Oswald and the CIA: The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK (20 page)

In the White House, Vice President Nixon actively participated in many of the important policy discussions. On December 10, 1959, during the discussion on Cuba at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), Vice President Nixon asked, "What was the Communist line toward Cuba? He gathered that the Russians did not object to a tough line on the part of Cuba." Richard Bissell, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans, replied that "the Soviets encouraged a tough anti-U.S. line in Cuba under the guise of nationalism."" In other words, the Cuban problem was, from its inception, fundamentally linked to the larger U.S.-Soviet power struggle in the minds of U.S. decisionmakers. At the following 429th meeting of the NSC on December 16, Nixon told those present he "did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels.""

The Soviet dimension of the Cuban situation raised the stakes to what was already a serious problem. Just how serious is evident from what followed the day after the 428th NSC meeting. On De cember 11, 1959, Allen Dulles approved a recommendation that "thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro." Over the years we have learned much about the Castro assassination planning that Dulles approved on that December day, including this detail from the 1975 final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities United States Senate (SSCIA-known as the "Church Committee."):

On December 11, 1959, J. C. King, head of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to Dulles observing that a "far left" dictatorship now existed in Cuba which, "if" permitted to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other Latin American countries. One of King's four "Recommended Actions" was: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro.""'

J. C. King was not alone in believing that Castro's leadership was a cancer so malignant as to warrant assassination. His mindset was no less ethical than that of many of the Cold Warrior cowboys who set aside morality in pursuit of a "higher good." Richard M. Bissell agreed with King's recommendation to consider assassinating Castro. Bissell was a powerful man in the CIA's covert world: He was in charge of all the Agency's clandestine services, then called the "Directorate of Plans."

Over the years, we have gradually learned of Bissell's role in the CIA's original planning to assassinate Castro. First, there is the CIA's own Inspector General's Report, written in 1967 after a Jack Anderson broadcast leaking details of the CIA's links to the Mafia and assassination plots." The IG Report contains this sentence:

Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, although King now recalls having only had limited knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date-about mid-1962.16

Obviously Bissell was right and King was wrong, but this sentence is fascinating to reflect upon." It was written for a secret internal CIA investigation, and its creators had not envisaged their work being released to the public. When Director Helms saw the report, he ordered all copies except his own destroyed.1B

A better source of information about Bissell's role in the development of the CIA's plans to assassinate Castro is a report written by the SSCIA, also known as the Church Committee. Its November 20, 1975 "interim report," entitled Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, is still one of the best and most thorough reports on the history of these plans. Bissell's testimony to the Church Committee contains details such as this:

I remember a conversation which I would have put in early autumn or late summer between myself and Colonel Edwards [director of the Office of Security), and I have some dim recollection of some earlier conversation I had had with Colonel J. C. King, chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, and the subject matter of both these conversations was a capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided upon.19

During the summer of 1960, apparently, coincident with the BissellEdwards conversations, such action was decided on. J. C. King's name appeared as the directing officer on a cable authorizing the CIA station in Havana to arrange for Castro's brother, Raul Castro, to have an "accident." We will return to that matter shortly. The revealing detail in the above passage from Bissell's testimony to the Church Committee is this: He refers to two distinct time periods during which discussions with King about assassinating Castro took place.

We can date both of these moments with some degree of confidence. The first conversation likely took place just before Dulles approved King's recommendation to study killing Castro, on December 11, 1959. The first Bissell-King conversation may have contained ideas similar to the one below, which was in the memorandum by King:

None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevera, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government.20 King's reasoning was based on the "belief" of "informed people" rather than hard evidence. In retrospect, the logic of singling out Castro's "mesmeric appeal" as the factor that added a high value to him as a target for assassination seems dubious. However, King's CIA chain of command never questioned this logic. Bissell's concurrence and Dulles's approval are recorded in the handwritten note that accompanied J. C. King's extraordinary document.21

Bissell states that the second conversation with King was in the "late summer or early autumn" of 1960. It likely occurred as a result of King's work in support of the Cuban project Allen Dulles had assigned to Bissell. According to Dulles biographer Peter Grose, Dulles had a plan to replace Castro with a moderate leadership. The CIA director is reported to have told his "closest associates" that the Agency had to "start working with the left." Dulles then set up a special Cuban task force outside of J. C. King's Western Hemisphere Division. Leading that task force were Richard Bissell, and Tracy Barnes, a veteran of CIA covert operations in Guatemala. King, functioning in a support role, told the task force that failure to eliminate Raul Castro and Che Guevera along with Castro would only draw out the "affair." As we will see, King thought it would be better to get rid of all three leaders "in one package.""

Nixon: "We need.. . a few dramatic things"

In 1959, Nixon and Dulles had cooperated to defeat the State Department recommendations to recognize the Castro regime. "Castro's actions when he returned to Cuba," Nixon wrote twenty years later, "convinced me he was indeed a Communist, and I sided strongly with Allen Dulles in presenting this view in NSC and other meetings."2; The Vice President's performance at the next NSC meeting was memorable, even though it did not mention the ongoing discussion about assassinating Castro. As we have seen, Nixon chose this moment to articulate a new American policy toward Cuba, as recorded in the minutes of the December 16, 1959, NSC meeting:

The Vice President did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels. Congress was an important element in the situation. The Administration must try to guide Congress and not simply react to proposals which may be made in Congress. He urged that between now and January 6 supplementary studies of U.S. strategy toward Cuba must be taken."`

This was an important new policy statement coming from Vice President Nixon, who was expected soon to be President Nixon. It was also an attack on the current Cuban policy which, up to that point, had been largely under the control of the State Department. Nixon was openly challenging the State Department's way of "handling" Cuban matters.

Nixon defined the Cuban problem in such a way as to take the initiative away from the State Department. The NSC minutes under the signature of Marion W. Boggs, the deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council, contain a verbatim transcript of a lengthy admonition of the State Department by Nixon, excoriating the department for the political cost of its failure in Cuba. Here are some pertinent parts of the minutes:

The Vice President said that when Congress reconvened there would be a great assault on the Administration's Latin American policy. Heavy criticism of that policy was coming from the Republican and Democratic members of Congress. In his view, a discussion of Cuba could not be avoided. The problem would soon have far-flung implications beyond the control of the Department of State; and any tendency of State Department officials to attempt to delay action would not be appropriate.... The Vice President recalled that some State Department officials had earlier taken the position that we would be able to live with Castro.25

This was a particularly damning assessment for the State Department officials who, like Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs Roy C. Rubottom, had held to a softer line toward Cuba.

Nixon had a large personal stake in the unfolding events in Cuba because the next presidential election, which it seemed likely he would win, was less than eleven months away. Those listening to the vice president might also have been thinking about how to keep their positions if he became the president. It did not appear that things were going to work out very well for Assistant Secretary Rubottom. On July 27, Nixon received the Republican nomination for president, and in August 1960 Rubottom found himself promoted out of the way into the post of ambassador to Argentina.26

At the December 16, 1959, NSC meeting, Nixon gave some hints about what changes he foresaw in Cuban policy:

No doubt that radical steps with respect to Cuba would create an adverse reaction through Latin America, but we need to find a few dramatic things to do with respect to the Cuban situation in order to indicate that we would not allow ourselves to be kicked around completely.... He repeated his fear that the problem was getting beyond the normal diplomatic province.27

The use of the words "dramatic things" to solve the problem "beyond the normal diplomatic province" goes hand in hand with Dulles's approval five days earlier of the King memo planning Castro's elimination. The imagery evoked by Nixon's choice of wordsbeing "kicked around" by Cuba-was a clear indication that Nixon had something major in mind for Castro. Nixon and Dulles's capture of Cuban policy after that December 16, 1959, NSC meeting is evident from the "dramatic things" that followed: the Bay of Pigs invasion and attempts to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders. The original plan was for both things to happen together, culminating in the first week of November 1960, to give Nixon a boost in the presidential election.

The vice president's remarks, as we have seen, to the same December 1959 NSC meeting included his announcement that "we should not advertise the fact that we regard the situation in Cuba as a crisis situation." The reason for this reticence was the covert nature of the measures being planned. CIA Director Dulles was at the same NSC meeting, and he responded to Nixon's comment this way:

Mr. Dulles felt the question of whether anti-Castro activities should be permitted to continue or should be stopped depended on what the anti-Castro forces were planning. We could not, for example, let the Batista-type elements do whatever they wanted to do. However, a number of things in the covert field could be done which might help the situation in Cuba [emphasis added].2B

A number of things were indeed under way: "In early 1960 Eisenhower became convinced that we were right," Nixon later wrote of his and Dulles's struggle with the State Department over Cuban policy, "and that steps should be taken to support the anti-Castro forces inside and outside of Cuba."'

Dulles, the Special Group, and the "Package Deal "

Allen Dulles lost no time in orchestrating the new covert Cuban policy within the Special Group. The first discussion at a Special Group meeting about a plan to overthrow Fidel Castro took place on January 13, 1960.1 This was a landmark meeting, in which CIA Director Allen Dulles laid down a chain of command that excluded the State Department for how the new covert war would be waged. That chain ran directly from the White House to the Special Group. The record of their meetings contains this entry:

Mr. Dulles notes the possibility that over the long run the U.S. will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and suggested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro government might be in order. He emphasized that details of plans of this kind would be properly aired at the Special Group meetings and with the President but not necessarily with the NSC."

A chain of command running from the president to a committee outside the regular institutions of government was unusual-even novel. It was also a power move to exclude the State Department from U.S. Cuban policy in Cuba. That policy was now the "elimination" of Castro and the overthrow of the Cuban government.

Declassified portions of the minutes of the January 13 Special Group meeting32 suggest that Livingston T. Merchant, who had just been promoted the month before to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, disagreed with Dulles. When the CIA director "suggested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro government might be in order," Merchant injected his view that timing was important to permit a solid opposition base to develop. He feared that "Raol [Raul] Castro and Che Guevara would succeed Fidel and this could be worse."33

What happened next was vintage Allen Dulles, whose domain of covert operations made him sensitive to any implication that the Agency might have overlooked something important. His smooth reply left the impression that the CIA's covert plans had taken Merchant's concern into account. Dulles "emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." Notes from minutes preserved by the Church Committee show that Dulles then added this finishing touch:

Mr. Dulles said that the CIA would pull together the threads of this problem and would inventory and assess all possible assets, and that this might take several months. He said that this is all the action in this connection that he plans for the immediate future.34