Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (65 page)

87
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 179.

88
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fols. 38–39,
War Diary
, pp. 258–259 (21 July 1941).

89
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 153 (22 July 1941).

90
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.2 XXXXVII.Pz.Korps. Ia 25.5.1941 – 22.9.1941’ BA-MA RH 24–47/2 (23 July 1941).

91
Glantz,
Battle for Smolensk
, pp. 33–41; Kipp, ‘Barbarossa and the Crisis’, pp. 142–143.

92
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 156 (23 July 1941); ‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 Bd.II vom 22.7.1941 bis 20.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/928, Fol. 14 (23 July 1941).

93
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fols. 159–160 (24 July 1941).

94
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der 12.Pz.Div. vom 25.5.41 – 30.9.41’ BA-MA RH 27–12/2, Fol. 67 (24 July 1941).

95
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 160 (24 July 1941).

96
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 181.

97
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 Bd.II vom 22.7.1941 bis 20.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/928, Fols. 22, 24–25 (24 July 1941).

98
As cited in James Lucas,
Das Reich. The Military Role of the 2nd SS Division
(London, 1991), p. 61.

99
‘Kriegstagesbuch Nr.2 des XXXXVI.Pz.Korps Teil II. 8.7.41 – 23.8.41’ BA-MA RH 24–46/8, Fol. 99 (24 July 1941).

100
As cited in Lucas,
Das Reich
, p. 63.

101
Günther,
Hot Motors, Cold Feet
, pp. 101–102.

102
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's Table Talk
, p. 13 (night of 24–25 July).

103
‘18. Panzer Division, Abt. Ia. Kriegstagebuch Teil I vom: 22.6 – 20.8.41’ BA-MA RH 27–18/20, Fol. 46 (23 July 1941).

104
Ibid., Fol. 48 (24 July 1941).

105
Hürter,
Ein deutscher General an der Ostfront
, p. 69 (20 July 1941).

106
Bähr and Bähr (eds.),
Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten
, p. 209 (23 July 1941).

107
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 41,
War Diary
, p. 261 (24 July 1941). See also Franz Halder, KTB III, pp. 109–110 (24 July 1941).

108
Lammers (ed.),
‘Fahrtberichte’
, p. 205 (26 July 1941).

109
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 41,
War Diary
, p. 261 (24 July 1941).

110
Ibid., Fol. 45, p. 265 (27 July 1941). David Glantz citing Soviet sources offers the much lower figure of 12,000 men (Glantz,
Battle for Smolensk
, p. 41).

111
Hürter,
Ein deutscher General an der Ostfront
, p. 70 (22 July 1941).

112
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 41,
War Diary
, p. 261 (24 July 1941).

113
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Vorbereitungszeit’, Fol. 3,
War Diary
, p. 195 (14 December 1940).

114
Leach,
German Strategy Against Russia
, p. 116.

115
KTB OKW, Volume II, pp. 1035–1036. Document 81 (25 July 1941).

116
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 42,
War Diary
, p. 262 (25 July 1941).

117
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 1036, Document 81 (25 July 1941).

118
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 42,
War Diary
, p. 262 (25 July 1941).

119
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, pp. 182–183.

120
As cited in Meyer,
Heusinger
, p. 154.

121
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 117 (25 July 1941).

122
Ibid., p. 111 (25 July 1941).

123
Klink, ‘Die Operationsführung’, p. 492.

124
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 111 (25 July 1941).

125
Ibid., p. 121 (26 July 1941).

126
Ibid. (26 July 1941).

127
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 44,
War Diary
, p. 263 (26 July 1941).

128
Franz Halder, KTB III, pp. 122–123 (26 July 1941).

129
Ibid., p. 123 (26 July 1941).

130
Ibid. (26 July 1941).

131
Ibid., p. 124 (26 July 1941).

132
Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, KTB, p. 309 (26 July 1941).

133
Von Manstein,
Lost Victories
, pp. 197–198. See also Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, p. 288, footnote 38.

134
The disdainful tone Keitel used to describe the opposition to Hitler's preference makes clear where his sympathies lay even after the war (Gorlitz (ed.),
Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel
, pp. 150–151).

135
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 199.

136
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 1019, Document 62 (27 June 1941).

137
KTB OKW, Volume II, pp. 1036–1037, Document 82 (27 July 1941); Mendelssohn,
Die Nürnberger Dokumente
, p. 386.

138
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, p. 199.

139
Von Kotze (ed.),
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943
, p. 107 (28 July 1941).

140
Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 185.

141
Ernst von Weizsäcker,
Erinnerungen. Mein Leben
, ed. Richard von Weizsäcker (Munich, 1950), pp. 315–316.

142
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 1040, Document 86 (28 July 1941); Mendelssohn,
Die Nürnberger Dokumente
, p. 387.

143
KTB OKW, Volume II, p. 1040, Document 86 (28 July 1941); Mendelssohn,
Die Nürnberger Dokumente
, p. 387.

144
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 129 (28 July 1941).

145
Halder's letter as cited by Heidemarie Gräfin Schall-Riaucour,
Aufstand und Gehorsam. Offizierstum und Generalstab im Umbruch. Leben und Wirken von Generaloberst Franz Halder Generalstabchef 1938–1942
(Wiesbaden, 1972), p. 167 (28/29 July 1941).

146
As cited in Meyer,
Heusinger
, p. 154.

147
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 43,
War Diary
, p. 263 (26 July 1941).

148
Kipp, ‘Overview Phase 1’, p. 371. See also Glantz,
Colossus Reborn
, p. 307.

149
Frisch with Jones, Jr.,
Condemned to Live
, p. 82.

150
As cited in Merridale,
Ivan's War
, pp. 110–111; Werth,
Russia at War 1941–1945
, p. 172. See also Chris Bellamy,
Absolute War. Soviet Russia in the Second World War
(New York, 2007), pp. 242–243.

151
Koch-Erpach, ‘Crossing of the Dnepr River’, p. 404.

152
Giorgio Geddes,
Nichivó. Life, Love and Death on the Russian Front
(London, 2001), p. 18.

153
Liddell Hart,
The Other Side of the Hill
, p. 330.

154
Although originally written in the early 1950s Raus's work was later republished; Erhard Rauss, ‘Russian Combat Methods in World War II’ in Peter G. Tsouras (ed.),
Fighting in Hell. The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front
(New York, 1998), pp. 35–36.

155
Ibid., pp. 40–41. See also Haape with Henshaw,
Moscow Tram Stop
, pp. 96–97.

156
The Red Army employed traditional cavalry throughout the war and even in September 1943 when the Soviet offensives began in earnest there were still eight Soviet cavalry corps, supported by light tanks (Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, p. 217).

157
Many standard works on Barbarossa and World War II recount the initial successes of the German Luftwaffe on the eastern front, but tend not to follow up on the development of the air war in which, as early as late July 1941, the Luftwaffe's increasingly limited resources could only dominate narrow sectors of the front.

158
This resulted in another round of arrests among the top echelon of the Soviet Air Force with many being severely beaten and imprisoned by the NKVD (Braithwaite,
Moscow 1941
, p. 134).

159
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, pp. 653–654.

160
Kesselring,
Memoirs
, p. 90; Plocher,
German Air Force Versus Russia, 1941
, p. 85.

161
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 32 (1 July 1941).

162
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 656.

163
Plocher,
German Air Force Versus Russia, 1941
, p. 44.

164
Murray,
The Luftwaffe 1933–45
, pp. 83–84.

165
Kesselring,
Memoirs
, p. 99.

166
Emelianenko,
Red Star Against the Swastika
, pp. 65 and 67. For more such accounts of successful Soviet actions in the summer of 1941 see Artem Drabkin (ed.),
The Red Air Force At War. Barbarossa & the Retreat to Moscow. Recollections of Fighter Pilots on the Eastern Front
(Barnsley, 2007), pp. 7 and 25–27.

167
Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 654. On the following day (13 July) Halder cited figures which indicated 33 per cent of the Stuka dive-bombers and 39 per cent of the Messerschmitt fighters had been lost. Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 75 (13 July 1941).

168
Von Hardesty,
Red Phoenix. The Rise of Soviet Air Power 1941–1945
(Washington DC, 1982), p. 59.

169
Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, p. 187.

170
Von Hardesty,
Red Phoenix
, p. 59.

171
Muller,
The German Air War in Russia
, p. 41; Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus
, p. 184; Boog, ‘Die Luftwaffe’, p. 299.

172
Richard Overy,
The Air War 1939–1945
(London, 1980), p. 49.

173
For more on the difficulties this was causing see von Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–45
, pp. 293–294.

174
4,408 fighters were produced for the RAF in last six months of 1941 (Overy,
The Air War 1939–1945
, p. 49).

175
Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, KTB, p. 309 (26 July 1941). See also Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 124 (26 July 1941).

176
Liddell Hart,
The Other Side of the Hill
, p. 266.

177
‘Kriegstagesbuch Ia. 14.Inf.Div. (mot) vom 25.5.41 – 1.10.41’ BA-MA RH 26–14/10, Fol. 83. See also Fols. 87–88 (25 July 1941).

178
As quoted in Steiger,
Armour Tactics
, p. 168.

179
KTB OKW, Volume II, pp. 1021–1022, Document 69 (8 July 1941) and Document 71 (14 July 1941); Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 73 (13 July 1941).

180
Kesselring,
Memoirs
, p. 89.

181
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 37,
War Diary
, p. 257 (20 July 1941).

182
Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier
, Band I, pp. 198–199, footnote 74.

183
Braithwaite,
Moscow 1941
, pp. 174 and 176.

184
The approaches to Moscow were defended by almost 800 medium anti-aircraft guns, over 600 large searchlights and nearly 600 fighters. Inside the city itself more anti-aircraft guns were positioned on the top of buildings, along with smaller searchlights and over 100 barrage balloons intended to make the Germans fly high and confuse their aim (ibid., pp. 169 and 186).

185
Kesselring,
Memoirs
, p. 94. See also Muller,
The German Air War in Russia
, pp. 51–54.

186
Overy,
The Air War 1939–1945
.

8 The attrition of Army Group Centre

The killing fields at Yel'nya

The arduous exertion of the long thrust into the Soviet Union, followed by the savage ongoing battles around Smolensk, Yel'nya and along the flanks of the army group, necessitated a period of rest and refitting for Guderian's and Hoth's armoured groups. On 23 July this was optimistically assessed to require only ten days in order for the panzer divisions to return to about 60–70 per cent of their former strength. Yet to reach this lofty goal it was acknowledged that ‘panzer replacements from Germany will arrive too late’ for the renewed offensive operations.
Halder's information indicated that the goal could not be achieved by merely repairing mechanical faults and battle damage to the existing pool of tanks in the panzer divisions. It was therefore suggested that one panzer division in each panzer group (Halder's notes recommended
17th and 20th Panzer Divisions) be broken up and used to reinforce the other divisions. Thus, in order to avoid ‘very quickly sinking to an unbearably small panzer strength’ in the armoured divisions, the rehabilitation process would have to include disbanding divisions, as well as undertaking a great many repairs to the existing quantity of tanks. Here the time factor also constituted a serious problem, not only in carrying out the repairs, but first receiving all the required spare parts, especially tank engines, via the dismal logistical system.
¹