Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (59 page)

In this regard it could then happen, that
Panzer Group 2 turns to the south, so that for the thrust on Moscow only infantry armies of Army Group Centre remain.

This eventuality does not worry the Führer because Moscow is for him only a geographical term.
⁵⁶

Clearly something had taken place to weaken Hitler's recent commitment to Directive 33 and this may well have prompted his decision to visit Army Group North and gain a first-hand account of its progress. With perhaps a similar motive Halder had flown to
Army Group South the day before (20 July), to see what could be done to improve the slow progress being made and conceivably work on deflecting Hitler from diverting Guderian south.

In any case, Halder's diary for 21 July talked of continuing the advance on Moscow with just Hoth's panzer group, a circumstance he was probably only willing to consider because his upbeat assessment of the war deemed it sufficient for the task. Outlining the future operation to
Brauchitsch and
Heusinger, Halder stated that Moscow would be ‘liquidated’ by a combined attack of
Weichs and
Strauss, with Hoth driving in the centre or on the left flank.
⁵⁷
Although
Halder does not record Brauchitsch's response to this revised plan, Brauchitsch's increasingly diminished enthusiasm for the prospects of a German success probably led him to a much starker criticism of the new directive and the implications it held for his much hoped for assault on
Moscow. Accordingly, on the following day Brauchitsch visited Hitler, most likely with a view to airing his grievances about the new war directive, but in the process he
was subjected to one of Hitler's ranting diatribes proclaiming his great dissatisfaction with
Leeb's command.
⁵⁸
Unexpectedly, as a result of this meeting, Hitler felt it necessary to issue a supplement to his previous war directive entitled War
Directive 33a. The supplement began with the preface: ‘After a report by Commander-in-Chief Army [Brauchitsch], the Führer on 22 July issued the following orders to amplify and extend Directive 33.’
⁵⁹
As details of the meeting are vague, one can only suppose what exactly might have taken place to warrant this action, but given the stern tone of the supplement, which essentially only reinforced the strategic intentions outlined in
Directive 33, it is reasonable to assume that Hitler was reacting somewhat angrily to complaints raised by Brauchitsch, and to what he saw as the ineptitude of Leeb.

If a despondent Brauchitsch had elaborated on the difficulties of Halder's scheme to attack Moscow with only Hoth's panzer group, Hitler may well have felt a sudden sense of betrayal, for he had certainly not agreed to any such operation and, for the first time in the unfolding dispute over Moscow, Hitler may have sensed he had been manipulated by Halder. Although only a theory, it remains a plausible explanation, together with Leeb's faltering advance, to answer the otherwise speculative question of why the OKW issued a second war directive which only reiterated what had been previously stated and added minor details. Furthermore, it explains the renewed purpose of mind and tart disregard for his generals that Hitler now displayed in committing Hoth's panzer group to the north. As for Halder, Hitler had never shared a great fondness for the Chief of the General Staff whom he regarded, at best, as competent in his role as a military bureaucrat and, at worst, as an insubordinate officer and a decidedly inept strategist. Yet Hitler, who often expressed an ingrained suspicion of his generals, now became even more distrustful, relying more and more on his own judgement against the mounting chorus of objections that would arise from his military
commanders.

When Brauchitsch received the new Directive 33a he was no doubt deeply disappointed. His concern over the weakness of Army Group Centre's drive on Moscow was given no further consideration, while Halder's intention to use Hoth's panzer group to attack Moscow was now specifically ruled out as the group was being reassigned to Army Group North for the investment of Leningrad, and later to be used in ‘thrusting forward to the Volga’. With Guderian's forces still being sent south, there were to be no panzers sent to Moscow, only the infantry. Yet Hitler was adamant that these were enough and the text of the new directive was
emphatic. ‘After mopping-up operations around Smolensk and on the southern flank, Army Group Centre, whose infantry formations drawn from both its armies are strong enough for the purpose, will defeat such enemy forces as remain between Smolensk and Moscow, by an advance on the left flank if possible. It will then capture Moscow.’
⁶⁰

The new directive was signed by
Keitel, although it reflected Hitler's reasoning, and it was therefore to Keitel that Brauchitsch directed a second appeal on 23 July. Brauchitsch complained that, given the situation at the front, the operational intentions of the new directive, especially those for Army Group Centre, were ‘not possible’. He therefore unsuccessfully requested that Keitel
postpone 33a until the current battles had produced a clearer outcome. Brauchitsch should probably have known better than to place much hope in Keitel, who was well known (and soon reviled) as Hitler's dependable mouthpiece and habitual yes-man. Brauchitsch then sought another audience with Hitler in which the Commander-in-Chief of the Army again tried to explain the difficulties of the army. Hitler, however, refused to be drawn on such matters and instead replied with a lecture on the advantages of smaller
encirclements.
⁶¹

Like Brauchitsch,
Halder too appeared at the
Wolf's Lair on 23 July and for the first time gave a presentation openly recommending Moscow as the best choice for attack. Halder reported that the infantry divisions were at only 80 per cent of their full strength with some having to be left behind because losses of horses were so high. In addition, the diversion of some infantry divisions to support Guderian's southern operation, and the loss of Hoth's panzer group to the north, rendered the remaining strength on Bock's front ‘insufficient’ for an offensive towards Moscow. He then pleaded for Hoth's panzer group, stating that while it was ‘urgently needed by Army Group Centre’, the thrust north would ‘probably find no worthwhile objective’.
⁶²
Moscow, on the other hand, Halder endeavoured to show, was of great importance. It was now protected by the greatest concentration of Soviet forces, it possessed the best infrastructure, was a major industrial area and the centre of military power.
⁶³
That Halder was purposefully trying to sway Hitler by indulging his delusional fantasies of grandeur is most evident from his conclusion. Here Halder deceptively pronounced that German troops would be at
Leningrad, Moscow and the line Orel–Crimea in about a month, with the Volga reached by the start of October and
Baku by the start of November. Later that day, when Hitler restated these same goals, Halder took a disdainfully cynical tone and mocked him in his diary. ‘Apparently he believes that the motorised units alone can make it to the
Volga and into the Caucasus as we head into the wet autumn.’
⁶⁴
By promising Hitler everything he could want, Halder hoped he would change his mind, but unlike the early days of the conflict when it appeared an outright victory had been won, Hitler was no longer so easily seduced by Halder's assurances, especially when they ran contrary to his own ideas. Indeed when Hitler spoke at the conclusion of Halder's presentation, the break with the OKH was clearer than ever.

In spite of everything that Halder and Brauchitsch had had to say, Hitler was resolute and remained firmly behind the position of his new war directive. Bock, Hitler made clear, would be sent to attack Moscow with just infantry divisions, while the armour was to be diverted to the flanks. Halder noted that the Soviet capital held ‘no interest at all’ for Hitler, but
Leningrad became the subject of a verbose monologue, which took in the mistakes made by Leeb and why Hoth must be directed north. Ultimately, Hitler declared, the objective of the operation was the elimination of the enemy, to which an affronted and sceptical Halder added: ‘One can only hope that he is right. As for the rest: Shame about the time lost for such a
presentation.’
⁶⁵

On 23 July the plans of
Halder and
Brauchitsch seemingly lay in ruin. Ideally Hitler was to have been subtly coerced, abiding in the wisdom of his generals and trusting that each new success was proof of the OKH's war-winning strategy. Yet, the evident failure to maintain a joint offensive with all three army groups forced choices about which axis of advance promised the best avenue for success. Suddenly the direct confrontation that Halder and Brauchitsch had hoped to avoid was thrust upon them. To their minds, Hitler was forgoing the great success in the centre and pushing everything towards the flanks before Bock had been able to achieve full operational freedom. Hitler's fixation with Leningrad, as a secondary target, endangered the whole campaign by failing to strike the decisive blow at Moscow where real Soviet power resided. Thus, on 23 July there could be no more pretence or outward posturing: to forestall Hitler's fatal step the OKH would have to declare themselves and openly show their hand, pleading the case for a continued offensive towards
Moscow and hoping it was enough to convince Hitler. Their failure on 23 July was not the end of the dispute, but only the opening salvo in the now openly declared conflict which was to become a crisis of command that paralleled the rising crisis on the battlefield. As Halder wrote after the war, the OKH's open opposition to Hitler's plan was abhorred by the Führer and ‘[t]he effect was
explosive’.
⁶⁶

As the
Stavka
began moving up the new reserve armies to strengthen Timoshenko's fragile front,
Army Group Centre's front was in scarcely better condition. Without infantry support and at the end of long supply lines, the state of the fatigued motorised divisions became more and more desperate.
In Panzer Group 2 the fact that large segments of the infantry were being diverted to the southern flank engendered ‘very bitter’ resentment among the troops, who felt they were being abandoned after shouldering the heaviest fighting for 30 straight days.
⁶⁷
The mental strain on the men was not just the result of physical exhaustion; there were also the psychological effects of growing gaps in the ranks, declining tank support and the increasing worry about shortages of munitions desperately needed to parry the relentless Soviet counter-attacks. This often resulted in the drastic measure of allowing only sighted firing, which under the harrowing onslaught of repeated enemy attacks only frayed nerves more rapidly. Casualties in the two panzer groups were also starting to make themselves felt.
After less than one month on the eastern front Guderian's group alone had suffered 830 casualties among its officers,
⁶⁸
while Hoth's group reported 562 officers lost.
⁶⁹
The figures were so high that Halder noted how some units had already lost half of their officers.
⁷⁰
Other ranks were also heavily affected with Guderian's group citing 15,228 men killed, wounded and missing,
⁷¹
while Hoth's group gave the lower figure of 10,509.
⁷²

Operating
in the depths of the Soviet hinterland, the size of the operational theatre also assumed daunting proportions which exacerbated the internal weaknesses of the combat units. Appealing for more infantry support, the war diary for Guderian's panzer group included this excerpt from its request to 4th Panzer Army on 22 July:

The fighting of the panzer group reaches to a depth of several hundred kilometres and along an exceptional width…The security of the deep flanks, not just the outer flanks of the panzer group, but also the inner flanks of the widely dispersed and engaged panzer corps, is very difficult and absorbs much strength, which results in the loss of the spearhead. Motorised troops cannot be used for this security activity if the panzer corps is to be used as a powerful attacking force. For the security of the flanks, the supply routes and the airfields requires the commitment of the infantry.
⁷³

The
consequence of the German strategic position was not just the distant horizontal dispersal of forces along the line, but also the vertical problem of keeping adequate supplies moving east to support them. This had been a considerable problem even with the frail rail network prioritising the panzer groups and the bulk of the motorisation servicing their
Grosstransportraum
. Yet every day the hundreds of thousands of men in the
9th and
2nd Armies were marching further east, straining the woeful logistical network ever more. On 21 July the
LIII Army Corps was stuck in bloody positional warfare in front of the Dnepr at Rogatschew and reported: ‘The munition consignment for the division is for a war of rapid movement. The necessary quantities for positional warfare (heavy shelling) are not available.’
⁷⁴
At the forefront of the German penetration eastward, the quartermaster-general's war diary of Guderian's panzer group pronounced the munitions situation on 22 July ‘critical’, especially in Schweppenburg's
XXIV Panzer Corps.
⁷⁵
Two days later the supply of Vietinghoff's
XXXXVI Panzer Corps was also being singled out as ‘critical’, while
Lemelsen's XXXXVII Panzer Corps was judged ‘tight’.
⁷⁶
What this meant to the fighting units is most apparent from
Vietinghoff's arduous struggle at
Yel'nya. Guderian noted how ammunition for the
10th Panzer Division had to be fetched by road from supply depots a staggering 440 kilometres to the rear.
⁷⁷
The divisional war diary
noted on 21 July that ‘in spite of all efforts by the corps in the coming days there will be no oil for the panzers. The munitions situation is also strained…in particular artillery shells must be used
sparingly.’ By the evening the division reported to the corps that the
7th Panzer Regiment (the tank arm of the division) would only be operational again when oil and a number of new motors were delivered. Until then the report stated: ‘In view of the constant Russian counterattacks a few panzers have been made provisionally operational.’
⁷⁸
The fact that one month into Operation Barbarossa a panzer division was struggling to make even a handful of its tanks operational, and even then with only extremely limited fuel and ammunition, says much about the state of equipment and the supply system. Nor was this the exception. On 22 July the
18th Panzer Division was reinforced by 30 new Panzer Mark IIIs and IVs, which still only brought the division up to 20 per cent of its full operational strength
⁷⁹
and, as the heavy fighting continued, by 24 July the divisional strength had again shrunk to just 12 operational tanks.
⁸⁰
Figures are not always readily obtainable for all the panzer divisions, but from those available the overall picture is a consistently bleak one. Among the strongest in Guderian's panzer group were the
17th and
4th Panzer Divisions which on 22 July were operating at 40 and 35 per cent strength respectively.
⁸¹
In Hoth's panzer group the situation on 21 July was marginally better, but still only amounted to an average strength of around 42 per cent for each of his four panzer divisions. In addition, the number of destroyed or totally lost panzers (i.e. those tanks which could not be repaired and returned to active service) had risen to 27 per cent (see
Figure 7.3
).
⁸²
These figures from Panzer Group 3's war diary and Panzer Group 2's divisional and corps diaries seem to refute Halder's oft cited figure from 23 July in which he reported a 50 per cent average strength among the panzer divisions, although he himself added the note, ‘here and there apparently
less’.
⁸³