Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (26 page)

By contrast, even the older model Soviet light tanks such as the T-26 and the BT-5 and 7 series employed 4.5cm main guns capable of penetrating 52mm armour (more than the thickest German armour) at a range of 100 metres. These light Soviet tanks had been produced in vast quantities during the 1930s (an estimated 12,000 T-26s and 3,000 of the BT series), which taken together with all other models gives the imposing figure of some 23,767 Soviet tanks in existence by the eve of war.
³⁵
Although equipped with powerful main armaments, these tanks were lightly armoured and certainly unequal to the rigours of the coming war, which their losses in the opening phase undoubtedly reflect. Furthermore, the Soviet tanks were at a considerable technical disadvantage because of their lack of radios and rudimentary communication equipment which hindered co-ordination on the
battlefield.

The
remarkable number of Soviet tanks and the fact that this figure included hundreds of T-34s and KV-1s has given cause for some historians to explain the apparent early success of Operation Barbarossa through a tremendous German superiority in mobile operations. Such representations, in addition to the well worn memoir literature of former generals, have contributed to the rise of a semi-mythical status surrounding the German panzer divisions and their execution of the so-called ‘blitzkrieg’. In fact, the preparation of the German motorised and panzer divisions was far from perfect, with Halder noting in his diary five weeks prior to the campaign: ‘we will be lucky if we're finished with their equipping; the training of the last equipped divisions will in any case be incomplete’.
³⁶
Ultimately, shortcomings in training affected no fewer than six of the 13 motorised infantry divisions and two of the panzer divisions (20th and 18th, both committed to Army Group Centre).
³⁷
This is not to question that the German armoured units had a qualitative advantage in the organisation and level of training and experience of their tank crews. Such advantages, however, do not fully explain the extent of German success in the summer of 1941, which was in no small part due to astonishing Soviet ineptitude as opposed to simple German brilliance.

Since
1940 the Red Army had pursued a radical restructuring and modernisation programme which began with the creation of nine new mechanised corps and followed in early 1941 with a further twenty.
³⁸
Fulfilling the manpower and materiel requirements of such an ambitious reform was truly a mighty undertaking with the result that many of the mechanised corps were woefully disorganised, ill-equipped and undermanned by the summer of 1941. In the western military district opposing Army Group Centre, mechanised corps averaged shortages of 75 per cent in personnel and 53 per cent in equipment, greatly impairing their ability to function effectively.
³⁹
Compounding the shortages, many tank drivers had as little as one-and-a-half to two hours’ driving experience, and command staff lacked specific training in the direction of motorised units.
⁴⁰
Furthermore, there was an appalling degree of negligence in the maintenance and servicing of older model Soviet tanks. A report from 15 June 1941 stated that among the great mass of T-26s and BT models, 29 per cent were in need of capital repair and 44 per cent of lesser maintenance, making a total of 73 per cent being in need of some kind of work.
⁴¹
During the winter of 1940–41 an analysis was conducted to assess the professional knowledge of the commanding officers serving in the border military districts and its conclusion was damning. The southernmost
Odessa Military District was marked ‘Average’ while all the others were marked ‘Poor’.
⁴²

Clearly the German panzer divisions were to encounter a foe scarcely prepared for war, which in spite of its numerical and technological superiority could not help but be at a severe disadvantage. The hapless state of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 was most definitely exploited by the German attack, but not caused by it. The great number of Soviet tanks subsequently captured or destroyed must be seen in this context. Yet the disparity of arms also points to a further consideration in the early progress of the war. If Germany could not achieve the outright success it aimed for and crush the Red Army in its weakened state, the reality was that future battlefields would only see an ever greater proportion of newer model Soviet tanks and a heightened degree of competence among those Soviet officers and men who survived earlier encounters.

The
German tank force at the start of the western campaign in May 1940 numbered some 2,445 vehicles of all models.
⁴³
In the last six
months of 1940 tank production averaged 182 units a month (all types) with this rising slightly to 212 in the first six months of 1941.
⁴⁴
By 22 June 1941 the combined figure for all tanks in the four panzer groups of Operation Barbarossa reached 3,505 (see Figure 3.1).
⁴⁵
Of the 21 panzer divisions in existence by the summer of 1941, two were engaged in northern
Africa, another two were in the process of being reorganised and refitted for future operations, leaving 17 panzer divisions available for service on the eastern front.
⁴⁶
Yet, just as caution should be exercised in a differentiation between tank models, so too must attention be paid to the divisions in which they were organised. Radical differences in the number of tanks assigned to each division resulted in considerable disparities of strength which directly impacted the overall performance of the panzer groups. By far the weakest,
Panzer Group 1, assigned to Army Group South, had an average of 154 panzers in its four panzer divisions. In contrast,
Panzer Group 3 of Army Group Centre averaged 253 tanks per division with the most numerous being the
7th Panzer Division, fielding 299 tanks.
Panzer Group 2, the second arm of Army Group Centre, was considerably smaller, averaging 191 tanks per division, but this was offset in overall strength by the addition of a fifth panzer division.
Panzer Group 4, attached to Army Group North, averaged 210 tanks per panzer division, although this panzer group contained only three panzer divisions, giving it roughly the same strength as Panzer Group 1. Thus, from a standpoint of overall tank numbers, Panzer Groups 2 and 3 had approximately one-third more tanks than Panzer Groups 1 and 4 which, in addition to the fact that both were deployed in the central Army Group, reinforces the paramount importance of this sector.
⁴⁷

Taken together, the relative strengths of Panzer Groups 2 and 3 reflect a considerable disparity in the composition of forces making up each group. While Panzer Group 2 was mainly stocked with tanks and trucks of German origin, Panzer Group 3 was a far less homogenous force, reflecting the spoils of past conquests. It comprised a core of Czech Pz Kpfw 38 (t) tanks and its motorised infantry was largely dependent upon
requisitioned French vehicles.
⁴⁸
All forms of wheeled transport suffered greatly on the deplorable Soviet roads, but the less robust French trucks proved even more susceptible on summer roads choked with dust and potholes, and soon converted to an impassable morass with every downpour. The commander of Panzer Group 3, Colonel-General
Hoth, would later complain: ‘It seems the allocation of trucks was totally unsuitable for an eastern campaign.’
⁴⁹
The addition of so many foreign vehicles also exacerbated the problem of standardisation within the army and made the process of conducting repairs and finding spare parts much more complicated. The result was a higher rate of attrition and a slower rate of return to service, affecting the overall performance of the panzer group and emphasising yet again the importance of a speedy victory before mobility was decisively
compromised.

Figure 3.1 
Panzer models available for Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941. Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg’, p. 185.

On 19 June 1941, only three days before Barbarossa was due to begin, the OKW issued a directive to
Brauchitsch relating
Hitler's intentions for the future use and deployment of panzer divisions. With undisguised conceit Hitler's instruction read:

1. Eastern Front
   : The eastern front should as much as possible live from its own materiel reserve. In case of heavy losses panzer divisions should be consolidated together. Newly-established panzer divisions in Germany shall be staffed by personnel vacated due to the consolidations.
   
2. From these newly-formed units
   2 panzer divisions are for France, 1 panzer division for Norway.
   ⁵⁰
   

The document goes on to direct that tank losses in
Africa must be replaced as soon as possible, leaving nothing in reserve for those on the eastern front. From this it is clear that Hitler's lofty confidence was as delusional as it was self-destructive, reinforcing yet again the absolute dependence on the forces at hand for the fullest achievement of the operational plan
. The panzer divisions now carried not only the profound expectations of their leaders, but the fate of Germany's greatest military
campaign.

Standing before the precipice – the infantry and Luftwaffe on the eve of Barbarossa

In
spite of the central importance of the motorised and panzer divisions, an analysis focusing on the make-up and employment of the infantry divisions is not without merit for gaining a wider appreciation of both the weaknesses of the German army and the complex function of managing armour and infantry in combined operations. Just as one must guard against a generalised accounting for tanks and panzer divisions, avoiding the inaccurate representation of a generic standard, it is likewise important to differentiate between the large sum of German infantry divisions. According to an army document assessing the combat value of divisions, dated 20 June 1941, a full 73 divisions were deemed to be at a level below the highest classification which determined a division to be capable of ‘any offensive action’. These 73 were described as follows: ‘[S]omewhat lesser offensive strength’, 8 divisions in total; ‘reduced offensive strength and mobility’, 19 divisions; ‘little offensive strength and mobility’, 22 divisions; and lastly 24 divisions equipped and trained only for rear-area security operations. Among those in the highest classification were 95 infantry divisions, four mountain divisions and one cavalry division, the great bulk of which were deployed in the east ready for the start of operations against the Soviet Union.
⁵¹
Yet the reality of so many second- and
third-class divisions discouraged the prospect of a rotational reserve existing between units on the eastern front and those stationed in quieter sectors. In any case, when German losses eventually demanded this course of action it proved difficult to implement quickly owing to the substantial distances and the Soviet Union's poor transportation network. Thus, while Barbarossa proceeded with the finest elements of the German army, it was largely self-reliant in dealing with the Red Army, and had to meet all operational requirements without recourse to an appreciable reserve of quality or quantity.

Compounding such limitations, the training of the German infantry proved insufficient to cope with the many challenges of the new theatre, as well as the stubborn and unorthodox tactical approach of Soviet soldiers.
⁵²
One post-war study of small unit actions on the eastern front concluded that several months of acclimatisation were often necessary before units could adapt and stem the high tide of casualties. The learning curve was large enough that occasionally full-strength combat units, without previous experience on the eastern front, were incapable of achieving the same tasks as those units greatly depleted by previous engagements.
⁵³

Even more problematic were the constraints of equipment which greatly hampered the performance of the infantry and directly exposed them to the structural failings of the German army. Given the plainly inadequate state of motorisation and the clear priority enjoyed by the motorised and panzer divisions, the great mass of German infantry was largely self-reliant for its means of transportation. In practice this led to an advance at the pace of a march, with some 625,000
horses
⁵⁴
employed to draw guns and supplies. Thus the tempo of the German advance progressed at two entirely different speeds, preventing the close mutual reliance of the two most basic arms of the army. The dire complications this caused to the German strategic and operational position will be fully explored in
Part II
but, in short, it meant that two separate armies were invading the Soviet Union. One army was highly mobile and armoured, but relatively small in size and without depth in manpower or endurance for battles of long, grinding duration. The other army was large, slow and cumbersome, bearing the great bulk of the three million men invading
the Soviet Union, and proving not greatly more manoeuvrable than the Kaiser's army of 1914, or even that of Napoleon in 1812.
⁵⁵
Particularly in reviewing the period from June to August 1941, this distinction between the infantry armies and panzer groups must be kept in mind. Indeed, one easily gains a deceptive impression from countless maps produced in the secondary literature, as they almost always limit themselves to showing the furthermost point of advance and thereby disguise a critical structural deficiency within the army, as well as giving a misleading impression of rapid, early success.
⁵⁶