The Grand Alliance (67 page)

– a possibility which could not be ignored – priority must be given to the attempt to obtain a successful military decision in the Western Desert Operation “Battleaxe.”

On the night of May 27 the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was summoned to consider the general situation throughout the Middle East, and I embodied their conclusions in a telegram to General Wavell.

Prime

Minister

to

28 May 41

General Wavell

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409

… Our immediate action in the Middle East is
dictated by the following facts: (1) Possession of Crete
will enable enemy to establish direct line of communication to Cyrenaica via west coast of Greece and Crete.

Unless we can establish air forces in Cyrenaica we can
neither interrupt this line nor can we easily maintain
Malta and continue interruption of Tripoli line of communication. (2) Attack through Turkey and/or through Syria
cannot develop in real strength for a good many weeks.

Our first object must be to gain a decisive military
success in the Western Desert and to destroy the
enemy armed forces in a battle fought with our whole
available strength.

Meanwhile, it is important to establish ourselves in
Syria before the Germans have recovered from the
immense drain on their air power which the vigorous
resistance of Freyberg’s army has produced. Accordingly, the general plan outlined in your telegram of May 25

is approved.

Preparations for the occupation of Syria, therefore, went forward amid anxieties about the fall of Crete and prior concentration on the Western Desert.

On June 3 I telegraphed to General Wavell:
Prime

Minister

to

3 June 41

General Wavell

Please telegraph exactly what ground and air forces
you are using for Syria. What are you doing with the
Poles? It seems important to use and demonstrate as
much air power as possible at the very outset, and
even the older machines may play their part, as they
did so well in Iraq.

2. There is a storm of criticism about Crete, and I am
being pressed for explanations on many points. Do not
worry about this at all now. Simply keep your eye on
Syria, and above all “Battleaxe.” These alone can
supply the answers to criticisms, just or unjust. The air
superiority available for “Battleaxe” far exceeds

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anything you are likely to have for many months. As
Napoleon said, “La bataille répondra.” All good wishes.

Wavell replied on the fifth informing us of the forces he would use. Fighting would be avoided as far as possible, progress being at first by propaganda, leaflets, and display of force. If resistance was encountered, the utmost force would be used. He said he had always estimated the strength required for the occupation of Syria as two divisions and one armoured division, or at least [some]

armoured brigades. He must, therefore, regard success as at least problematical, and dependent on the attitude of the French garrison and local population.

Remembering the baffling and confused nature of the problems which confronted de Gaulle, I now sent on the eve of our joint expedition into Syria the following telegram of good will:

Prime

Minister

to

6 June 41

General de Gaulle

I wish to send you my best wishes for success of our
joint enterprise in the Levant. I hope you are satisfied
that everything possible is being done to provide
support to the arms of Free France. You will, I am sure,
agree that this action, and indeed our whole future
policy in the Middle East, must be conceived in terms of
mutual trust and collaboration. Our policies towards the
Arabs must run on parallel lines. You know that we
have sought no special advantages in the French
Empire, and have no intention of exploiting the tragic
position of France for our own gain.

I welcome, therefore, your decision to promise
independence to Syria and the Lebanon, and, as you
know, I think it essential that we should lend to this
promise the full weight of our guarantee. I agree that

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we must not in any settlement of the Syrian question
endanger the stability of the Middle East. But subject to
this we must both do everything possible to meet Arab
aspirations and susceptibilities. You will, I am sure,
bear in mind the importance of this.

All our thoughts are with you and the soldiers of
Free France. At this hour, when Vichy touches fresh
depths of ignominy, the loyalty and courage of the Free
French save the glory of France.

I must ask you in this grave hour not to insist on
declaring Catroux High Commissioner for Syria.

As usual, I kept President Roosevelt fully informed.

Former Naval Person

7 June 41

to

President

Roosevelt

We enter Syria in some force tomorrow morning in
order to prevent further German penetration. Success
depends largely upon attitude of local French troops.

De Gaulle’s Free French outfit will be prominent, but
not in the van. He is issuing a proclamation to the
Arabs offering in the name of France complete in
dependence and opportunity to form either three or one
or three-in-one free Arab States. Relations of these
States with France will be fixed by treaty safeguarding
established interests somewhat on the Anglo-Egyptian
model. General Catroux is not to be called High Commissioner, but French Delegate and Plenipotentiary.

2. I cannot tell how Vichy will react to what may
happen. I do not myself think they will do much worse
than they are now doing, but of course they may
retaliate on Gibraltar or Freetown. I should be most
grateful if you would keep up your pressure upon them.

We have no political interests at all in Syria except to
win the war.

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All Wavell could muster for the advance was the 7th Australian Division, part of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade, recently returned from Eritrea, and the Free French force under General Le Gentilhomme, comprising six battalions, one battery, and a company of tanks. Air support was limited at first to about seventy aircraft in all. The Crete battle had priority with both sides.

Two cruisers and ten destroyers, besides smaller craft, were spared for the Syrian effort. The Vichy forces, under General Dentz, comprised eighteen battalions, with a hundred and twenty guns and ninety tanks, thirty-five thousand men in all, an air force amounting to ninety aircraft, and a naval force of two destroyers and three submarines based on Beirut.

The task assigned to the Allied army was to capture Damascus, Rayak, and Beirut as a preliminary to the occupation of the whole country. The advance began on June 8, and at first met little opposition. No one could tell how much Vichy would fight. Although our attack could hardly achieve a surprise, it was thought by some that the enemy would offer only a token resistance. But when the enemy realised how weak we were they took heart and reacted vigorously, if only for the honour of their arms. The Free French were held ten miles short of Damascus, and a counter-movement round their eastern flank threatened their line of communications. The Australians, on the coast road, made slow progress over difficult ground. A British battalion was overwhelmed at Kuneitra by a counterattack of two battalions with tanks. At sea contact was made with the Vichy destroyers, but they fled with superior speed. On the ninth a brief encounter took place at sea, in which the destroyer
Janus
was severely hit. On the fifteenth, while bombarding Sidon, two British destroyers were damaged by The Grand Alliance

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air attack, but a Vichy destroyer approaching the coast from the west was sunk by the Fleet air arm.

As a result of the first week’s fighting, it was clear to Wavell that reinforcements were necessary. He was able to collect transport for one brigade of the 6th British Division, which was now partly formed, followed at the end of June by a second brigade. He also arranged for a brigade group of the 1st Cavalry Division, “Habforce,” which had taken part in the capture of Baghdad, to advance on Palmyra through the deserts from the south; and two brigades of the 10th Indian Division in Iraq were ordered to move up the Euphrates on Aleppo. This enlargement of the campaign began to take effect from June 20. Damascus was captured by the Australians on the twenty-first, after three days of severe fighting. Their advance was aided by a daring raid by Number 11 Commando, which was landed from the sea behind the enemy lines. In this devoted stroke the Commando lost their leader, Colonel Pedder, and all its other officers were either killed or wounded, together with nearly a hundred and twenty other ranks, or one quarter of its total strength.

The operations of the first week of July brought the Vichy collapse into sight. General Dentz realised that his limit was reached. He still had about 24,000 men, but he could not hope to offer continued resistance. Barely one-fifth of his air force remained. At 8.30 A.M. on July 12, Vichy envoys arrived to sue for an armistice. This was granted, a convention was signed, and Syria passed into Allied occupation. Our casualties in killed and wounded were over 4600; those of the enemy about 6500. One distasteful incident remained. British prisoners taken during the fighting had been hurriedly shipped off to Vichy France, whence they would certainly have passed into German keeping. When this was discovered and no redress was