The Fall of Carthage (20 page)
The Romans put to sea ready either to fight a fleet action or to continue the journey to the African coast and stage a landing, since they could not yet know the likely Carthaginian reaction to their move. Amongst the fleet were a number of horse transports, although precisely how many is unknown. They were later to land horses for the 500 cavalry left with Regulus, presumably as well as the mounts required by the senior officers. The transports did not travel under their own power, but were towed behind war galleys, allowing them to keep station with the rest of the fleet. In fact, the Punic commanders had already resolved to fight a fleet action off the coast of Sicily, judging this to be the best way of protecting Carthage itself. In addition, if their fleet was as strong as Polybius suggests, then it may well have been the largest naval force ever assembled by the city and this, with their continued belief in their superior skill to the enemy, may well have encouraged the belief that that they had the opportunity to win a major success over the Romans. The two fleets moved towards each other, within sight of the coast of Sicily.
Such was the importance of this venture that both of the year's consuls, Lucius Manlius Vulso and Marcus Atilius Regulus, were present. They had divided the fleet into four divisions, numbered one to four and known either as 'squadrons' or 'Legions'. This was simply a nickname and bore no relation to their actual size, and it seems that the four divisions were not equal in numbers. The first two groups were led by the consuls themselves, whose two 'sixes' headed the Roman formation. The other ships from these squadrons took station from the flagships, in line echeloned back to either side, so that each ship's prow lay behind and to the side of the ship in front. In effect these squadrons formed the apex of a triangle, the base being composed of the third squadron, arrayed in line abreast, each ship towing one of the horse transports. The fourth squadron was arrayed in line behind this group and was probably more numerous than the third, for its ships overlapped its line on either flank. Protecting the rear of the formation and acting as an ultimate reserve, this squadron was also nicknamed the
triarii.
The Roman formation was praised by Polybius for its practicality, being relatively dense and keeping the fleet together, but also permitting it to turn and face a threat from any direction. It was a sign of the improved quality of the Roman crews and the greater experience of their commanders that they were able to adopt such a plan, and there is no good reason to doubt Polybius' account or assume that he had misunderstood what was no more than an accidental formation.
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triarii.
The Roman formation was praised by Polybius for its practicality, being relatively dense and keeping the fleet together, but also permitting it to turn and face a threat from any direction. It was a sign of the improved quality of the Roman crews and the greater experience of their commanders that they were able to adopt such a plan, and there is no good reason to doubt Polybius' account or assume that he had misunderstood what was no more than an accidental formation.
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The Carthaginians made some changes to their deployment once the Roman fleet came into view, having apparently advanced in the normal battle formation of line abreast. The Carthaginian line was formed with the coast of Sicily to its left. The left wing, one quarter of the fleet's ships, reached forward towards the shore. Angled away from this was the remainder of the fleet; the extreme right wing, commanded by Hanno (the general who had failed to relieve Agrigentum in 261), was made up of the fastest ships and extended beyond the flank of the Roman formation. The centre was led by the overall commander in Sicily, Hamilcar, who had instructed the captains of his division to begin by withdrawing in the face of a Roman attack. Hamilcar's plan appears to have been to break up the compact Roman formation, so that his divisions on the right and left could sweep in and attack the enemy from the flank or rear. This would produce a series of smaller encounters between parts of each fleet in which the Carthaginians might hopefully exploit their skill in ramming tactics and avoid frontal attacks on the
corvus-equippe
d
Roman ships. Attempts to suggest a far more complex Carthaginian plan are not convincing.
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corvus-equippe
d
Roman ships. Attempts to suggest a far more complex Carthaginian plan are not convincing.
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At first the battle seemed to be developing as Hamilcar had hoped. The Roman consuls had judged that the centre of the Punic line was weak -Polybius describes it as 'thinner' which may suggest that there were wider intervals between the ships than elsewhere. The flagships led the charge of the first and second divisions straight at this apparently vulnerable spot, and Hamilcar's ships withdrew in haste, so that a large gap swiftly developed between the consuls' ships and the third squadron, still towing the transports. Deciding that the Romans had been lured far enough forward to isolate the rear of their fleet, Hamilcar gave a signal to his ships to turn and engage. A fierce fight developed as the Romans surged forward and tried to grapple the enemy vessels, inspired by the presence of both consuls who played an active role in the fighting. The Carthaginian ships' greater speed produced some successes and some may even have passed through the Roman line and turned to deliver rams from the stern.
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In the meantime, Hanno's right wing had enveloped the Roman fleet and mounted a fierce attack on the
triarii,
whilst the left wing had changed its alignment to face the Romans and closed with the third squadron. The horse transports were cast adrift and the Roman galleys surged forward to meet the enemy. Thus, as Polybius comments, in effect the battle developed into three separate and widely spaced actions. Although this was probably the situation that the Carthaginians had hoped to achieve, in the event they failed to gain a lasting advantage from it. The Roman sailors were no longer as poorly trained as they had been in 260. More importantly, the great expansion in the Carthaginian fleet can only have reduced the average quality of its crews, so that their superiority over the enemy was no longer as marked. The sheer number of ships involved in each action added to the confusion and made it far harder for Punic ships to attack and ram a victim and then escape without encountering another Roman ship. Finally, as Lazenby rightly emphasizes, the Carthaginians had failed to discover an effective remedy to the
corvus.
An army or navy with a long tradition of success may well have difficulty in adapting to a novel tactic employed by an enemy, as seen for instance in the radically varying attitude to aircraft carriers of the navies in the Second World War.
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triarii,
whilst the left wing had changed its alignment to face the Romans and closed with the third squadron. The horse transports were cast adrift and the Roman galleys surged forward to meet the enemy. Thus, as Polybius comments, in effect the battle developed into three separate and widely spaced actions. Although this was probably the situation that the Carthaginians had hoped to achieve, in the event they failed to gain a lasting advantage from it. The Roman sailors were no longer as poorly trained as they had been in 260. More importantly, the great expansion in the Carthaginian fleet can only have reduced the average quality of its crews, so that their superiority over the enemy was no longer as marked. The sheer number of ships involved in each action added to the confusion and made it far harder for Punic ships to attack and ram a victim and then escape without encountering another Roman ship. Finally, as Lazenby rightly emphasizes, the Carthaginians had failed to discover an effective remedy to the
corvus.
An army or navy with a long tradition of success may well have difficulty in adapting to a novel tactic employed by an enemy, as seen for instance in the radically varying attitude to aircraft carriers of the navies in the Second World War.
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The clash between the Carthaginian centre and the first two Roman squadrons was decided first, when Hamilcar's ships gave up the struggle and fled. Despite initial successes, several Punic vessels had been caught by the ravens' beaks and boarded. As the Carthaginians fled, Manlius Vulso supervised the securing of the captured prizes, whilst Regulus led as many ships as he could back to the aid of the rest of the Roman fleet. The
triarii
had been given a hard time by Hanno's squadron until the Roman ships came up behind him; together the Roman forces drove the Carthaginians off. The Punic left had driven the Roman third squadron up against the shore, but when the Roman ships had bunched up and formed a line with their prows facing towards the enemy, the Carthaginians had been reluctant to close for fear of the
corvi.
Their ships had done little more than hem the Romans in and were finally driven off when Manlius Vulso came to their aid from one direction and Regulus from the other. Fifty Carthaginian ships were captured in this final phase of the action, for it was difficult to escape, trapped as they were between the shore and the Roman third squadron and the converging forces led by the consuls. Another fourteen Punic ships were captured, probably mainly in the centre, and thirty were sunk. Roman losses were twenty-four sunk and none taken.
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triarii
had been given a hard time by Hanno's squadron until the Roman ships came up behind him; together the Roman forces drove the Carthaginians off. The Punic left had driven the Roman third squadron up against the shore, but when the Roman ships had bunched up and formed a line with their prows facing towards the enemy, the Carthaginians had been reluctant to close for fear of the
corvi.
Their ships had done little more than hem the Romans in and were finally driven off when Manlius Vulso came to their aid from one direction and Regulus from the other. Fifty Carthaginian ships were captured in this final phase of the action, for it was difficult to escape, trapped as they were between the shore and the Roman third squadron and the converging forces led by the consuls. Another fourteen Punic ships were captured, probably mainly in the centre, and thirty were sunk. Roman losses were twenty-four sunk and none taken.
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The largest clash of the war, and possibly the biggest naval battle in history, had ended in a clear Roman victory. Once again the
corvus had
proved its worth, most markedly when the beleaguered third squadron had still been able to hold the enemy at bay despite its bad position. The achievement of the Roman consuls also deserves mention. It was difficult at the best of times to control a fleet in this period, with only the simplest signals and plans standing much chance of success. The speed with which, following the defeat of Hamilcar, Regulus and then Manlius also gathered enough ships to make a difference and led them to the aid of the rest of the Roman fleet was truly remarkable. It was in these last phases of the action that the most damage was inflicted on the Carthaginian squadrons. Carthage's greatest ever fleet had not performed well and its commanders had failed to have much influence on the fighting after the initial clash. The Carthaginians did not take advantage of their success in dividing the Roman fleet up. There is no evidence for their successfully boarding and taking a Roman ship, which may suggest that they carried significantly fewer marines. The sheer size of the fleets may have made them clumsy and been better suited to the simpler boarding tactics favoured by the Romans.
At the end of the battle the three divisions of the Punic fleet had retreated in different directions and were in no position to renew the fight. The Romans returned to Sicily to rest their men, repair their ships and salvage as many of the captured warships as possible. This action has caused needless surprise amongst some scholars and led them to doubt that the fleet had intended to cross to Africa in the first place, which would then render the presence of the horse transports somewhat curious. Yet it is important to remember that the battle had been fought close to Sicily and the bulk of the journey still lay before them. The exertion required of crews during a battle was far greater than that of normal travel and it was sensible to allow the rowers to rest and to renew each ship's supply of water before continuing the voyage. Probably the majority of Roman marines were transferred to transport ships to ease the burden on the warships. In addition some of the Roman ships may well have been badly damaged in the fighting and the fleet had certainly become scattered and needed to be reorganized. The Carthaginian fleet still retained a large number of serviceable ships and crews, but its morale must have been very low after its decisive defeat. There was no reason to expect it to risk a second encounter soon after Ecnomus, but in fact this proved to be the case when the Roman fleet sailed to Africa shortly afterwards.
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Sieges and Storms
The African campaign and Regulus' ultimate defeat have already been described. As soon as the outcome of this was reported to the Romans they mustered a large fleet to rescue the survivors from Aspis. The expedition was led by the consuls for 255, Servius Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior and Marcus Aemilius Paullus, who led 350 ships. The Carthaginians were only able to provide crews for 200 vessels to oppose them and were defeated off Cape Hermaeum north of Aspis, a success which may have been aided by a fortuitous attack by the forty ships from the besieged Roman garrison of that city. However, both numbers and morale may anyway have made a Roman success likely. Polybius claims that 114 of the Punic ships were taken along with their crews. The survivors at Aspis were then taken on board and the Roman fleet returned to Sicilian waters. Polybius tells us that the consuls wished to take advantage of their recent victory and the great size of their fleet by cruising along the Carthaginian held south-western coast of Sicily, hoping to overawe the cities tiiere and persuade some to defect. This was against the advice of the experienced ships' captains, who knew that this shore was hostile and possessed few safe harbours, and that there was a strong risk of bad weather at this time of year, between the rising of Orion and that of Sirius (roughly mid July). Off Camarina the fleet was caught in a violent storm and many ships floundered or were driven against the shore and wrecked with huge loss of life.
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Polybius says that only eighty ships survived out of the 364 in the Roman fleet, although other sources provide a wide range of alternative figures. Again the numbers have been doubted. If the Romans had begun the expedition with 350 ships and captured 114 at Hermaeum then they should have had at least 464, apart from the surviving ships from the squadron originally left to support Regulus in Africa. Many ingenious, and often plausible, solutions have been proposed for this problem, but once again we are forced to admit that we cannot establish a precise figure. Clearly it was a major Roman disaster with more men and ships being lost than had previously fallen to enemy action. An attractive suggestion is that the fitting of the
corvus
to the Roman ships made them dangerously unseaworthy in bad conditions and contributed to the catastrophe. The sensitivity of the reconstructed trireme to shifts in weight caused even by movements amongst the crew would tend to support this view. The
corvus
was mounted near the bow of the ship and its weight may well have made the galley bow-heavy, which would clearly be a major problem in a rough sea. If the Romans had captured so many ships at Hermaeum then this would suggest that the
corvus
was still in use, and indeed there seems no reason for the abandonment of such a successful device, although it is not mentioned in our sources after Ecnomus. It is in this section that Polybius famously comments on the Roman reliance on brute force
(bia
)
in all their activities, throwing massive resources into a project and expecting success through effort alone. This attitude, he says, has usually been a source of frequent victories on land, but at sea, when opposed by the power of nature, it has produced some spectacular failures. The narrative of the Punic Wars on the whole supports this judgement on the Roman character. Nevertheless, although the consuls may have been blamed for this disaster, it does not seem to have outweighed the credit they had gained by their earlier victory, for both men survived and went on to celebrate a naval triumph.
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corvus
to the Roman ships made them dangerously unseaworthy in bad conditions and contributed to the catastrophe. The sensitivity of the reconstructed trireme to shifts in weight caused even by movements amongst the crew would tend to support this view. The
corvus
was mounted near the bow of the ship and its weight may well have made the galley bow-heavy, which would clearly be a major problem in a rough sea. If the Romans had captured so many ships at Hermaeum then this would suggest that the
corvus
was still in use, and indeed there seems no reason for the abandonment of such a successful device, although it is not mentioned in our sources after Ecnomus. It is in this section that Polybius famously comments on the Roman reliance on brute force
(bia
)
in all their activities, throwing massive resources into a project and expecting success through effort alone. This attitude, he says, has usually been a source of frequent victories on land, but at sea, when opposed by the power of nature, it has produced some spectacular failures. The narrative of the Punic Wars on the whole supports this judgement on the Roman character. Nevertheless, although the consuls may have been blamed for this disaster, it does not seem to have outweighed the credit they had gained by their earlier victory, for both men survived and went on to celebrate a naval triumph.
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An indication of the Romans' capacity for massive effort came in their swift rebuilding of their naval power. In 254, 220 ships were built and floated in three months, a remarkable but not unprecedented building programme. Sailing to Messana and gathering the eighty ships which had survived the storm (which may imply that this figure included only those ships which were still felt to be seaworthy), the fleet attacked Panormus. The two consuls for 254, Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio, the man who had been captured at Lipara in 260, and Aulus Atilius Caiatinus, who had been consul in 258, besieged the city by land and sea. The election of two experienced former consuls, even if Scipio's reputation may not have been entirely creditable, may suggest a Roman feeling about the seriousness of the situation after the disasters in 255. Panormus' defences were breached nearest the sea and the city was successfully stormed.
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