The French Way (32 page)

Figure 9. Poster for an exhibition at the Carrousel du Louvre,
Art or Advertising?
Courtesy Carrousel du Louvre.

Finally, the experience of these companies raises the question of what effect American business had on French behavior—especially on patterns of consumption and French business practice.

The benign version of the globalization thesis holds that American products will have rather little impact and serve only to broaden options
without diminishing prevailing ways of consumption and leisure. The coming of Coca-Cola, from this perspective, merely added to the repertoire of drinks without displacing other beverages, just as Euro Disney changed little except to add to French and European choices for leisure. Similarly, food supposedly did not become Americanized, it merely became more cosmopolitan, eclectic, and varied.
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This perspective has some validity, but it is probably much too sanguine and uncritical. The Yanks changed the competitive environment, gained market shares at the expense of the natives, and modified patterns of consumption and leisure.

In general these Americans heightened competitive pressures and energized their French rivals. And there was also some loss of market shares for French business in all three sectors. Euro Disney attracted five times as many visitors as its nearest rivals and forced some French leisure parks into bankruptcy. But it also stimulated others to enter the market and to imitate its ways. Parc Asterix, for one, was founded because of Euro Disney and it borrowed from its practices. Coca-Cola transformed how soft drink companies conducted business, advertised products, and sought international markets; and Orangina learned from Coke. Fast food was not the same once McDonald's entered the business; its rivals competed by imitating how the Americans hired and trained employees, operated their outlets, and prepared, presented, and advertised their products. McDonald's enhanced the restaurant business by encouraging conviviality and raising hygiene, according to some of the country's finest chefs.
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In the end all three won the lion's share of their markets: Disney, Coke, and McDonald's were the largest enterprises in their respective sectors and some of their growth came at the expense of local competitors.

The impact on consumers was equally formidable. The Americans did far more than add options for French consumers—they changed them and their habits. There is no doubt that the French proved to be eager customers. In 1949 the French consumed virtually no Coca-Cola, no Big Macs (admittedly, the company did not yet exist), and their only
exposure to Disney was
Le Journal de Mickey
and some animated feature films. In 1999 five million French men, women, and children visited Disneyland Paris; McDonald's had almost a thousand outlets and the French consumed a million meals per day under the Golden Arches; and per-capita consumption of Coca-Cola doubled after 1989 so that the average French person drank about ninety eight-ounce bottles per year.

These market positions at the end of the 1990s may not have been all that the newcomers had hoped for. The French still lagged behind most Europeans and, of course, far behind Latin Americans and Americans in their per-capita consumption of Coke. And as a drink, bottled water still outsold cola. Fast food held only a small portion of the restaurant trade and the consumption of hamburgers, even among the young, was minuscule. And attendance at Disney's park fell short of expectations. But none of these shortfalls diminish the fact that the French became ardent consumers of what the Americans sold—often at the expense of traditional tastes and local business. The consumption of fast food grew spectacularly from the 1970s on and traditional fast food—that of the cafes, viennoiseries, boulangeries, and charcuteries—lost market share to hamburger sales. While fast food outlets grew, the number of cafes fell from 220,000 in 1960 to less than 65,000 by the 1994.
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The consumption of wine among young adults fell dramatically in the 1980s and ‘90s and the willingness among this cohort, and even among some older groups, to drink a sweet beverage like Coca-Cola with meals increased. Causation here is complex, but the beneficiary, and to a lesser extent a cause, of these changes was the American product. This American trio helped change consumer habits of eating, drinking, and leisure.

The adventurers from the New World succeeded—they found the treasure, meaning they won customers, brand recognition, profits, and market shares. To achieve this, they had to adapt and make modifications to suit the locals, but they did so without changing anything essential about their operations, products, or appeal. Rather, they capitalized on their associations with America and imposed their ways.

The French response to these intruders varied. Most simply ignored what they were selling and remained indifferent to them. But millions of others liked what the Americans offered. Among these fans the younger generation was overrepresented. Within the economic sectors targeted by these companies, some businesses became victims; but most survived, and many learned from the Americans and prospered. Politicians tended to welcome these newcomers because of the benefits they offered, such as job creation. Then there were those, like farmers and antiglobalization militants, who attacked the companies as symbols of American imperialism. For these opponents the stakes of the game soared to the level of national identity. But French culture and habits adjusted—there was room for the Americans. In the end Americanization occurred: there was displacement and loss of tradition—the French were changing how they ate, drank, and enjoyed themselves. They gained diversity by adding an American menu, but they also lost uniqueness by becoming more like Americans.

Jacques Chirac once observed that relations between France and the United States “have been, are, and will always be conflictive and excellent. It's in the nature of things….The U.S. finds France unbearably pretentious. And we find the U.S. unbearably hegemonic. There will always be sparks, but not fire….”
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The president of France thus tidily enunciated the essence of the friendly, yet testy, relations between the two countries during the 1990s. Understanding French perceptions of America must begin with their basis in international affairs.

The end of the Cold War made the United States even more important than it had been earlier. Gone were the days when France could enhance its independence by maneuvering between Washington and Moscow. America was the lone superpower and the hegemon in Europe. To be sure, relations with Washington were not the only international concern of Paris: there were other serious issues like binding the newly united Germany to the European Union (EU); stabilizing Eastern Europe, including Russia and the Balkan states; and advancing European integration. But the United States mattered more than any other nation in accomplishing France's agenda and in determining its status. Thus in international relations, as in cultural and socioeconomic affairs, fin-de-siecle France measured itself against the United States: contests over major issues, and even minor ones,
became indices of French diplomatic influence, global rank, and self-image.
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America, in the post-Cold War era, posed a dilemma because France wanted an ally but faced a hegemon. On the one hand France valued the United States because it needed the superpower to stabilize Europe, to keep Germany under control, to provide insurance against a resurgent Russia, and to accomplish many of its goals like peacekeeping in the Balkans or the Middle East; this made Paris wary of alienating Washington, especially when the Americans seemed tempted to retreat into domestic affairs under President Bill Clinton and lighten their commitment to Europe. France also esteemed its transatlantic ally because the two countries shared many common aims and values as well as a dense network of economic and trade relations. If France may have preferred less American presence in Europe, it did not want the Americans to go home and leave Europeans alone with each other. On the other hand, the United States, after its Cold War “victory,” was tempted to act unilaterally. It was even more assertive during the 1990s than it had been in the 1980s: President George H. W. Bush hailed the arrival of a “new world order” and President Clinton extolled “the indispensable nation.” By the end of the decade the United States was tagged as “the hyperpower.” The dilemma was, how to live with Uncle Sam? How to be his partner yet not be overpowered by him? This was a problem, as we have seen, that Francois Mitterrand had failed to solve during the 1980s.

Taming the hyperpower became an index of a successful foreign policy. The principal issue was, how could France either direct or restrain the seemingly omnipotent, headstrong, and sometimes impetuous, transatlantic ally? Gulliver had to be domesticated so that his strength could be used for good ends. For a historian the question is, How did France go about this task, with what success, and with what consequences ? In order to curb the unilateralist instincts of the hyperpower, as we shall see, France employed multiple tactics: it engaged
in bilateral diplomacy; relied on international organizations; formed rival coalitions; constructed a European security capacity; acted without, and even against, the United States; and ultimately designed an alternative to the unipolar international system around the notions of multipolarity and multilateralism.

It may be useful to note that in French politics the first post-Cold War decade divided midway. Francois Mitterrand finished his second term at the Elysee in 1995: his socialist governments were those of Michel Rocard (1988-91), Edith Cresson (1991-92), and Pierre Beregovoy (1992-93), and the foreign minister was Roland Dumas (1988-93). But for the final two years ofhis presidency (1993-95) Mitterrand again faced cohabitation and had to work with a conservative government whose prime minister and foreign minister were, respectively, Edouard Balladur and Alain Juppe. The Mitterrand era ended in 1995 with the election ofJacques Chirac as president: his first prime minister was Alain Juppe (1995-97), accompanied by Herve de Charette as foreign minister. But the 1997 legislative election brought a left-wing majority forcing cohabitation on Chirac: from 1997 to 2002 he cooperated with a socialist government whose prime minister and foreign minister were, respectively, Lionel Jospin and Hubert Vedrine.

A confluence of rather dramatic events during the early 1990s engaged France and the United States. My exposition separates these activities, but in real time they occurred almost simultaneously. Thus, the war in the Persian Gulf had barely subsided when a downward spiral into ethnic strife seized the inhabitants of Yugoslavia. At the same time the United States and France engaged in diplomatic brinkmanship over trade and waged a contest over reform of the Atlantic Alliance. Transatlantic sparring often occurred on many fronts and one struggle tended to complicate the other. This exposition will be thematic rather than chronological, beginning with war, and then security, followed by trade, the “indispensable nation,” and more war, and concluding with the topic of the hyperpower.

Wars: The GulfWar and Bosnia

Iraq raised the question of American ambitions in the “new world order” when in August 1990 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened oil fields in Saudi Arabia. The administration of President George H. W. Bush organized an international coalition to eject Iraq and invited France to join, not only to broaden the ranks but also to secure its assistance on the UN Security Council, whose mandate the U.S. government sought. France, as it turned out, stood with the United States: it voted for UN resolutions and French forces fought under U.S. command in the Desert Storm campaign ofJanuary-February 1991. Nevertheless, there was friction and distrust: President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker harbored doubts until the fighting started that France was entirely on board because Mitterrand tried his best to avoid war by finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis and seemed reluctant to escalate his military commitment. The French meanwhile suspected that the United States sought not just to liberate Kuwait but to overthrow Saddam Hussein and remake the entire oil-rich Middle East

Why did the Mitterrand administration (the prime minister was then Michel Rocard) pursue negotiations with Iraq that made it appear overly conciliatory to the United States? First, there was uneasiness about Washington's motives and ambitions in the Middle East. And there was the usual need to avoid the appearance of servility. France also sought to avoid damaging its reputation in the Arab world: moderate Arab countries, or so it seemed, required the French government to do its best to find a diplomatic solution. There were also considerable economic interests to be protected in Iraq. Finally, the two governments, from the French perspective, approached the issue differently: as Mitterrand's senior military adviser explained, Bush saw the invasion as a moral issue—Iraq must be punished for its faults—while Mitterrand believed it was a crisis that needed a solution; thus, war was only the last resort.
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These and other concerns flared up in cabinet
meetings, fracturing the Rocard government and leaving Mitterrand, who proved to be a strong advocate of supporting the Americans, surrounded by hesitant ministers.
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Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the defense minister who eventually resigned over the war, ardently opposed joining the coalition and he had considerable sympathy within the Socialist Party. Outside the government prominent left-wing politicians like Georges Marchais, speaking for the communists; the ecologist Antoine Waechter; and major right-wing figures like Michel Jobert, Charles Pasqua, and Jean-Marie Le Pen, representing the Front National, all objected to fighting with the Americans.
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Then there was the usual sniping by the intellectual scolds: from Regis Debray, Jean Baudrillard, Claude Julien, and Max Gallo on the left as well as from Alain de Benoist and others on the extreme right. U.S. motives were suspect in these antiwar circles: besides wanting to control the oil-rich Persian Gulf or secretly providing protection to Israel, the United States was allegedly a global gendarme implementing President Bush's “new world order.” France's joining the coalition, they argued, would only help Yankee imperialists in their drive to dominate the Middle East and would ruin French relations with the Arab world. A public opinion survey in November 1990 showed a majority of the French people opposed participation in the war.
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And television news, especially TFi, appeared so sympathetic to Saddam Hussein that Michel Rocard reprimanded it for bias.

Despite their doubts about the war and despite some open opposition, the Mitterrand-Rocard team proved to be a reliable, if difficult, ally. In August 1990 Mitterrand committed French forces to defend Saudi Arabia, insisting before his cabinet that there were times when the French must show solidarity with the Americans, that they could not be false friends, and that they must, since forced to choose, fight against Saddam Hussein regardless of the consequences.
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Saddam, he believed, had embarked on a “Hitlerian scheme” to control the oil deposits of the Middle East.
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Or, as he told Secretary of State Baker, Saddam was “a brute,” a dangerous dictator who had to be contained.
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Mitterrand reasoned that France could not stand aside and be left out of the remaking of the Middle East that was bound to follow the war. There was, moreover, the need to demonstrate that France deserved its permanent seat on the UN Security Council as the representative of Europe; or as Mitterrand told his ministers, “Germany is still a political dwarf….The British are too submissive to the Americans,” leaving only France to negotiate with Iraq—and, in the event that Saddam conceded, it would appear to have saved the peace.
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Still, this did not mean, he instructed his ministers, that France needed to be “servile” to the Americans.
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As the march to war gathered momentum in the fall of 1990 Paris tried simultaneously to meditate between the United States and Iraq while preparing for Operation Desert Storm. Mitterrand hoped to demonstrate to both his own people and the Arab world that France was trying to avoid war. In a speech to the UN in September he angered the Bush administration by not only appearing to open space between France and the UN resolution that required the immediate evacuation of Kuwait, but also asking for an international conference to resolve disputes over Kuwait, Lebanon, and the Occupied Territories in Palestine. Such linkage was what Saddam advocated and what Washington was trying to avoid. Mitterrand told Bush that the United States and Israel were mistaken in opposing a UN conference on peace in the Middle East. French efforts at finding an alternative to war even as the January 1991 deadline approached and their reticence about clarifying their military commitment upset the U.S. government. Days before Desert Storm began, Baker visited Paris and “shocked” Mitterrand by asking him if French ground troops were ready to fight under U.S. command. The French president shot back, “Ten days ago I said that I was in agreement. Are the American military deaf ?”
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Afterward Baker cabled Bush, “The French will be with us when it counts. It just may be bumpy for the next week or so.”
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Baker was right: once ground operations began in February Mitterrand told Bush that the French were totally engaged with the Americans.
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Much of Washington's suspicions
about the firmness of Paris's military commitment can be attributed to Chevenement's holding back at the ministry of defense. Bush later acknowledged there had been differences between American and French officials, but not between the presidents, that “at our level…Francois was always there, and we always stood together.”
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Mitterrand carried his country into war. The Rocard government won overwhelming parliamentary support for the fight in January 1991, including the backing of most of the Socialist Party and all the major right-wing parties. Thanks to Mitterrand's efforts, which demonstrated that all avenues for peaceful resolution had been exhausted, and thanks to the way the media presented Saddam's brutality and his contempt for international law, public opinion shed its initial reservations about the war. Once Operation Desert Storm began, roughly three of four supported allied military intervention and almost as many backed French participation.
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Partisans on all sides, from the Socialist Party to the Gaullists and even the Front National (which in this case spurned its own leader), massively backed the war while expressing confidence in the United States; only the communists stood apart. And the intellectuals who had dissented months before were shoved aside by others like Alain Minc, Guy Konopnicki, and Andre Glucksmann, who rallied to the side of the government. As Jean Daniel from
Le Nouvel Observateur
argued, even if the United States was acting in its own interest, that did not transform Saddam from a criminal to an innocent.
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When hostilities finally began in January 1991 there were over ii,000 French troops in the coalition, along with fighter-bombers and an aircraft carrier. But this was a tiny force compared to the almost half million Americans, the large contingents from Arab countries, or even the 30,000 British troops. Moreover, the French military discovered, to its chagrin, how far behind the Americans it was in high-tech combat. Its Jaguar fighters, for example, lacked the capacity to navigate at night and its intelligence capability was so out-of-date that U.S. intelligence forces had to provide most of the data.
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As images from CNN transmitted the coalition's rapid success, public opinion remained skeptical
about American aims: more believed the goal of the United States was to control oil than it was to liberate Kuwait.
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And CNN's monopoly of reporting from the Persian Gulf antagonized many who thought they were receiving only the sanitized American version of the fighting; or as one of Mitterrand's advisers observed, the Europeans were absent from coverage: “everything happens as if the American Superman confronts the Iraqi Evil alone.”
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If the Gulf War exposed anxieties about President Bush's new world order the French, in the end, sided with their American cousins and confidence in the United States remained high. While fighting subsided in the Gulf it erupted in Yugoslavia.