Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (96 page)

1
Chor'kov, ‘The Red Army’, p. 429.

2
Kipp, ‘Barbarossa and the Crisis’, pp. 117 and 150.

3
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad
, p. 178; Bullock,
Hitler and Stalin
, pp. 790–791.

4
Bernd Bonwetsch, ‘Stalin, the Red Army, and the “Great Patriotic War”’ in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds.),
Stalinism and Nazism. Dictatorships in Comparison
(Cambridge, 2003), pp. 197–199.

5
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 267 (4 October 1941).

6
As quoted in Fritz,
Frontsoldaten
, p. 126.

7
Geyer, ‘German Strategy’, p. 578.

8
Omer Bartov, ‘From Blitzkrieg to Total War: Controversial Links between Image and Reality’ in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds.),
Stalinism and Nazism
, pp. 165–166.

9
Figures from Richard Overy, ‘Statistics’ in Dear and Foot (eds.),
The Oxford Companion to the Second World War
(Oxford, 1995), Table 2: Military Production, p. 1060.

10
Hoffmann, ‘Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion’, p. 734.

11
Walter S. Dunn, Jr.,
Stalin's Keys to Victory. The Rebirth of the Red Army in WWII
(Mechanicsburg, 2006), p. 41.

12
Overy, ‘Statistics’, Table 2: Military Production, p. 1060.

13
As quoted in Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, p. 193.

14
This assertion is strongly contested by Richard Overy, who argues: ‘Economic size as such does not explain the outcome of wars…The line between material resources and victory on the battlefield is anything but a straight one. The history of war is littered with examples of smaller, materially disadvantaged states defeating a larger, richer enemy’ (Overy,
Why the Allies Won
, pp. 316–317). Generally speaking Overy is quite correct, but not in the case of World War II. In this author's opinion, Overy considerably over-estimates both Germany's outright military strength and Hitler's woeful strategic direction, both of which would have to compensate massively for her inferior economic resources.

15
There is a long list of historians (both German and international) who have produced first-rate studies on the many diverse aspects of this topic. On the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war see Streit,
Keine Kameraden
. For the relationship between the German army and NS State see Bartov,
Hitler's Army
. For the army's role in the occupation of the Soviet Union see Theo Schulte,
The German Army and the Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia
and Gerlach,
Kalkulierte Morde
. On the war against the partisans see Shepherd,
War in the Wild East
. For an overview of the German army's criminal activity in 1941 see Jürgen Förster's contribution to the fourth volume of
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
and Megargee,
War of Annihilation
.

16
One recent study by Klaus J. Arnold seeks a radical reinterpretation of the army's role in the east. Arnold attempts to argue that the Wehrmacht's crimes were merely a reaction to circumstances either beyond their control or ‘forced’ on them by enemy elements such as the partisans. Such an argument has no factual credibility and should remain sidelined. Klaus J. Arnold,
Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion. Kriegführung und Radikalisierung im ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’
(Berlin, 2005).

17
For one of the best studies of the Wehrmacht, which addresses its ideological bias and criminal activity as well as the many enduring post-war myths, see: Wolfram Wette,
Die Wehrmacht. Feindbilder, Vernichtungskrieg, Legenden
(English translation: Wolfram Wette,
The Wehrmacht. History, Myth, Reality
). Equally indispensable is Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann,
War of Extermination. The German Military in World War II 1941–1944
(Oxford, 2006). For more recent research see the outstanding study by Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
. In addition, Johannes Hürter, ‘Konservative Akteure oder totale Krieger? Zum Transformationsprozess einer militärischen Elite’ in Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter and Ulrike Jureit (eds.),
Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Bilanz einer Debatte
(Munich, 2005), pp. 50–59.

18
Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, p. 276.

19
Especially positive assessments of Guderian, Hoth, Strauss and Weichs can be found in their personal files. The appraisals were written at different times during the war by Bock, Leeb, Rundstedt, Manstein and Kluge. See: ‘Personalakten für Strauss, Adolf’ BA-MA Pers 6/56, Fol. 20 (13 February 1941); ‘Personalakten für Guderian, Heinz’ BA-MA Pers 6/27, Fol. 44 (29 September 1939); ‘Personalakten für Hoth, Hermann’ BA-MA Pers 6/38, Fol. 21 (20 February 1941); Fol. 25 (6 April 1942); Fol. 28 (23 March 1943); Fol. 29 (18 December 1943); ‘Personalakten für Weichs, Max. Frhr. von’ BA-MA Pers 6/62, Fol. 33 (20 February 1941); Fol. 36 (No date given).

20
One can also see examples of this in the preliminary planning and conceptualisation of the Western campaign in 1940. See Frieser,
Blitzkrieg-Legende
, Zweiter Teil (English translation:
The Blitzkrieg Legend
,
Chapter 2
).

21
The over-emphasis on operational matters was already evident under the tenure of Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, the Army Chief of Staff before Halder. Beck complained that younger officers were fixated on maximising the use of weapons without learning to evaluate operations in the context of wider strategic factors. As Michel Geyer concluded: ‘To be sure, military technocrats with their functional outlook and National Socialists with their goal of ideological war remained apart and often were at cross purposes, but they complemented each other and, in crucial moments, when the Third Reich turned from preparing to fighting war, achieved a symbiosis’ (Geyer, ‘German Strategy’, p. 572). See also Hartmann,
Halder Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942
, p. 239.

22
As quoted in Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, p. 44. See also Braithwaite,
Moscow 1941
, p. 254.

23
For a first-rate account of the Napoleon's 1812 campaign see: Adam Zamoyski,
1812. Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow
(London, 2004). See also Michael Howard's Foreword to Carl von Clausewitz,
The Campaign of 1812 in Russia
(New York, 1995).

24
Howard and Paret (eds.), Carl von Clausewitz,
On War
, p. 258.

25
Guderian makes reference to having studied the campaigns of Charles XII of Sweden and Napoleon I (Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 142). Kluge's desk at his headquarters in Warsaw was said to be laden with books and maps on Russia and, according to Blumentritt, he read General de Caulaincourt's account of the 1812 campaign with ‘the greatest attention’. Blumentritt himself studied the Soviet-Polish war (1919–1920) and delivered a series of lectures on the subject (Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’, pp. 34–35). In a separate publication, Blumentritt wrote about Napoleon's 1812 campaign and then commented: ‘In 1941 the German commanders all remembered these French misadventures’ (Blumentritt,
Von Rundstedt
, p. 102).

26
In this year the Prussian army decisively defeated the French at the battle of Sedan, the high point of the Franco-Prussian war (1870–1871).

27
When the pivotal battle of the Marne began the railheads of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies were between 136 and 168 kilometres behind the front.

28
Hew Strachan,
The First World War
, Volume I:
To Arms
(Oxford, 2003), pp. 239–240.

29
This is because of the sheer scale of the undertaking. Kluck's 1st Army alone had 84,000 horses, which required some two million pounds of fodder a day. Living off the land was, therefore, the only option available in spite of its inadequacy (van Creveld,
Supplying War
, pp. 124–126).

30
Strachan,
The First World War
, pp. 230–231 and 241.

31
Ibid., p. 242.

32
Ibid., p. 261. Evan Mawdsley's discussion is also enlightening: Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, pp. 44 and 53.

Bibliography

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BA-MA Pers 6/27. ‘Personalakten für Guderian, Heinz’

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BA-MA Pers 6/62. ‘Personalakten für Weichs, Max. Frhr. von’

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