The Grand Alliance (141 page)

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giance is to the King Emperor, and that the rule of the
Congress and Hindu priesthood machine would never
be tolerated by a fighting race.

2. I do not think you will have any trouble with
American opinion. All press comments on India I have
seen have been singularly restrained, especially since
they entered the war. Thought here is concentrated on
winning the war as soon as possible. The first duty of
Congress nominees who have secured control of
provincial government is to resume their responsible
duties as ministers, and show that they can make a
success of the enormous jobs confided to them in this
time of emergency. Pray communicate these views to
the Cabinet. I trust we shall not depart from the position
we have deliberately taken up.

I was much disturbed by the reports which Mr. Eden had brought back with him from Moscow of Soviet territorial ambitions, especially in the Baltic States. These were the conquests of Peter the Great, and had been for two hundred years under the Czars. Since the Russian Revolution they had been the outpost of Europe against Bolshevism. They were what are now called “social democracies,” but very lively and truculent. Hitler had cast them away like pawns in his deal with the Soviets before the outbreak of war in 1939. There had been a severe Russian and Communist purge. All the dominant personalities and elements had been liquidated in one way or another. The life of these strong peoples was henceforward underground. Presently, as we shall see, Hitler came back with a Nazi counter-purge. Finally, in the general victory the Soviets had control again. Thus the deadly comb ran back and forth, and back again, through Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There was no doubt The Grand Alliance

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however where the right lay. The Baltic States should be sovereign independent peoples.

Prime

Minister

to

8 Jan. 42

Foreign Secretary

We have never recognised the 1941 frontiers of
Russia except de facto. They were acquired by acts of
aggression in shameful collusion with Hitler. The
transfer of the peoples of the Baltic States to Soviet
Russia against their will would be contrary to all the
principles for which we are fighting this war and would
dishonour our cause. This also applies to Bessarabia
and to Northern Bukhovina, and in a lesser degree to
Finland, which I gather it is not intended wholly to
subjugate and absorb.

2. Russia could, upon strategical grounds, make a
case for the approaches to Leningrad, which the Finns
have utilised to attack her. There are islands in the
Baltic which may be essential to the safety of Russia.

Strategical security may be invoked at certain points on
the frontiers of Bukhovina or Bessarabia. In these
cases the population would have to be offered evacuation and compensation if they desired it. In all other
cases transference of territory must be regulated after
the war is over by freely and fairly conducted
plebiscites, very differently from what is suggested. In
any case there can be no question of settling frontiers
until the Peace Conference. I know President
Roosevelt holds this view as strongly as I do, and he
has several times expressed his pleasure to me at the
firm line we took at Moscow. I could not be an advocate
for a British Cabinet bent on such a course.

3. I regard our sincerity to be involved in the maintenance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which
Stalin has subscribed. On this also we depend for our
association with the United States….

5. About the effect on Russia of our refusal to
prejudice the peace negotiations at this stage in the
war, or to depart from the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, it must be observed that they entered the war
only when attacked by Germany, having previously

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shown themselves utterly indifferent to our fate, and
indeed they added to our burdens in our worst danger.

Their armies have fought very bravely and have shown
immense unsuspected strength in the defence of their
native soil. They are fighting for self-preservation and
have never had a thought for us. We, on the contrary,
are helping them to the utmost of our ability because
we admire their defence of their own country and
because they are ranged against Hitler.

6. No one can forsee how the balance of power will
lie or where the winning armies will stand at the end of
the war. It seems probable however that the United
States and the British Empire, far from being exhausted, will be the most powerfully armed and economic
bloc the world has ever seen, and that the Soviet Union
will need our aid for reconstruction far more than we
shall then need theirs.

7. You have promised that we will examine these
claims of Russia in common with the United States and
the Dominions. That promise we must keep. But there
must be no mistake about the opinion of any British
Government of which I am the head, namely, that it
adheres to those principles of freedom and democracy
set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and that these
principles must become especially active whenever any
question of transferring territory is raised. I conceive
therefore that our answer should be that all questions
of territorial frontiers must be left to the decision of the
Peace Conference.

Juridically this is how the matter stands now.

While at Palm Beach I was of course in constant touch by telephone with the President and the British Staffs in Washington, and also when necessary I could speak to London. An amusing, though at the moment disconcerting, incident occurred. Mr. Wendell Willkie had asked to see me. At this time there was tension between him and the The Grand Alliance

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President. Roosevelt had not seemed at all keen about my meeting prominent members of the Opposition, and I had consequently so far not done so. Having regard however to Wendell Willkie’s visit to England a year before in January, 1941, and to the cordial relations I had established with him, I felt that I ought not to leave American shores without seeing him. This was also our Ambassador’s advice. I therefore put a call through to him on the evening of the 5th. After some delay I was told, “Your call is through.” I said in effect, “I am so glad to speak to you. I hope we may meet. I am travelling back by train tomorrow night. Can you not join the train at some point and travel with me for a few hours? Where will you be on Saturday next?” A voice came back: “Why, just where I am now, at my desk.” To this I replied, “I do not understand.” “Whom do you think you are speaking to?” I replied, “To Mr. Wendell Willkie, am I not?”

“No,” was the answer, “you are speaking to the President.” I did not hear this very well, and asked, “Who?” “You are speaking to me,” came the answer, “Franklin Roosevelt.” I said, “I did not mean to trouble you at this moment. I was trying to speak to Wendell Willkie, but your telephone exchange seems to have made a mistake.” “I hope you are getting on all right down there and enjoying yourself,” said the President. Some pleasant conversation followed about personal movements and plans, at the end of which I asked, “I presume you do not mind my having wished to speak to Wendell Willkie?” To this Roosevelt said, “No.”

And this was the end of our talk.

It must be remembered that this was in the early days of our friendship, and when I got back to Washington I thought it right to find out from Harry Hopkins whether any offence had been given. I therefore wrote to him: I rely on you to let me know if this action of mine in wishing to speak to the person named is in any way

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considered inappropriate, because I certainly thought I was acting in accordance with my duty to be civil to a public personage of importance, and unless you advise me to the contrary I still propose to do so.

Hopkins said that no harm had been done.

It was now time to come home.

Prime Minister to Lord

9 Jan. 42

Privy Seal

You will have seen by the telegrams which have
passed that I have not been idle here. Indeed, the
seclusion in which I have lived has enabled me to focus
things more clearly than was possible in the stir of
Washington. I am in the midst of preparing a considerable paper on Anglo-American co-operation, which I
shall discuss with the Staffs and then with the President
as soon as I get back.

I am so glad the debate of the 8th passed off peacefully, and that the House was willing to postpone the
discussion on the main issue. Of course the naggings
and snarlings have been fully reported over here, and
one would think that they represented the opinion of the
House. Several remarks have been reported which are
not very helpful to American opinion, and I am pointing
out to the President that we can no more control the
expression of freak opinion by individual members than
he can those of Congress backwoodsmen. Try to let
me have the gist of what you and Anthony said.

It might be convenient if I made my statement on
Tuesday as a statement, and the adjournment was
moved by somebody else immediately after. This would
enable the usual criticisms to be made without my
having exhausted my right to reply. Perhaps however
you will not think this necessary. I cannot help feeling
we have a good tale to tell, even though we cannot tell
the best part of it.

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I set out by train to return to Washington on the night of the 9th, and reached the White House on the 11th. Business kept me company.

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17

Return to Storm

Some Further Notes on the War After Anglo-American Discussions — Expansion of the United
States Army — And of the Air Force — Growing
Output of Munitions and Shipping
—
Importance
of Sending an American Army to Northern Ireland