Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (92 page)

Signs were commonly hung by the men reading ‘TO MOSCOW’
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and hope was sustained by the idea that heavy losses were local rather than general. Thus, when orders finally arrived directing forces to the north and south, there was a sudden feeling of bewilderment and confusion, with some men even sensing that the campaign was now in trouble. An artilleryman, Werner
Adamczyk, wrote:

I had a chance to look at a map of Russia. It showed the distance between Smolensk and Leningrad to be about 600km. On the other hand, the distance from where we were to Moscow was less than 400km…Definitely the Russians confronting us on our way to Moscow had been beaten. And now, it seemed we were to turn away from our greatest chance to get to Moscow and bring the war to an end. My instinct told me that something was very wrong.
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Erich
Mende noted how his troops were ‘agitated’ and couldn't understand why there was not an immediate offensive towards Moscow.

Moscow was only 280 kilometres away. The troops hoped that we would be in the Soviet capital in August or latest September and then the resistance of the Red Army would probably be broken. We were very angry that the panzer divisions were pulled out and sent to the Ukraine to fight at Kiev. We saw this as a completely wrong strategy.
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Alexander
Stahlberg recalled his ‘shock’ when the order was given to discontinue the advance to Moscow and assume defensive positions. ‘What strategy was intended?’ he asked himself. ‘The word had gone around at once that it had come from the highest level, from Hitler himself. After a few days the riddle was solved…Moscow was no longer the objective, Leningrad was to be taken first.’
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As confusion over strategy pervaded the ranks of the German army, for many at the front thoughts were quickly overtaken by day-to-day hardships and the suffering caused by harsh fighting. One man summed it up in a letter to his mother on 28 August: ‘I passionately wanted to be part of the attack on Moscow, but now would be more pleased if I could get out of this hellish situation.’
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With preliminary planning for Hitler's directive underway at Army Group Centre, discussion switched to what was most likely
Halder's real
interest in visiting Bock's command – securing a way to subvert Hitler's order.
Guderian noted that Halder seemed ‘deeply upset’ and in the lengthy discussion that followed a new scheme emerged to challenge Hitler's ‘unalterable will’.
³⁶
Almost a month before, Halder had spoken to the Chiefs of Staff of the three army groups and emphasised the importance Hitler attached to the views of battlefield commanders. At this time Halder was already considering the value of pressing the OKH's point of view using such ‘courier generals’, which as Halder accurately assessed, were ‘more trusted than us!’
³⁷
Halder had just witnessed first-hand Guderian's rigid forcefulness for which he was well known throughout the army. Halder was undoubtedly also impressed by the dire terms in which Guderian set out his current predicament and the manifest difficulties of fulfilling Hitler's
orders. Furthermore, Guderian's status as an ‘heroic’ panzer general was firmly established, and he was one of the most celebrated military idols in Goebbels's propaganda machine which constantly lauded his victories and heaped praise on his leadership. It also happened that Guderian's panzer army was at the centre of the strategic dispute over where the bulk of Bock's armour should strike. Thus, it did not take long for a new plan to form – a last-ditch throw of the dice to gain what until now had eluded the army.
Bock telephoned Hitler's headquarters and asked
Schmundt to secure a meeting with Hitler that same evening for Guderian. Bock carefully explained the reason as giving Hitler an opportunity, ‘to form a picture of the situation for himself ’.
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According to one eyewitness, Colonel Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von
Gersdorff, when Guderian took his leave of Bock he did so with the words: ‘Only over my dead body will it come to another solution [other than Moscow]’.
³⁹
Guderian then accompanied Halder for the flight back to Lötzen airfield in East Prussia, near to Hitler's Wolf's Lair headquarters.

When Guderian arrived he reported first to
Brauchitsch, who categorically forbade him from raising the question of Moscow in Hitler's presence. ‘The operation to the south has been ordered,’ Brauchitsch insisted. ‘The problem now is how it is to be carried out. Discussion is pointless.’
⁴⁰
Brauchitsch had never been a particularly strong character in his time as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his resolve to push so vigorously for Moscow resulted partly from his own inner convictions, but mainly from two external factors. One was the dominance of Halder and his followers in the OKH which bolstered Brauchitsch's nerve and instilled
in him an artificial robustness. The other, however, was the absence of staunch opposition. Since the end of July when the strategic issue became a crisis of two opposing and equally inflexible factions within the German command, Hitler did not end the dispute there and then with his customary intolerance for dissent. Rather, he himself was seized by indecision, which enabled Brauchitsch to go on actively supporting the Moscow alternative, although even in this period the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at times experienced grave doubts and even spells of utter despair. Once Hitler had recovered his nerve and sought to impose his will with ardent determination, Brauchitsch predictably buckled, exposing the frail man that hid behind a facade of high rank and position. Now, as Guderian threatened to pursue the matter of Moscow further, Brauchitsch, who had already accepted defeat on the matter and was in damage control over the army's confrontation with Hitler, sought to prevent upsetting the Führer any further. Upon receiving such a stern command, Guderian claims that he threatened to turn around and fly straight back to his panzer army, as his meeting with Hitler would now be a waste of time. Yet that too was unacceptable to Brauchitsch and he ordered Guderian to make his report as expected, ‘but without mentioning
Moscow!’
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Guderian was shown in to see
Hitler who was surrounded by the usual cast of OKW officers including
Keitel,
Jodl and
Schmundt. Guderian began to outline the state of his forces and claims to have initially adhered to Brauchitsch's instructions by not raising the issue of Moscow. Finally, Hitler asked: ‘In view of their past performance, do you consider that your troops are capable of making another great effort?’ To which Guderian responded: ‘If the troops are given a major objective, the importance of which is apparent to every soldier, yes.’ Hitler was under no illusions about what was meant by this and raised the topic himself. ‘You mean, of course, Moscow’, he rejoined. Guderian then seized his chance and began: ‘Yes. Since you have broached the subject, let me give you the reasons for my opinions.’
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Guderian then entered into a long exposition of all the evidence that counted in favour of an attack towards Moscow, recounting the many familiar arguments Hitler had no doubt heard in varying forms before
. Probably in deference to his high standing, Guderian was not interrupted once and allowed to speak his mind freely to the end. Only then did Hitler begin to speak and it was soon apparent that he remained wholly unconvinced. Keeping his composure, Hitler set about expounding the opposing arguments for a strike into the Ukraine. His focus was unmistakably fixed on economic objectives, claiming they were vitally necessary for the future prosecution of the war. This was
backed by Hitler's insistence that: ‘My generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war.’

Guderian's account leaves no doubt about Hitler's resolve and it was clear that the ‘strict orders’ for the attack to the south would proceed and that ‘all actions were to be carried out with that in mind’.
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Guderian also observed how all those present nodded in agreement with everything that Hitler said, revealing the presiding dominance of the Führer myth, which quickly captivated Guderian as well. His memoir explains his sudden compliance by the hopelessness of his position in changing a decision that had clearly already been taken.
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As he explained: ‘I did not think it right to make an angry scene with the head of the German state when he was surrounded by his advisers.’ Yet Guderian also sought to blame Halder and Brauchitsch, stating he was ‘extremely sorry’ that neither of them accompanied him to the meeting, ‘on the outcome of which, according to them, so very much depended, perhaps even the result of the war as a whole’.
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If this was true, and the fate of the whole war potentially rested on his success, it seems a distinctly half-hearted effort on his part to convince Hitler, especially when he had previously felt no aversion to bitterly contesting the orders of superiors over decidedly lesser matters. According to his leading biographer, he was also being unofficially discussed as an eventual replacement for Brauchitsch and it was clear, from his private correspondence, that Guderian was well aware he was under consideration for the post.
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Thus, his placid behaviour and accommodating attitude towards Hitler appear suddenly less mysterious for a man who was usually extremely reluctant to compromise, and exceedingly ambitious. Additionally, Guderian's explanation that he could not challenge Hitler in front of his entourage is difficult to accept when, in his later career as Chief of the Army General Staff, there were numerous occasions where he clashed openly with Hitler in fiery displays of temper. Guderian was not the dutiful soldier compelled to humbly follow orders as he suggests. There is enough evidence to show that he was, in fact, far closer to the regime, its policies and its leader than the
general himself was prepared to admit.
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Furthermore, in criticising the absence of Halder and Brauchitsch, what Guderian did not acknowledge (or mistakenly undervalued) in his post-war account was the degree of antipathy that now existed between Hitler and the OKH. Halder was all too aware that his presence would not have advanced his cause, or stayed Hitler's temper on the issue. The difference now in this eleventh-hour attempt to change Hitler's mind was not so much the nature of the message, as the status of the man who was arguing for it. While Guderian counted greatly in that regard, Halder and Brauchitsch were clearly liabilities. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Guderian's mission was doomed from the very beginning, both because Hitler's mind was not to be changed on the issue and because he was far too malleable to deal with
Hitler.

In adopting the southern operation, Guderian was not so much reluctantly abiding by Hitler's orders, as actively converted to carrying out Hitler's will.
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He was simply overawed in Hitler's company and the result finally spelled defeat for Halder's cherished plans. On the following day (24 August), when Guderian told
Halder of his failure to convince Hitler and that the southern operation would have to be adopted, Halder, according to Guderian, ‘suffered a complete nervous collapse’. Halder unloaded all his pent-up frustrations onto Guderian in a tirade of resentful accusations. Guderian explained Halder's outburst as an unreasonable over-reaction, resulting from over-strained nerves, to news which he should have known to expect.
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Halder, on the other hand, could not understand how Guderian could have presented such a blatantly critical critique of Hitler's plan and now freely propose to carry it out with the same forces that only yesterday were regarded as incapable of doing so. Guderian defended his behaviour by saying that his previous comments were given to provide the OKH with arguments against Hitler's proposal, but he also alluded to the difficulties the coming operation would entail by claiming that he was now duty bound to ‘make the
impossible possible’. Halder was disgusted by such a flagrant twisting of the facts to suit Guderian's own standpoint. Brauchitsch insisted that he would issue strict new orders on the drafting of reports. Halder, however, was dismissive of such an action, declaring: ‘You can not change character through orders.’
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The confrontation between Halder and Guderian ended on hostile terms and without any form of agreement; indeed Guderian later claimed that Halder actively sought to hinder his operations by denying him adequate strength.
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The recriminations were also felt at Army Group Centre, whom Halder contacted immediately to report news of Guderian's duplicity and
betrayal.
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When Bock heard the news, his bitter disappointment at the loss of the Moscow operation was mixed with resentment and confusion for Guderian's apparently inexplicable role in the final act of the long-drawn-out command
crisis.
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Operations now shifted to the south and north, and with them a degree of strategic clarity emerged which had been absent for many weeks. Still, the gruelling effects of the long period of indecision and internal wrangling left their mark on the higher command with frayed nerves and bitter personal animosity reflective of an army that had suffered a major reversal. The daily business of directing the war went on, of course, but it was no longer a blitzkrieg campaign; now it was a war of endurance – and in such a war the Soviet Union, backed by its allies in the west, was already in the favoured position. No one could yet predict the collapse of the Third Reich, nor a Soviet occupation of
Berlin, but by forfeiting its only possibility of eliminating the Soviet Union, Germany was destined for a long war, against an emerging superpower, which it could not hope to overcome. Operation Barbarossa's failure was more than just a lost campaign; the scale and importance of the eastern theatre ensured that the summer of 1941 was the turning point of World War II.