaging the “prestige of the German nation, and in particular of the police.” Therefore they advocated its general abolition,
¹⁹
which, they stipulated, should not be implemented explicitly but merely by a tacit nonapplication. In turn, this experience induced the Party Chancellery and the SIPO to withdraw plans for the proposed introduction of a general compulsory Hitler-
Gruss
to Germans in uniform in
all
annexed and occupied territories.
²⁰

Among the segregation measures was the practice of omitting the social title
Mr.
in official correspondence with Poles,
²¹
the numerous measures to Germanize place names,
²²
and the suppression of Polish terms and the Polish language from public life as the language of the vanquished.
²³
Extremist ethnic politicians would have preferred to see the Polish language totally repressed and banned.
²⁴
Because this was impossible, bilingualism was introduced to the public sector and hailed as a sign of “German superiority in the East.”
²⁵
The spread of the German language among those members of the (local) population of German origin who still could not speak German was encouraged by every means possible.
²⁶
The NSDAP
Gauleitung
Wartheland announced in December 1943 that all Germans in the Wartheland, including Poles of German origin recognized as capable of Germanization (
eindeutschungsfähig
) by entry of their names in the German Ethnic Classification List (
Deutsche Volksliste
) were required to learn German; if this did not occur voluntarily, pressure should be applied by threatening to revoke the German citizenship acquired by virtue of entry in the German Ethnic Classification List or by cancellation of the entry and the return of the resettlers to the Altreich (“forced repatriation”).
²⁷
Furthermore, it was the will of the leadership that “popular sentiment” as such would prevent any contact with the Polish neighbors. Leaflets, appeals, and posters continually urged vigilance, the maintaining of “distance from the Poles,” who were the “eternal enemies.”
²⁸
Numerous articles and views published on the “Polish issue” advocated very radical measures far exceeding those actually implemented.
²⁹
In contrast to the General Government, where a late change of course was attempted from 1943 on, the policy of segregation as such was maintained until the end of the war,
³⁰
although a more lenient line was taken in Danzig–West Prussia and Upper Silesia than in the radically anti-Polish Warthegau and Zichenau administrative districts.

To clarify the full extent of the policy of segregation and discrimination, a number of regulations are described in detail below. These originate mostly from the
Reichsgau
Wartheland, officially termed the “model district” of the East because there the strictest ethnic segregation prevailed, the “non-German” population living as if in a large prison and completely isolated from the outside world. In this district, where all ethnic policy measures were agreed in minute detail between Party and administrative leadership, the decree issued by the
Reichsstatthalter
on September 25, 1940,
³¹
prevailed, in which the “principles of the coexistence” of Germans and Poles were specified; because it was impossible to implement fully the principle of total segregation because of the general housing shortage and the workplace conditions, the decree stipulated that contact with Poles should be limited to the minimum required for official or economic purposes. It warned against “repeated friendly contact” with Poles; in the event of sexual relations between German women and Polish men, the German partner was sent to a concentration camp; in the reverse case, the Polish woman was threatened with committal to a brothel. These measures, far exceeding the sanctions imposed by the Blood Protection Law, which punished only the man involved, were no empty threats but indeed were rigorously implemented.
³²
Later on, as in the territory of the Reich, the Gestapo officially introduced the right of “first intervention” (by a decree of the RSHA) in all cases of sexual relations between Germans and Poles, including by circumventing the judicial system.
³³
Corresponding, sometimes even more stringent instructions on the “absolute segregation” of Germans and Poles were issued to the administrative authorities, police authorities, and party offices.
³⁴

These examples alone show that especially in the Warthegau, the principle of ethnic segregation was extremely successful. Meticulously drafted police decrees and directions covering other areas also swamped the authorities. The National Socialist leadership had its eye especially on public socializing, as the uncontrolled opportunities this allowed for forming acquaintances and exchanging opinions were in any case particularly objectionable to the advocates of the “racial struggle,” and they put their heart into this with their usual systematic approach. From mid-1940 on, all inns and restaurants in the Warthegau were divided into those for Germans and those for Poles, “to prevent an excessive mingling of the races.”
³⁵
German inns were identified as such and bore a special sign “Access for Poles prohibited.”
³⁶
The radical nature of these directives is a good example of the pigheadedness
³⁷
with which the special regulations were railroaded through without any regard for reality—and the measures failed to achieve the desired results. Although Poles were prohibited from visiting German inns, Germans (with the exception of members of the Party or its divisions and affiliated associations) were essentially not forbidden to enter Polish inns,
³⁸
a freedom exploited above all by members of the Wehrmacht; furthermore, the segregation resulted in considerable financial losses for the German inns because their Polish customers were absent.
³⁹

Another instance of the zealous special regulations of the authorities concerns the numerous police curfews and closing times for Poles and Jews
⁴⁰
as well as the ban on Poles’ buying spirits.
⁴¹
The policy of segregation also produced such exaggerations as the prohibitions on cinema performances for Poles on Saturdays and Sundays,
⁴²
the ban on the showing of German fairy-tale films for Polish children (“The conveying of German sentimental values … appears … fundamentally questionable”),
⁴³
the banning of Polish kindergartens,
⁴⁴
the segregation of Germans and Poles during fire-fighting training and during ambulance transport,
⁴⁵
and the closure of public baths to Poles.
⁴⁶

However, the policy of segregation had a serious impact not only in terms of ethnic policy and psychological effects but also when it came to administrative organization. One example is that of municipal law, which highlights particularly clearly the intentions of the regime as regards the segregation of Germans and “non-Germans.”

After the occupation of Poland, Polish municipal constitutional law had been partially suspended,
⁴⁷
but some elements remained in force—mostly for practical reasons—resulting in an inconsistent legal situation.
⁴⁸
Despite this, the December 21, 1939, Decree on the Adoption of the German Municipal Code (
Deutsche Gemeindeordnung
) in the Annexed Eastern Territories directly implemented German municipal law in the urban boroughs (
Stadtkreise
) only,
⁴⁹
whereas the law of the German Municipal Code could be granted to other municipalities by special decree of the
Reichsstatthalter
if the “ethnic policy conditions” existed, that is, if there was a “sufficient proportion of Germans” in the population.
⁵⁰
Until this occurred, the municipalities were administered by German municipal commissioners with the same function as local mayors.
⁵¹
German municipal law was not therefore introduced at once, which would have corresponded to a policy of rapid Germanization, but rather decided from case to case as a reward for a process of Germanization already completed.
⁵²
In less euphemistic terms, it was granted only after the completion of resettlement and political “reallocation of land.”
⁵³
Opinions in the Annexed Eastern Territories about exactly when a “sufficient proportion of Germans” had been reached in a municipality, however, differed substantially.

As late as fall 1940, an inquiry by the Reich Ministry of the Interior as to which municipalities had been granted the right to use the German Municipal Code produced a near-zero return.
⁵⁴
Only in Silesia, which had made strenuous efforts to achieve Germanization, was the procedure more lenient, with the right to use the German Municipal Code being granted at an early stage (1940) to many municipalities, even where the proportion of Germans was low,
⁵⁵
in order to stimulate the settlement of Germans. The procedure in the Zichenau administrative district was also relatively flexible.
⁵⁶
In Danzig–West Prussia, a minimum of 15 percent German population, where known, was required for the granting of the German Municipal Code,
⁵⁷
whereas in the Wartheland the “benefits” of German municipal law were reserved for the urban municipalities.
⁵⁸