The Grand Alliance (69 page)

We feel sure you should keep at it both at Sollum and
Tobruk. He cannot possibly fill the gap as you can.

Presume you are using your powerful mechanised field
artillery to the full at both places, compelling him to fire
off ammunition, of which we know he is short. We
should also be grateful if, without burdening yourself

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personally, you could have some officer on your staff
send a fuller report of the events and position as known
at your headquarters each evening. This is all the more
desirable when operations of such outstanding importance for the world situation as those of the Western
Desert are in progress.

4. What are your dates for bringing Tiger Cubs into
action?

General

Wavell

to

18 May 41

Prime Minister

Enemy proved rather stronger than we thought, and
has forced us back on defensive till Tiger Cubs come
into action. This will not be before end of month, and it
would be better if they could be given more time to
settle down, but this must depend on situation. Enemy
is collecting strength in forward area and may try further
advance.

You will have heard of Aosta’s surrender, which
practically completes East African campaign.

On May 20 Wavell reported that a tank battalion of the 15th Panzer Division was believed to have arrived in the forward area. Thus the opportunity of defeating Rommel before he could be reinforced had passed. Despite preparations made in advance, the delays in unloading, refitting, and making desert-worthy the Tiger Cubs proved severe. The mechanical condition of many of the “I” tanks was found on arrival to be indifferent.

General

Wavell

to

25 May 41

Prime Minister

Many thanks for your message. We realise that our
burdens and responsibilities here, though heavy, are
nothing to those you shoulder so gallantly….

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Weaning of Tiger Cubs proceeding satisfactorily, but
even tigers have teething troubles.

“I remember,” says my wife, “terrible anxiety and
even anger at Chequers on several Sundays because
the newly arrived tanks could only come into action so
slowly.”

But trouble soon descended. During the ensuing week considerable movement of enemy armoured vehicles was observed. From documents captured later it was learnt that Rommel was expecting a serious attack to relieve Tobruk, and was determined to recapture and hold Halfaya in order to make such an attempt more difficult. He deployed the greater part of the newly arrived 15th Panzer Division, which, except for a small reconnaissance force thrown out to the south, he concentrated on the frontier between Capuzzo and Sidi Omar. Halfaya was held by a battalion group composed of the 3d Battalion Coldstream Guards, a regiment of field artillery, and two squadrons of tanks. The remainder of our frontier troops, except for observation patrols to the south, had been withdrawn considerable distances to the rear. The enemy advanced on Halfaya on May 26, and that evening captured a feature north of the pass which gave good observation over the whole position held by the Coldstream. A counter-attack to regain the feature was unsuccessful, and next morning after heavy shelling a concerted attack by at least two battalions and sixty tanks placed our small force in great jeopardy.

Reserves were too distant to be able to intervene, and it remained only to extricate the force without more ado. This was accomplished, but losses were severe; only two of our tanks remained effective, and the Coldstream Guards lost eight officers and a hundred and sixty-five men. The enemy

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had gained his objective, and proceeded to install himself firmly at Halfaya. As he had hoped, his occupation of this position was to prove a considerable hindrance to us three weeks later.

Preparations for “Battleaxe” continued actively; but there was a darker side.

General Wavell to C.

28 May 41

I.G.S.

All available armoured strength, which will be
deciding factor, is being put into “Battleaxe.” Various
difficulties are delaying reconstitution 7th Armoured
Division. Earliest date for beginning of forward move
from Matruh will be June 7, and may be later.

2. I think it right to inform you that the measure of
success which will attend this operation is in my opinion
doubtful. I hope that it will succeed in driving enemy
west of Tobruk and reestablishing land communications
with Tobruk. If possible we will exploit success further.

But recent operations have disclosed some disquieting
features. Our armoured cars arc too lightly armoured to
resist the fire of enemy fighter aircraft, and, having no
gun, are powerless against the German eight-wheeled
armoured cars, which have guns and are faster. This
makes reconnaissance difficult. Our infantry tanks are
really too slow for a battle in the desert, and have been
suffering considerable casualties from the fire of the
powerful enemy anti-tank guns. Our cruisers have little
advantage in power or speed over German medium
tanks. Technical breakdowns are still too numerous.

We shall not be able to accept battle with perfect
confidence in spite of numerical inferiority, as we could
against Italians. Above factors may limit our success.

They also make it imperative that adequate flow of
armoured reinforcements and reserves should be
maintained.

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On May 31 General Wavell reported the technical difficulties which he was having with the re-formation of the 7th Armoured Division. The earliest date at which he was able to launch “Battleaxe” would be June 15. While he realised the dangers of postponement, with the risk of enemy air reinforcements and a heavy attack on Tobruk, he felt that, as the forthcoming battle would be primarily a tank engagement, he must give the armoured division every chance, and the extra days gained by waiting should

“double the possibilities of success.”

I now awaited in keen hope and fear our attack in the Desert, from which results might be gained which might change in our favour the whole course of the campaign.

The extra fortnight that had passed before the Tiger Cubs could be assimilated by the 7th Armoured Division made me fear that the 15th Panzers would all have reached Rommel.

According to our Intelligence there were now known to be in, or approaching, Eastern Cyrenaica the German 5th (Light) Panzer and the 15th Panzer Divisions, with the Italian Ariete Armoured Division, the Trento Motorised Division, and the Brescia Infantry Division. Another Italian infantry division was in reserve at Derna. In disquieting contrast with our own performances earlier in the year, the Germans had brought Benghazi rapidly into use, and the bulk of their forces was probably already being maintained to a large extent through that port.

In his dispatch Wavell states that the bulk of the enemy lay before Tobruk with about one hundred and thirty medium and seventy light tanks. In the forward area it was estimated that there were only one hundred medium tanks, with the equivalent of seven German and nine Kalian battalions. Two-thirds of the enemy’s tank strength was,

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therefore, believed to be seventy miles back from the frontier. If Tobruk by a sortie could hold for a while the enemy around it, we should have at the outset a superiority in armour on the frontier of one hundred and eighty to one hundred tanks. Wavell comments that these estimates were wrong. So far as now can be established, Italian tanks were not used at all in the frontier battle. The Germans had succeeded in concentrating forward a large part of their own armour without our becoming aware of it. Actually they brought rather more than two hundred tanks into action against our one hundred and eighty.

“Battleaxe” started early on June 15. General Creagh commanded our armour, and General Messervy the 4th Indian Division and the 22d Guards Brigade. The whole force, comprising about twenty-five thousand men, was under General Beresford-Peirse. At first things went reasonably well. Although the enemy defence about Halfaya held out against the combined attack from north and south, the Guards Brigade took Capuzzo in the afternoon with several hundred prisoners. A part of this brigade also moved on against the western defences of Sollum, but there they were stopped. The 7th Armoured Brigade, moving in protection of the outer flank, reached a position west of Capuzzo without encountering enemy tanks. On June 16 no progress was made. Halfaya and Sollum held firm against us, and in the afternoon strong forces of enemy tanks appeared, moving with the clear intention of outflanking our attack from the west. The 7th Armoured Division, both the brigade and the support group, moved to deal with this threat. They engaged the enemy near Sidi Omar, but were outnumbered and forced to The Grand Alliance

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withdraw. The flank of the main attack, which it was their task to protect, was thereby imperilled.

Next day, June 17, everything went wrong. In the morning the Guards Brigade were still in Capuzzo and facing Sollum. Capuzzo was taken from them by a considerable force, with tanks reported to be one hundred strong. The 7th Armoured Brigade, with only about twenty cruiser tanks now in action, had spent the night near Sidi Suleiman. The enemy force, which had forced them back overnight from Sidi Omar, made towards Halfaya and threatened to cut off the Guards Brigade. To deal with this threat Creagh proposed an attack with the 7th Armoured Brigade from the south, while the 4th Armoured Brigade, to be relieved of its task of co-operating with the Guards Brigade, attacked from the north. But as soon as the 4th Brigade started to move off yet another enemy armoured column coming in from the west threatened the Guards’ flank. The armoured brigade held this attack off, but the enemy pressure continued, and Messervy informed Creagh that he could not part with the brigade lest his infantry be cut off.