The Grand Alliance (71 page)

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I had for several months past been extremely distressed by the apparent inadequacy of the Cairo Staff, and I increasingly realised the undue burdens of so many different kinds cast upon our struggling Commander-in-Chief. He had himself, together with the other Commanders-in-Chief, as early as April 18 asked for some relief and assistance. His view was endorsed by his two professional colleagues. “We consider it necessary for some authority to be established here to deal, inside the broad lines of policy laid down by His Majesty’s Government, with the political aspects of issues affecting more than one department or territory. This will, of course, entail his being directly responsible to the War Cabinet and not to any one department.” The Commanders-in-Chief had felt the convenience of having high political authority close at hand during Mr. Eden’s visit. They were conscious of a vacuum after his departure.

I had already by June 4 appointed General Haining to the unusual office, which I created, of “Intendant-General.” This officer had deputised for the C.I.G.S. during his absence abroad, and was consequently familiar with War Cabinet procedure and the wider aspects of the war. I hoped he would be able to relieve Wavell of all the business of supply and technical administration. I meant him to overhaul the whole rearward administrative machine, paying particular attention to the great tank and aircraft repairing etablishments, as well as to the evergrowing railway, road, and port development which was now in progress. Thus the commanders would be freed from a mass of detail, and need think only of the fighting.

My son Randolph, who had gone out with the commandos, now to some extent dispersed, was at this time serving in The Grand Alliance

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the Desert. He was a Member of Parliament and had considerable contacts. I did not hear much or often from him, but on June 7 I had received through the Foreign Office the following telegram which he had sent from Cairo with the knowledge and encouragement of our Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson:

Personal and Secret. From Randolph Churchill to
Prime Minister

Do not see how we can start winning war out here
until we have a competent civilian on the spot to
provide day-to-day political and strategic direction. Why
not send a member of the War Cabinet here to preside
over whole war effort? Apart from small personal staff,
he would need two outstanding men to co-ordinate
supply and direct censorship, intelligence, and propaganda. Most thoughtful people here realise need for
radical reform along these lines. No mere shunting of
personnel will suffice, and the present time seems
particularly ripe and favourable for a change of system.

Please forgive me troubling you, but consider present
situation deplorable and urgent action vital to any
prospects of success.

It is the fact that this clinched matters in my mind. “I have been thinking,” I replied to him a fortnight later, “a good deal for some time on the lines of your helpful and well-conceived telegram.” And thereupon I took action.

I had brought Captain Oliver Lyttelton into the Government as President of the Board of Trade in October, 1940. I had known him from his childhood. His father, Alfred Lyttelton, had been Mr. Balfour’s Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1904, and had before the Home Rule split been a youthful private secretary to Mr. Gladstone. He was for many years a distinguished member of the House of Commons. His son was thus brought up in a political atmosphere. He served in the Grenadiers through the hardest fighting of the First World War, being wounded and The Grand Alliance

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decorated several times. I remember going to see him in hospital in 1918 after he had had the good luck to be wounded by a poison-gas shell, which burst at his feet and burned him all over, instead of being killed, as he would have been, by a more orthodox and humane high-explosive projectile. After leaving the Army he had entered business and made and lost and made again a fortune. Knowing his remarkable personal qualities, I did not hesitate to bring him into Parliament and high office. As President of the Board of Trade his administration had won respect from all parties in our National Government. I had not liked his proposals of 1941 for clothing coupons, but I found these were received with favour by the Cabinet and the House of Commons, and there is no doubt they were necessary at the time. My unusual choice had been vindicated by the results, although he had still much to learn as a newcomer in the House of Commons. He was an all-round man of action, and I now felt that he was in every way fitted for this new and novel post of a War Cabinet Minister resident in the Middle East.

This would take another large slice of business off the shoulders of the military chiefs. I found this idea most readily acceptable to my colleagues of all parties.

Accordingly:

Prime

Minister

to

29 June 41

General Wavell

The King has been pleased to appoint Captain
Oliver Lyttelton, formerly President of the Board of
Trade, to be Minister of State in the War Cabinet, vice
Lord Beaverbrook, who becomes Minister of Supply.

Captain Lyttelton leaves by air on the thirtieth, and
should reach Cairo July 3, with a small nucleus secre-tariat. He will represent the War Cabinet in the Middle
East, and his prime duty will be to relieve the High
Command of all extraneous burdens, and to settle
promptly on the spot in accordance with the policy of H.

M.G. many questions affecting several departments or

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authorities which hitherto have required reference
home. This is largely in accordance with your telegram
of April 18, but goes a good deal further. The instructions I am giving to Captain Lyttelton follow in my next.

Please inform General Auchinleck when he arrives
and Sir Miles Lampson. Complete secrecy should be
observed about Captain Lyttelton’s journey and mission
till he has arrived.

All these new arrangements, with their consequential administerial reactions, fitted in with, and were appropriate to, the change in the command in the Middle East. I cannot better sum them up than by the telegram which I sent to President Roosevelt, who was now giving us most important material aid in this theatre.

Former Naval Person

4 July 41

to President Roosevelt

Following are considerations which weighed with us
in deciding upon change in command in the Middle
East. Wavell has a glorious record, having completely
destroyed the Italian Army and conquered the Italian
Empire in Africa. He has also borne up well against
German attacks and has conducted war and policy in
three or four directions simultaneously since the beginning of the struggle. I must regard him as our most
distinguished General.

Nevertheless,

though this

should not be stated publicly, we felt that, after the long
strain he had borne, he was tired, and a fresh eye and
an unstrained hand were needed in this most seriously
menaced theatre. Incomparably the best and most
distinguished officer to take his place was General
Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India. We feel
sure that Auchinleck will infuse a new energy and
precision into the defence of the Nile Valley, while
Wavell will make an admirable Commander-in-Chief in
India who will aid him in the whole of the great sphere
which India is now assuming, as our flank moves
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eastward. As Commander-in-Chief India Wavell will
have operations in Iraq under his control.

Wavell has accepted this decision gracefully, saying
that he thinks us wise to make the change and get new
ideas and action on the many problems in the Middle
East. The Viceroy has assured me that his shining
achievements will secure him a very warm welcome in
India from the Army and public opinion.

The present lull in the German offensive in the
Middle East has provided a convenient opportunity for
change-over. It coincides also with the appointment of
Oliver Lyttelton as Minister of State to represent the
War Cabinet in that theatre and relieve the Commanders-in-Chief of many non-operational functions which
have hitherto greatly increased their burdens, such as
relations with the Free French, relations with the
Emperor of Abyssinia, the administration of occupied
enemy territory, propaganda, and economic warfare.

The Minister of State will also exercise general supervision over the activities of the Intendant-General
(another innovation), including all matters locally
connected with supplies from the United States.

The Intendant-General (General Haining) will relieve
the Army Commander-in-Chief of detailed control of
rearward administrative services and supply arrangements.

All these changes will, I hope, result in a greatly
increased vigour and drive in our effort in the Middle
East, and ensure that the fullest use is made of the
formidable resources steadily accumulating there from
the United Kingdom, the overseas Empire, and the
United States. Harriman will doubtless be reporting
upon them. He is being asked to await Lyttelton’s
arrival in Cairo (now expected on July 5), so as to pool
all information and settle arrangements for the
reception of American supplies.

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20

The Soviet Nemesis

Soviet Miscalculations — The German Deployment in the East
—
A Prospect Too Good to be
True — Views of the Joint Intelligence Committee

— Warning of the Chiefs of Staff, May
31 —
A
Lightning Flash — My Personal Warning to Stalin,
April
3 —
A Vexatious Delay — Hitler Twice
Postpones “Barbarossa” — The Three Army
Groups — Attempts to Restrain Hitler and Ribbentrop — My Telegram to General Smuts of May
16

—
Stalin’s Illusions — The Tass Broadcast of
June
14 —
A Fateful Telegram from Ribbentrop,
June
21 —
War Declared, June
22 —
Schulenburg

— Hitler’s Policy of Ruthlessness — A Week End
at Chequers — President Roosevelt’s Assurance

— The German Attack — My Broadcast of June
22.

N
EMESIS personifies “the Goddess of Retribution, who brings down all immoderate good fortune, checks the presumption that attends it … and is the punisher of extraordinary crimes.”
1
We must now lay bare the error and vanity of cold-blooded calculation of the Soviet Government and enormous Communist machine, and their amazing ignorance about where they stood themselves.

They had shown a total indifference to the fate of the Western Powers, although this meant the destruction of that “Second Front” for which they were soon to clamour.