The Ghost in the Machine (44 page)

 

 

However, we know that in between the 'disembodied spirit' of pure
abstract reasoning, and the passionate neighings in the old cortex,
there is a series of intermediary levels. As already said
(
pp. 180 f
), it would be a gross oversimplification
to distinguish only two types of mentation, such as Freud's 'primary'
and 'secondary' process, the first governed by the pleasure principle,
the second by the reality principle. In between these two, we have to
interpolate several methods of cognition, as we find them in primitive
societies at various stages of development, in children at various ages,
and in adults in various states of consciousness -- such as dreaming,
day-dreaming, hallucinating, etc. Each of these systems of thought has
its own canon, its particular 'rules of the game', which reflect -- in a
manner we are at a loss to explain -- the complex interactions of various
levels and structures in the brain. The old and new levels must interact
all the time -- -even if their co-ordination is inadequate, and deficient
in the controls which lend stability to a well-balanced hierarchy.

 

 

One of the consequences of this is that verbal symbols become associated
with emotive values and visceral reactions -- as the psychogalvanic
lie-detector so dramatically shows. And that applies, of course, not only
to single words or single ideas; complex doctrines, theories, ideologies
are apt to acquire a similar emotional saturation -- not to mention
fetishes, leader-figures and Causes. Unfortunately, we cannot apply a
lie-detector to measure the irrationality of our belief-systems, or the
visceral component in our rationalisations. The true believer moves in a
vicious circle inside his closed system: he can prove to his satisfaction
everything that he believes, and he believes everything he can prove.

 

 

 

Janus Revisited

 

 

MacLean distinguishes two basic motivational drives, each giving rise
to its appropriate types of emotion:
self-preservation
and
preservation of the species
. His experimental work on monkeys
led him to a tentative localisation of the first in the lower, of the
second in the upper half of the limbic system. The emotions derived from
the self-preserving drives are the classic trinity of hunger, rage and
fear. They depend on the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous
system and on the galvanising effect of adrenal hormones released into the
bloodstream. If we include the aggressive and oral components of sexual
behaviour into this group (and we have seen how electric stimulation of
one of these responses spills over into another), we get a fairly complete
inventory of what we have called the
self-assertive
tendencies.

 

 

The other of MacLean's basic drives, preservation of the species, is a
less clear-cut category. He includes in it the care of the young, the
grooming habits and other forms of friendly social behaviour in monkeys;
but he seems to regard them in the Freudian tradition, as derivatives
from the sexual drive:

 

Concern for the welfare and preservation of the species is based
on sexuality, and in man it reflects itself in a multiplicity of
ways. It is a concern that leads to courtship and the eventual
rearing of the family. It is a concern that permeates our songs,
our poetry, our novels, art, theatre, architecture. It is a concern
that preoccupies us in planning for the higher education of our
children. It is a concern that promotes the building of libraries,
institutes of research, and hospitals. It is a concern that inspired
medical research to prevent suffering and dying of patients. . . . It
is a concern that makes us think in terms of rockets, travel in outer
space, and the possibility of immortal life in some other world. [34]

 

By the time we have travelled from the first sentence of this quotation to
the last, the connection with sexuality has become more and more tenuous
-- unless we subscribe to the doctrine that all social, artistic and
scientific activities are sublimations or substitutions for sexuality.
It is equally difficult to see how the 'magnetic force', as Konrad Lorenz
has called it, which holds a herd or a shoal of ocean fish together --
an attraction which seems to increase in geometrical proportion with
the size of the shoal and to depend on no other factors [35] -- could
be based on sexuality. The same consideration applies to the division of
labour in the beehive, with its vast proportion of sexless workers. Even
though the most powerful of drives, sexuality is not the only, and
perhaps not even the primary, bond which holds animal and human societies
together, and which ensures the preservation and welfare of the species
-- including the spiritual and artistic welfare of our own. It seems
therefore more appropriate to include the sexual instinct, together with
the other forces of social cohesion, in the more general category of our
'integrative tendencies'. Sex, as we have seen, is a relative late-comer
on the evolutionary stage; whereas the polarity of self-assertive versus
integrative tendencies is inherent in all hicrarchic order, and present
on every level of living organisms and social organisations.

 

 

In the animal kingdom, of course, MacLean's term 'preservation and welfare
of the species' (as distinct from self-preservation) covers practically
all manifestations of what we call the integrative tendencies; and if
MacLean is correct in localising them in the upper half of the limbic
system, and the drives of self-preservation in the lower half, we cannot
ask for a better confirmation of the postulated polarity.

 

 

Thus as long as we confine the discussion to monkeys, the question
of terminology is reduced to a semantic quibble. But when we come to
man, the integrative tendency may assume a variety of forms, including
the self-transcending emotions which enter into religious and artistic
experience, but have little bearing on preservation of the species. They
too must have their neurophysiological correlates, but here the subject
becomes rather technical, and the general reader may safely skip the
next two paragraphs.

 

 

We have seen that a close correlation exists between the
aggressive-defensive emotions and the sympathetic division of the
autonomic nervous system. It would be tempting to assume a symmetrical
correlation between the self-transcending emotions and the other division
of the autonomic system -- the parasympathetic. There is some evidence in
favour of this view, although it is not conclusive. In general (but there
are, as we shall presently see, important exceptions) the action of the
two divisions is mutually antagonistic: they equilibrate each other. The
sympathetic division prepares the animal for emergency reactions under
the stress of hunger, pain, rage and fear. It accelerates the pulse,
increases blood-pressure, provides added blood-sugar as a source of
energy. The parasympathetic division does in almost every respect
the opposite: it lowers blood-pressure, slows the heart, neutralises
excesses of blood-sugar, facilitates digestion and the disposal of
body wastes; activates the tear-glands -- it is generally calming and
cathartic. Characteristically, laughter is a sympathetic, weeping a
parasympathetic, discharge.

 

 

Both divisions of the autonomic nervous system are controlled by the
limbic brain (the hypothalamus and adjacent structures). Different
authors have described their functions in different terms. Allport
related the pleasurable emotions to the para-sympathetic, the
unpleasant ones to the sympathetic. [36] Olds distinguishes between
'positive' and 'negative' emotive systems, activated respectively by
the parasympathetic and sympathetic centres in the hypothalamus. [36a]
From a quite different theoretical approach, Hebb also arrived at the
conclusion that a distinction should he made between two categories
of emotion, 'those in which the tendency is to maintain or increase
the original stimulating conditions (pleasurable or integrative
emotions)' and 'those in which the tendency is to abolish or decrease
the stimulus (rage, fear, disgust)'. [36b] Pribram has made a similar
distinction between 'preparatory' (warding-off) and 'participatory'
emotions. [36c] Hess and Gellhorn, distinguish between an ergotropic
(energy-consuming) system operating through the sympathetic division to
ward off threatening stimuli, and a trophotropic (energy-conserving)
system which operates through the parasympathetic in response to
peaceful or attractive stimuli. [37] Gellhorn has summarised the
emotional effects of two different types of drugs: on the one hand the
'pep pills', such as benzedrine, and on the other the tranquillisers,
such as chlorpromazine. The former activates the sympathetic, the latter
the parasympathetic, division. When administered in small doses, the
tranquillisers cause 'slight shifts in the hypothalamic balance to the
parasympathetic side, resulting in calm and contentment, apparently
similar to the state before falling asleep, whereas more marked
alterations lead to a depressive mood'. [38] The benzedrine-type
drugs, on the other hand, activate the sympathetic division, cause
increased aggressiveness in animals, and in man in small doses
alertness and euphoria, in larger doses over-excitation and manic
behaviour. Lastly, Cobb has summed up the implicit contrast in a pointed
form: 'Rage is called the most adrenergic, and love the most cholinergic
[characteristically parasympathetic] reaction.' [39]

 

 

What this short survey indicates is, in the first place, a general trend
among authorities in this field to distinguish between
two basic
categories of emotion
-- though the definitions of the categories
differ, and are mixed up with the hedonic tone (which, in the present
theory, is an independent variable of either category; cf.
pp. 226f
). In the second place, there is a general
feeling that the two categories are 'somehow' correlated to the two
divisions of the autonomic nervous system.

 

 

But the correlation is not a simple and clear-cut one. Thus, for instance,
according to MacLean, 'erection is a parasympathetic phenomenon,
whereas ejaculation depends on sympathetic mechanisms' [40] -- which,
as far as categories are concerned, is neither here nor there. Moreover,
strong parasympathetic stimulation may cause nausea or vomiting which,
though cathartic (that is, 'cleansing' in the literal sense), can
hardly be called an act of psychological self-transcendence. In a
word, the functioning of the autonomic nervous system is one of the
most intriguing physiological aspects of man's emotional life; and in
fairness to the general reader I ought to point out that, while there
is ample evidence that the self-assertive emotions are mediated by
the sympathico-adrenal division, there is no conclusive proof for the
symmetrical correlation suggested here. Such proof can be forthcoming
only when human emotions outside the hunger-rage-fear class will be
recognised as a worthwhile object of study by experimental psychology
-- which at present is not the case. In conformity with the Zeitgeist,
the self-transcending emotions are still the stepchildren of psychology,
in spite of their evident reality. Weeping, for instance, is certainly an
observable behavioural phenomenon (the Behaviourist could even measure
the amount of lachrymation in milligrams per second). But it is almost
completely ignored in psychological literature.*

 

* For a discussion of the subject, and a bibliography of weeping,
see The Act of Creation, Chapters XII-XIV and pp. 725-8.

 

Some additional facts about the autonomic nervous system are pertinent
to our theme. In strongly emotional or pathological conditions, the
mutually antagonistic, i.e., equilibrating action of the two divisions no
longer prevails; instead they may mutually
reinforce
each other,
as in the sexual act; or over-excitation of one division may lead to a
temporary
rebound
or over-compensatory 'answering effect' by the
other [41]; lastly, the parasympathetic may act as a
catalyst
that triggers its antagonist into action. [42]

 

 

The first of these three possibilities is relevant to our emotional
state in listening to rhapsodic music -- a Wagner opera for instance --
where relaxed, cathartic feelings seem to be paradoxically combined with
euphoric arousal. The second possibility is reflected in 'emotional
hangovers' of one kind or another. The third possibility is the most
relevant to our theme: it shows in concrete physiological terms how one
type of emotional reaction can act as a vehicle for its opposite -- as
self-transcending identification with the hero on the screen releases
vicarious aggressiveness against the villain; as identification
with a group or creed releases the savagery of mob-behaviour. The
rationalisations for it are formulated in the language-symbols of the
new cortex; but the emotive dynamism is generated by the old brain,
and conveyed to viscera and glands by the autonomic nervous system.

 

 

This is another point where neurophysiological research begins to merge
with psychology, to provide clues to its paradoxes -- and perhaps a
first inkling of an answer to the human predicament.

 

 

 

Summary

 

 

The evolution of arthropods and marsupials shows that mistakes in brain
building do occur. The strategy of evolution is subject to trial and
error, and there is nothing particularly improbable in the assumption that
in the course of the explosive growth of the human neocortex evolution
erred once more. The Papez-MacLean theory offers strong evidence for
the dissonant functioning of the phylogenetically old and new cortex,
and the resulting 'schizophysiology' built into our species. This would
provide a physiological basis for the paranoid streak running through
human history, and point the direction of the search for a cure.