Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (23 page)

6
KTB OKW, Volume I, pp. 257–258 (9 January 1941).

7
Ibid., p. 258 (9 January 1941).

8
Ibid., pp. 257–258 (9 January 1941).

9
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, p. 259.

10
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 156.

11
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 178.

12
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 256 (28 January 1941).

13
Ibid., pp. 256, 260–261. See also Thomas's report of 9 January 1941, KTB OKW, Volume II, pp. 997–998, Document 46 (9 January 1941).

14
Italics in the original. Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 258 (28 January 1941).

15
Ibid.

16
Ibid.

17
Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, p. 140.

18
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 259 (28 January 1941).

19
Ibid., p. 261.

20
Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 210–211; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, pp. 127–128; Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, pp. 117–118. In January 1941 Ribbentrop's opposition to Barbarossa was expressed much more clearly and with greater conviction. ‘Would this war’, Ribbentrop asked, ‘bring us any closer to our goal as regards England, even if it went entirely according to plan? Either we smash England, in which case we don't need to become embroiled in the East, or we fail to force England to capitulate, in which case a war in the East will be of no use to us.’ Geoffrey Waddington, ‘Rippentrop and the Soviet Union, 1937–1941’ in John Erickson and David Dilks (eds.),
Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies
(Edinburgh, 1998), p. 27.

21
Frieser,
Blitzkrieg-Legende
, pp. 110–114;
The Blitzkrieg Legend
, pp. 94–98.

22
Replacing the old
Reichswehr
(German armed forces) of the Weimar Republic.

23
Michael Geyer, ‘German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945’ in Peter Paret (ed.),
Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(Oxford, 1999), pp. 583–584.

24
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 5,
War Diary
, p. 197 (31 January 1941).

25
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 198 (27 November 1940).

26
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 5,
War Diary
, p. 198 (1 February 1941).

27
Joachim Fest,
Hitler
(Orlando, 1974), p. 644.

28
Richard Overy,
Interrogations. The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945
(London, 2001), p. 281.

29
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 464 (Appendix 2); Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 151, Document 39, ‘Aus der Aufmarschanweisung des Oberbefehlshabers des Heeres für die Aggression gegen die Sowjetunion (Aufmarschanweisung Barbarossa), 31. Januar 1941’.

30
Italics in the original. Franz Halder, KTB II, pp. 464–465; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 152.

31
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 465; Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 153.

32
Görlitz,
Paulus and Stalingrad
, p. 127.

33
Heinz Guderian,
Panzer Leader
(New York, 1952), pp. 142–143. Guderian's account goes on to emphasise his own unclouded view in which his supposed prescience concerning Soviet strength led him to see the coming campaign as an ‘infinitely difficult task’ (p. 143). In fact, the only time Guderian's opinion was asked for in the planning of the campaign, he presented an optimistic view of German superiority over the Red Army. See Hillgruber,
Hitlers Strategie
, pp. 226–227.

34
Weichs's letter cited by Johannes Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer. Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42
(Munich, 2006), p. 282.

35
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 297 (3 February 1941).

36
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 266 (2 February 1941).

37
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 297 (3 February 1941).

38
Heinz Guderian,
Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare
(London, 2002), p. 153.

39
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 190.

40
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 267 (2 February 1941).

41
Ibid., p. 266.

42
Hildegard von Kotze (ed.),
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel
(Stuttgart, 1974), p. 93 (17 January 1941). Engel's book, although presented in the form of a diary, was in fact written after the war from his personal notes.

43
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 297 (3 February 1941).

44
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 267 (2 February 1941).

45
KTB OKW, Volume I, pp. 297–298 (3 February 1941).

46
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 242–243. The ‘Deployment Directive Barbarossa’ as published in Halder's War Diary is incomplete and misleading (see Klink, p. 242, footnote 147). An accurate reference is found in Moritz (ed.),
Fall Barbarossa
, p. 154.

47
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, pp. 237, 243.

48
Jürgen Förster, ‘Die Gewinnung von Verbündeten in Südosteuropa’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band IV:
Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion
(Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 355–356; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, pp. 188–189.

49
Förster, ‘Die Gewinnung von Verbündeten’, p. 356; Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 242; KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 299 (3 February 1941). Ultimately the Hungarian leader Admiral Horthy, who was himself a committed anti-communist and feared Romania's increasing favour with Hitler, would of his own volition declare war on the Soviet Union and send an army to aid Army Group South.

50
As cited by Leach, ‘Halder’, p. 116.

51
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 299 (3 February 1941).

52
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 267 (2 February 1941).

53
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 299 (3 February 1941).

54
Ibid., p. 300 (3 February 1941).

55
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 5,
War Diary
, p. 198 (1 February 1941).

56
Von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, p. 262.

57
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 230 (13 December 1941).

58
Von Kotze (ed.),
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler
, p. 92 (18 December 1940).

59
KTB OKW, Volume I, p. 306 (5 February 1941).

60
Klink, ‘Die militärische Konzeption’, p. 244.

61
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 319 (17 February 1941).

62
Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 125.

63
Georg Thomas,
Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918–1943/45)
, ed. Wolfgang Birkenfeld (Boppard am Rhein, 1966), p. 18.

64
Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, p. 144; Kershaw,
Hitler 1936–1945
, p. 345.

65
I am indebted to Alex J. Kay for access to his doctoral work: ‘“Neuordnung” and “Hungerpolitik”: The Development and Compatibility of Political and Economic Planning within the Nazi Hierarchy for the Occupation of the Soviet Union, July 1940–July 1941’, Chapter IV, ‘Laying the Foundations for the Hungerpolitik’.

66
This refers in particular to the Walther memorandum of October 1940 which foresaw no chance of an internal Soviet collapse and argued that the Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states would probably be more of a burden than a benefit to the economic situation of Germany. Robert Gibbons, ‘Opposition gegen “Barbarossa” im Herbst 1940 – Eine Denkschrift aus der deutschen Botschaft in Moskau’,
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte
23 (1975), 337–340.

67
Hillgruber, ‘The German Military Leaders’ View of Russia’, p. 183.

68
Thomas,
Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft
, pp. 515ff. See also Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz’, p. 127; Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, pp. 144–145.

69
Ulrich von Hassell,
Vom andern Deutschland
(Freiburg, 1946), p. 183 (2 March 1941). For the English translation see Ulrich von Hassell,
The Von Hassell Diaries 1938–1944
(London, 1948), pp. 157–158 (2 March 1941).

70
Examples are cited throughout his excellent two-volume biography, although only the second volume deals with the war years. See Kershaw,
Hitler 1936–1945
.

71
Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Das “Unternehmen Barbarossa” als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg’ in Gerd R. Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (eds.),
‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’. Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941
(Paderborn, 1984), p. 188; Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg’, p. 126.

72
Omer Bartov, ‘Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich’,
Journal of Modern History
, 63 (1991), 53–54.

73
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 312 (14 March 1941).

74
Ibid., p. 313 (15 March 1941).

75
Ibid., p. 316 (16 March 1941).

76
Ibid., p. 319 (17 March 1941).

77
Ibid., pp. 319–320 (17 March 1941).

78
Von Hassell,
Vom andern Deutschland
, p. 184 (16 March 1941); Ulrich von Hassell,
The Von Hassell Diaries 1938–1944
, p. 158 (16 March 1941).

79
Franz Halder, KTB II, p. 338 (30 March 1941).

80
Ibid., p. 319.

81
Richard Brett-Smith treads this precarious line, suggesting: ‘without Halder's meticulous planning Hitler would have been unable to frame the simplest military operation effectively…Halder was surely one of the best brains and ablest Staff officers of his time, but not even he could cope with the strain and uncertainty of working under a psychopath.’ Richard Brett-Smith,
Hitler's Generals
(London, 1976), pp. 216, 218.

82
Leach, ‘Halder’, pp. 111–112.

83
Hitler even condemned Halder and Brauchitsch during the planning stages for ‘thinking like military cadets’: von Kotze (ed.),
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943
, p. 75 (19 February 1940).

84
Brian Bond, ‘Brauchitsch’ in Barnett (ed.),
Hitler's Generals
, p. 77. See also Megargee,
Inside Hitler's High Command
, p. 55.

85
Jürgen Förster, ‘New Wine in Old Skins? The Wehrmacht and the War of “Weltanschauungen”, 1941’ in Wilhelm Deist (ed.),
The German Military in the Age of Total War
(Warwickshire, 1985), p. 305.

86
Bond, ‘Brauchitsch’, pp. 80–81. See also Mitcham,
Hitler's Field Marshals
, p. 63. Richard C. Lukas,
The Forgotten Holocaust. The Poles Under German Occupation 1939–1944
(New York, 1997), p. 3.

87
Brett-Smith,
Hitler's Generals
, pp. 43–44.

88
Basil Liddell Hart,
The Other Side of the Hill. Germany's Generals: Their Rise and Fall, With Their Own Account of Military Events, 1939–1945
(London, 1999), p. 87.

89
Von Manstein,
Lost Victories
, p. 76; John Wheeler-Bennett,
The Nemesis of Power. The German Army in Politics 1918–1945
(New York, 1969), pp. 471–472.

90
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 149.

91
Hermann Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen. Die Panzergruppe 3 und der operative Gedanke der deutschen Führung Sommer 1941
(Heidelberg, 1956), p. 48.

92
Ibid.

93
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 9,
War Diary
, p. 203 (18 March 1941).

94
Ibid. (18 March 1941).

95
This approach was also reflected in Halder's diary which contains no mention of the discussion and even makes the extraordinary statement next to his sub-heading ‘AGp Centre’ (Army Group Centre) ‘No significantly new viewpoints’. Halder then goes on to record an issue of comparatively minor importance between 9th Army and Panzer Group 3. Given Bock's fury over the outcome it is hard to believe Halder was oblivious to his reaction. The avoidance of such an essential detail, however, is typical of Halder's diary on all questions concerning his covert plans for Moscow. Halder no doubt understood the explosive potential of keeping a written record of his deceit, especially since he must have assessed its future historical value in terms of Third Reich historians above all others.