"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (48 page)

Faced with the massive pressure from the Party leadership, SS and police leaders, and the local administrative chiefs, all unanimously promoting the principle of independence from the Reich administration, the Reich administration, headed by the Reich Chancellery maneuvering in all directions, proved simply incapable of holding or developing any opposite standpoints. The attempt by the SS and police leaders mentioned above to seize for themselves the power vested by the
Immediatsprinzip,
originally designed for Hitler alone, that is, the authority to issue instructions to
all
civilian heads of administration, by-passing all Reich authorities, best shows how far the situation had progressed.
³⁷

In its reaction to this onslaught by the Party bureaucracy, the Reich Ministry of the Interior, which had general responsibility for the new Eastern Territories, picked the worst possible tactic. It initially reacted only in an “elastic defensive,”
³⁸
despite verbally protesting the authority of the internal administration in all matters relating to the administration of the new Eastern Territories, instead of undertaking any positive action itself. If, as was normally the case, the deputy Führer or the
Reichsführer-
SS and chief of the German police proved to be uncompromising, the ministry retreated and limited itself to formal adjustments to political decisions that had already been made.
³⁹
The sum total of the “participation” by the Reich internal administration was thus either that it was involved only via institutionalized information processes (which frequently served only the delaying and obstructing tactics of the Party leadership) or that it was simply confronted with a fait accompli.

In the areas where no agreement could be reached with Berlin about the policy of special rights for the local population, the endeavors of the Party leaders and the
Reichsstatthalter
in the Annexed Eastern Territories to achieve autonomy ultimately resulted in their frequently shying away from any trial of strength with the Reich Ministry of the Interior and protracted conflicts about jurisdiction, thereby simply excluding the Reich authorities. Berlin could complain as eloquently as it wished, but what effect did it have as long as the local authorities implemented the decrees of the
Reichsstatthalter?
Was it not the case that the
Reichsstatthalter/
Gauleiter, not Berlin, enjoyed all direct authority to issue instructions and thus true power, once the cumbersome legislative procedure had been abandoned and the more comfortable instrument of a
policy of issuing guidelines
had been adopted? The guideline policy therefore gradually became the most important instrument of totalitarian power in the Annexed Eastern Territories: it offered the advantage of bypassing the Reich authorities, secrecy, and the ability to change the relevant regulations at any time. This guideline policy offered particular advantages where “non-Germans” were concerned, since existing legal safeguards could be largely circumvented in the administrative procedure. Another favored tactic was to allow such people formal rights of appeal in guidelines but at the same time to issue instructions internally that all appeals should be rejected,
⁴⁰
so as not to endanger the “authority of the German administration.” The relevant authorities even went so far as to view the issue of guidelines as inappropriate because these were still stipulations that the Poles should not be allowed to cite.
⁴¹
The aim in the Warthegau (or Wartheland), achieved to a large extent, was the totalitarian ideal of the policy of ad hoc decisions and the absence of any binding nature whatsoever in acts of state.

Despite a superficial similarity to the Reich administration in organization,
⁴²
a new model of totalitarian administration organization had thus evolved in the Annexed Eastern Territories, characterized by a semiautonomous status vis-à-vis the Reich authorities, the close personal and material integration of state and Party, the dominating influence of the Party, and a radical policy of special rights for the local population in the form of secret guidelines. This new administrative model thus stood about halfway between the traditional (Reich) form of administration and the colonial administration models established in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe, of which one, the administrative model in the General Government (Poland) is discussed in greater detail in section 3.

III. Results

The results of the Polish policy—predominantly drafted by the Party—in the German Eastern Territories, the overwhelming majority of whose population consisted of “non-Germans,”
¹
require a differentiated assessment. Despite the aforementioned general guidelines, there can be no talk of any uniform Polish policy, because each of Hitler’s “
Gau
kings” (
Reichsstatthalter,
or regional presidents) pursued his own policies in his own region. Although a stringent anti-Polish course was pursued in the Warthegau
²
and in the Zichenau administrative district, those regions with a strong mixed German-Polish population, such as Danzig–West Prussia and the annexed regions of Upper Silesia, experienced a policy of Germanization that took the form of the “alignment” of Polish living conditions with German conditions (e.g., an equal labor law status with Germans). This meant that the living conditions in these regions were relatively bearable, which led the Poles to the false conclusion that this was where the real Polish policy was being implemented and that the Warthegau was suffering from the rule of a “handful of radical
Polenfresser
[“eaters” of Poles],” who would not be able to prevail in the long term.
³
Especially in the “model district” of the Wartheland, however, the impact of the “ethnic policy” fell short of the expectations and notions of the National Socialist leadership.

The reasons for this lay not only in the organizational problems of the Party and administrative machineries mentioned above; a crucial factor in the failure of the ethnic policy was the critical personnel problem already cited, which led to innumerable complaints about the poor professional and personal suitability of administrative and Party personnel, to the recall of many appointees because of breach of service regulations or personal misconduct (drunken excesses, embezzlement, etc.),
⁴
and to many applications for transfer back to the Reich (being assigned service in the East was regarded as a “disciplinary transfer”).
⁵

Particular ill feeling arose because the personnel records of the seconded civil servants were not sent by their home authorities to the recipient authority, with the result that not all individuals appointed to positions of trust were thoroughly suited to the standards imposed upon them.
⁶

Above all, however, as the responsible administrative authorities deplored repeatedly, the policy of segregation and “oppression” of the Poles was never properly grasped and consistently implemented by either the German authorities or the German population. In a report addressed to
Reichsstatthalter
Greiser concerning the current state of the Polish policy, and dated July 30, 1941, the head of ethnic policy in the office of the
Reichsstatthalter
Posen argued that the pre-1914 Prussian policy, oriented toward mutual understanding, had been wrong. The German population was no match for the “tactics of the Polish race,” displayed not unity but a friendly attitude toward the Poles, and certainly did not maintain the prescribed personal distance.
⁷
Both this report and numerous other reports are full of complaints about fraternization between Germans (particularly members of the Wehrmacht) and Poles (particularly Polish women),
⁸
which was detrimental to the German race but did not decline even when unauthorized contact with Poles was punished by arrest by the Gestapo (i.e., mostly by committal to a concentration camp).
⁹
Germans helped Poles evade the German police on many occasions.
¹⁰

Neither was the line taken by the individual authorities against the Poles consistent—at least in the Warthegau. The regular police, for instance, were explicitly prohibited from harassing the Poles.
¹¹
In the
Reichsbahn,
80 percent of whose employees were Poles, or in the labor administration, the prevailing conditions were largely dictated by economic considerations (i.e., preserving the workforce) rather than the principle of oppression at any cost. That situation prompted the radical ethnic politicians in the
Reichsstatthalter’s
office to warn against actions hostile to the Germans and acts of sabotage by the Poles and to demand stronger ideological indoctrination on the Polish issue for civil servants and plant managers, indeed for the entire population.
¹²
According to the official line, the Poles were “rebellious” and “impudent” and must be treated harshly in every respect; even the slightest concession, according to the recommendation by the ethnic experts to the administrative leadership, would reinforce the Poles’ hostile attitude toward the Germans. The administrative authorities always countered this policy with economic arguments, which were accepted as important but could have no effect on the ethnic policy objectives: in the long term, the Poles would have to be expelled from the Eastern Territories, but in the medium term the “Pole should be exploited as labor” “as much as possible and then left to his own devices,” so that he “is no longer in a position … to reestablish himself ethnically and politically … with outside aid.”
¹³

A. The Principal Features of the National Socialist Policy of Special Law: The Segregation of Germans and “Non-Germans” and the Greatest Possible Discrimination against “Non-Germans”

The development and organization of the special regulations for isolation of and discrimination against “non-Germans” were linked to the practice already established in the Reich. The measures instituted against the Jews in the Altreich were implemented in comprehensive fashion in the Annexed Eastern Territories. This process of repression, under cover of the terms
racial struggle
and
German Restructuring Efforts (deutsche Aufbauarbeit)
cited before, was organized along the same lines in both the Altreich and all annexed and occupied territories: (1) the group to face discrimination was first
separated
and isolated from the other local population groups, and (2)
special regulations
were imposed upon this group, now placed outside the legal system (which frequently ended in the deprivation of all civil rights). The special regulations were frequently accompanied by the granting of explicit privileges to the German population.
¹

The measures implemented to separate the German and “non-German” races principally comprised the mandatory “Hitler-
Gruss
” (Hitler salute) and numerous compulsory identification regulations and rules of conduct for Poles designed to confront them daily with the ignominy of their defeat. These were a direct continuation of the “proven” models in the Reich instituted as part of the anti-Jewish persecution. The relevant measures in the Annexed Eastern Territories therefore display clear parallels with the anti-Jewish laws enforced in the Reich.

As to the Jews, the special regulations on Jewish names implemented in the Reich also applied, such as the obligation to adopt the first name or surname
Israel
or
Sara
in legal and commercial transactions and in all dealings with the authorities and public offices.
²
In the Wartheland, however, the authorities also came up with a special rule for the Poles. Along the same lines as the special treatment enforced for the Jews, a decree issued by the
Reichsstatthalter
on November 1, 1941, obliged all Poles to adopt a Polish name from an official list of names or to add the special name of
Kazimierz
to their own name,
³
so that all Poles could be immediately identified as such in dealings with the authorities. Although it is questionable whether this decree was implemented in practice, its very existence shows that there were proposals to subject Poles to the same treatment as the Jews.

In contrast, general compulsory identification of “non-Germans” was not introduced in the Annexed Eastern Territories (except for “non-German” forced laborers from Russia),
⁴
although the top administrators certainly had concrete plans: for instance, it was proposed that as with the Polish civilian laborers in the Altreich, all Poles in the Annexed Eastern Territories should wear an armband bearing a large
P.
⁵
However, practical and political considerations made such a measure inappropriate. Instead, at least in the Warthegau, the objective of segregation and isolation of Poles and Germans was achieved by a different, much simpler method right from the outset—not the Poles, but the much less numerous local German population was obliged to wear a
Volksdeutsch
badge or another badge indicating their membership in the German race.
⁶
Anybody not wearing such a badge could automatically be identified as a “non-German.” Overzealous Party offices also proposed compulsory identification for German staff in shops and inns so that “it is evident from the outset whether one is being served by a German or a Pole.”
⁷
To prevent any form of disguise, the Poles themselves were strictly prohibited from wearing any form of badge or marking in the Warthegau,
⁸
which also included German, Austrian, and Polish medals and decorations, under a directive issued by the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
⁹
Poles were also forbidden to wear complete or partial German traditional costume (
Tracht
).
¹⁰
Although violations of the prohibition on the wearing of badges or decorations carried severe penalties, it is clear that these regulations were not always observed by the Poles.
¹¹