The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (144 page)

3
     Since the science of the philosopher treats of being
qua
being universally and not in respect of a part of it, and ‘being’ has many senses and is not used in one only, it follows that if the word is used equivocally and in virtue of nothing common to its various uses, being does not fall under one science (for the meanings of an equivocal term do not form one genus); but if the word is used in virtue of something common,
(35)
being will fall under one science. The term seems to be used in the way we have mentioned, like ‘medical’ and ‘healthy’. For each of these also we use in many senses.
[1061a]
Terms are used in this way by virtue of some kind of reference, in the one case to medical science, in the other to health, in others to something else, but in each case to one identical concept. For a discussion and a knife are called medical because the former proceeds from medical science,
(5)
and the latter is useful to it. And a thing is called healthy in a similar way; one thing because it is indicative of health, another because it is productive of it. And the same is true in the other cases. Everything that is, then, is said to ‘be’ in this same way; each thing that is is said to ‘be’ because it is a modification of being
qua
being or a permanent or a transient state or a movement of it,
(10)
or something else of the sort. And since everything that is may be referred to something single and common, each of the contrarieties also may be referred
to the first differences and contrarieties of being, whether the first differences of being are plurality and unity, or likeness and unlikeness, or some other differences; let these be taken as already discussed. It makes no difference whether that which is be referred to being or to unity.
(15)
For even if they are not the same but different, at least they are convertible; for that which is one is also somehow being, and that which is being is one.

But since every pair of contraries falls to be examined by one and the same science, and in each pair one term is the privative of the other—though one might regarding some contraries raise the question,
(20)
how they can be privately related, viz. those which have an intermediate, e. g. unjust and just—in all such cases one must maintain that the privation is not of the whole definition, but of the
infima species.
e. g. if the just man is ‘by virtue of some permanent disposition obedient to the laws’, the unjust man will not in every case have the whole definition denied of him,
(25)
but may be merely ‘in some respect deficient in obedience to the laws’, and in this respect the privation will attach to him; and similarly in all other cases.

As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities, e. g.
(30)
weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these
qua
quantitative and continuous,
(35)
and does not consider them in any other respect, and examines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these, and the commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others, and the ratios of others; but yet we posit one and the same science of all these things—geometry)—the same is true with regard to being.
[1061b]
For the attributes of this in so far as it is being,
(5)
and the contrarieties in it
qua
being, it is the business of no other science than philosophy to investigate; for to physics one would assign the study of things not
qua
being, but rather
qua
sharing in movement; while dialectic and sophistic deal with the attributes of things that are, but not of things
qua
being, and not with being itself in so far as it is being; therefore it remains that it is the philosopher who studies the things we have named,
(10)
in so far as they are being. Since all that is is said to ‘be’ in virtue of something single and common, though the term has many meanings, and contraries are in the same case (for they are referred to the first contrarieties and differences of being), and things of this sort can fall under one science,
(15)
the difficulty
we stated at the beginning
²⁰
appears to be solved—I mean the question how there can be a single science of things which are many and different in genus.

4
     Since even the mathematician uses the common axioms only in a special application, it must be the business of first philosophy to examine the principles of mathematics also. That when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal, is common to all quantities,
(20)
but mathematics studies a part of its proper matter which it has detached, e. g. lines or angles or numbers or some other kind of quantity—not, however,
qua
being but in so far as each of them is continuous in one or two or three dimensions; but philosophy does not inquire about particular subjects in so far as each of them has some attribute or other,
(25)
but speculates about being, in so far as each particular thing
is
.—Physics is in the same position as mathematics; for physics studies the attributes and the principles of the things that are,
(30)
qua
moving and not
qua
being (whereas the primary science, we have said, deals with these, only in so far as the underlying subjects are existent, and not in virtue of any other character); and so both physics and mathematics must be classed as
parts
of Wisdom.
²¹

5
     There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived,
(35)
but must always, on the contrary, recognize the truth—viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, or admit any other similar pair of opposites.
²²
[1062a]
About such matters there is no proof in the full sense, though there is proof
ad hominem.
For it is not possible to infer this truth itself from a more certain principle, yet this is
necessary
if there is to be completed proof of it in the full sense.
²³
(5)
But he who wants to prove to the asserter of opposites that he is wrong must get from him an admission which shall
be
identical with the principle that the same thing cannot be and not be at one and the same time, but shall not
seem
to be identical; for thus alone can his thesis be demonstrated to the man who asserts that opposite statements can be truly made about the same subject.
(10)
Those, then, who are to join in argument with one another must to some extent understand one another; for if this does not
happen how are they to join in argument with one another? Therefore every word must be intelligible and indicate something, and not many things but only one; and if it signifies more than one thing,
(15)
it must be made plain to which of these the word is being applied. He, then, who says ‘this is and is not’ denies what he affirms, so that what the word signifies, he says it does not signify; and this is impossible. Therefore if ‘this is’ signifies something, one cannot truly assert its contradictory.
²⁴

Further, if the word signifies something and this is asserted truly,
²⁵
this connexion must be necessary; and it is not possible that that which necessarily is should ever not be; it is not possible therefore to make the opposed affirmations and negations truly of the same subject.
²⁶
(20)
Further, if the affirmation is no more true than the negation, he who says ‘man’ will be no more right than he who says ‘not-man’. It would seem also that in saying the man is not a horse one would be either more or not less right than in saying he is not a man,
(25)
so that one will also be right in saying that the same person
is
a horse; for it was assumed to be possible to make opposite statements equally truly. It follows then that the same person is a man and a horse, or any other animal.
²⁷

While, then, there is no proof of these things in the full sense,
(30)
there is a proof which may suffice against one who will make these suppositions. And perhaps if one had questioned Heraclitus himself in this way one might have forced him to confess that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects. But, as it is, he adopted this opinion without understanding what his statement involves.
²⁸
But in any case if what is said by him is true,
(35)
not even this itself will be true—viz. that the same thing can at one and the same time both be and not be.
[1062b]
For as, when the statements are separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, in the same way—the combined and complex statement being like a single affirmation—the whole taken as an affirmation will be no more true than the negation.
²⁹
(5)
Further, if it is not possible to affirm anything truly, this itself will be false—the assertion that there is no true affirmation.
³⁰
But if a true affirmation exists, this appears to refute what is said by those who raise such objections and utterly destroy rational discourse.
(10)

6
     The saying of Protagoras is like the views we have mentioned; he said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that that which seems to each man also assuredly is. If this is so,
(15)
it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and is bad and good, and that the contents of all other opposite statements are true, because often a particular thing appears beautiful to some and the contrary of beautiful to others, and that which appears to each man is the measure.
(20)
This difficulty may be solved by considering the source of this opinion. It seems to have arisen in some cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others from the fact that all men have not the same views about the same things, but a particular thing appears pleasant to some and the contrary of pleasant to others.
³¹

That nothing comes to be out of that which is not,
(25)
but everything out of that which is, is a dogma common to nearly all the natural philosophers. Since, then, white cannot come to be if the perfectly white and in no respect not-white existed before, that which becomes white must come from that which is not white; so that it must come to be out of that which is not (so they argue),
(30)
unless the same thing was at the beginning white and not-white. But it is not hard to solve this difficulty; for we have said in our works on physics
³²
in what sense things that come to be come to be from that which is not, and in what sense from that which is.
³³

But to attend equally to the opinions and the fancies of disputing parties is childish; for clearly one of them must be mistaken.
(35)
And this is evident from what happens in respect of sensation; for the same thing never appears sweet to some and the contrary of sweet to others, unless in the one case the sense-organ which discriminates the aforesaid flavours has been perverted and injured.
[1063a]
And if this is so the one party must be taken to be the measure, and the other must not.
(5)
And I say the same of good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, and all other such qualities. For to maintain the view we are opposing is just like maintaining that the things that appear to people who put their finger under their eye and make the object appear two instead of one must be two (because they appear to be of that number) and again one (for to those who do not interfere with their eye the one object appears one).
³⁴

In general,
(10)
it is absurd to make the fact that the things of this earth are observed to change and never to remain in the same state,
the basis of our judgment about the truth. For in pursuing the truth one must start from the things that are always in the same state and suffer no change. Such are the heavenly bodies; for these do not appear to be now of one nature and again of another,
(15)
but are manifestly always the same and share in no change.
³⁵

Further, if there is movement, there is also something moved, and everything is moved out of something and into something; it follows that that which is moved must first be in that out of which it is to be moved, and then not be in it, and move into the other and come to be in it,
(20)
and that the contradictory statements are not true at the same time, as these thinkers assert they are.

And if the things of this earth continuously flow and move in respect of quantity—if one were to suppose this, although it is not true—why should they not endure in respect of
quality
? For the assertion of contradictory statements about the same thing seems to have arisen largely from the belief that the quantity of bodies does not endure,
(25)
which, our opponents hold, justifies them in saying that the same thing both is and is not four cubits long. But essence depends on quality, and this is of determinate nature, though quantity is of indeterminate.
³⁶

Further, when the doctor orders people to take some particular food, why do they take it? In what respect is ‘this is bread’ truer than ‘this is not bread’? And so it would make no difference whether one ate or not.
(30)
But as a matter of fact they take the food which is ordered, assuming that they know the truth about it and that it is bread. Yet they should not, if there were no fixed constant nature in sensible things, but all natures moved and flowed for ever.
³⁷

Again, if we are always changing and never remain the same,
(35)
what wonder is it if to us, as to the sick, things never appear the same? (For to them also, because they are not in the same condition as when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear alike; yet, for all that, the sensible things themselves need not share in any change, though they produce different, and not identical, sensations in the sick.
[1063b]
And the same must surely happen to the healthy if the aforesaid
³⁸
change takes place.
(5)
) But if we do not change but remain the same, there will be something that endures.
³⁹

As for those to whom the difficulties mentioned are suggested by
reasoning
, it is not easy to solve the difficulties to their satisfaction, unless they will posit something and no longer demand a reason for
it; for it is only thus that all reasoning and all proof is accomplished; if they posit nothing,
(10)
they destroy discussion and all reasoning. Therefore with such men there is no reasoning. But as for those who are perplexed by the traditional difficulties, it is easy to meet them and to dissipate the causes of their perplexity. This is evident from what has been said.
⁴⁰

It is manifest,
(15)
therefore, from these arguments that contradictory statements cannot be truly made about the same subject at one time,
⁴¹
nor can contrary statements, because every contrariety depends on privation. This is evident if we reduce the definitions of contraries to their principle.
⁴²

Similarly, no intermediate between contraries can be predicated of one and the same subject, of which one of the contraries is predicated.
(20)
If the subject is white we shall be wrong in saying it is neither black nor white, for then it follows that it is and is not white; for the second of the two terms we have put together
⁴³
is true of it, and this is the contradictory of white.
⁴⁴

We could not be right, then, in accepting the views either of Heraclitus
⁴⁵
or of Anaxagoras.
(25)
If we were, it would follow that contraries would be predicated of the same subject; for when Anaxagoras says that in everything there is a part of everything, he says nothing is sweet any more than it is bitter, and so with any other pair of contraries, since in everything everything is present not potentially only,
(30)
but actually and separately. And similarly all statements cannot be false nor all true, both because of many other difficulties which might be adduced as arising from this position, and because if all are false it will not be true to say even this, and if all are true it will not be false to say all are false.
⁴⁶
(35)