The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (145 page)

7
     
[1064a]
Every science seeks certain principles and causes for each of its objects—e. g. medicine and gymnastics and each of the other sciences, whether productive or mathematical. For each of these marks off a certain class of things for itself and busies itself about this as about something existing and real—not however
qua
real; the science that does
this
is another distinct from these.
(5)
Of the sciences mentioned each gets somehow the ‘what’ in some class of things and tries to prove the other truths, with more or less precision. Some
get the ‘what’ through perception, others by hypothesis; so that it is clear from an induction of this sort that there is no
demonstration
of the substance or ‘what’.

There is a science of nature, and evidently it must be different both from practical and from productive science.
(10)
For in the case of productive science the principle of movement is in the producer and not in the product, and is either an art or some other faculty. And similarly in practical science the movement is not in the thing done, but rather in the doers. But the science of the natural philosopher deals with the things that have
in themselves
a principle of movement.
(15)
It is clear from these facts, then, that natural science must be neither practical nor productive, but theoretical (for it must fall into some one of these classes). And since each of the sciences must somehow know the ‘what’ and use this as a principle, we must not fail to observe how the natural philosopher should define things and how he should state the definition of the essence—whether as akin to ‘snub’ or rather to ‘concave’.
(20)
For of these the definition of ‘snub’ includes the matter of the thing, but that of ‘concave’ is independent of the matter; for snubness is found in a nose,
(25)
so that we look for its definition without eliminating the nose, for what is snub is a concave nose. Evidently then the definition of flesh also and of the eye and of the other parts must always be stated without eliminating the matter.

Since there is a science of being
qua
being and capable of existing apart, we must consider whether this is to be regarded as the same as physics or rather as different. Physics deals with the things that have a principle of movement in themselves; mathematics is theoretical,
(30)
and
is
a science that deals with things that are at rest, but its subjects cannot exist apart. Therefore about that which can exist apart and is unmovable there is a science different from both of these, if there
is
a substance of this nature (I mean separable and unmovable),
(35)
as we shall try to prove there is.
⁴⁷
And if there is such a kind of thing in the world, here must surely be the divine, and this must be the first and most dominant principle.
[1064b]
Evidently, then, there are three kinds of theoretical sciences—physics, mathematics, theology. The class of theoretical sciences is the best, and of these themselves the last named is best; for it deals with the highest of existing things,
(5)
and each science is called better or worse in virtue of its proper object.

One might raise the question whether the science of being
qua
being is to be regarded as universal or not. Each of the mathematical sciences deals with some one determinate class of things, but universal mathematics applies alike to all. Now if natural substances are the first of
existing things,
(10)
physics must be the first of sciences; but if there is another entity and substance, separable and unmovable, the knowledge of it must be different and prior to physics and universal because it is prior.
⁴⁸

8
     Since ‘being’ in general has several senses,
(15)
of which one is ‘being by accident’, we must consider first that which ‘is’ in this sense. Evidently none of the traditional sciences busies itself about the accidental. For neither does architecture consider what will happen to those who are to use the house (e. g. whether they will have a painful life in it or not),
(20)
nor does weaving, or shoemaking, or the confectioner’s art, do the like; but each of these sciences considers only what is peculiar to it, i. e. its proper end. And as for the argument that ‘when he who is musical becomes lettered he will be both at once,
(25)
not having been both before; and that which is, not always having been, must have come to be; therefore he must have at once become musical and lettered’—this none of the recognized sciences considers, but only sophistic; for this alone busies itself about the accidental, so that Plato is not far wrong when he says
⁴⁹
that the sophist spends his time on non-being.

That a science of the accidental is not even possible will be evident if we try to see what the accidental really is.
(30)
We say that everything either is always and of necessity (necessity not in the sense of violence,
(35)
but that which we appeal to in demonstrations), or is for the most part, or is neither for the most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as it chances; e. g. there might be cold in the dog-days, but this occurs neither always and of necessity, nor for the most part, though it might happen sometimes.
[1065a]
The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most part. Now we have said what the accidental is, and it is obvious why there is no science of such a thing; for all science is of that which is always or for the most part,
(5)
but the accidental is in neither of these classes.

Evidently there are not causes and principles of the accidental, of the same kind as there are of the essential; for if there were, everything would be of necessity. If
A
is when
B
is, and
B
is when
C
is, and if
C
exists not by chance but of necessity,
(10)
that also of which
C
was cause will exist of necessity, down to the last
causatum
as it is called (but this was supposed to be accidental). Therefore all things will be of necessity, and chance and the possibility of a thing’s either occurring or not occurring are removed entirely from the range of events. And if the cause be supposed not to exist but to be coming to be, the same
results will follow; everything will occur of necessity. For to-morrow’s eclipse will occur if
A
occurs,
(15)
and
A
if
B
occurs, and
B
if
C
occurs; and in this way if we subtract time from the limited time between now and to-morrow we shall come sometime to the already existing condition. Therefore since this exists, everything after this will occur of necessity,
(20)
so that all things occur of necessity.

As to that which ‘is’ in the sense of being true or of being by accident, the
former
depends on a combination in thought and is an affection of thought (which is the reason why it is the principles, not of that which ‘is’ in this sense, but of that which is outside and can exist apart, that are sought); and the
latter
is not necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental) ; and of such a thing the causes are unordered and indefinite.
⁵⁰
(25)

Adaptation to an end is found in events that happen by nature or as the result of thought. It is ‘luck’ when one of these events
⁵¹
happens by accident. For as a thing may exist, so it may be a cause, either by its own nature or by accident.
⁵²
Luck is an accidental cause at work in such events adapted to an end as are usually effected in accordance with purpose.
(30)
And so luck and thought are concerned with the same sphere; for purpose cannot exist without thought. The causes from which lucky results might happen are indeterminate;
(35)
and so luck is obscure to human calculation and is a cause by accident, but in the unqualified sense a cause of nothing.
⁵³
It is good or bad luck when the result is good or evil; and prosperity or misfortune when the scale of the results is large.
[1065b]
⁵⁴

Since nothing accidental is prior to the essential, neither are accidental causes prior. If, then, luck or spontaneity is a cause of the material universe, reason and nature are causes before it.
⁵⁵

9
     Some things are only actually, some potentially,
(5)
some potentially and actually, what they are, viz. in one case a particular reality, in another, characterized by a particular quantity, or the like.
⁵⁶
There is no movement apart from things; for change is always according to the categories of being, and there is nothing common to these and in no one category. But each of the categories belongs to all its subjects in either of two ways (e. g. ‘this-ness’—for one kind of it is ‘positive form’,
(10)
and the other is ‘privation’; and as regards quality one kind is ‘white’ and the other ‘black’, and as regards quantity one kind is
‘complete’ and the other ‘incomplete’, and as regards spatial movement one is ‘upwards’ and the other ‘downwards’, or one thing is ‘light’ and another ‘heavy’); so that there are as many kinds of movement and change as of being.
(15)
There being a distinction in each class of things between the potential and the completely real, I call the actuality of the potential as such, movement. That what we say is true, is plain from the following facts. When the ‘buildable’, in so far as it is what we mean by ‘buildable’,
⁵⁷
exists actually, it is being built, and this is the process of building. Similarly with learning, healing, walking,
(20)
leaping, ageing, ripening.
⁵⁸
Movement takes place when the complete reality itself exists, and neither earlier nor later.
⁵⁹
The complete reality, then, of that which exists potentially, when it is completely real and actual, not
qua
itself, but
qua
movable, is movement. By
qua
I mean this: bronze is potentially a statue; but yet it is not the complete reality of bronze
qua
bronze that is movement.
(25)
For it is not the same thing to be bronze and to be a certain potency. If it were absolutely the same in its definition, the complete reality of bronze would have been a movement. But it is not the same. (This is evident in the case of contraries; for to be capable of being well and to be capable of being ill are not the same—for if they were, being well and being ill would have been the same—it is that which underlies and is healthy or diseased,
(30)
whether it is moisture or blood, that is one and the same.) And since it is not the same, as colour and the visible are not the same, it is the complete reality of the potential, and
as potential
,
(35)
that is movement. That it is this, and that movement takes place when the complete reality itself exists, and neither earlier nor later, is evident.
[1066a]
For each thing is capable of being sometimes actual, sometimes not, e. g. the buildable
qua
buildable; and the actuality of the buildable
qua
buildable is building. For the actuality is either this—the act of building—or the house. But when the
house
exists, it is no longer buildable; the buildable is what
is being
built.
(5)
The actuality, then, must be the
act of building
, and this is a movement. And the same account applies to all other movements.

That what we have said is right is evident from what all others say about movement, and from the fact that it is not easy to define it otherwise. For firstly one cannot put it in any other class.
(10)
This is evident from what people say. Some call it otherness and inequality and the unreal;
⁶⁰
none of these, however, is necessarily moved, and
further, change is not either to these or from these any more than from their opposites. The reason why people put movement in these classes is that it is thought to be something indefinite, and the principles in one of the two ‘columns of contraries’ are indefinite because they are privative,
(15)
for none of them is either a ‘this’ or a ‘such’ or in any of the other categories. And the reason why movement is thought to be indefinite is that it cannot be classed either with the potency of things or with their actuality; for neither that which is capable of being of a certain quantity, nor that which is actually of a certain quantity, is of necessity moved, and movement is thought to be an actuality,
(20)
but incomplete; the reason is that the potential, whose actuality it is, is incomplete. And therefore it is hard to grasp what movement is; for it must be classed either under privation or under potency or under absolute actuality, but evidently none of these is possible. Therefore what remains is that it must be what we said—both actuality and the actuality we have described—which is hard to detect but capable of existing.
⁶¹
(25)

And evidently movement is in the movable; for it is the complete realization of this by that which is capable of causing movement. And the actuality of that which is capable of causing movement is no other than that of the movable. For it must be the complete reality of both. For while a thing is capable of causing movement because it
can
do this, it is a mover because it is
active
; but it is on the movable that it is capable of acting,
(30)
so that the actuality of both is one, just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and as the steep ascent and the steep descent are one, but the being of them is not one; the case of the mover and the moved is similar.
⁶²