Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (60 page)

Figure 7.3 
Combat readiness of Panzer Group 3 on 21 July 1941. ‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Anlagen zum Kriegstagesbuch “Berichte, Besprechungen, Beurteilungen der Lage” Bd.IV 22.7.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/47. Fol. 112 (23 July 1941).

Lacking adequate resources, elements of the panzer groups were resorting to extraordinary measures to meet the demands of their extended fronts. On 21 July
4th Panzer Division, having cut off ten to twelve thousand Soviet soldiers in a forest near
Cherikov, took around 2,000 prisoners in the fighting and then, lacking adequate air, artillery and panzer support, opted to allow the rest to return to Soviet lines rather than endure what was expected to be heavy material and personnel losses in continuing to oppose their breakout.
⁸⁴
It was a reflection of the tactical choices confronting commanders all along the line, as the changing relationship between individual strength and external pressure forced pragmatic responses to engagements. No longer did the panzer divisions reign supreme on the battlefield with superior firepower and mobility.
Clashes were increasingly being fought on far more equal terms, with the Red Army even able to dominate in some sectors. The inability of Army Group Centre to cut down the constant pressure from the east led to a form of strategic deadlock with forces pinned down all along the front
and incapable of supporting each other or being assembled in enough mass to close the troublesome opening in the pocket around
Smolensk. As Bock observed on 21 July: ‘Pilots report that strong enemy forces are marching out of the pocket to the east.’
⁸⁵

The continued presence of this hole and the inability of the panzer groups to close it forms the best example of the failing military solution to the developing strategic crisis engulfing Army Group Centre.
Unaccustomed to setbacks on the battlefield, and seemingly incapable of seeing the many integral failings that accompanied the whole concept of Operation Barbarossa, the frustrated generals of Army Group Centre sought answers by pointing the finger at each other.
Hoth clearly believed that responsibility for closing the gap lay with Guderian and bemoaned his decision to strike instead towards Yel'nya.
⁸⁶
Guderian, on the other hand, blamed Kluge for interfering in his panzer group and overriding his orders.
⁸⁷
Kluge in turn directed the same accusation against Bock – a charge that Bock strenuously rejected in a meeting with Brauchitsch on 21 July.
Bock then responded with a personal attack on Kluge's character.

I have scrupulously avoided any intermixing in Kluge's area of command, because of my awareness of his ego…I outlined in broad strokes Kluge's strange behaviour…I told Brauchitsch that it was very hard not to wound his vanity.
⁸⁸

The pettiness of such infighting must have seemed tiresome to
Brauchitsch who was worried about the overall situation and had not come to arbitrate the personal disputes of the men he trusted to conduct the operation. Yet being egotistical is not an uncommon trait among men who rise to command armies, with all the pitfalls this brings out when the fortunes of war sour.

As the ferocity of the fighting continued with unabated violence, appeals from units within the panzer groups to be pulled out of the line for a period of rest and refitting were gaining in frequency.
Panzer Group 3 noted the widespread feeling among the armoured troops that they were fighting the war almost alone, without the mass of the infantry, giving rise to the wish for a few days of quiet.
⁸⁹
Such calls were echoed in Panzer Group 2, but as
Lemelsen's XXXXVII Panzer Corps observed, gaining any kind of breathing space was ‘extremely problematic’ and could only be achieved when the infantry arrived in force to replace them on
the front (see
Map 9
).
⁹⁰
In the meantime, despite all their deficiencies, the panzer and motorised divisions remained bound to the front, enduring the daily grind of relentless battle and hardening the strategic stalemate gripping the whole army group. It is not surprising, therefore, that without the ability to concentrate and deal decisively with the enemy, the motorised and panzer units of Army Group Centre found themselves embroiled in an ever more costly struggle, eroding their strength in an inescapable war of attrition.

Map 9 
Dispositions of Army Group Centre 22 July 1941: David M. Glantz,
Atlas of the Battle of Smolensk 7 July–10 September 1941

On
23 July the major Soviet counter-strike planned by
Zhukov began, but from the beginning it was complicated by problems of poor co-ordination and delays in the deployment of formations. As a result, the offensive developed in a staggered fashion and was further complicated by shortages of tanks, aircraft and logistical support,
⁹¹
which quickly ruled out any prospect of a Soviet-style blitzkrieg. Instead, the offensive developed as a kind of crude blunt instrument hammering away at the German front, gaining little ground, but inflicting fearsome casualties on both sides. Although the Soviet offensive, which ebbed and flowed until early August, did not come close to achieving its stated objective of pushing Army Group Centre back and relieving the Soviet position around Smolensk, the cumulative effect of its bludgeoning attacks on Bock's panzer groups means that the Soviet offensive cannot be depicted as a comprehensive failure. The furious close quarters engagements and violent artillery bombardments exacted a cost which, in the long run, proved especially detrimental to the high-quality German formations.

Beyond
material and personnel losses, the Soviet offensive also frustrated renewed German attempts to close the pocket around Smolensk. By 23 July Bock's increasing exasperation at the inability of his two panzer groups to make any headway over such a relatively short distance was becoming more and more conspicuous. Both Hoth and Guderian were in the process of scraping together the necessary force to be used for the operation,
⁹²
but as
Timoshenko's offensive developed, every available unit was needed to hold the line and repulse the attacks. A thrust by
Hoth was the most favourable option to both Hitler and Bock, but the panzer group's war diary makes it clear that nothing in
Schmidt's XXXIX Panzer Corps, on the northern flank of the pocket, could be spared before infantry support arrived. The
7th Panzer Division, the
unit best placed strategically for an attack south, was caught in ‘intense defensive battles to the east and the west’ and could not risk thinning its lines further by thrusting south.
⁹³
The neighbouring
12th Panzer Division was likewise extremely hard pressed with the divisional diary noting that there was ‘not one man in reserve’ and that as a result ‘[we] must trust in the troops.’
⁹⁴
The 18th and
20th Motorised Infantry divisions as well as the 20th Panzer Division were all similarly engaged and in any case, the more distant elements lacked the necessary fuel supplies to make the journey.
⁹⁵

Attempting to close the pocket from the south,
Guderian sought to make a thrust north from the
Yel'nya salient using the 2nd SS Division known as
Das Reich
, but as Guderian discovered from a visit to the front on 23 July this was a hopeless venture and would require the additional commitment of the Infantry Regiment
Grossdeutschland
. Over the following days, however, Guderian later recalled: ‘the Russian attacks went on with undiminished violence…all attempts to advance towards
Dorogobuzh were a complete
failure’.
⁹⁶
Yet this passage from Guderian's memoir only tells part of the story. Much less than thrusting forward in attack,
Das Reich
was under enormous pressure just holding its position and suffering debilitating losses in the process (see
Map 10
). At midday on 24 July the war diary of
Panzer Group 2 described the situation as ‘extremely tense’, which then became ‘critical’ by the afternoon and eventually became a retreat.
⁹⁷
As one survivor,
Heid Ruehl, later recalled from the fierce battles in the northwest of the salient on 24 July:

The gunners, working like fury, finally beat off the first Russian tank attacks, but these were then renewed in greater strength and then our motorcycle battalion came under heavy pressure. We were smothered in a drum fire such as we had never before experienced…Because of the severe losses which it had sustained [the] motor-cycle battalion had to be taken out of the line and was replaced by an East Prussian engineer battalion. With the help of that formation we stemmed the Russian advance, albeit only temporarily, for soon ammunition for the guns began to run out and we were only allowed to fire against certain, specified targets.
⁹⁸

The severe shortages were common to Vietinghoff's entire corps and the possibility of solving these was, for the time being, noted to be ‘very unlikely’.
⁹⁹
When the relentless Soviet pressure forced
Das Reich
to pull back from its positions on the left flank of Yel'nya, Heid Ruehl's account continued:

The battery had been ordered to pull back from its position near Ushakova. We were not the only ones on the road. Motorcycles loaded with wounded and other comrades, either alone or in groups, were making their way out of the burning village, all of them completely exhausted, dusty and sweaty. The Russian advance had rolled over our thin infantry defensive lines and a lot of our lads did not get
out.
¹⁰⁰

Another veteran of
Das Reich
,
Helmut Günther, recalled after the first days of battle in Yel'nya: ‘Now it was clear to every one of us that this Russia would be a very hard nut to crack. If some of us had not already lost it, then here in the Yel'nya bend we lost the fragile innocence of
youth.’
¹⁰¹

Map 10 
Dispositions of Army Group Centre 24 July 1941: David M. Glantz,
Atlas of the Battle of Smolensk 7 July–10 September 1941

That
night, as Hitler was engaged in his habitual pastime of delivering long-winded monologues to his inner circle, the plight of the
SS division was by no means a cause for concern. On the contrary, Hitler explained: ‘For an elite force, like our SS, it's great luck to have suffered comparatively heavy losses. In this way, it's assured of the necessary prestige to intervene, if the need be, on the home front.’ He also praised the German army for being ‘technically the most perfect in the world’ and added that the German soldier ‘in a moment of crisis, is safer and sounder than any other soldier’. His glorification of the army, however, was not to be confused with his distaste for the generals, nor his growing distrust of them. ‘I’ve never doubted the qualities of the German soldier – which is more than I can say for some of the chiefs of the Wehrmacht.’
¹⁰²