Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (91 page)

As
soon as Halder had read the new dictate from Hitler he knew all his plans and hopes had come to nothing. Hitler's order was a devastating blow and left Halder uncertain of how exactly the war was to be won. Writing in his diary Halder ominously pronounced: ‘It is decisive for the outcome of the campaign.’
¹²
Hitler's directive began:

The proposal by the army for the continuation of the operations in the east, dated 18.8, do not meet with my approval. I order the following:

The principal objective that must be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but rather in the south the occupation of the Crimea and the industrial and coal region of the Donets, together with the isolation of the Russian oil regions in the Caucasus. In the north, the encirclement of Leningrad and the union with the Finns.
¹³

Army Group Centre was now to co-operate with Army Group South in order to enact an encirclement of the Soviet
5th Army in the region east of Kiev. With the Dneper crossed and the Soviet southern front in ruins, Army Group South would then be free to advance eastwards and seize the industrial centres of
Rostov and
Kharkhov. Hitler also placed great importance on the capture of the Crimea insisting it was ‘of paramount importance for safeguarding our oil supply from
Romania’.
¹⁴

As the OKH reeled from the totality of its rebuff, there was still worse to come when on the following day (22 August) a second memorandum arrived personally dictated by Hitler. It was a so-called ‘study’ of the general situation and purported to lecture the generals at OKH on the importance of strategic goals and operational methods. It also included a scathing attack on the leadership of the army, citing poor management and a failure to provide adequate direction which, by contrast, was being superbly exhibited by
Göring in command of the Luftwaffe. The study began with Hitler's long-espoused argument that eliminating the Soviet Union would deny Britain its last remaining continental ally, and thereby eradicate all hope of altering the course of events in Europe. To do this Hitler stated that two objectives had to be achieved. First, the resistance of the Red Army had to be broken and, second, the industrial base of the Soviet Union had to be either occupied or destroyed to prevent any reorganisation of Soviet forces. Having emphasised the strategic goals of the campaign, Hitler turned his attention to operational aspects and returned in veiled fashion to his earlier preoccupation with smaller encirclements. Hitler wanted the infantry to participate more directly in the battles of encirclement in order to prevent the escape of Soviet forces from the pockets. Following the OKH's plan and continuing operations into the distant east, in Hitler's opinion, failed to acknowledge what had been learned from past battles and also ignored the favourable strategic opportunity to hit the Soviet flanks in the north and especially in the south. Hitler also criticised the OKH for failing to grasp the concept of concentration and splitting up the valuable motorised divisions and Luftwaffe units among the various armies and army corps along the front. Failure to recognise that successful mobile warfare depended on unifying these forces under a single high command was only fully understood by Göring and, accordingly, he came in for much praise at the expense of the army.

In spite of his determination to divert Bock's remaining strength to the flanks, Hitler was not opposed to the idea of an operation towards Moscow, but this would have to wait until after Leningrad and the
Ukraine were within Germany's reach. The argument that a delay in the drive on Moscow would not leave enough time or find the motorised and panzer divisions primed for such a plan, was also countered by Hitler. The elimination of the threat to Bock's southern flank would compensate for any other loss of strength and in fact make the later offensive, in Hitler's words, ‘not more difficult, but considerably
easier’.
¹⁵

At the OKH Halder was beside himself with fury. After the crushing setback of Hitler's first directive, the arrival of Hitler's ‘study’ effectively blaming the OKH for all the army's woes, was simply too much. Writing in the privacy of his diary Halder openly criticised Hitler. ‘I regard the situation created by the Führer's interference unendurable for the OKH. No other but the Führer himself is to blame for the zigzag course caused by his successive orders.’ Furthermore, Halder protested that the ‘study’ was ‘filled with contradictory statements’ and inexcusably placed Göring well above
Brauchitsch. Halder also recorded that Brauchitsch was accused of being swayed by the special interests of the individual army groups.
¹⁶
Although Halder singles out Brauchitsch as the subject of Hitler's criticism, the document is not so specific and should rather be taken to include the whole OKH, especially Halder given his central position in the organisation. Still, Halder preferred to single out Brauchitsch.

The afternoon and evening Halder spent in consultation with Brauchitsch and
Heusinger. There was some discussion about how Hitler's new orders could to be put into effect, but the mood was dominated by abject despair and loss of hope. Halder was insistent that after four victorious campaigns the OKH had had its ‘good name tarnished’. He also considered the way Brauchitsch (and thereby the OKH) was treated to be ‘outrageous’. The embittered discussion finally reached a point where Halder proposed to Brauchitsch that they both resign their posts in protest over Hitler's new orders and his treatment of the army. Brauchitsch, however, refused on the grounds that such a move ‘would not result in them quitting their posts [because he felt Hitler would not accept such a move] and so nothing would be changed’.
¹⁷
Halder then also opted not to resign, but he was still not quite prepared to admit defeat over the question of Moscow.

Halder and Heusinger attempted to persuade Brauchitsch to confront Hitler over the matter and to push again for the Moscow alternative, but Brauchitsch took Hitler's rebuke as a stern warning and refused any further opposition to his plans. A split now developed within the OKH
with Brauchitsch resisting all attempts to prompt him into action. Under pressure from Halder and Heusinger, the Field Marshal declared, ‘what is the purpose of presenting everything to the Führer
again?’ Whereupon a frustrated Heusinger retorted: ‘God, should we lead our whole life as if everything we do has to have a
purpose?’
¹⁸
Halder was also bitterly disappointed with what seemed to be Brauchitsch's betrayal. Writing to his wife Halder confided: ‘Alone I can not stand against a world of cowardice that shares my opinion, but will not fight for it.’
¹⁹
Desperate for more support, Halder decided to visit Bock on the following day to discuss the situation
further.

At
Bock's headquarters news of Hitler's memorandum arrived on 22 August, just as orders were about to be sent out to the entire army group detailing plans for a major offensive to the east. Bock was stupefied by the news. ‘I want to smash the enemy army’, he wrote in his diary, ‘and the bulk of this army is opposite my front!’ He termed the turn south a ‘secondary operation’ and claimed it would jeopardise the main goal which he defined as: ‘the destruction of the Russian armed forces before winter’. When Bock had the chance to confer with
Guderian he asked him which units could be released for the turn south. According to Bock, Guderian ‘flatly rejected the operation’ citing the utter fatigue of
XXIV Panzer Corps, the inability to spare forces for a secondary operation, and the impassability of the Maglin–Unecha–Starodub road.
²⁰
Guderian himself claims to have protested the move as ‘criminal folly’.
²¹
It was not only Guderian's offensive strength that was placed in doubt for the new operation; the defence of the army group's long front was also determined to be ‘over time unbearable’ and therefore ‘the attack eastwards must proceed’. With this, although the army group reluctantly began planning to implement Hitler's new directive, there was also no abandonment of planning for an attack to the east.
²²
Halder had already told Bock he wanted to visit him on the following day (23 August), and Bock hoped something could still be done to bring about a change of plans. Bock also spoke on the telephone with
Brauchitsch and, after outlining which forces could be dispatched south in accordance with Hitler's orders, he ominously added that no other major offensive could
be considered ‘
for this year
’.
²³
Brauchitsch then asked: ‘If the designated strength is deployed to the south, then you will not have any motorised units behind your front. Can the front then hold another 8 days?’ To which Bock answered:

8 days yes, if the motorised divisions that must be refitted, can be made ready behind the front. This concerns the SS
Das Reich
, the 14th Motorised Infantry Division and the 7th Panzer Division. To this must be added the badly battle-worn
161st Infantry Division. The whole thing is naturally only an
emergency solution
. 8–10 days can be somehow managed, but not longer, especially if the enemy continues with strong attacks.
²⁴

Brauchitsch was clearly shaken by this and replied that either the attack eastward had to proceed or Army Group Centre would have to be withdrawn to a more defensible
line.
²⁵

On
23 August Halder flew to Bock's headquarters at
Borisov, ostensibly to see what could be done to hasten the attack set out by Hitler's memorandum.
²⁶
This did indeed take up a good deal of discussion, but they also hatched a final plot for one last desperate effort to bring Hitler around to the views of the army. When Halder arrived in the afternoon a meeting was convened to discuss possibilities. In attendance were Bock,
Heusinger, Halder, Lieutenant-Colonel Chrift, two junior officers and, summoned specially for the meeting,
Guderian. Halder began with an overview of Hitler's orders, whereupon discussion followed of their implementation. Bock and Guderian were steadfastly critical, Guderian almost to the point of dismissing Hitler's orders as impossible. The panzer general stated that his divisions, after nine weeks of uninterrupted fighting, required a respite before undertaking any big operation. Guderian then stated that, in the best case scenario, only four divisions could be made available for the operation and that, because of the long lengths of atrocious roads, the ability of the divisions to reach
Starodub (Guderian's southernmost position) in good time and with sufficient strength was ‘
completely impossible
’. Guderian even went so far as to add ‘that under the best conditions 30 per cent of the fighting strength would reach Starodub’.
²⁷
A second suggestion to conduct a sweeping movement through
Briansk and then strike deep into the Ukraine was also condemned as requiring too much strength. Finally, it was decided
to move the mobile divisions behind the front all the way to
Gomel, a distance of 200
kilometres.
²⁸

Although the new southern operation was being taken seriously by the army and planning was in full swing, there were still deep reservations about where this was leading the whole campaign. Time remained for just one more major offensive, and none were optimistic that Hitler's drive to seize the
Ukraine and isolate
Leningrad would be sufficient to force an end to the war. Bock also expressed concern that the morale of the troops should not be forgotten; according to him, they asked only one question: ‘When will we march to Moscow? We don't want to get stuck here in
winter.’
²⁹
As things now stood, there could be only one answer to this question. The whole war in the east was being improvised on an almost daily basis, which was the consequence of a fragmented command and competing strategic conceptions. The generals themselves did not know if or when Moscow would be attacked, just as they did not know whether Hitler's thrust south could be carried out with the available strength, and what risk this would entail for the security of Bock's weakened army group. One thing, however, was certain, although scarcely understood at the time; the fears the men held of spending the winter deep in the Soviet Union were now assured. The army simply did not have the resources to avoid it and the grinding daily attrition slowly but steadily made this eventuality ever clearer. For the time being, the mass of German troops still believed in the ultimate victory of their Wehrmacht, although none were of any doubt that the Red Army demonstrated an incredible resilience, and that the war still had much hard fighting left in it. Yet the men of Army Group Centre recognised that Moscow was their objective and its capture, it was widely assumed, would bring about an end to the fighting. Many soldiers reasoned that, with two-thirds of the distance covered from the German border to the Soviet capital, only one-third of the war remained. As Heinrich
Haape wrote:

Our marching column…wanted to get to Moscow. It was their only objective. They had been told it would be taken soon and to each man it meant the end of the march, rest, an organised life again, excitement, civilisation, women, relaxation of discipline perhaps…We measured it out on the map – one hundred and eighty
miles [290 kilometres] across country to Moscow! We had marched six hundred miles [965 kilometres] from East Prussia…we could do it in a fortnight at the most, even with resistance stiffening as we approached the
capital.
³⁰